Introduction

The question requires an in depth analysis on one of the fundamental elements of contract
law i.e. the doctrine of consideration. It has to be considered whether there is any valid
consideration provided by ………… for the promises made by ………. and whether there is any
valid consideration provided by ……. for the promises made by …………… Since there are
multiple parties involved in the present situation, thus each of the situations of each party
will be dealt separately and independently.

PARAGRAPH 1

The doctrine of consideration being one of the fundamental elements of the law of contract
was defined by Justice Lush in the case of Currie v Misa(1874) LR 10 Ex 153 as “A valuable
consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or
benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility,
given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.” The definition was later confirmed by Lord
Dunedin in Dunlop v Selfridge Ltd [1915] AC 847 where it viewed consideration as “An act or
forbearance of one party, or the promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of the
other is bought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable.” For there to be a valid
consideration certain criteria needs to be established which includes that consideration
need not be adequate but must be sufficient and that the consideration provided by the
promise must have an economic value. The former criteria simply means that promisee
must provide something that the court may recognise as a legally binding contract and that
such consideration need not be adequate as explained in Thomas v Thomas(1842) 2 QB 851
and Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd [1960] AC 97. As far as the latter is concerned, it
simply means that the consideration provided by the promise must have worth some
economic value irrespective of the fact as to how minimal it may be as stated in White v
Bluett(1853) 23 LJ Ex 36.

PART PAYMENT
One of the core limitations of the doctrine of consideration is called the part payment of a
debt. The concept having been stemmed from the Pinnel’s Case (1602) 5 Co Rep 117 states
that part payment of a debt is never a good consideration. This means that any less
payment of the actual amount due cannot amount to a good consideration to relief the
promise from the remaining amount due and such the promisee is likely to be still liable to
pay the remaining amount due. Such view was further confirmed in the case of Foakes v
Beer(1883) LR 9 App Cas 605 and D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617.

Relate Fact.

EXCEPTION: However, such view was subject to the recent case of MWB v Rock
Advertisement [2018] UKSC 24 where Lord Justice Arden and Lord Justice Kitchin opined
that in the event of any practical benefit received by the promisor for accepting the part
payment may amount to a good consideration.

EXCEPTION : Different method, form, part payment along with something additional,

Relate Fact.

PROMISORY ESTOPPEL

However, if the court regards the situation as falling under the general principles of the
party payment of a due, then Promisory Estoppel is a defence that may be available to the
promisee which operates as to restrict the promisor to go back to its original promise for a
certain period of time. The principle is clearly reflected by Lord Denning in the case of
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130. The defence is only
suspensory and does not in any way extinguishes the rights of the promisor but rather only
allows the promisee some time to give a valid consideration. In order to achieve an order of
promisroy estoppel from the court certain criteria need to be established. The criteria
includes that there must be an existing legal relationship between the promisor and the
promise; the promise must have relied on the second promise of the promisor detrimentally
and; it must be inequitable for the promisor to go back to its original promise.
Relate Fact.

PAST CONSIDERATION

Past consideration is one of the core restrictions on the doctrine of consideration. The
current status of the principle can be seen in the case of Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669 where it
stated that a past consideration can never become a good consideration. This in other
words mean that promises made after a consideration is given in not a sufficient
consideration to enforce the agreement. Only promises made before or at the time of
consideration is applicable to enforce an agreement.

Relate Fact.

EXCEPTIONS: However, the case of Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 clearly provided an
exception where past consideration may become a good consideration in three criterias are
satisfied which includes that the consideration given by the promise must have flowed from
a request rather than the promisee’s own initiative Lampleigh v Braithwaite (1615) Hob 105;
there is common intention that payment is expected for such work Re Casey’s Patents
[1892] 1 Ch 104 and lastly; had the consideration been provided after the promise it would
have been a good consideration.

Relate Fact.

EXISTING PUBLIC DUTY

A person already having an existing public duty, cannot provide a good consideration. This in
simple terms mean that a person who is already under a duty to do a particular act agrees
to do the same act for a separate promise in anticipation of payment, cannot provide a good
consideration for the fresh promise. This was evident in the case of Collins v Godefroy(1831)
1 B & Ad 950.
Relate Fact

However, there is an exception to such principle as laid down in the case of Glasbrook Bros
v Glamorgan County Council [1925] AC 270 where it was stated that if the person already
under a public duty has performed beyond the public duty, then such performance is likely
to amount to a good consideration.

Relate Fact.

EXISTING CONTRACTUAL DUTY

Considering the case of Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317, 170 ER 1168, it was held that
performance of an existing duty does not amount to a good consideration. Therefore, a
person who is already under an obligation to do a particular act, cannot provide a good
consideration for a fresh promise made by the same promisor on the same matter.

Relate Fact

EXCEPTIONS: However, there are two exceptions in law that leaves a gateway for an existing
duty to become a good consideration.
First of all, if the promisee goes beyond the duty of the initial promise for complying with
the fresh promise as explained in Hartley v Ponsonby and

Secondly, if the criteria of Lord Justice Glidwell in the case of Williams v Roffey [1991] 1 QB 1
is satisfied. As far as the latter is concerned, it must be established that a promisor entering
into a contract with promisee, realises that the promise will not be able to complete the
work or provide service on time and such, the promisor makes a fresh promise to the
promisee and the promisor by making the fresh promise has obtained a practical benefit or
avoided a dis benefit and that the fresh promise was not made due to any fraud or
economic duress. As far as economic duress is concerned, the case of Pao On v Lau Yiu Long
[1980] AC 614 stated that economic duress will occur where the promisee threatens to
cancel the contract if the demands are not fulfilled and the promisor had no alternative
situation but to fulfil the demand. However, following Atlas v Kafco, there must be some
failed protest on part of the promisor to establish economic duress.

Relate Fact

EXISTING DUTY OWNED TO A THIRD PARTY

Following the case of Shadwell v Shadwell(1860) 9 CB NS 159,, if a person in already

under an existing duty agrees to do the same particular work for a different promise made
by a different person, such performance is likely to become a good consideration in the eyes
of the law. The view was later affirmed by The Eurymedon, where it was stated that
performance of an existing duty may amount to a good consideration if the promise was
made by a different person and as such the consideration also flowed to the new promisor.

Relate Fact.

CONISDERATION MUST MOVE FROM PROMISEE BUT NEED NOT MOVE TO PROMISOR

As explained above, certain criteria needs to be established for there to be a good

consideration. Firstly, consideration need not be adequate but must be sufficient and
secondly the consideration provided must have an economic value. As far as the former is
concerned, it simply means that the there must be something provided by the promise for
the court to consider a legally binding agreement. This is other word means that the
promisee must do and/or provide what has been asked by the promisor from the promisee
even if a third party is benefitted out of it. As explained in the case of Tweddle v Atkison
which states that what is important is that the consideration is moving from the pormisee
but what is not important that to whom it is going. That means that it is not necessary to
move to the promisor. If the promisor asked the promise to give the consideration to a third
party and notthe promisor, it will be consideration as a sufficient consideration as seen in
the case of Bolton v Madden.
 NOT TO BRING A CLAIM

As explained above, certain criteria needs to be established for there to be a good

consideration. Firstly, consideration need not be adequate but must be sufficient and
secondly the consideration provided must have an economic value. As far as the former is
concerned, it simply means that the there must be something provided by the promise for
the court to consider a legally binding agreement. This is other word means that the
promisee must do and/or provide what has been asked by the promisor from the promisee.
Morever, as stated in the case of Alliance Bank Ltd v Broom, if a party who does not enforce
a possible claim for a promise made by the promisor, then not enforcing a claim amounts to
a good consideration However, it must be noted that the claim not enforced would have
been a well found one as honestly beleived and that there was reasonable grounds to bring
a claim as seen in the case of Cook v Wright. This principle applies even if subsequently seen
be an unarguable one as seen in the case of Simantob v Shavleyan. However it the claim was
primea facie unarguable, then following the case of Wade v Simeon 1846.

CONSIDERATION NEED NOT BE ADEQUATE BUT MUST BE SUFFICIENT

Consideration need not be adequate but must be sufficient is one of tool imposed by law for
there to be a good consideration in the eyes of law. However, discussion of this matter firstly
requires an explanation of what is the doctrine of consideration. As explained by Lord Justice
Lush in the case of Currie v Misa (1874) LR 10 Ex 153 as “A valuable consideration, in the
sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the
one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or
undertaken by the other.” The definition was later confirmed by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop v
Selfridge Ltd [1915] AC 847 where it viewed consideration as “An act or forbearance of one
party, or the promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the
promise thus given for value is enforceable.” However, for there to be a valid consideration it
must be suficent but need not be adequate and that it must have an economic value.

As far as the former is concerned, the word sufficient simply means that promisee must
provide something which the court can considered for there to be a legally binding agreement
irrespective of how minimal the promisor asked from the promisee and it in unnecessary for
the consideration to be an adequate one. The word adequate simply reflects the
proportionality between the promise made by the promisor and the consideration given by the
promisee. Thus, it may is a well established principle that the court looks for sufficient
consideration and not for an adequate one. This may be because, the court does not want to
infertere in situations where bargain capacity of every individuals is concerned. It is a
person’s own will as to how and what to bargain and the court does not help parties who
ended up having a bad bargain. Such principle was reflected many times while considering
the doctrine of judicial precedent. One of the finest example can be seen in the case of
Chappell & Co v Nestle Co where three chocolate wrappers as asked by the promisor
amounted to a good consideration by the promisee against the promise of getting a radio
made by the promisor. As such Upex and Bennet in this case has stated “as long as some
value is given, the courts will not ask whether adequate value has been given,” Moreover, as
stated by Lord Somervell in the same case that just because a promisor did not like what was
provided by the promisee and that promise did accordingly what the promisor asked for, it is
likely to be a good consideration. As quoted by Lord Somervell in “a peppercorn does not
cease to be a good consideration if it is established that the promisee does not like pepper and
will throw away the corn.”

Another important point what revolves the sufficiency criteria is that the sufficient
consideration must have an economic value. For there to be a sufficient consideration, it must
have an economic value. A consideration without an economic value does not amount to a
good consideration as can be seen in the case of White v Bluett(1853) 23 LJ Ex 36. However,
in the context of legal relationship, the chances of having an economic value is higher as
opposed to family relationship as evident in Hamer v Sidway. Ultimately, whether it has an
economic value lies within the discretion of the court.