Security Part 1: Auditing Operating Systems and Networks
Security Part 1: Auditing Operating Systems and Networks
Keystroke Monitoring
Keystroke monitoring involves recording both the user’s keystrokes and the
system’s responses. This form of log may be used after the fact to reconstruct the
details of an event or as a real-time control to prevent unauthorized intrusion.
Keystroke monitoring is the computer equivalent of a telephone wiretap.
Whereas some situations may justify this level of surveillance, keystroke monitoring
may also be regarded as a violation of privacy. Before implementing this type of
control, management and auditors should consider the possible legal, ethical, and
behavioral implications.
Event Monitoring
Event monitoring summarizes key activities related to system resources. Event
logs typically record the IDs of all users accessing the system; the time and duration
of a user’s session; programs that were executed during a session; and the files,
databases, printers, and other resources accessed.
Setting Audit Trail Objectives
Audit trails can be used to support security objectives in three ways: (1) detecting unauthorized access to the
system, (2) facilitating the reconstruction of events, and (3) promoting personal accountability.
Detecting Unauthorized Access.
Detecting unauthorized access can occur in real time or after the fact. The primary objective of real-time
detection is to protect the system from outsiders attempting to breach system controls. A real-time audit trail
can also be used to report changes in system performance that may indicate infestation by a virus or worm.
Reconstructing Events.
Audit trail analysis can be used to reconstruct the steps that led to events such as system failures, or security
violations by individuals. Knowledge of the conditions that existed at the time of a system failure can be used
to assign responsibility and to avoid similar situations in the future.
Personal Accountability.
Audit trails can be used to monitor user activity at the lowest level of detail. This capability is a preventive
control that can influence behavior. A system audit log can also serve as a detective control to assign personal
accountability for actions taken such as abuse of authority. For example, consider an accounts receivable clerk
with authority to access customer records. The audit log may disclose that the clerk has been printing an
inordinate number of records, which may indicate that the clerk is selling customer information in violation of
the company’s privacy policy.
4. Implementing a System Audit Trail
- The information contained in audit logs is useful to accountants in measuring the potential
damage and financial loss associated with application errors, abuse of authority, or unauthorized
access by outside intruders. Audit logs, however, can generate data in overwhelming detail.
Important information can easily get lost among the superfluous details of daily operation. Thus,
poorly designed logs can actually be dysfunctional.
- Protecting exposures with the potential for material financial loss should drive management’s
decision as to which users, applications, or operations to monitor, and how much detail to log. As
with all controls, the benefits of audit logs must be balanced against the costs of implementing them.
The paradox of networking is that networks exist to provide user access to shared resources,
yet the most important objective of any network is to control such access. Organization
management constantly seeks balance between increased access and the associated business
risks.
Intranet Risks
Intranets consist of small LANs and large WANs that may contain thousands of individual
nodes. Intranets are used to connect employees within a single building, between buildings
on the same physical campus, and between geographically dispersed locations. Typical
intranet activities include e-mail routing, transaction processing between business units,
and linking to the outside Internet.
Unauthorized and illegal employee activities internally spawn intranet threats. Their
motives for doing harm may be vengeance against the company, the challenge of breaking
into unauthorized files, or to profit from selling trade secrets or embezzling assets.
The threat from employees (both current and former) is significant because of their intimate
knowledge of system controls and/or the lack of controls. Discharged employees, or those
who leave under contentious circumstance, raise particular concerns. Trade secrets,
operations data, accounting data, and confidential information to which the employee has
access are at greatest risk.
Interception of Network Messages
The individual nodes on most intranets are connected to a shared channel across which
travel user IDs, passwords, confidential e-mails, and financial data files. The unauthorized interception
of this information by a node on the network is called sniffing. The exposure is even greater when the
intranet is connected to the Internet. Network administrators routinely use commercially available
sniffer software to analyze network traffic and to detect bottlenecks. Sniffer software, however, can also
be downloaded from the Internet. In the hands of a computer criminal, sniffer software can be used to
intercept and view data sent across a shared intranet channel.
Access to Corporate Databases
Intranets connected to central corporate databases increase the risk that an employee will view,
corrupt, change, or copy data. Social Security numbers, customer listings, credit card information,
recipes, formulas, and design specifications may be downloaded and sold. Outsiders have bribed
employees, who have access privileges to financial accounts, to electronically write off an account
receivable or erase an outstanding tax bill.
Privileged Employees
We know from Chapter 1 that an organization’s internal controls are typically aimed at lower-level
employees. According to the CSI study, however, middle managers, who often possess access privileges
that allow them to override controls, are most often
prosecuted for insider crimes. Information systems employees within the organization are another
group empowered with override privileges that may permit access to mission-critical data
Reluctance to Prosecute.
Call-Back Devices
• Requires the dial-in user to enter a password and be identified.
Audit Objectives Relating to Subversive Threats
• Verify the security and integrity of financial transactions by
determining that network controls:
1. Can prevent and detect illegal access both internally and from the
Internet
2. Will render useless any data that a perpetrator successfully
captures
3. Are sufficient to preserve the integrity and physical security of data
connected to the network.
Audit Procedures Relating to Subversive Threats
1. Review the adequacy of the firewall in achieving the proper
balance between control and convenience
▫ Criteria for assessing firewall effectiveness
a. Flexibility
b. Proxy services
c. Filtering
d. Segregation of systems
e. Audit tools
f. Probe for weaknesses
Audit Procedures Relating to Subversive Threats
2. Verify that an intrusion prevention system with deep packet
inspection is in place for organizations that are vulnerable
3. Review security procedures governing the administration of data
encryption keys
4. Verify the encryption process by transmitting a test message and
examining the contents at various points along the channel
5. Review the message transaction logs to verify that all messages
were received in their proper sequence
6. Test the operation of the call-back feature by placing an
unauthorized call from outside the installation
Controlling Risks from Equipment Failure
• Line Errors
• Two techniques used to detect and correct errors:
a. Echo Check
b. Parity Check
Audit Objectives Relating to Equipment Failure
• To verify the integrity of the electronic commerce transactions by
determining that controls are in place to detect and correct
message loss due to equipment failure