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Consti Report

This document discusses the police power of local governments in the Philippines. It summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding a resolution passed by the municipality of Makati to provide 500 peso burial assistance to low-income families. The Commission on Audit denied the resolution, finding no connection to public welfare. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding that while police power is broad, there must still be a clear connection to public purpose. Resolutions under police power must benefit the majority of inhabitants, not just individuals. The court affirmed that police power is inherent to sovereignty but must be delegated to local governments, and any inferred powers still require a clear delegation.

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Derick Balangay
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
47 views

Consti Report

This document discusses the police power of local governments in the Philippines. It summarizes a Supreme Court case regarding a resolution passed by the municipality of Makati to provide 500 peso burial assistance to low-income families. The Commission on Audit denied the resolution, finding no connection to public welfare. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, finding that while police power is broad, there must still be a clear connection to public purpose. Resolutions under police power must benefit the majority of inhabitants, not just individuals. The court affirmed that police power is inherent to sovereignty but must be delegated to local governments, and any inferred powers still require a clear delegation.

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Derick Balangay
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
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Republic of the Philippines Binay, were denied by respondent in its Decision No.

1159, in
SUPREME COURT the following manner:
Manila
Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following
EN BANC grounds, to wit:

G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991 1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council
of Makati and the intended disbursements fall within the twin
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF
principles of 'police power and parens patriae and
MAKATI, petitioners,
vs. 2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON Certification, dated June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the
AUDIT, respondents. amount of P400,000.00 to implement the Id resolution, and
the only function of COA on the matter is to allow the financial
Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner.
assistance in question.
Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for respondents.
The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state
that:

PARAS, J.: a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational


relation to the public safety, health, morals, or general welfare
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police
No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the power. The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute
Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under relates to the public health, safety, or welfare does not in itself
the general welfare clause. bring the statute within the police power of a state for there
must always be an obvious and real connection between the
The pertinent facts are:
actual provisions of a police regulations and its avowed
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its purpose, and the regulation adopted must be reasonably
Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which reads: adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16 Am.
Jur 2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied).
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING
BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between
THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE the objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s.
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare,
TO BE TAKEN OUT OF UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS etc. of the inhabitants of Makati.
EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A" p.
Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution
39)
No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, covered thereby should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the
are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial assistance to
does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The a bereaved family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of
beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other requirements, would P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be for
receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants
from the Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41) of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few
individuals as in the present case. On this point government
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. 50-51, Rollo)
fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the
implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo, Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the
Annex "C", p. 43). Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed Resolution
No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60 (Rollo, Annex "H", p.
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on 52).
Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its
preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by
No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for COA Decision No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was
the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44) constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying
that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo,
pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest
Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic
comfort and convenience of the people. and must be responsive to various social conditions.
(Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the
corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA
comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the
182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power,
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of
there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of
which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is
the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from
not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents
express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the
resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of
creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule,
a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the
fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no
proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and perceptible connection or relation between the objective
statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra,
construed as empowering them to do the things essential to and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the
the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power
of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are
by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general
those conferred in express terms, the inference of their
welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the
municipal corporation and the additional fact that the In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police
corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
governmental agencies, must have such measures of the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
power as are necessary to enable them to perform their could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only assuring the greatest benefits.
does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of
the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has
Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102). been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the
duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health,
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be
welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs,
authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every
as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
necessary and proper for governance such as to promote absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and
maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and COA's additional objection is based on its contention that
preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the
therein." expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ...
should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of
the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.
only a few individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
"G", p. 51).
MALCOLM, J.:
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as
purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be
by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards
met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet,
social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept
provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II,
in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular
Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5,
government, and if we give expression to the paramount
Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity
purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of
and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." (Comment, p.
such a government, were constituted. The primary question
12)
is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine
The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise Islands?
of police power in the promotion of the common good.
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for
classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be other departments of the government, the facts are these: The
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. confined to their houses in the district by the police.
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program
the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
government office for the use of the coastguard
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a
loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is
guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25,
more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such
the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life,
Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
should have more in law." This decision, however must not be
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the
taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were
dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
under the impression that they were being taken to a police
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they
this petition is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked
Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE. if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.
SO ORDERED. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers
by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment
of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29.


The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who
vs. had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. happenings to these women and the serious charges growing
out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of
essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed
generally, that some of the women married, others assumed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that
more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing
work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao
and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales
to Manila. answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of
the Supreme Court because the women had never been under
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time
his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of
the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the
Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number
laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not
of the deportees presented an application for habeas
have any of the women under his control and that therefore it
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the
was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after
application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to
due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a
include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to
second order, which related that the respondents had not
Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the
application will be considered as including them. The
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore
application set forth the salient facts, which need not be
directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought
repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained
before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and
of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by
written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first
certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before
instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the
the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents,
right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ
further stated that the question of whether the respondents
should not be granted because the petitioners were not
were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
proper parties, because the action should have been begun in
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao
and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a
women under their custody or control, and because their number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen,
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the
of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the
the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same
good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically
open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a presented before the Court the women who had returned to
member of the court, that these women had been sent out of the city through their own efforts and eight others who had
Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the
an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city and further endeavored to account for all of the persons
of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that
and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the the respondents, through their representatives and agents,
court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight
their liberty, on December 2, 1918. women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on
notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned
transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn
to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for
statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by
petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the
other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-
Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in
six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the
the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose
city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first
behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts,
Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the
were notified by the police and the secret service to appear
police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo,
before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when
Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila,
pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the
in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica
al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not
record. even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for
United States, who has often been said to exercise more
granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will
power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary
now proceed to do so.
prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore,
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere
hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police
then at night, without their consent and without any could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then
were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other
regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If
women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case these officials can take to themselves such power, then any
is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise
the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these the power, then all persons would have just as much right to
officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and
secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to under no law from one locality to another within the country,
refute and practically admitted by the respondents. then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any
citizen.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the
question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed
Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
persons from Manila to another distant locality within the disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find — outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we
pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we
conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard
provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The
of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme
authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our
may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New system of government, and every man who by accepting office
York and other States have statutes providing for the participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to
commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it
health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very
quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in
colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life,
search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to beginning that the primary question was whether the courts
another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law should permit a government of men or a government of laws
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being to be established in the Philippine Islands.
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person
to change his residence. What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official
oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials
aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas
with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be
never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal
situation as that now before us. Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law,
in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in
duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if
force in these Islands provides:
there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no
regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been
the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less
asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have
than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three
been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be
by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
who shall compel any person to change his domicile or But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge
less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.) Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.)
Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that
and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, women had any means by which to advance their plea before
that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the
can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown
be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the
if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned
to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ
confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of
indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of
therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the the superior court to consider the application and then to
matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits
of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and of the writ.
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more
freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel,
by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no
individual at liberty. restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and
the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable
have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is
instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ
parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a of habeas corpus.
assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not
restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose
police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees.
The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and
that city, who handed them over to other parties, who since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the
freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this
belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of
court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid
going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty
before us. . . .
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the
truly waived his right. eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended
upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could
defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality
declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna
in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection
was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no
of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole
jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true
instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
important that it be determined without delay, that the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the
legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt
order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to
whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are
custody of a person before the application for the writ is no confined to the case of imprisonment within the
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to
chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue
officials must necessarily have the same means to return them and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not
from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of rights which existed. . . .
her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow
the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of
lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served
great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach
the former except through the latter. The officer or person
It must be that some such question has heretofore been who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the
presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the
it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ
reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the
courts are however very persuasive in nature. means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are
fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of
relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only
Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas
auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is,
corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within
therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is
the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor
within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he
child under guardianship in the State, who has been and
can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of
continues to be detained in another State. The membership of
affording redress is not increased by the confinement being
the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was
beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may
composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and
affect it. The important question is, where the power of
Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was
control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the
equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C.
matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the
most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as
whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57
issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to
Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.) due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be
released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of
The English courts have given careful consideration to the
the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland.
subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the
Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term.
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the
(United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas.
Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother
No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624;
and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child.
Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to
produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one
the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a
by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He
There remains to be considered whether the respondent
was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through
complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding
Lord Esher, M. R., said:
the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not,
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as
on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have purged.
the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton
Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ,
Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the
together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That
persons named in the writ before the court on December 2,
is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be
1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The
obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the
respondents were thus given ample time, practically one
nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason
month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses,
of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child
the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer
November before sending a telegram to the provincial
power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney
the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the
for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there
child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not
were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila,
obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have
but who should not be permitted to do so because of having
been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to
contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in
some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what
none of the parties in question being brought before the court
was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt.
on the day named.
But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of
the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three
in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the
in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
[1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.) before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest.
right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They
A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before
did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the
the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored
writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return
performance; and they did not present writings that waived
to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes
the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few
as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they
stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women
were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the
were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have
service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then
since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the
beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence
return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number
tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because
of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to
he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus.
Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of
The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and
Davao, and that about this number either returned at their
that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being
own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that
respondents.
he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
would have been warranted summarily in finding the inherent power in order to retain that respect without which
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless
to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non- when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to
authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An
must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a
"We thought that, having brought about that state of things by contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns
his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial
back; that he must do much more than write letters for the
regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the
purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
respondents, with the possible exception of the first named,
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that
has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its
mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would
authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and
only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of
Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while,
excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every
under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them
possible effort to produce the women was made by the
entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance.
respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take
The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the
drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to
case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to
officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the
have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith
representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of
and to mitigate their wrong.
any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners,
appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a which brings him into this undesirable position, must be
better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record
were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the
in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the
expected, and while a critical reading of the record might Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of
come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the
it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the
our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was
an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of
separate habeas corpus proceedings.
the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much
connection remains to be done. as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos,
and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt
members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would
of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez,
comply substantially with the second order of the court, he
and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of
Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of
the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two
Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto
extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of
Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.
respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court
The power to punish for contempt of court should be tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only
as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once those women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said
command such respect without being unduly women to return to their former residences in this city or in
oppressive — such an amount is P100. the provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to
Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to bring back the
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ
women who are still in Davao so that they may return to the
of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
places in which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be
certain houses in Gardenia Street.
in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt
of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos orders of this court, we do not find any apparent disobedience
(P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the
from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account
Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed the difficulties encountered in bringing the said women who
against respondents. So ordered. were free at Davao and presenting them before this court
within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not
said women were living together in a given place. It was not
be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve
because they were really detained, but because on the first
to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws
days there were no houses in which they could live with a
and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
relative independent from one another, and as a proof that
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur. they were free a number of them returned to Manila and the
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result. others succeeded in living separate from their companions
who continued living together.

To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good


purpose and legal object and whether he has acted in good or
Separate Opinions bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community of
prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is
TORRES, J., dissenting:
necessary to consider not only the rights and interests of the
The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the said women and especially of the patrons who have been
majority in the decision of the habeas corpusproceeding directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and
against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city. shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also
the rights and interests of the very numerous people of Manila
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some
impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great number of women of days reside, the inhabitants thereof being more than three
various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference
Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many
residence. unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which If the material and moral interests of the community as well as
clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of prostitution, the demands of social morality are to be taken into account, it
as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason, is not possible to sustain that it is legal and permissible to
when more than one hundred and fifty women were establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of
assembled and placed aboard a steamer and transported to an enlightened population, for, although there were no
Davao, considering that the existence of the said houses of positive laws prohibiting the existence of such houses within a
prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates
undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the
manner shown, acted without authority of any legal provision public administration, acting correctly, in exercising the
which constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a
liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city of house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public, and of
Manila. obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house
We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the
displayed by the police in complying with the order of the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty,
mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of his individual rights, and his right to property.
taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a
governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to known contagious disease cannot invoke in his favor the
suppress the segregated district or the community formed by constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual
rights, should the administrative authority order his For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when
hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain island the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they assumed,
or distant point in order to free from contagious the great were obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen
majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the
not have such diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good conservation of public health and social morality, the latter
with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to could take the step he had taken, availing himself of the
prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose
first persons named have contracted their diseases without of protecting the immense majority of the population from the
their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the social evils and diseases which the houses of prostitution
unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which
living and spontaneously accepted all its consequences, houses have been constituting for years a true center for the
knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of propagation of general diseases and other evils derived
all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and
which they are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the
multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did
disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which
men and women, is still prejudicial to the human species in the guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every
same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not absolutely
leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious diseases which enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they
produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free practice of
humanity. their shameful profession.

If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have
works suitable to her sex, which can give her sufficient been adopted by the administrative authorities similar
remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes,
the will of another woman who is usually older than she is and considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true
who is the manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or that in the execution of such measures more humane and less
spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma, have
is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own knowledge been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view
renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the the ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the
Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join the community, that is, putting an end to the living together in a
society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing
respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for her to live their domicile, with the problematical hope that they adopt
within the community or society with the same liberty and another manner of living which is better and more useful to
rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable themselves and to society.
conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised within
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we
that class which is always subject to the police and sanitary
hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to take back
regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency
and restore the said women who are at present found in
and morality and to the conservation of public health, and for
Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective
this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate
residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District, with the
women dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and
exception of the prostitutes who should expressly make
resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against Davao, which manifestation must be made under oath. This
the said poor women, but those who have been worrying so resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within the
much about the prejudice resulting from a governmental shortest time possible for its due compliance. The costs shall
measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be be charged de officio.
considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with due
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in general
and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority
the authorities which administer and govern it; they have in the decision rendered in these proceedings, with respect to
forgotten that many of those who criticize and censure the the finding as to the importance of the contempt committed,
mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
care of their children. city of Manila, and the consequent imposition upon him of a
nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said: respondents to produce before the court, on January 13, 1919,
the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton
that it was impossible to comply with the said order on the
Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the
two grounds previously mentioned. With respect to this
persons named in the writ before the court on December 2,
second order, the same decision has the following to say:
1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The
respondents were thus given ample time, practically one In response to the second order of the court, the respondents
month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record disclosed, appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a
the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards
November before sending a telegram to the provincial were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined
governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and
were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be
but who should not be permitted to do so because of having expected, and while a critical reading of the record might
contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we
none of the parties in question being brought before the court come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with
on the day named. it.

In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as I do not agree to this conclusion.
said in the same decision, the respondents, for the purpose of
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let
complying with the order of the court, could have, (1)
17 days elapse from the date of the issuance of the first order
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command
on November 4th till the 21st of the same month before taking
of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness
the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said
or infirmity the said women could not safely be brought before
order; he waited till the 21st of November, as the decision
this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties
says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial governor o f
in question or their lawyers waived their right to be present.
Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified
According to the same decision, the said respondents ". . . did
in the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared
not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the
before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was
writ was granted; did not show impossibility of performance;
not complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance
and did not present writings, that waived the right to be
there was the circumstances that seven of the said women
present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped
having returned to Manila at their own expense before the
affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented
said second day of December and being in the antechamber of
with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
the court room, which fact was known to Chief of Police
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the
attorney for the respondents, were not produced before the
women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila
court by the respondents nor did the latter show any effort to
is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were
present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was
easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about
called to this particular by the undersigned.
this number either returned at their own expense or were
produced at the second hearing by the respondents." The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same
decision, that the respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the
for the protection of the women before this court, presented
time the return to its first order was made, would have been
technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had
warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of
returned to the city at their own expense and the other eight
contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they
(8) women whom the respondents themselves brought to
obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non production of the
Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates
persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this, the
succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent;
majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo,
that in Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when
Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the
asked if they desired to return to Manila with free
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the
women was made by the respondents."
affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that,
When the said return by the respondents was made to this through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already
court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion was that returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to
Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts of
contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred
decision was issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said,
have been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of failed to give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has
Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will, created and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in
only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because
before this court by the respondents in compliance with the of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the said
said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same
Manila through other means not furnished by the required.
respondents, twenty-six of whom were brought by the
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the
attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from
authority, justice, or dignity of the court; and he is guilty of
Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket the
contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this city
disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
at their own expense before January 13 we have a total of
sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order
falsity of the allegation by the respondents in their first answer of the court constitutes contempt, unless the defendant is
at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 502.)
for their inability to present any of the said women that the
latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did not It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment
desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that the of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the service
respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the service of
Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that refers to process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any
the compliance with the orders issued by this court, could means, the result is the same as though he had obstructed by
bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the some direct means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
case, as well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the
compliance with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74)
courts often do, of enforcing respect for the law and for the
women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or
means it has provided in civilized communities for establishing
at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority decision,
justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is
inasmuch as the said respondent could count upon the aid of
apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in
the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had
the courts and obedience to their orders and just measures is
transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said
so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be
respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before
difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing
this court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my judgment,
without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where due
with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion
respect for the courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a
that the said respondent has substantially complied with the
necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so
second order of this court, but on the other hand
much to excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to
demonstrates that he had not complied with the mandate of
remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the
this court in its first and second orders; that neither of the said
administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)
orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is, according to the The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself,
majority decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to and has been exercised from the earliest times. In England it
which conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent has been exerted when the contempt consisted of scandalizing
with respect to the second order confirms the contempt the sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the
committed by non-compliance with the first order and courts. In the American states the power to punish for
constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with contempt, so far as the executive department and the
the second, because of the production of only eight (8) of the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as
one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been the legislative department is concerned, is obsolete, but it has
illegally detained by virtue of his order and transported to been almost universally preserved so far as regards the judicial
Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26) department. The power which the courts have of vindicating
women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of
opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case which justice, whether of record or not; and the authority for issuing
deals with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented by the attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it has
petitioners and involving the question whether they should or been declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage as
not be granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case
attention to the same nor has he made any effort to comply Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the
said two orders; has despised the authority of this court; has The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which
have been disobeyed; the loss of the prestige of the authority
of the court which issued the said orders, which loss might
have been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on
the part of the respondent Justo Lukban; the damages which
might have been suffered by some of the women illegally
detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought to
Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court
and of the further fact that some of them were obliged to
come to this city at their own expense while still others were
brought to Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who
paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said
women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in the
resolution of the petition interposed by the said petitioners
and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not
opportunately and duly obeyed and complied with, are
circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing
upon the respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding
to the contempt committed by him, a penalty which, according
to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of
a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding
months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition
of the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration
the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by
a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first
executive authority of the city, and consequently, the person
obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and
respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly
constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating
from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said
courts in order that justice may be administered with
promptness and rectitude.

I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred


pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the respondent
Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the
costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be
my duty to state here that the records of this proceeding
should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order that,
after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony
which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of
the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the
provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present the
corresponding informations for the prosecution and
punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the
occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried
into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and
Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes
committed by reason of the same detention and while the
women were in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby
the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be
realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should
exist a government of laws and not a government of men and
that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty
from illegal encroachments.

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