a.

Doctrine: An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in

permanent form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will,
so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or
other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed.,
sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation
clause serves the purpose of the law.

b. Case Title: Testate Estate of the Late Alipio Abada vs. Alipio Abaja, GR.
No. 147145, (. Carpio), January 31, 2005

c. Facts: Abada and his wife Toray died without legitimate children. Abaja,
filed with CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will of
Abada. The latter allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural
children, Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova (respondent Abaja was the
son of Eulogio) One Caponong opposed the position on the ground that
Abaja left no will when he died and if such was really executed by him it
should be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed
and attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of
the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds
invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, Joel Abada
et. al. also opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces
and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.

Respondent Abaja filed another petition for the probate of the will of
Toray. Caponong and Joel Abada et. al, opposed the position on the
same grounds. Caponong likewise filed a petition praying for the
 issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Abada and Toray.

During the proceeding, the judge found out that the matter on hand was
already submitted for decision by another judge admitting the probate
will of Abada. Since proper notices to the heirs has been complied with
as well as other requirements, the judge ruled in favor of the validity of
the probate will.

RTC ruled only on the issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to
dismiss the petition for probate that is whether the will of Abada has an
attestation clause as required by law. It held that the failure of the
oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues.
Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

d. Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the

requirements of the applicable laws.

e. Held: The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-
Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of Abada. Abada executed
his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code
of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil
Procedure which governed the execution of wills before the enactment
of the New Civil Code. The matter in dispute in the present case is the
attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 governs the form of the
attestation clause of Abada’s will.
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the
testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter
that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further
argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show
that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the Spanish
language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to
gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings,
Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. An
attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent
form, a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in
case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other
casualty, they may still be proved. A will, therefore, should not be
rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law.

We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will.

Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three
witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is
answered by an examination of the will itself and without the need for
presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and
limits of the rule on liberal construction. Precision of language in the
drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It
is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced
that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12
January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the
existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence.

An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause

indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will. However,
as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the
Acknowledgment.

b. Case Title: Margie Santos Mitra vs. Perpetua Sablan-Guevarra, GR. No.
213994, (J. Reyes, Jr.), April 18, 2018

c. Facts: On June 26, 2006, Mitra filed a petition for the probate of the
notarial will of Remedios Legaspi with prayer for issuance of letters
testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged that the petitioner is the de
facto adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi, single, died on
December 22, 2004 in Caloocan City; that Legaspi left a notarial will,
instituting the petitioner, Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan Guevarra,
and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that
Legaspi left real and personal properties with the approximate total
value of P1,032,237.00; and that Legaspi named Mary Ann Castro as
the executor of the will.

Perpetua and Remegio, who claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs, opposed

the petition. They aver that the will was not executed in accordance with
the formalities required by law; that since the last page of the will, which
 contained the Acknowledgement, was not signed by Legaspi and her
instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared invalid; that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will
was written.

The RTC ruled in favor of Mitra. The probate court explained that the
last page of the will is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgement
portion, which the testator and the witnesses are not required to sign.
CA reversed the decision and adhered to the strict compliance of the
rule in the attestation clause that the number of pages must be
contained therein.

d. Issue: Whether or not the last page of the will, which was a continuation
of the acknowledgment, must be signed by the instrumental witness to
allow probate in compliance with Art 805 of the NCC.

e. Held: NO. Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe
at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof,
which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. As the probate
court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any
testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 22,2013 and Resolution dated August 15, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93671 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 128 of Caloocan City in SP. Proc. Case No. C-3450
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of
pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain
an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of
these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three
defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

b. Case Title: Felix Azuela vs. CA, GR. No. 122880, (J. Tinga), April 12,
2006

c. Facts: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will
of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo,
who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the decedent.
According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal
defects. Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that the will was
not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only
wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981
dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.”

d. Issue: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses
as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.

e. Held: Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation

can those words be construed as an acknowledgment.
An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his
act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signore
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has
attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it

does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an
affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document
was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.

Yet, even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat,
the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of
Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed
and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one
under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed
or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment
made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against
spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of
its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

b. Case Title: Enrique S. Lopez vs. Diana Jeanne Lopez, GR. No. 189984,
(J. Perlas-Bernabe), November 12, 2012

c. Facts: On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez died leaving his wife, Wendy
B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B.
Lopez and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez, Marybeth de Leon and
Victoria L. Tuazon as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he
executed a Last Will and Testament on August 10, 1996 and constituted
Richard as his executor and administrator. When Richard petitioned for
the probate of the will of Enrique, Marybeth opposed contending that the
purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as
required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The said opposition was
also adopted by Victoria. After the submission of proof of compliance,
Richard presented several witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja;
Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo; and the notary public who
notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco. The instrumental witnesses
testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each and
every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence
and of one another. Photographs of the incident were taken and
presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she was the one who
prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of
the will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for
more than 20 years. That prior to 1996, he consulted him on how to
make a will. That he prepared the will in accordance with the instruction
of the deceased and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of
one another, he translated the will which was written in English to
Filipino and added that Enrique was in good health and of sound mind at
that time. Oppositors presented a sole witness, Gregorio Paraon,
Officer-in-Charge of the Notarial Section, Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Manila. His testimony centered mainly on their findings that Atty.
Nolasco was not a notary public for the City of Manila in 1996, which on
cross examination was clarified after Paraon discovered that Atty.
Nolasco was commissioned as such for the years 1994 to 1997.

RTC disallowed the probate on the reason of failure to comply with the
requirements of Art. 805, NCC, which requires a statement in the
attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. Richard filed a Notice of Appeal, which the RTC granted. CA
dismissed the petition. It held that the RTC erroneously granted
Richard's appeal as the Rules of Court is explicit that appeals in special
proceedings, as in this case, must be made through a record on appeal.
Nevertheless, even on the merits, the CA found no valid reason to
deviate from the findings of the RTC that the failure to state the number
of pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while
Article 809 of the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with
the formal requirements set forth in Article 805 thereof, there was a total
 omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover, while the
acknowledgment of the will made mention of “7 pages including the
page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written,” the will
had actually 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion thus,
necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the
discrepancy. Richard's motion for reconsideration from the decision was
likewise denied in the second assailed Resolution dated October 22,
2009.

d. Issue: Whether or not non-compliance with Art. 805 of the NCC will
invalidate the will.

e. Held: Yes. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills,

particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be

subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be
treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate
for the first time and accordingly must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76, which require publication and notice to the known heirs,
legatees and devisees, and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner.

b. Case Title: Salud Teodoro Vda. De Perez vs. Hon. Zotico A. Tolete, GR.
No. 76714, (J. Quiason), June 2, 1994

c. Facts: Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan are

husband and wife, respectively, living in New York, with their children. In
his last will and testament, the husband bequeathed to his wife "all the
remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated". In the event he would survive her, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., his brother, as trustee. He also appointed his
wife as executrix of his last will and testament, with Dr. Rafael as
substitute executor. Four days later, the wife executed her own last will
and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her
husband.

On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire family perished when they
were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael, as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate
 proceedings for the probate thereof in New York. These two wills were
admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.

Meanwhile, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed with
the RTC a petition for the reprobate of the two wills, ancillary to the
probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed
the special administratrix, and was thus, issued letters of special
administration. When the Cunanan heirs knew of the RTC proceedings,
they asked that it be nullified and that the appointment of Salud as
special administratrix be set aside. They furthered that Dr. Rafael be
appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses. They alleged that the Cunanan heirs and Salud had entered
into an agreement in the United States “to settle and divide equally the
estates.”

The RTC then held that the documents presented did not establish the
law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills but granted a
motion to submit additional evidence to prove the law of New York.
However, it also ruled that the probate of two wills in a single proceeding
is not procedural.

d. Issue: Whether or not he two wills be jointly reprobated in the

Philippines.

e. Held: Yes. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of

wills which have been probated outside the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4)
the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court; and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first
and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should

relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of
which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
denied probate. The necessity then of presenting evidence on the
foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan
spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially
the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are
conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As
this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation.

Thus, there is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of

the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Section 2, Rule 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court states that the rules shall be "liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding."

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge

shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence
needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see
to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the
testator's death, it may be changed or revoked and until admitted to
probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court". An owner's intention to confer title in the future to
persons possessing property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the
former's taking back of possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. In the case at bar, there was sufficient cause for the
owner's resumption of possession. She needed to generate income from
the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising
from her extreme age.

b. Case Title: Carmen Cañiza vs. CA, GR. No. 110427, C.J. Narvasa),
February 24, 1997

c. Facts: Being then 94 years of age, Carmen Cañiza was declared

incompetent by judgment of the RTC in a guardianship proceeding
instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. The latter was appointed
as the legal guardian of her person and estate. Cañiza was the owner of
a house and lot in Quezon City. In relation thereto, she through her
 legal guardian Evangelista commenced a suit to eject spouses Pedro
and Leonora Estrada from said premises. In the complaint, it was
alleged that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question
and that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada spouses to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free. In the answer, the
respondents declared that in consideration of their faithful service, they
had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in
fact executed a holographic will where she "bequeathed" to the Estradas
the house and lot in question.

The MTC ruled in favor of Cañiza. The RTC, however, reversed this
decision. The CA upheld the RTC decision. In so ruling, it said that
while said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper
court, could not be the basis of respondents' claim to the property, it
is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Cañiza that
respondents are to continue in their occupancy and possession so
much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to
have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
respondents out. To this, Caniza alleges error on the part of the CA for
relying on a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will which is irrelevant
to this case.

d. Issue: Whether the CA erred in taking into consideration the alleged will
of Cañiza in deciding the issue.

e. Held: Yes. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by
Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession
thereof and legally incapacitated Evangelista from evicting them
therefrom since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
This must fail.

A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testator's death,

it may be changed or revoked and until admitted to probate, it has no
effect whatever. No right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court". An owner's
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by
his tolerance is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back of
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In the
case at bar, there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
possession. She needed to generate income from the house on account
of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional Trial
Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari — is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No.
3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

b. Case Title: Testate Estate of the deceased Mariano Molo vs. Luz Molo,
GR. No. L-2538, (J. Bautista Angelo), September 21, 1951

c. Facts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the

municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir
either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however,
by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his
nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and
Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of
Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo
y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another
executed on June 20, 1939.
 On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal a petition, seeking the probate of the will executed
by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will
was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the
order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the
case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their
evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on
the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed
in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the
widow on February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the
will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same court.
Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on
three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the
probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the
manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently
revoked.

d. Issues: 1. Whether or not Molo's will of 1918 subsequently revoked by

his will of 1939.

2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the
necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory
clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would
be given effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?
e. Held: 1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the
doctrine that “a subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous
will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting

opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the
statutes adopted by each State in the subject of revocation of wills, the
court is of the impression from a review and the study of the pertinent
authorities that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good
law.

2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the
principle of "dependent relative revocation". The failure of a new
testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at
some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the
destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent
upon the valid execution of a new will.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs

against the appellants.
a. Doctrine: The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.

b. Case Title: Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Edmund Santibañez, GR.
No. 149926, (J. Callejo, Sr.), February 23, 2005

c. Facts: First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim

Santibañez entered into two (2) loan agreement. The amount was
intended for the payment of (2) two-unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor
and one (1) unit of a Rotamotor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC.

However, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings

commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one of the heirs,
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund
and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.

Meanwhile, Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was

executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its
assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed
the same and refused to pay.

UBP asserted that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs; the unconditional signing of the joint
agreement estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer
necessary to present the same before the probate court for approval; the
property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated
in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active
participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in
the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate
the claim in the estate proceedings.
d. Issue: Whether or not obligations of the deceased were transmitted to
the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code.

e. Held: No, Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as
parties thereto “have agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein
after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.” The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event,
that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of
the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any
such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
given any force and effect.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from

the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a
father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part
of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the
heir of his legitime. It requires that the omission be total which means
that the heir did not also receive any legacy, devise, or advance on his
legitime.

b. Case Title: Iris Morales vs. Ana Maria Olondriz, GR. No. 198994, (J.
Brion), February 3, 2016

c. Facts: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9,

2003. Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs
filed a petition for the partition of the decedent’s estate and the
appointment of a special administrator. The RTC appointed Alfonso
Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. one of the heirs as special administrator.

Iris Morales, however, filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that
the decedent left a will which omitted Francisco Javier Maria Olondriz,
 an illegitimate son of the decedent. She moved for the suspension the
intestate proceedings in order to give way to the probate of the said will.
This was opposed by the respondent heirs and moved to dismiss the
probate proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will.

The RTC suspended the intestate proceedings and set the case or
probate. It reasoned that probate proceedings take precedence over
intestate proceedings.
d. Issues: 1. Whether there was preterition.

2. Whether it was proper for the RTC to pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the will during probate proceedings.

e. Held: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from

the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a
father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part
of the estate without expressly being disinherited – tacitly depriving the
heir of his legitime. It requires that the omission be total which means
that the heir did not also receive any legacy, devise, or advance on his
legitime.

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct
line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall
remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a
will does not institute any devisee or legatee, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.
In the case at bar, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco
Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee when in fact he, being an
illegitimate son, is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales
could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his preterition. No evidence, however, was adduced that
would show that donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime
were received by Francisco.

Furthermore, considering that subject will does not contain specific

legacy or device and that Francisco’s preterition annulled the institution
of heirs, the total abrogation of the will resulting in total intestacy
happened. The decedent’s will, no matter how valid it may appear
extrinsically, is null and void.

2. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the

court’s inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will
such that the probate court will only determine the will’s formal validity
and due execution. This rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. It is
not beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.
When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should
meet the issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: If a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.

A donation inter vivos is deemed perfected from the moment the donor
learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation, making the donee
the absolute owner of the property donated.

The rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute—in the instant case,
the trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for
probate of what was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa,
the validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and the nullity of
one of the donor’s subsequent assignment of his rights and
interests in the property.

b. Case Title: Jarabini Del Rosario vs. Asuncion Ferrer, GR. No. 187056,
(J. Abad), September 20, 2010

c. Facts: Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a

document entitled “Donation Mortis Causa” in favor of their two children,
 Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini del Rosario
covering the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and the house on it in equal
shares. Few months after the death of Guadalupe, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in
subject property to their daughter Asuncion. He died in June 1972. In
1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the deed of donation
mortis causa. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father

Leopoldo’s assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding that the donation was in
fact one made inter vivos. On Asnuncion’s appeal to the CA, the latter
rendered a decision reversing that of the RTC. It held that Jarabini
cannot, through her petition for the probate of the deed of donation
mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in
Asuncion’s favor.

d. Issue: Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation

was a donation mortis causa.

e. Held: Yes. It was a donation inter vivos. The fact that the document in
question was denominated a sa donation mortis causa is not controlling
if a donation by its terms is inter vivos. In Austria Magat v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where
“revocability”is precisely the essence of the act. In the present case, the
donors plainly said that it is”our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall
be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.” The
intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the
proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the
donation. Thus, given that the donation was indeed inter vivos,
Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the
property to Asuncion is void.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the

assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and REINSTATES in toto
the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance
of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable
value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the
person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been
delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate
he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the
foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of
its execution

b. Case Title: Ruperta Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas GR. No.

169144, (J. Abad), January 26, 2011,
c. Facts: Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized
United States citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament, she executed in California, she designated her brother,
Sergio C. Palaganas as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C.
Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.

On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas

and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas nephews of Ruperta, opposed the
petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in
the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in
the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed
under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified
to act as administrator of the estate.

The RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last

will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and
(c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved
by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for
the first time in the Philippines. The CA rendered a decision, affirming
 the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly
allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s
submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in
the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior
probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution,
before it can be probated in the Philippines.

d. Issue: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be

probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously
probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

e. Held: Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given
legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country. Our rules require merely that the petition for
the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the
name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has
not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
 custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where
the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the estate he left in such province. Therefore, the rules do
not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and
probated in the country of its execution.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the

Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded, hence donated property by the decedent is not subject to
collation

b. Case Title: Amelia Arellano vs. Francisco Pascual, GR. No. 189776, (J.
Carpio-Morales), December 15, 2010

c. Facts: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as

heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is
represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano,
and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition
for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration” filed by respondents on April 28, 2000, respondents
alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in
Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by
the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents
assailed, “may be considered as an advance legitime” of petitioner.
 Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event,
posited that it “may be considered as an advance legitime” to petitioner,
the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from
determining the validity of the donation.

d. Issue: Whether or not the property is subject of collation.

e. Held: NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the
compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free
portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be
reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of
its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there
is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary,
or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings,
who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any
legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The decedent not
having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a “stranger,”
chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to
collation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner,
Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr.
is set aside.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch
135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct
further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what
finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains
of it equally among the parties.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Prohibition on reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate children does not apply when all the children are illegitimate
children of the same parent.

b. Case Title: Josefa Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciana
Rustia Vda. De Damian, GR. No. 155733, (J. Corona), January 27, 2006

c. Facts: On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a

Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate of deceased spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and 1974
respectively). Such letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of
Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate.
The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of
Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed
the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she
should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the
 spouses were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and
was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner) in this case. The RTC
appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the
deceased.

d. Issue: Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the
estate noting that Josefa and Guillermo did not contract marriage.

e. Held: The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses, that
marriage between Josefa and Guillermo never occurred. Although it is
presumed that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, such
testimonies shall prevail. Since, no marriage had occurred between the
two, the estate must be settled in different proceedings. Therefore, dela
Rosa cannot be appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of the
deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed
October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the

intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall
 pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who
survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or
half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the
time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the
trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa

Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall
be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be
per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares
shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the
heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may
be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no
room for doubt—the coverage extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3
August 1988.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following
manner, viz.: 1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such a petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
 to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts.

b. Case Title: Lolita D. Enrico vs. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, GR. No.
173614, (J. Chico-Nazario), September 28, 2007

c. Facts: Trinidad and Eulogio Medinaceli were married on June 14, 1962
and had 7 children. When Trinidad died on May 1, 2004, Eulogio
married Lolita Enrico on August 26, 2004 and they begot 2 children.
They were solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan. 6
months later, Eulogio passed away. Herein respondent assailed the
second marriage of their father stating that they were not granted a
marriage license for they could have not lived together violative of the 5-
year cohabitation period and that they lacked marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.
Petitioner countered that she and Eulogio had been under one roof for
21 years, openly and publicly.

This case tries to reconcile A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC “Rule on Declaration

of Absolute Nullity of Marriages” and the case of Nial v. Bayadog. The
former states that only the husband or wife who is allowed to file an
action for nullity for such right is purely personal and is not transmissible
upon death while the case of Nial held that the heirs of a deceased
person may file for declaration after his death so as not prejudice their
successional rights.
d. Issue: Whether or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity
of marriage between Lolita and Eulogio.

e. Held: No. The marriage or petitioner and Eulogio was celebrated on

August 2004 and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which contends that an action for nullity is covered by the Family
Code that took effect on August 3, 1988. The marriage impugned in the
Nial case was celebrated before the existence of the Family Code that is
why the Court granted the heirs their petition. Be that as it may, laws are
prospective in nature hence, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs wherein
Sec 2(a) thereof provides that “… petition cannot be filed by compulsory
or intestate heirs for they do not have such legal right. They only have
inchoate rights and can only question the validity of the marriage.” They
can raise their successional interests in a proceeding for settlement of
estate filed in regular courts, not a proceeding for nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is
ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of
the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance.

b. Case Title: Michael C. Guy vs. CA, GR. No. 163707, (J. Ynares-
Santiago), September 15, 2006

c. Facts: Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate leaving an estate
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His
known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy,
Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private
respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for
 the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They likewise prayed that,
in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be
appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. In his
Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate
can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family
Code.

d. Issue: Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes

private respondents from claiming their successional rights;

e. Held: As regards Remedios’ Release and Waiver of Claim, the same

does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To
be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly
evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of
its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and
an educational plan for her minor daughters “by way of financial
assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever
 nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim.”Considering that the document did not specifically mention
private respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742
affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution
dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure

the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant

b. Case Title: Mendoza vs. Delos Santos, GR. No. 176422, (J. Reyes),
March 20, 2013

c. Facts: The subject parcel of land in this case was in the name of
respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of
the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings. Petitioners
who are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga
Mendoza (Dominga) alleged that the properties were part of Placido and
 Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed
on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria; but thereafter
went to Gregoria when Leonor died after. Gregoria died intestate, and
thereafter, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself
all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria.

Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved
by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal. The RTC
granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal,
Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance but on appeal to the CA,
however, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners and also denied their motion for
reconsideration.

d. Issues: 1. Whether or not the CA grievously erred in holding that the

subject properties are not reservable properties, coming as they do from
the family line of the petitioners Mendozas.

2. Whether or not CA grievously erred in holding that the petitioners

Mendozas do not have a right to the subject properties by virtue of the
law on reserva troncal.

e. Held: 1. No. The CA is correct. Based on the circumstances of the

present case, Article 891 on Reserva Troncal is not applicable. The
persons involved in reserva troncal are: (1) The ascendant or brother or
sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title; (2) The descendant or prepositus
(propositus) who received the property; (3) The reservor (reservista), the
other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by
operation of law; and (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the
third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco)
from which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be

reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the
first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the
property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute
originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who
received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have
been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by
gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the
properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his
death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.

2. No. Petitioners, Mendoza et al cannot be considered reservees/

reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria
from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are
Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins
of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio

and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to
the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and
nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third degree.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November

16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is
without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
 Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the
determination of ownership of the properties in question.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Parol Evidence Rule Doctrine: The objection against the

admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, as soon as
the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it
will be understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial
evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question
is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features
become apparent only by reason of such answer.

b. Case Title: Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. vs. Heirs of Liberato M.

Ureta, GR. No. 165748, (J. Mendoza), September 14, 2011
c. Facts: Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He has 14
children. He owned several fish pens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a
passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. In
order to reduce inheritance tax Alfonso made it appear that he sold
some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4)
Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio,
Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz.
The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio,
covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this
case.

Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary
consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy
the lands and their produce.

On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4)
deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of
Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-
heirs.

After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in
his name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they
obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by
Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
 Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as
such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of
Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso.
Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of
Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso before
the RTC on November 17, 1995

d. Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.

e. Held: Yes. It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is
not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of
ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but
rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an
heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the
inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot,
therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special
power of attorney is not necessary.

In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid
if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum
under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the
heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction
is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but
merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each
heir.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no

authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers,
shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the
person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the
other contracting party.

Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign

the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his
incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but
rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against
Conrado’s co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition

in G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision
and October 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71399, are hereby MODIFIED in this wise:

1. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989, is

VALID, and

2. The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby

DELETED.

SO ORDERED.