0% found this document useful (0 votes)
11 views

PSYC 3000 Reflection 3

The document discusses the need for psychology to develop a theory of personhood. It reviews how the biopsychosocial model is not adequate and explores two theories of personhood proposed by Martin and Sugarman. Their developmental theory of personhood attempts to address issues with prior approaches and provide a framework for psychological research involving the self.

Uploaded by

delmonacomari
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
11 views

PSYC 3000 Reflection 3

The document discusses the need for psychology to develop a theory of personhood. It reviews how the biopsychosocial model is not adequate and explores two theories of personhood proposed by Martin and Sugarman. Their developmental theory of personhood attempts to address issues with prior approaches and provide a framework for psychological research involving the self.

Uploaded by

delmonacomari
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 4

Reflection 10- Reconsidering the Person in Psychology

Psychology claims itself to be a discipline which studies the mind, behaviour, and people.

Despite this, mainstream psychology is yet to create uniform theory surrounding essential

psychological concepts like the self and personhood. Initially, I thought Engel’s biopsychosocial

method was psychology’s mainstream theory for personhood. However, Dr. O’Doherty corrected

this misconception. The biopsychosocial method an atheoretical model, not a theory. So, how can

psychological academia create a cohesive, empirically applicable theory for personhood? The

following guiding questions will aid in understanding my final reflection:

1) Why is understanding personhood integral to the discipline of psychology?

2) Why is the biopsychosocial method an inadequate explanation for human personhood?

3) How should psychological academia approach creating an empirically applicable theory

of personhood?

Psychology is notably desperate to be recognized as a “hard” science. In my second

reflection, I noted “hard” sciences like chemistry or physics properly label terminology to control

their variables. Psychology has always struggled with defining inherently philosophical

terminology which is difficult to empirically investigate. This week, psychologists Martin &

Sugarman claimed the terms “personhood” and “personal agency” are not commonly employed

in mainstream psychology. Despite this, previous and current psychological literature uses the

term “self” loosely to help explore thousands of research topics and theses. Psychology’s

looseness in self-definition is scientifically inadequate. Without consistent ontological status of

the “self” or personhood, how may psychology investigate self-concept, self-esteem, or self-

regulation? Therefore, self-definition is necessary for self-reflective research.


Initially, I thought the biopsychosocial method was psychology’s mainstream theory for

understanding personhood. Originally proposed by psychiatrist George Engle in 1977, the

biopsychosocial method posits mental health conditions are not solely influenced by genetics.

Instead, mental health conditions are biologically, psychologically, and socially influenced in a

trifecta-like fashion, hence the name biopsychosocial method. In my first university-level

psychology course, my professor hammered the biopsychosocial method into all her students. I

memorized it perfectly and believed Engle’s ideals adequately explained personhood.

However, the biopsychosocial method is imperfect; it can be critiqued in two senses. Firstly,

the biopsychosocial method explains human pathology, not personhood. Considering one’s

genetics, personal psyche, and individual life experience, the biopsychosocial method seems like

it adequately defines self-conceptualization. However, the method was initially created by Engle

to teach psychiatrists psychological and sociological influences of mental health or illness.

Secondly, the biopsychosocial method is not considered a theory in psychological academia, so it

cannot adequately theorize personhood. Instead, the biopsychosocial method is regarded as a

“status quo” which helps psychologists remember what influences mental pathology. The

biopsychosocial method cannot expand to aid in researching self-concept, self-esteem, or self-

regulation. It seems psychology has an ‘identity crisis’; the field cannot define personhood. If

possible, how can academics empirically theorize the self?

Martin & Sugarman’s 2003 essay “A Theory of Personhood for Psychology” helped fix this

problem in contemporary psychological research by developing two personhood theories:

“ontologically prior” theory and “socioculturally contingent” theory. The ontologically prior

personhood theory builds on philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The theory posits socialization does

not impact one’s personality or beliefs. Ontological self-concept is stable or unwaveringly fixed
at human nature’s origin. Alternatively, the socioculurally contingent theory for personhood

builds on Marxist and neoliberal ideologies. This contrasting personhood theory posits self-

reality is constructed by sociocultural influence and human relationships. By defining two

literature-based theories for personhood, Martin and Sugarman progress psychological academia

in the right direction. In ways never done previously, these psychologists created theories for

personhood which can be applied to psychological research in varying disciplinarily branches.

Upon first impression, the ontologically prior and socioculturally contingent personhood

theories seem problematic since they directly contrast each other. However, Martin &

Sugarman’s developmental theory for personhood combine ontological and sociocultural

foundations from their previous theories to understand the multifaceted person with agency.

Ontological theory seems quite deterministic in that personhood lacks free will; it is as essential

and biologically unchanging. Contrarily, sociocultural theory appears libertarian in that

personhood involves free will and agency. The self is psychologically influenced by self-action

and the society they aid in shaping. By combining ontological and sociocultural perspectives,

Martin & Sugarman’s developmental theory for personhood offers a compatibilist view of self-

agency which accounts for biological, psychological, and sociological aspects of personhood.

Despite me critiquing the biopsychosocial model earlier, Engel positively popularized the

idea that biology does not solely contribute to psychological pathology. Viewing Martin &

Sugarman’s developmental theory for personhood, it becomes evident that the biopsychosocial

model influenced them. Martin & Sugarman believe humans are given ontologically biological

capabilities. Then, as humans grow, they are socioculturally influenced through experience,

affecting their psychological development. Inspired by the biopsychosocial model, Martin &

Sugarman synthesized grounded personhood theory from an unempirical pathology tip.


Applying the developmental theory of personhood to all future research regarding self-

psychology could make psychology a “harder” science. Properly applying developmental theory

universally could help label terminology and research variables more effectively, like other

“hard” sciences. However, the developmental personhood theory has limitations. For example,

Martin & Sugarman admit to not knowing the possible social, political, or ethical ramifications

involved in globally assigning one uniform theory for personhood.

Psychology prides itself in researching humans, but the discipline tends to forget humans are

people, too. Asking the question “what is ‘the self’” is difficult. However, it is a question the

field must attempt to answer if they ever hope to understand, not just pathologize, people.

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy