Judicial Construction

Basis, Extent, and Limitations

Article VIII

Section 1

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Section 4

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules
of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Endencia v David

Facts:

Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo, judicial officers Defendant Saturnino David, Collector
of Internal Revenue.
Republic Act No. 590 is enacted, stating that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
considered a diminution of compensation fixed by the Constitution. Plaintiffs contended that
income tax on their salaries amounted to a diminution of compensation, prohibited by the
Constitution.

Issue:

1. Legislative Authority: Can the Legislature declare that such tax collection is not a salary
decrease after the Supreme Court's contrary ruling?

Ruling:

1. Legislative Overreach: The Court ruled that the Legislature cannot declare the tax
collection as non-diminutive after a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary.

The Court stated that the legislature cannot interpret the Constitution or any part thereof,
especially after the courts have already interpreted and applied it in a decision. The Court
emphasized that defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function, and the Legislature
cannot restrict or limit this power.

Marcos vs Manglapus

Facts:

The case arose when President Corazon Aquino's government barred the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines due to national security concerns. The
Supreme Court dismissed the petition on September 15, 1989, ruling that the President did not
act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion. Following Marcos' death on September 28,
1989, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 2, 1989, arguing that barring
their return violated their constitutional rights.

Issue:

Does the President have the power to bar a Filipino citizen from returning to their own country,
and if so, was this power exercised arbitrarily?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners. It
maintained its earlier decision to bar the return of the Marcos family and the remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos to the Philippines.
The President has unstated residual powers implied from the grant of executive power,
necessary to fulfill her constitutional duties, including protecting national interest and welfare.
These powers are not limited to those expressly enumerated in the Constitution.

President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the Marcoses was deemed compliant with her
duty to protect the people and not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council)

Facts:

Six consolidated petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (Human
Security Act of 2007). The petitioners argued that the law was unconstitutional due to vagueness
and overbreadth.

Issue:

Does the Human Security Act of 2007 violate constitutional rights, particularly those related to
free speech and due process?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions on procedural grounds. The Court found that the
petitioners lacked legal standing and failed to present an actual case or controversy.

Judicial Review Requirements:

(a) An actual case or controversy
(b) Legal standing (locus standi)
(c) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity
(d) The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

Facts:

In the consolidated cases of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the petitioners challenged the

constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O.
No. 5). They also contended that the President overstepped her authority by issuing decrees and
taking over private businesses without congressional approval.

PP 1017, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on February 24, 2006, declared a state of
national emergency due to a perceived conspiracy to overthrow the government. G.O. No. 5
directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to
suppress lawless violence and acts of terrorism.

Issue:

1. Whether the petitioners had legal standing to challenge PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Ruling:

The Court recognized the petitioners' right to question the issuances.

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct
injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance.

Article 7 Civil Code

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary

Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission

Facts:

Petitioner Maynard R. Peralta was appointed as Trade-Specialist II in the Department of Trade

and Industry (DTI) on September 25, 1989, with a "Reinstatement/Permanent" classification.
DTI deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his absences on September 29, 1989,
and October 20, 1989, including the intervening Saturdays and Sundays, as he had no
accumulated leave credits.

The CSC policy stated that when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, such days shall also be without pay. The
CSC upheld the deductions in Resolution No. 90-497.

Issue:

Is the Civil Service Commission's policy mandating salary deductions for employees without
leave credits who are absent on the immediately preceding working day valid?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court declared the CSC policy mandating salary deductions for intervening
non-working days invalid. The Court ordered the CSC to take appropriate action to ensure that
Peralta is paid the amounts previously deducted from his salary.

The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal
contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. San Roque Power Corp.

Facts:

Consolidated Cases: The Supreme Court addressed issues related to claims for tax refunds or
credits of unutilized input VAT in the cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque
Power Corporation (G.R. No. 187485), Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 196113), and Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (G.R. No. 197156).

San Roque Power Corporation: Filed an administrative claim for a refund of P560,200,283.14
for the taxable year 2001 on March 28, 2003, and a judicial claim with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) on April 10, 2003. The CTA Second Division initially denied the claim but later partially
granted it, ordering a refund of P483,797,599.65. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
contested this decision, arguing that the judicial claim was prematurely filed.

Issue:

1. Was San Roque Power Corporation's judicial claim for a tax refund prematurely filed?

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court granted the petition of the CIR in G.R. No. 187485, denying San
Roque Power Corporation's claim for a tax refund of P483,797,599.65.

Ratio:

Mandatory Compliance: The Supreme Court held that compliance with the 120-day period for
the Commissioner to act on an administrative claim for a tax refund or credit is mandatory and
jurisdictional.

San Roque as failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period renders its petition for
review with the CTA void. Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, acts executed against provisions
of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.a San Roque void petition for review cannot be legitimized by the CTA or this Court
because Article 5 of the Civil Code states that such void petition cannot be legitimized except
when the law itself authorizes [its] validity.a There is no law authorizing the petition as validity.

Araullo vs. Aquino III

The case involves the challenge to the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP) in the Philippines.

The DAP aimed to accelerate government spending to stimulate economic growth. Petitioners
argued that aspects of the DAP, such as the withdrawal of unobligated allotments and
cross-border transfers of savings, violated the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Supreme Court
initially ruled on July 1, 2014, that specific acts under the DAP were unconstitutional.

Issue:

1. Does the doctrine of operative fact apply to the DAP and its implementors?

Ruling:

1. The doctrine of operative fact applies to the DAP-funded projects that can no longer be
undone but does not apply to the authors, proponents, and implementors of the DAP
unless there are concrete findings of good faith by the proper tribunals.

The doctrine of operative fact was applied to protect the validity of completed projects and
programs funded by the DAP, recognizing the potential inequity and injustice of nullifying these
projects. This doctrine did not extend to the officials responsible for the DAP, who could still be
held accountable in proper tribunals.

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded.