Tailings

Management

Good Practice Guide

May 2021
Acknowledgements

The development of this publication would not have Whiting (Freeport McMoRan), Ian Gordon (Newcrest),
been possible without the input and support of the Briana Gunn, John Lupo and Kim Morrison (Newmont),
individuals below. ICMM gratefully acknowledges the Imran Gillani (Rio Tinto), Greg Puro (Vale).
following contributions:
Member Representatives
Writing Team Representatives of the ICMM Council Tailings Subgroup
Unusually for an ICMM publication, no external and Tailings Working Group provided valuable direction
consultant was contracted to support the report writing and input to (as well as feedback on iterative drafts of)
process. In practice, this meant that the writing team the guide. They included: Nerine Botes, Pule Soaisa
solely comprised representatives of member (African Rainbow Minerals), Matthew Cox, Roy Harvey,
companies or associations. Some of these individuals Paul Smithall (Alcoa), Caius Priscu (Anglo American),
invested very significant amounts of time and energy to Roger Welff (AngloGold Ashanti), Ivan Arriagada, Jorge
ensuring the delivery of a high-quality product that was Troncoso Boys (Antofagasta Minerals SA), Grant
responsive to the views and perspectives of other Beringer, Bassam El Husseini (Barrick), Matthew Currie,
members. ICMM is indebted to them for their Chad Le Poudre (BHP), Rene Orellana (Codelco), Ivan
exceptional contributions and service. Glasenberg (Glencore), Richard Adkerson, Thomas
Calhoun, Sheila Deely, Kanyembo Katapa, Katie Kruger,
The report was drafted by a writing team led by
Teresa Speigl (Freeport McMoRan), Aaron Chapple
Tamara Johndrow (Freeport-McMoRan) and Charles
(Glencore), Johan Boshoff (Gold Fields), Breno de Matos
Dumaresq (Mining Association of Canada (MAC)).
Castiho (Hydro), Shigeru Oi, Koichiro Tsuchiya (JX
Their commitment to this work represented a significant
Nippon), Mario Velasco (Minera San Cristobal), Nikisi
investment on their part as well as a substantial in-kind
Lesufi, Stephanie Mudau (Minerals Council South Africa),
contribution from their respective employers, which
Harry Silva (Minsur), Veronica Shime (National Mining
ICMM greatly appreciates.
Association), Ian Gordon (Newcrest), John Lupo, Kim
Extensive drafting and editing support was provided Morrison (Newmont), Philippe Crochon (Orano), Pavel
by Michael Davies (Teck) and David Machin (MMG). Grachev, Pavel Shevelenko (Polyus), Imran Gillani, J.S.
Jacques, Marnie Pascoe, John Mulcahy (Rio Tinto), Ross
Special Advisor Copper, Grant Stuart, Matt Wolfe (Sibanye Stillwater),
Professor Norbert Morgenstern provided invaluable Dave Luppnow, Rowena Smith (South32), Marcia Smith
guidance throughout the drafting process providing (Teck), Rafael Bittar, Luis Cervantes, Greg Puro, (Vale).
content, collaborating closely with the writing team
and content contributors. Professor Morgenstern’s ICMM Team
contributions to the tailings field has been Aidan Davy and Diane Tang-Lee led the process to
immeasurable over the decades and ICMM deeply develop this guide, with input and support from Hideo
appreciates his views. His selfless contribution of Aoyama, Alice Evans and Kira Scharwey.
expertise and time along with his patience throughout
Alice and Will Beaven (Positive 2), Nic Benton and Ella
the development process was crucial to the completion
Yarrow (ICMM) provided creative design support.
and quality of this Guide.
The photographs provided in this document were
Content Contributors compiled by our members over many years and are
A number of tailings experts and environment used to illustrate tailings facilities and related tailings
specialists in the ICMM membership provided management activities. In the majority of cases, these
substantial technical content for the writing team to images were taken prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and
integrate into the drafts. They included the following: therefore do not show employees wearing masks.

Caius Priscu (Anglo American), Chad LePoudre (BHP),

Ranjiv Gupta, David Jensen, Georgia Lysay and Brant

ICMM Acknowledgements 2
Contents

Foreword 4
01 Overview  7
1.1 Introduction  8

1.2 Overview of the Guide 12

 elationship to the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management,

1.3 R
the ICMM Conformance Protocols and the ICMM Tailings Governance Framework19

02 Governance of Tailings Management 24

2.1 Overview  25

2.2 Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 26

2.3 Tailings Management Systems 40

2.4 Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 50

2.5 Managing Information 60

2.6 Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 64

2.7 Emergency Preparedness and Response 72

03 Implementation of Good Engineering

Practices for Tailings Management  78
3.1 Overview  79

3.2 Overarching Engineering Concepts 80

3.3 Project Conception 92

3.4 Design 98

3.5 Construction 117

3.6 Operations 121

3.7 Closure and Post-Closure 130

Glossary 135
List of Acronyms 141

Tailings Management Contents 3

 Professor (Emeritus)
Foreword Norbert R Morgenstern

‘Tailings dams are complex systems that Assuring safety or otherwise is not achieved by a set of
calculations alone or by observations alone, unless they
have evolved over the years. They are reveal that performance as flawed, or by adopting a
also unforgiving systems, in terms of pre-conceived list of safety indicators that reduces the
the number of things that have to go confirmation of safety to checking the items off in a box.
As revealed by the quotation above, the construction
right. Their reliability is contingent on
and operation of a tailings storage facility incorporating
consistently flawless execution in a dam, is a highly dynamic process, more so than is
planning, in subsurface investigation, common for water dams where there is usually a clearer
in analysis, in construction quality in separation between the Design and Construction
phases and the Operations phase. Therefore, reliable
operational diligence, in monitoring, confirmation of safety requires an equally dynamic
in regulatory action, and in risk process applied to the full lifecycle of the facility so that
management at every level. All of these it can, in turn, reassure all stakeholders.
activities are subject to human error.’ Progress in this regard has already been made by the
publication of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings
Mount Polley Independent Expert Engineering
Management, and its recommendations will be
Investigation and Review Panel (2015)
integrated into ICMM’s industry member commitments.
The Standard makes recommendations both with
regard to Environmental, Social and Governance issues
and technical issues. The Standard might be regarded
as requirements of what has to be done. ICMM has
developed this Guide, which is aligned with the
Standard, but focuses primarily on technical issues and
recommends good practice for design, construction,
operation and closure.

ICMM Foreword 4
From my perspective, this Guide is built upon the — Adopt the technical recommendations put forward
following core elements: for the safe design, construction, operation, and
closure of tailings storage facilities. This should
— Of overarching significance is the safety culture
recognise the enhanced responsibilities of the
expressed by the Operator. It is common to declare a
Engineer of Record for declaring design criteria as
goal of zero fatalities, occupational disease and
opposed to relying on prescriptive values. Where
catastrophic events. Hence, a common denominator
conditions are complex, recognize the value of
for all Operators that share this goal is that tailings
adopting performance-based design. Always
facilities should be designed, constructed, operated
respect regulatory requirements as a minimum.
and closed to such high standards that ‘failure is not
an option’. — Maintain comprehensive documentation of
construction and quality assurance through all
— A governance framework to support the aspirational
phases of the lifecycle, with special emphasis on
goals of the safety culture is recommended,
confirming or adjusting the site characterization
incorporating roles and responsibilities from the
model as new information is obtained.
Board of Directors to the Engineer of Record and the
Design Team. — As part of the Tailings Management System,
determine what documentation related to safety
— In recognition of the phases associated with tailings
could enter the public domain in order to enhance
management, from Project Conception through to
transparency and trust.
Design, Construction, Operations, Closure and
Post-Closure, ensure that tailings management is While the task of determining the cause of failure is
continually integrated within a sitewide integrated simpler after the event, I have evaluated this Guide in
mine, tailings, water and closure plan. terms of my experience with a significant number of
tailings dam failures and related serious incidents and
— Informed by the integrated planning, develop a
concluded that had this Guide been available and
tailings management system.
adopted, these incidents should not have occurred.
— Engage external Independent Review for technical
Norbert R Morgenstern
matters early in the lifecycle and throughout all of its
Distinguished University Professor (Emeritus),
phases.
University of Alberta (Canada) and Consulting Engineer
— Manage uncertainty through all phases of the
lifecycle by risk-informed decision-making that
assesses uncertainty, conducts risk assessments at
appropriate stages, and carries a risk register
throughout the lifecycle of the facility.

Tailings Management Foreword 5

 Richard C Adkerson
Foreword

The ICMM Tailings Management: ICMM served as the industry representative in the
development of the Global Industry Standard on Tailings
Good Practice Guide represents the Management, a multi-stakeholder effort designed to
culmination of years of work by ICMM elevate the standard of practice for tailings storage
member companies and external facilities worldwide. ICMM is committed to leading the
mining industry in the safe and responsible design,
experts to develop guidance for safely
construction, operation and closure of tailings facilities.
and responsibly constructing and This is a critical issue at every mine, which must be
managing mine tailings facilities. viewed as such by every mine operator.
Inspired by the pathbreaking work of Dr In the Good Practice Guide, ICMM member company
Norbert R Morgenstern, as set forth in experts build on the Standard promulgated by the
the Sixth Victor de Mello Lecture in 2018, multi-stakeholder initiative. The Good Practice Guide
supports the requirements of the Standard and
ICMM embarked on an undertaking to provides guidance on good governance and
improve safety and management of engineering practices.
tailings storage facilities. The Good Practice Guide is important in achieving
the aspirational goal of eliminating fatalities and
catastrophic failures at tailings facilities. We strongly
encourage all mining companies worldwide, whether
or not they are ICMM members, to incorporate the
Standard and Good Practice Guide into their practices
to improve mine tailings facility performance and to
achieve these safety goals.

Richard C Adkerson
Chairman of the Board, and Chief Executive Officer
Freeport-McMoRan and Chair of ICMM

ICMM Foreword 6
Part 1: Overview

Tailings Management Part 1: Overview 7

Introduction 1.1

1.1.1 Context A systematic, comprehensive approach to tailings

Tailings are a by-product of mining, consisting of the management, with checks and balances, helps to
processed rock or soil left over from the separation of reduce the risk that the human element can ultimately
the commodities of value from the rock or soil within lead to ineffective tailings management, or worse, the
which they occur. If they are not managed in a safe, failure of a tailings facility. The implementation of a
responsible manner, tailings can pose risks to the systematic approach will help to prevent human error.
environment, human health and infrastructure.
In cases where tailings are managed in purpose built 1.1.2 Mining Industry Safety Culture
(ie engineered) facilities, management of the integrity Protecting the health and safety of employees,
of these facilities is critically important. The failures that contractors and communities has become ingrained in
have occurred over the last 30 to 40 years illustrate the mining industry’s culture. Mining operations, like all
these potential risks. These failures have included types of heavy industry, can pose many health and
fatalities, displacement of communities, damage to safety hazards, and the adoption of a safety culture
infrastructure, and loss of ecosystems and habitat. was in response to the high numbers of fatalities
They have cost the mining industry billions of dollars. and injuries.

Most tailings facilities are planned, designed, As stated on the ICMM website:
constructed, operated and closed in a safe and ‘Responsible mining companies have an unwavering
responsible manner. However, as recent failure incidents commitment to the health and safety of workers and
clearly indicate, the physical stability of tailings facilities their families, local communities and wider society.
has not been universal. Global performance needs Health and safety has to be at the heart of all operations
to improve. and processes. Mining presents various hazards that
This guidance is intended to facilitate continual can be of significant consequence, but through
improvement across the global mining sector, leading effective risk management strategies neither safety
to the safe, responsible management of tailings incidents nor the onset of occupational diseases are
worldwide. The guidance presents a comprehensive, inevitable. ICMM members are progressing towards a
holistic approach to tailings management that goal of zero fatalities, occupational disease and
describes good engineering practices and is informed catastrophic events. People have a right to go home
by lessons learned from past failures. It is intended to
safe and healthy to their families and their communities
at the end of every day.’
improve performance across all the aspects that
underpin safe tailings management. While no guidance However, the failures of tailings facilities around the
document is perfect, this Guide is intended to be world, resulting in hundreds of fatalities over the last
part of the continual improvement process of the three decades, point to the imperative that the mining
mining industry. industry’s safety culture be applied to tailings
management.
The guidance is ultimately aimed at mitigating what can
perhaps be the greatest risk factor: the human element. Beyond driving improvements in practice, the guidance
Individuals, however professional and qualified, make is aimed at fostering and strengthening the safety
judgements and decisions based on their own culture associated with tailings management and
experiences and biases. Embedded ignorance, which provides a roadmap to the continual improvement of
we all have, results from a lack of knowledge, or a failure tailings safety at both new and existing facilities. To be
to recognise internal weaknesses or limitations. consistent with this safety culture, tailings facilities
Complacency, over-confidence, competing priorities should be designed, constructed, operated and closed
and the loss of corporate knowledge over time can be to such high standards that the goal of eliminating
compounding factors. fatalities and catastrophic events is achieved.

ICMM Introduction 8
Although regulators, investors, communities and others — Should not be used to assess conformance against
have a role in this cultural shift, the responsibility resides the Standard, which is the purpose of the
primarily with the Operators of mines and the Conformance Protocols. Some examples in the
associated tailings facilities. Conformance Protocols draw upon and refer to
related sections of the Guide.
1.1.3 Objectives
In keeping with these objectives, the Guide presents
This Guide is intended to support the safe and
recommendations, not requirements. The use of the
responsible management of tailings across the global
word ‘should’ is intended to mean ‘recommended’
mining industry, with the ultimate goal of eliminating
not ‘must’.
fatalities and catastrophic events.

It provides guidance on good governance and good 1.1.4 Scope of Application of the Guide
engineering practices that will support continual The Guide describes good governance and good
improvement in the management of tailings facilities and engineering practices for tailings management and may
help to foster and strengthen a corporate safety culture. be applied to:

The Guide: — The management of tailings facilities worldwide,

including those operated or maintained by State
— Is informed by the requirements of the Global
agencies.
Industry Standard on Tailings Management (the
Standard) and the commitments in ICMM’s Tailings — New and existing tailings facilities throughout all
Governance Framework Position Statement. It will phases and activities of the lifecycle (Section 1.2.1),
help Operators work through how to integrate from the Project Conception phase for future tailings
these into their own programmes. facilities, to facilities that have been inactive for many
years, and to those which have been closed.
— Promotes good engineering practices for tailings
management, including a performance-based While the objective is focused primarily on preventing
approach where appropriate. catastrophic failures, the guidance is equally applicable
to a wide range of other potential risks associated with
— Provides an overview of good practices and, as
the management of tailings facilities.
such, does not generate additional requirements
beyond those within the Standard.

Tailings Management Introduction 9

 — Consultants and others providing services (eg
tailings facility design) to Operators related to tailings
management.

— Investors, insurers and others with the ability to

directly influence improved industry performance
In Detail
through access to funding or other means.
A tailings facility is a facility that is designed and
managed to contain the tailings produced by a This Guide may also be of interest to community
mine. A tailings facility includes the collective organisations, non-government organisations and other
engineered structures, components and stakeholders that may be affected by tailings
equipment involved in the management of tailings management, providing them with information on
solids, other mine waste managed with tailings (eg leading practices in tailings management so that they
waste rock, water treatment residues), and any are better informed in their engagement with Operators.
water managed in the facility, including pore fluid,
This guidance does not replace professional expertise
any ponds, and surface water inflows and
or jurisdictionally specific legal requirements. Operators
discharges.
should obtain qualified professional advice throughout
The guidance is applicable to tailings facilities as a the lifecycle to be sure that each tailings facility’s
whole, not just tailings embankments, excluding specific conditions are understood and addressed, and
riverine systems and other types of facilities such that the facility is planned, designed, constructed,
as fresh and process water dams, stockpiles, etc. operated and closed in a safe and responsible manner.
This distinction is important because while the
design, construction and operation of 1.1.6 Basis for the Guide
embankments is a very important factor in In 2016, ICMM released a Position Statement on
influencing the safety of tailings facilities, it is not Preventing Catastrophic Failure of Tailings Storage
the only factor. For example, aspects related to Facilities that included a Tailings Governance
water management (eg seepage, surface water) Framework (the Framework). The Position Statement
can be very important in ensuring safe tailings committed ICMM members to implement practices
management. consistent with the Framework.

The Framework focuses on six elements of tailings

management and governance that are key to
1.1.5 Intended Audience minimising the likelihood of a catastrophic tailings
The audience for the Guide is broad, in keeping with failure happening:
the breadth of the objective and scope of application 1. Accountability, Responsibility and Competency.
of the Guide.
2. Planning and Resourcing.
As a document prepared by ICMM, the primary
3. Risk Management.
audience of the Guide is ICMM member companies.
However, this Guide is intended to facilitate safe 4. Change Management.
tailings management worldwide. Thus, it is intended
5. Emergency Preparedness and Response.
to support all Operators in improving their practices
to meet the goal of eliminating fatalities and 6. Review and Assurance.
catastrophic events.
While this guidance builds upon the Framework it is
In addition to ICMM member companies, and more comprehensive in scope and is intended to be
consistent with the Standard, the audience includes: applied site-specifically. In developing this guidance,
ICMM used existing, well-established external
— Operators of all tailings facilities, including non- resources as a starting point. Thus, while this Guide
ICMM Operators, and their employees and represents a new level of detail for guidance prepared
contractors across the organisation with roles and by ICMM, it reflects more than 20 years of experience in
responsibilities related to tailings management, the development and implementation of other external
from senior management/board level leadership to resources to support tailings management (eg Mining
personnel at the site level. Association of Canada (MAC)).

ICMM Introduction 10
The Tailings Governance Framework and existing
guidance from MAC are focused primarily on tailings
management governance and do not address design
and other technical elements related to tailings
management. Technical resources for tailings facilities
are available from several sources (eg International
Commission on Large Dams, Canadian Dam
Association, Australian National Committee on Large
Dams).

In delivering the Sixth Victor de Mello Lecture, in Brazil in

2018, Prof Norbert Morgenstern, a highly esteemed
expert on tailings facility safety, identified significant
shortcomings in current practices related to tailings
management. While he identified good practices related
to the governance of tailings management (ie MAC
guidance), he identified an urgent need for improved
technical and engineering practice, integrated with
stronger governance, in order to improve tailings safety
across the industry. A key component of his lecture was
an outline of a tailings management system (TMS) for
Performance-Based Risk-Informed, Safe Design,
Construction, Operation and Closure of tailings facilities
(PBRISD). He recommended that ‘ICMM support the
tailings management system based on PBRISD, as
outlined here, and fund the development and
publication of a guidance document that would
facilitate its adoption in mining practice’.

Tailings Management Introduction 11

Overview of the Guide 1.2

1.2.1 Tailings Management Lifecycle Tailings management does not occur in isolation from
Having a common understanding of the lifecycle of the other activities that occur at mine sites. Tailings
tailings management is important for applying this production is ‘downstream’ of many steps in the
guidance and the requirements of the Standard. mining process and a wide range of decisions related
The lifecycle of a tailings facility encompasses all the to the overall process that can impact tailings
activities across the life of a tailings facility, from the management are often made without sufficient
earliest stages of the Project Conception phase consideration of those potential impacts. For example,
through to the Closure and Post-Closure phases. It is decisions about waste rock management, ore
determined on a site-specific basis by a wide range of processing and water management often have
factors and is always subject to change. The lifecycle significant implications for tailings management.
consists of six phases or activities: Similarly, decisions related to tailings management are
sometimes taken without adequate consideration of
1. Project Conception1
other plans. A failure to recognise these relationships
2. Design and potential impacts and to plan accordingly can
compromise the objective of safe tailings
3. Construction
management.
4. Operations
Throughout the lifecycle, an integrated approach to
5. Closure mine planning is essential to safe tailings management.
This involves integrating the planning of all aspects of
6. Post-Closure.
the mine that can impact tailings management (Section
The relationship between these phases or activities is 3.2.2), such as ore extraction and processing, sitewide
dynamic and rarely linear. In addition, the lifecycle of a water management and the management of waste
tailings facility can last for many decades to reach the rock. For new tailings facilities and proposed mine life
end of the Operating phase, and centuries beyond for extensions, this includes integrating planning for tailings
the Post-Closure phase. management into the development of Pre-Scoping,
Scoping, Pre-Feasibility and Feasibility Studies.
Throughout the lifecycle, change can be a key source of
risk for tailings facilities and needs to be effectively Such an integrated approach should be adopted for
managed (Section 2.3.2). Consequently, it is important both new facilities and existing facilities, to help to
that Operators recognise and plan for a dynamic ensure that decisions are aligned with the short-,
lifecycle and implement a TMS throughout the lifecycle medium- and long-term objectives of tailings
(Sections 1.2.2.1 and 2.3). management.

1. For new tailings facilities, the Project Conception and Design phases encompass key steps in the mine planning process: Pre-Scoping Study, Scoping Study, Pre-Feasibility Study,
and Feasibility. Thus, just as conceptual mine planning begins at the pre-scoping and scoping steps, planning for tailings management should also begin at these steps. However, for
Project Conception and Design activities related to proposed material changes or closure planning, there may not be corresponding Pre-Scoping, Scoping, Pre-Feasibility and
Feasibility studies for the broader mine planning process.

ICMM Overview of the Guide 12

 Operations: The period in the lifecycle when tailings
are transported to and deposited in the tailings
facility, inclusive of any periods of inactivity prior to
the commencement of implementation of the closure
In Detail
plan. Construction is typically ongoing throughout the
Project Conception: A recurring lifecycle activity that
Operations phase. In addition, progressive
is the first step in the planning and design of:
reclamation in preparation for closure and consistent
— Construction and Operations phases of new with the closure plan may occur during the
tailings facilities. Operations phase. In some cases, after the end of the
active deposition of tailings, tailings may be removed
— Closure and Post-Closure phases of tailings
from the tailings facility for reprocessing or other
facilities.
uses. Such activity would also be considered
— Any material changes to the design or operation Operations.
of tailings facilities.
Temporary suspension of mine operations: A period
— Re-commissioning of an existing tailings facility in the lifecycle when mine operations have been
for a mine re-opening. suspended and tailings are not being deposited into
the tailings facility. The suspension may be short-
Project Conception consists of the analysis of a
term (eg temporary suspension due to wildfires,
range of alternatives (eg location of a new tailings
labour disruption) or of a longer, indeterminate
facility, technologies to be applied) to select a
duration (eg due to low commodity prices).
preferred alternative to advance to the Design phase.
Lifecycle cost estimates are developed as per the During temporary suspension, maintenance and
Operator’s corporate guidelines. surveillance continue and some operation activities (eg
active water management) may also continue. The
Design: A recurring lifecycle activity that builds upon
closure plan is not implemented. However, temporary
the decisions made during the Project Conception
suspension may lead to closure in some cases.
phase. Once a preferred alternative has been
selected, all aspects of that alternative are designed Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when deposition
in detail, based on the design intent and defined of tailings into the tailings facility ceases permanently
performance objectives. More detailed lifecycle cost and the closure plan is implemented, including:
estimates are developed as per the Operator’s
— Transitioning from the Operations phase to the
corporate guidelines.
Closure phase and the Post-Closure phase.
Construction: A recurring lifecycle activity that
— Removal of infrastructure such as pipelines.
includes:
— Changes to water management or treatment.
— Initial construction prior to the start-up of a new
tailings facility (eg starter embankment, pipelines — Construction of covers, recontouring or
for tailings transport, water management revegetation of tailings and any embankments or
infrastructure). other structural elements.

— Ongoing construction through the Operations — Other reclamation and decommissioning activities.
phase to increase the capacity of the tailings
While Closure is a discrete lifecycle phase, closure
facility (eg facility raises).
planning is part of an integrated approach to mine
Construction may also include: planning. It is a lifecycle activity that should begin as
early as possible and be conducted iteratively
— Construction for any material changes (eg
throughout the lifecycle. The project conception and
increase capacity beyond original design intent,
design process should be used to develop the
buttress to strengthen an embankment).
closure plan and an executable design for closure.
— Construction during the Closure phase (eg
Post-Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when the
installation of covers, water management
closure plan has been implemented and the tailings
infrastructure).
facility has transitioned to long-term maintenance
and surveillance. The Post-Closure phase has to

Tailings Management Overview of the Guide 13

 address all the aspects of safety and environmental used for other purposes (eg construction material).
compliance related to long-term stability and legal
In some jurisdictions, during the Post-Closure phase,
requirements.
responsibility for a tailings facility may transfer from
During the Closure or Post-Closure phases, tailings the Operator to jurisdictional control.
facilities could return to the Operations phase. In
The tailings management lifecycle is illustrated in
addition, tailings could be removed for reprocessing
Figure 1.
to recover additional commodities of value, or to be

Figure 1: The tailings management lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Temporary Suspension

Project Design Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure

Conception

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

1.2.2 Core Elements of Safe Tailings These elements are equally vital to the safe and
Management responsible management of tailings and should be
A comprehensive, holistic approach is needed across implemented together in a fully integrated manner
the lifecycle for the safe and responsible management throughout all the phases of the lifecycle. They each
of tailings. This encompasses two inter-related core fulfil a different but essential role:
elements:
— Effective governance of tailings management
— Governance of tailings management (further ensures accountability for decisions, provides a
described in Part 2). management structure with checks and balances
for decision-making, provides the means to
— Implementation of good engineering practices for
effectively manage tailings on a day-to-day basis,
tailings management across the lifecycle (further
and provides input to mechanisms to respond
described in Part 3).
effectively if an emergency occurs.

ICMM Overview of the Guide 14

— Good engineering practices, including a risk- commensurate to their level of accountability and
informed approach throughout the lifecycle, are responsibility.
needed to improve the safety of tailings facilities. In
Corporate policy on tailings management: Operators
some cases, improvement can be achieved
should develop a corporate policy on tailings
through enhancing current practices. In other
management that is aligned with the declaration of a
cases, the adoption of a performance-based
corporate safety culture, providing a basis and overall
approach will provide a more rigorous technical
direction for safe tailings management (Section 2.2.3).
basis for decision-making across the lifecycle.
Recognising that safe tailings management is a core
Implementing these elements together helps to business function, the planning of which should be
achieve the best outcomes for tailings management closely integrated with related activities such as ore
and helps to ensure effective communication. Most extraction and processing, the corporate policy on
importantly, this approach helps to mitigate the human tailings management should be recognised in the overall
element in tailings management and reduce the business case for the mine and integrated into sitewide
likelihood that human error will lead to ineffective policies, objectives and plans.
tailings management, or worse, the failure of a tailings Tailings Management System (TMS): Operators should
facility. develop and implement site-specific TMSs and apply
them across the lifecycle (Section 2.3). Based on the
1.2.2.1 Governance of Tailings Management Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle of management systems, a
Governance of tailings management refers to the TMS is a comprehensive framework to integrate the
organisational structures, processes, procedures and people, resources, processes and practices related to
communication channels that a company puts in tailings management to help Operators achieve their
place to ensure the effective management, oversight performance objectives, manage risk and ensure safe,
and accountability for tailings. responsible management of tailings. The TMS should be
Effective governance provides an essential foundation aligned and integrated with other relevant site-level
for all activities and decisions related to tailings systems, such as a sitewide environmental and social
management, and ultimately for managing risk. management system (ESMS) and systems related to
water management.
Governance of tailings management is inclusive of the
following elements: A TMS:

Accountability and responsibility: Operators should — Encompasses governance and decision-making

assign and deliver on accountability and responsibility related to tailings management.
for tailings management to provide the foundation for — Provides a mechanism to systematically and rigorously
good governance and decision-making (Section 2.2.2). implement the other elements described in this
The Operator should designate one or more guidance to implement good engineering practice.
Accountable Executive(s) who is/are directly
Operation, maintenance and surveillance (OMS)
answerable to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
activities are essential to the day-to-day implementation
communicate(s) with the Board of Directors (BoD), and
of the TMS and engineering practices for safe tailings
who is/are accountable for the safety of tailings
management (Section 2.4). Without OMS, an Operator
facilities and for minimising the social and
has no effective control of tailings management.
environmental consequences of a potential tailings
facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) may Managing information: Good information is essential to
delegate responsibilities but not accountability. good governance and decision-making (Section 2.5).
Conversely, delegation of responsibility to competent Preparing, maintaining and updating documentation of
personnel is essential to the effective delivery of all information on all aspects of tailings management is
tasks and activities related to tailings management. critical to providing a basis for current and future
Personnel with accountability, responsibility or decisions, managing change, and for fully understanding
authority related to tailings management should have and effectively managing risks. This includes
the necessary competencies and experience, documentation describing key aspects related to:

Tailings Management Overview of the Guide 15

— Tailings management governance. first used to identify and describe the risks (risk
identification) and estimate the magnitude of the risks to
— Planning, design, construction, operation and
individuals or populations, property or the environment
closure of a tailings facility.
(risk analysis). The acceptability of the risks is then
Programme for reviewing tailings safety: Operators evaluated considering the potential consequences for
should implement a programme for reviewing the health and safety, social, environmental, financial and
safety of tailings facilities that provides expert other factors that may occur (risk evaluation). Once the
oversight of tailings management activities and the risks have been assessed, risk management plans are
safety of a tailings facility (Section 2.6). Such a developed to eliminate, reduce or mitigate, and
programme, including Independent Review, should be communicate the risks.
applied throughout the lifecycle.
Uncertainty is inherent in the analysis and evaluation of
Emergency preparedness: Notwithstanding the risks related to tailings facilities. Uncertainty may be
obligation to design and operate safe tailings facilities, related to many factors, such as the natural variability of
Operators need to be prepared in the event that an the foundation and construction materials for a
emergency occurs related to tailings management. As proposed tailings facility, design parameters, the
part of sitewide plans for emergency preparedness, accuracy of predictions of future climate conditions,
Operators should develop and test plans for potential and the challenge of estimating the likelihood of highly
emergencies related to tailings to help to ensure a improbable events. As tailings facilities are reliant on
timely and effective response if an emergency occurs natural materials and processes, uncertainty in risk
(Section 2.7). assessment may be greater than in other sectors (eg
chemical industry) for which the variability and
1.2.2.2 Implementation of Good Engineering Practices uncertainty regarding feedstock materials may be
for Tailings Management significantly less.
There are many facets to engineering practices An essential characteristic of managing risk is
related to tailings management, including: recognising and acknowledging uncertainty, managing
— Recognising and managing uncertainty. risk within the limitations of that uncertainty and
working to reduce uncertainty. Implementing a risk-
— Project conception and design. informed approach is key to managing this uncertainty.
— Integrated mine planning. A risk-informed approach involves planning, designing,
— Designing and operating for closure. operating and closing tailings facilities in a manner
that is:
Recognising and Managing Uncertainty — Informed by the results of the risk assessment.
Understanding and managing risk is fundamental to Potential risks and related uncertainties associated
the safe management of tailings but subject to with tailings management are identified, analysed
significant uncertainty. and evaluated during the Project Conception phase,
re-assessed during the Design phase, and re-
Risk is a frequently used but often misunderstood
assessed periodically throughout the lifecycle.
concept. It is important to emphasise that assessing
risk involves the consideration of both the potential — Intended to prevent or eliminate risks to the extent
consequences of an event and the probability or possible and to effectively manage those risks that
likelihood of that event occurring. Risk should not be remain by developing a robust tailings facility design
confused with consequence, nor should these terms with less uncertainty in design criteria.
be used interchangeably.
— Informed by improved site characterisation, the
Risk assessment involves a process of risk identification, results of surveillance, input from the programme for
risk analysis and risk evaluation. Available information is reviewing facility safety (Section 2.6), and updates to

ICMM Overview of the Guide 16

 the risk assessment process, all of which help to new tailings facilities, this would include the alternative
reduce uncertainty. Site-specific surveillance locations for a tailings facility and the alternative
programmes should be designed and implemented technologies to be used. Both the location and the
(Section 2.4.3.4) to provide the information (eg data, technology selected can have a strong influence on the
observations, results of inspections) needed to risks that will need to be managed. Thus, decisions
accurately assess on an ongoing basis whether the made during the Project Conception phase may prove
risk management plan is effective. Results from to be some of the most important in the entire lifecycle
surveillance and input from reviews, together with of a tailings facility. The importance of this phase
updates to the risk assessment process, should be cannot be overstated.
used to identify: The preferred alternative is then designed in detail,
- Variances from performance criteria indicative of taking into account factors including:
potential upset or emergency conditions.
— Site-specifically appropriate design criteria (Section
- Deficiencies in performance or practice that should 3.4.3).
be addressed.
— Site-specific performance objectives and indicators
- Opportunities for continual improvement.
(Section 3.3.3).
A risk-informed approach may include the use of:
— Credible failure modes identified through the risk
— Surveillance results to verify whether the tailings assessment process and means to address those
facility is behaving as per the design and adjusting failure modes in the design (Section 3.4.3.10).
accordingly.
— Continued improvements in site characterisation
— Numerical models of tailings facility performance information and models.
based on surveillance and site characterisation data
— Where appropriate, the application of a
to validate assumptions about the facility design and
performance-based approach to design that uses
predict future performance. Outputs from these
the results of numerical modelling of various aspects
models can be used to inform changes to the design
of the tailings facility performance to inform and
or operating practices to improve performance and
refine the design (Section 3.4.3.6).
reduce risk.
— Refinements to the risk assessment, including
Project Conception and Design of Tailings Facilities reducing uncertainty associated with the risk
The project conception and design of new tailings assessment (Section 3.4.2).
facilities, material changes, and the closure of tailings
facilities build upon a risk-informed approach (Sections Designing and Operating for Closure
3.3 and 3.4). For new facilities, the Project Conception Tailings facilities may continue to pose risks long
phase is the first stage in the lifecycle for the potential after the Operations phase has ended, and after the
elimination of risks. Once a tailings facility has been closure plan has been implemented. The development
designed and built, it may be much more difficult to and implementation of closure plans is critical to
eliminate the risks that exist, than if they had been mitigating these risks. However, relying solely on the
avoided in the Project Conception phase. implementation of the closure plan to achieve closure
objectives may limit the capacity to reduce long-term
During the Project Conception phase, site
risks and liabilities in the Closure and Post-Closure
characterisation (Section 3.3.2) and risk assessment
phases.
are used to inform a process of identifying potential
alternatives for the conceptual design of a tailings Alternatively, designing tailings facilities with the
facility, and rigorously evaluate those alternatives (eg objectives of closure in mind from the outset, and
using multiple accounts analysis (MAA)) to select the incorporating those objectives in the performance
preferred alternative (Section 3.3.4). For example, for objectives for the tailings facility, can help to reduce

Tailings Management Overview of the Guide 17

long-term risks and reduce the liabilities associated with Designing for closure builds upon integrated mine
closure. This includes designing, operating and closing planning, as a holistic approach to mine planning,
tailings facilities in a manner that results in them design and operation may be needed to achieve the
becoming engineered landforms – structures that objectives of designing for closure. This should be
mimic natural landforms – to increase their long-term recognised early in the Project Conception phase.
stability and make them more resilient not only to the For existing tailings facilities that were not originally
risk of failure, but also more resilient to gradual designed with closure in mind, Operators may consider
deterioration due to erosion. An engineered landform changes to the design or practices that can be
also has much lower long-term maintenance and implemented during the Operations phase to reduce
surveillance requirements. risk and better position the tailings facility for closure.

ICMM Overview of the Guide 18

Relationship to the Global Industry 1.3
Standard on Tailings Management,
the Conformance Protocols and
the Tailings Governance Framework

1.3.1 Relationship to the Global Industry For example, Principle 1 of the Standard includes
Standard on Tailings Management and requirements relating to: respect for human rights and
ICMM Conformance Protocols for the Global related due diligence; working to obtain and maintain
Industry Standard on Tailings Management the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of
As noted earlier (Section 1.1.3), this Guide has been indigenous or tribal peoples; meaningful engagement of
informed by the Standard and will help Operators to work project-affected peoples; and the establishment of
through how to integrate the related requirements or effective grievance mechanisms to address the
commitments into their own programmes. The Guide complaints and grievances of project-affected people.
should not be used to assess conformance against the All of these are adequately covered by existing sources
Standard, which is the purpose of the ICMM of ICMM guidance.
Conformance Protocols for the Global Industry Standard
Two principles from the Standard that require some
on Tailings Management (The Conformance Protocols).
further explanation are Principles 2 and 3 that deal with
The Conformance Protocols have been developed to the development and use of an integrated knowledge
enable conformance to be assessed and to support base. The concept of a ‘knowledge base’ is addressed
the integration of the Standard into ICMM’s existing in ICMM’s Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice
assurance processes for its member commitments. Guide, and the basic approach is transferrable to
The Conformance Protocols support either self- tailings management. It involves developing,
assessments or independent third-party assessments documenting and periodically updating information
of progress with implementing the Standard and about the social, environmental and local economic
ultimately conformance. It details clearly and concisely context of the tailings facility, to support informed
criteria that assessors expect to see evidenced for decision-making across the tailings facility lifecycle.
conformance to be assessed, with illustrative examples This should be undertaken using approaches aligned
of evidence and explanatory notes as appropriate. It is with international good practice and designed to
available to be used by company members (or non- capture uncertainties due to climate change. In terms of
members) or suitably qualified independent third parties updating the knowledge base, this should be revisited
and maps to the Standard and its 77 requirements. at least every five years, and whenever there is a
material change to the tailings facility or to the social,
The social and environmental requirements of the
environmental and local economic context.
Standard are referred to within this Guide, but the
intention is that these are largely addressed by reference Other aspects of the knowledge base such as
to existing guidance from ICMM. Where appropriate, developing, documenting and updating detailed site
these other sources of guidance are referred to within characterisations of tailings facility sites for a range of
this Guide and within the Conformance Protocols. criteria or the conduct and periodic updating of breach
analysis are addressed in this Guide.

Relationship to the GISTM, the Conformance

Tailings Management Protocols and the Tailings Governance Framework 19
1.3.2 Implementation of the ICMM Tailings consistent with the Framework, which consists of six
Governance Framework elements of tailings management and governance.
This Guide builds upon the ICMM Tailings Governance These elements are described below, together with
Framework Position Statement (the Framework) and will corresponding sections of the Guide that support
support implementation of the Framework. The Position implementation.
Statement commits members to implement practices

ICMM Tailings Governance Framework Corresponding Sections in the ICMM Good

Practice Guide

Accountability, Responsibility and Competency: Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility

Accountabilities, responsibilities and associated competencies are
Section 2.2.4: Competency and Promoting Continual Learning
defined to support appropriate identification and management of
tailings facility risks. Section 2.2.6: Communication

— A
 ccountability for the overall governance of tailings facilities Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
resides with the owners and operators.*
Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
— O
 rganisational structures and roles are established to support
management of tailings facility risks and governance
accountability.

— C
 ommunication processes are maintained to ensure that
personnel understand their responsibilities. Training is conducted
to maintain currency of knowledge and skills.

— R
 ole competency and experience requirements are defined for
critical roles within the established organisational structures.

* The ICMM Position Statement uses the terms owners and

operators. This Guide uses the term Operators. As defined in the
Glossary, Operators is inclusive of owners and operators as
described in the Position Statement.

Planning and Resourcing: Section 2.2.3: Corporate Policy on Tailings Management

The financial and human resources needed to support continued
Section 2.3.2.3: Resources
tailings facility management and governance are maintained
throughout a facility’s lifecycle.

— T
 ailings facility operating and capital costs, and human resource
needs, are included in relevant business planning processes.

— R
 esources necessary to implement and maintain activities within
this governance Framework are provided.

Risk Management: Section 1.2.2: Core Elements of Safe Tailings Management

Risk management associated with tailings facilities includes risk
Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility
identification, an appropriate control regime and the verification of
control performance. Section 2.2.4: Competency and Promoting Continual Learning

— R
 isk controls and their associated verification activities are Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
identified based on failure modes and their associated
Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
consequences and evaluated on a tailings facility-specific basis
considering all phases of the tailings facility lifecycle. Section 2.7.2: Assessing Credible Potential Consequences

— S
 uitably qualified and experienced experts are involved in tailings Section 3.2.4: Managing Uncertainty and Risk
facility risk identification and analysis, as well as in the
Section 3.3: Projection Conception
development and review of effectiveness of the associated
controls. Section 3.4: Design

— P
 erformance criteria are established for risk controls and their Section 3.6: Operations
associated monitoring, internal reporting and verification Section 3.7: Closure and Post-Closure
activities.

Relationship to the GISTM, the Conformance Protocols

ICMM and the Tailings Governance Framework 20
 ICMM Tailings Governance Framework Corresponding Sections in the ICMM Good
Practice Guide

Change Management: Section 2.2.2: Accountability and Responsibility

Risks associated with potential changes are assessed, controlled
Section 2.3: Tailings Management System
and communicated to avoid inadvertently compromising tailings
facility integrity. Section 2.5: Managing Information

— P
 rocesses are applied that involve the identification, Section 3.2.4: Managing Risk and Uncertainty
assessment, control and communication of risks to tailings
Section 3.3: Projection Conception
facility integrity arising from both internally-driven and
externally-driven change, to avoid introducing uncertain, Section 3.4: Design
unacceptable, and/or unmanaged risks.
Section 3.5: Construction
— D
 ocuments and records that support tailings facility planning,
Section 3.6: Operations
design, construction, operation, surveillance, management
and governance are maintained and kept suitably current Section 3.7: Closure and Post-Closure
and accessible.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
Processes are in place to recognise and respond to impending failure
Section 2.7: Emergency Preparedness and Response
of tailings facilities and mitigate the potential impacts arising from a
potentially catastrophic failure. Section 3.6: Operations

— A
 ction thresholds and their corresponding response to early
warning signs of potential catastrophic failure are established.

— E
 mergency preparedness and response plans are established
commensurate with potential failure consequences. Such plans
specify roles, responsibilities and communication procedures.

— E
 mergency preparedness and response plans are periodically
tested.

Review and Assurance: Section 2.3: Tailings Management System

Internal and external review and assurance processes are in place
Section 2.4: Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance
so that controls for tailings facility risks can be comprehensively
assessed and continually improved. Section 2.6: Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety

— Internal performance monitoring and inspections and internal

and external reviews and assurance are conducted
commensurate with consequences of tailings facility failure
to evaluate and to continually improve the effectiveness of
risk controls.

— O
 utcomes and actions arising from tailings facility review and
assurance processes are recorded, reviewed, closed-out and
communicated.

— P
 erformance of risk management programmes for tailings
facilities is reported to executive management on a regular basis.

Relationship to the GISTM, the Conformance

Tailings Management Protocols and the Tailings Governance Framework 21
1.3.3 Relationship between the Guide, the In turn, this Guide supports the interpretation and
Standard, the Conformance Protocols and implementation of many requirements within the
the Tailings Governance Framework Standard. It also supports the implementation of the
The relationship between the Standard and ICMM’s commitments within the Tailings Governance Framework
tailings-related documents (discussed in Sections 1.3.1 Position Statement. In addition, the Guide also refers to
and 1.3.2) is illustrated in Figure 2 and may be other sources of ICMM guidance that help to support
summarised as follows. implementation of some of the environmental and social
requirements of the Standard (primarily under Principles
The two documents that include the commitments of
1–3 of the Standard).
membership are illustrated on the top of Figure 2. The
six commitments in the Tailings Governance Lastly, the ICMM Conformance Protocols (bottom left
Framework Position Statement on tailings of Figure 2) support either self-assessments or
management and governance (see top left of Figure 2) independent third-party assessments of progress with
pre-date the requirements of the Standard which implementing the Standard (as described in Section 1.3.1
adequately addresses them. More broadly, the above). Where appropriate, the Protocols refer to related
Standard (top right of Figure 2) outlines seventy-seven sections of the Guide.
Requirements for responsible tailings management,
The relationship between the Standard, supporting
under fifteen Principles that cover six Topic areas. The
guidance from ICMM (and other authoritative sources of
Standard has helped to inform the development of
guidance by organisations such as MAC) and technical
this Guide (top right of Figure 2).
guidelines produced by reputable technical organisations
such as those focused on dams is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 2: Relationship between key documents

Outlines commitments
1 2 Outlines 77
December 2016

for 6 key elements of Informed requirements requirements for

tailings management Tailings Governance
Framework
within the Standard responsible tailings
and governance Position Statement
management

Supports implementation Enables conformance Helped to inform Supports

of the position statement with the Standard to development of interpretation and
commitments be assessed the Guide implementation of
many requirements

Supports self-
assessments and
third-party
4 Conformance
Protocols
Tailings
Management
3 Provides guidance on
good governance and
engineering practices
assessments of Global Industry Standard
on Tailings Management Good Practice Guide
for responsible tailings
progress with management
implementing the Note: Also refers to other
Standard Draws upon and refers to relevant sources of ICMM
related sections of Guide guidance that support
February 2023 implementation

Relationship to the GISTM, the Conformance Protocols

ICMM and the Tailings Governance Framework 22
Figure 3: Increasing levels of detail between specific commitments, supporting guidance and technical guidelines

December 2016

Tailings Governance
Framework

Position Statement

Specific – Requirements of Standard

Commitments  – Commitments in ICMM position statement on
Tailings Governance

– ICMM Tailings Management Good Practice

Supporting Guide and Conformance Protocols
Guidance – Other ICMM guides that deal with relevant
environmental and social requirements

– Technical guidelines from ICOLD, ANCOLD,

Technical CDA, JCOLD, SANCOLD, etc.
Guidelines

Relationship to the GISTM, the Conformance

Tailings Management Protocols and the Tailings Governance Framework 23
Part 2: Governance of
Tailings Management

ICMM Part 2: Governance of Tailings Management 24

Overview 2.1

The governance of tailings management Effective governance is essential to safe and

responsible tailings management. Elements of
as described in this Guide is consistent governance include:
with the Standard and refers to the
— Accountability, a corporate policy and related
organisational structures. Governance elements:
refers to the processes, procedures and - Competency and training
communication channels that a - Community engagement
company puts in place to ensure the - Communication
effective management, oversight and — Tailings management system (TMS)
accountability for tailings.
— Operation, maintenance, and surveillance (OMS)
activities

— Managing information

— Programme for reviewing tailings safety

— Emergency preparedness and response

planning (EPRP).

These governance elements provide an essential

framework within which all other activities related to
tailings management are conducted. To be effective,
the governance of tailings management must come
first, with all other activities conducted within that
framework.

Tailings Management Overview 25

Accountability, Policy 2.2
and Related Elements

2.2.1 Introduction — Share information about tailings management

Role clarity is critical to the safe management of tailings. with regulators, communities, investors and other
From defining policy at the corporate level to external parties.
implementing regular measurements in the field at the
technician’s level, and for every task in between, clear 2.2.2 Accountability and Responsibility
roles and responsibilities enhance individual ownership Accountability, responsibility and authority are closely
of assigned scope. related concepts. The difference between them is
critical but is sometimes not clearly understood. The
Accountability, which cannot be delegated, should be
usage of these terms in this Guide is defined as follows:
underpinned by the Operator’s commitment to the safe
management of tailings, including providing the Accountability: The answerability of an individual for
resources (eg financial, personnel) needed to support their own performance and that of any personnel they
both the short- and long-term objectives for safe and direct, and for the completion of specified deliverables
responsible tailings management. or tasks in accordance with defined expectations. An
accountable person may delegate responsibility for the
The circumstances of each Operator and tailings facility
completion of the deliverable or task but not the
vary, and the governance and organisational structure
accountability.
should be appropriately tailored to suit each facility.
At a minimum, the Operator should: Responsibility: The duty or obligation of an individual or
organisation to perform an assigned duty or task in
— Define and document accountabilities and
accordance with defined expectations, and which has a
responsibilities related to tailings management
consequence if the expectations are not met. An
for the:
individual or organisation with responsibility is
- BoD. accountable to the person that delegated that
- Accountable Executive. responsibility to them.
- Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE). Authority: The power to make decisions, assign
- Engineer of Record (EOR) and Design Team responsibilities, or delegate some or all authority, as
(Section 2.2.2). appropriate. The ability to act on behalf of the Operator.

— Establish and maintain a corporate policy on tailings Personnel with accountability and responsibility for all
management through the BoD. decisions related to tailings management should be
identified and in place. Decisions should be made by
— Understand the competencies required for tailings
persons who have clear accountability or responsibility
management and ensure that relevant personnel
and who are appropriately qualified and experienced.
(employees, contractors and consultants) have those
Those persons with defined accountability and
competencies.
responsibility should also have the authority to make
— Engage local communities on matters related to decisions commensurate with their level of
tailings management, including potential risks to responsibility. The Accountable Executive should have
those communities. clear authority commensurate with their accountability
and in cases where they need funding authorisations
— Integrate activities and communicate effectively,
beyond their authority, they should have access to and
both internally (eg between different business units)
communication with those who can provide
and externally, on matters related to tailings
authorisation in a timely manner.
management.

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 26

Persons with accountability, responsibility and authority 2.2.2.2 Accountable Executive
for tailings management should have an understanding The BoD or CEO should designate one or more
– appropriate to their accountability, responsibility and executive-level person(s) to be the Accountable
authority level – of how the tailings facility is planned, Executive(s), who is/are accountable for the safety of
designed, constructed and operated and how it will be tailings facilities and for minimising the social and
closed. This includes the risks posed by the tailings, the environmental consequences of a potential tailings
risk management process and operational constraints. facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) may delegate
responsibilities for tailings management and the
For persons with accountability, responsibility and
development and implementation of the systems needed
authority for tailings management, incentive payments
for safe, responsible tailings management but
or performance reviews should at least in part be based
accountability cannot be delegated. The Accountable
on public safety and the integrity of tailings facilities.
Executive(s) is/are directly answerable to the CEO (or to
Incentive payments should reflect the degree to which
the BoD in the case that a CEO is the Accountable
public safety and the integrity of the tailings facility are
Executive) on matters related to tailings management and
part of the role. Long-term incentives for relevant
should have regular communication with the BoD
executive managers should also take tailings
(initiated either by the BoD or the Accountable
management into account.
Executive(s)). The mechanism for holding the
To enhance clarity of roles and responsibilities, an Accountable Executive(s) accountable should be
Operator may elect to use a tool such as a RACI documented. The role and accountability of the BoD
(responsible, accountable, consult and inform) matrix versus the Accountable Executive(s) determined by the
or a RASCI (responsible, accountable, support, consult Operator and should also be documented.
and inform) matrix to describe roles and relationships
Responsibilities of the Accountable Executive(s) include:
between employees and with contractors and
consultants, including the Engineer of Record (EOR) — Having accountability and responsibility for putting in
and the Design Team. place an appropriate management structure.

— With authorisation from the BoD, ensures that the

2.2.2.1 Board of Directors
necessary resources are in place for tailings
While companies may be organised in different ways,
management.
this Guide adopts the Standard’s definition of BoD. The
ultimate governing body of the Operator is the BoD, — Demonstrating to the BoD whether tailings are
which is typically elected by the shareholders of the managed responsibly and in accordance with
Operator. The BoD is the entity with the final decision- applicable legal requirements and standards.
making authority for the Operator and holds the
authority to, among other things, set the Operator’s
policies, objectives and overall direction, and oversee
the firm’s executives. As the term is used here, it
encompasses any individual or entity with control over
the Operator, including, for example, the owner or
owners. Where the State serves as the Operator, the
BoD is understood to mean the government official with
ultimate responsibility for the final decisions of the
Operator.

Accordingly, the Standard requires that the BoD adopt

and publish a policy on or commitment to the safety
management of tailings facilities, to emergency
preparedness and response, and to recovery after
failure.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 27

— Delegating responsibility and authority for endorsed by Independent Review, while maintaining the
tailings management and defining the personnel flexibility to upgrade the design for the highest
responsibilities, authority and reporting relationships consequence later in the facility’s lifecycle.
to implement the systems needed for safe,
The Accountable Executive(s) may be supported by a
responsible tailings management throughout
corporate expert(s) in tailings management to help
the lifecycle.
oversee the Operator’s portfolio of tailings facilities and
— Delegating responsibility and authority for the to provide a bridge between the Accountable
development of integrated closure plans to ensure Executive(s) and the RTFE and EOR for each tailings
facility integrity post-closure. facility for which the Operator is responsible.

— Being aware of the key outcomes of tailings risk

2.2.2.3 Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer
assessments and how these risks are being
As a minimum, the Operator should designate one RTFE
managed.
for each tailings facility. The RTFE is accountable for the
— Being accountable for a programme of tailings integrity of that tailings facility. During the Construction
management training and for emergency and Operations phases, an RTFE should be available at
preparedness and response. all times (although this person does not necessarily
need to be located on site). Alternatively, there may be
— Establishing a programme for reviewing tailings
an RTFE at the corporate level, with responsibility for
safety, including Independent Review.
more than one tailings facility.
— For new tailings facilities, approving that the design
The RTFE liaises with the EOR and has regular
satisfies the as low as reasonably practicable
communication with the Accountable Executive or their
(ALARP) principle and approving additional steps to
delegate. The RTFE should also liaise with internal teams
further reduce potential consequences to people
with direct and indirect responsibilities related to tailings
and/or the environment, where appropriate.
management such as operations, planning, regulatory
— Having scheduled communication with the EOR. affairs, social performance and the environment. The
RTFE should be familiar with the design, construction,
— Encouraging open, transparent communication
operation and performance of the tailings facility and
among all employees and contractors regarding
have experience, knowledge and competencies
concerns about tailings facility integrity, safety or
appropriate to the complexity of the facility and the
compliance. Establishing a formal, confidential and
risks posed.
written process to receive, investigate and promptly
address concerns from employees and contractors The RTFE should have clearly defined, delegated
about possible permit violations or other matters responsibilities for tailings management and should
relating to regulatory compliance, public safety, have the appropriate competencies to carry out these
tailings facility integrity or the environment. responsibilities. They should identify the scope of work
and budget requirements for all aspects of tailings
The Accountable Executive(s) should embrace the use
management, including the EOR. The RTFE should
of conservative external loading criteria as a guiding
delegate specific tasks and responsibilities for aspects
philosophy for tailings facilities. Where appropriate, the
of tailings management to qualified personnel.
Accountable Executive(s) may decide to adopt lower
design criteria if recommended by the EOR and

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 28

 reclamation as practicable during the Operations
phase, and implementation of the closure plan at
the end of the Operations phase (Section 3.7).

In Detail — Maintain records related to design, construction

Examples of the responsibilities of a RTFE include: and OMS (Section 2.5).

— Coordinate their efforts through the Accountable — Ensure inspections (eg dam safety inspections or
Executive for an aligned approach to tailings DSRs) are completed (Section 2.6).
governance for the Operator.
— Review and update the OMS manual (Section 2.4).
— Implement the TMS (Section 2.3).
— Ensure that emergency response plans are
— Establish, with input from appropriate personnel, a developed, maintained and tested, either as
budget for approval by the Accountable Executive stand-alone plans or as components of sitewide
or persons with delegated budget authority. emergency response plans directly related to
tailings management (Section 2.7).
— With input from the Accountable Executive or
persons with delegated responsibility, establish an — Implement measures to remedy variances from
organisational structure with roles and performance objectives or criteria (Section 3.5, 3.6
responsibilities that meets the operational needs. and 3.7).

— Establish a formal relationship with the EOR and — Implement a programme for reviewing tailings
Design Team to ensure that construction and safety, including Independent Review (Section 2.6).
operation meet the design intent and are
— Identify when/where contemplated operational
compliant with legal requirements (Sections 3.4,
changes are a potential deviation from the design
3.5 and 3.6).
intent and engage the EOR or Design Team as
— Ensure surveillance is undertaken in accordance part of the process to manage change (Sections
with design intent, performance objectives and 2.3, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7).
the risk management plan (Section 2.4).
— Participate in or provide input to community
— Ensure the development of the tailings facility engagement activities related to tailings
closure plan, implementation of progressive management (Section 2.2.5).

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 29

2.2.2.4 Engineer of Record and Design Team — In cases where the Operator has more than one EOR
The EOR is a fundamental role in the development and with responsibilities related to different
management of safe tailings facilities. While this role embankments, the roles and responsibilities of each
can be described using various terminology, at its core, EOR should be clearly defined, together with the
the EOR role: relationship between these EORs.

— Provides assurance to the Operator and relevant — Mechanisms to ensure that relevant personnel
regulatory authorities that the tailings facility design understand the role, responsibilities and authority of
conforms with and meets applicable regulations, the EOR.
statutes, guidelines, codes and standards.
— Resources required for the EOR to fulfil the assigned
— Confirms that the facility has been constructed and role and responsibilities, including financial
is being operated consistent with the design intent resources, support personnel required (and
presented in the design drawings, specifications and appropriate qualifications) and other resources.
design basis documentation.
— Specific deliverables to be provided by the EOR and
— Provides critical, ongoing support during the associated schedules.
Operations phase and through the lifespan of the
The EOR shares responsibility with the RTFE for assuring
facility, confirming that the facility is being safely
to the Operator and other stakeholders that the facility
operated and performing as planned.
is constructed, operated, monitored and performing
The purpose of the EOR role should be understood as a according to the design criteria and intent, applicable
means to ensure that business and operational design standards, change management processes, risk
decisions made by the Operator are informed by an controls, relevant guidelines and accepted engineering
engineer who understands the design principles and practices. All levels of the Operator’s organisation
technical limitations of the tailings facility and the should understand the responsibility and authority held
impact of changes on its safety and performance. by the EOR. The EOR should have regular, scheduled
communication with the Accountable Executive or
There are multiple models that can fulfil the role of EOR,
delegate. In addition, they should have the ability to
and past practices for the engagement of an EOR have
ultimately raise concerns directly with the Accountable
varied significantly in different countries and regions of
Executive if necessary.
the world. This Guide recognises that a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach is impractical and acknowledges two The EOR should have professional attributes aligned
basic models for fulfilling the role of EOR – an external with the responsibilities required for the given tailings
EOR or an internal EOR – and that multiple variations of facility inclusive of that facility’s complexity and
each model may exist. precedence. Selection of the appropriate person for the
EOR role and ensuring this person has adequate
It is up to each Operator to determine and document
support is fundamental to tailings facility safety.
the following:
Because the scope of an EOR for most tailings facilities
— EOR model best suited to their needs and their
is so broad, implementation of the role typically requires
capacity.
the combined expertise of an individual EOR and a
— Required qualifications and competencies for the supporting multi-disciplinary team. This multi-
EOR, and the process to ensure that these disciplinary team should be scaled according to the
requirements are met. complexity of each facility. Regardless of how individual
responsibilities are delegated among the various
— Responsibility, authority and role of the EOR.
members of the team, the overarching responsibility for
— Relationship between the EOR and the RTFE. understanding the design concept and how it applies to
the construction and successful operation of the facility
— Relationship between the EOR and the Design Team.
resides with the individual appointed as EOR.
— Relationship between the EOR and members of the
The Design Team develops the design of the tailings
Operator’s technical and functional teams and
facility. The work involved may include the initial design
contractors related to tailings management.
for a new tailings facility, planned construction through
— Relationship between the EOR and the programme the Operations phase, and any material changes to the
for reviewing tailings safety (eg role of the EOR in design of the tailings facility. The Operator should define
Independent Review). and document the roles and responsibilities and

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 30

relationship of the EOR relative to the Design Team. As Tailings facilities are long-lived structures that change
with the EOR, there are different models for the Design throughout their lives and may require maintenance and
Team. The Design Team may be from the same firm as surveillance long after the original EOR has retired from
the EOR, which is helpful in terms of facilitating effective professional practice. Thus, managing change of the
communication and collaboration. In some instances, EOR is critical to the continuity of safe and responsible
there may be a single or lead designer, sometimes tailings management.
referred to as the Designer of Record. In some cases,
Above all, the EOR needs to accept the commitment, be
the EOR may fulfil the design function. It is up to
available when required, and communicate effectively
the Operator, subject to any relevant legal requirements,
with the RTFE and Accountable Executive (or delegate).
to determine the most appropriate approach.
The EOR needs to gain the confidence of the
Like the EOR, the Design Team members should have Independent Reviewer(s) through demonstrated
professional attributes aligned with the responsibilities commitment and competent responses to issues as
required for the given tailings facility inclusive of that they arise.
facility’s complexity and precedence. The role of the
EOR with respect to design is further discussed in
Section 3.4.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 31

 concerns or any significant outstanding concerns
that have not been adequately addressed by the
RTFE or others with relevant responsibility and
authority.
In Detail
Examples of normal responsibilities carried by the — Advising on contemplated changes to the tailings
EOR include: facility’s operation.

— Documentation of information on the design, — Participating in inspections and Independent

design basis and design intent of the facility Review (Section 2.6.4).
(Section 3.4.5).
— Working with the RTFE, be responsible for
— Providing guidance and oversight to the preparation of or review of the Construction
investigations and studies needed to adequately Records Report (CRR) (‘as-built’ report) and
characterise the site (Section 3.3.2). updates (Section 3.5.4).

— Identifying and providing oversight to the — Developing and maintaining relevant records
necessary design analyses as required to develop related to design, construction and operation,
the design basis for the facility (Section 3.4.3). maintenance, surveillance and closure (Section
2.5), and handing those records over to the
— Providing responsible charge for reviewing and
Operator.
approving data analyses and deliverables
prepared by Design Team, Operator or third With respect to managing a change of the EOR the
parties. following should be considered:

— Providing engineering analysis in support of the — Succession planning for the EOR role is important
development of the closure plan (Section 3.7). (Section 2.3.2.1).

— Providing input into the OMS manual and — Change for the sake of change should be avoided.
implementation of OMS activities (Section 2.4) in
— Decisions to select, retain or change the EOR
accordance with the design.
should never be based on cost alone. The selection
— Receiving and reviewing tailings facility of the EOR should be decided by the Accountable
performance data at a frequency determined Executive with input from the RTFE and informed,
based on the risks. but not decided by, procurement personnel.

— Participating in periodic risk assessments Where procurement practices place a strong

(Sections 3.2 and 3.4.2). emphasis on competitive costs, this can result in
breaking the design into small segments for either
— Participating in the identification and evaluation of
economic or other management objectives. This
potential failure modes, and the identification of
creates an unnecessary risk by not taking a holistic
credible failure modes.
approach to design. Thus, procurement policies that
— Participating in the development of the risk ensure experience is adequately weighted in
management plan, including risk controls and selecting the EOR and Design Team are helpful to
critical controls and associated surveillance. make sure that decisions are not being driven unduly
by economics.
— Overseeing or verifying quality management
during construction (Section 3.5). All tailings facilities evolve and change throughout
their lifecycle. As such, the Operator should review
— Preparing a periodic Deviance Accountability
the required qualifications of the EOR periodically
Report (DAR) (Section 3.5.3).
(every three to five years for tailings facilities in the
— Confirming that the tailings facility’s operation is Operations, Closure and Post-Closure phases, even
compliant or identifying variances from more frequently as projects progress from the Project
performance criteria and advising the Operator Conception phase through to the Design phase) to
with recommendations. ensure the EOR has the experience, knowledge and
competencies appropriate to the tailings facility.
— Notifying the Accountable Executive (or delegate)
in the event the EOR identifies any critical

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 32

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 33
2.2.3 Corporate Policy on Tailings — Providing adequate resources (financial, personnel,
Management etc) to manage tailings in accordance with the policy.
Establishing a corporate policy on tailings management
The corporate policy should be:
provides an important basis for establishing corporate
priorities and performance objectives (Section 3.3.3) — Reviewed and endorsed by the BoD.
related to tailings management. A policy is an important
— Consistent with applicable legal requirements.
tool to demonstrate, both internally and externally, the
Operator’s commitment to tailings management. — Communicated to employees.

The policy should be aligned with the Operator’s — Understood to a degree appropriate to their roles
commitment to implementing a corporate safety and responsibilities by personnel whose activities
culture: prioritising safe and responsible tailings may affect tailings management either directly or
management with the ultimate goal of zero fatalities indirectly.
and catastrophic events.
— Publicly available.
The policy should be integrated with corporate policies
Tailings management is a core business function of the
related to sustainability, health and safety, business
mining industry, and as described in Sections 1.2.2.2 and
ethics and other related elements to ensure that:
3.2, planning for tailings management should be
— Corporate commitments and goals related to tailings integrated into planning related to relevant aspects of
management are integrated with and reflected in mining operations, such as ore extraction and
other corporate commitments. processing, sitewide water management, management
of waste rock and other mine wastes, and sitewide
— Other corporate commitments and goals are
closure planning. To facilitate this integrated approach,
reflected in tailings management.
it is essential that all business units understand the
Operators should develop a policy on tailings corporate policy on tailings management and their role
management that best meets their needs and corporate in implementing the policy, including the importance of
management approach while addressing their legal integrated mine planning. Furthermore, the corporate
requirements and commitments to local communities. As policy and site-specific performance objectives for
their portfolio of tailings facilities and associated risks will tailings management should be integrated into sitewide
change with time, the Operator should re-evaluate the policies, objectives and plans.
adequacy of the policy on a regular basis.

The corporate policy should demonstrate the Operator’s 2.2.4 Competency and Promoting Continual
commitment to: Learning
Tailings management requires the Operator and
— Protection of health and safety of employees, personnel involved in tailings management to have a
contractors and the public. level of competence consistent with the requirements
— Safe and responsible management of tailings with of the tailings facility and its risks. The key elements of
the objective of zero fatalities and eliminating developing and maintaining competence are
catastrophic failures. qualifications, training and experience.

— Allocation of appropriate resources to support Competency

tailings management activities. Competencies comprise knowledge, skills and abilities
— Implementing effective governance of tailings and are typically demonstrated through behaviour.
management through the actions of the Operator’s Competency is important for effective performance.
employees, contractors and consultants. High level competencies for tailings management may
be identified by the Operator and should reflect the
— An organisational culture that promotes learning,
Operator’s values. Those broader competencies are
communication, early problem recognition and early
often supported by role specific competencies,
escalation of issues.
performance indicators, knowledge/skills/abilities and
— Emergency preparedness and post-incident current learning resources for the position.
recovery if a failure occurs.
As tailings personnel progress through their careers,
— Implementing a programme for reviewing tailings they are naturally expected to gain competency in key
safety, including Independent Review. practice areas. A competency framework should be

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 34

developed and used in conjunction with a mentoring — Understanding of and knowledge in relevant
and training system to maximise learning and practice areas
development. When assessing competency, consider
— Understanding and application of relevant theory
such aspects as:
and practice
— Purpose of the position
— E xecution of the TMS
— Nature of the work
— Leadership skills and behaviours
— Education/Experience
Operators should identify appropriate qualifications
— Level of interaction and experience requirements for all personnel who
play safety-critical roles related to tailings
— Autonomy/decision-making capacity and authority
management, including, but not limited to the RTFE,
— Budgetary responsibilities the EOR and the Accountable Executive. Operators
should ensure that incumbents of these roles have the
— Managerial responsibilities
identified qualifications and experience and develop
— Skill demonstration succession plans for these personnel.

‘responsible charge’ for the facility. The EOR should

also have additional skills and characteristics that
allow them to: effectively and respectfully
communicate with a broad audience; convey
In Detail
competence and reliability; and gain trust from clients
Attributes of Key Roles and peers in the tailings facility safety community.
Further information on competencies for key roles are
discussed below. RTFE
The RTFE should understand the tailings facilities for
Accountable Executive which they are responsible, the risks, and the manner
The Accountable Executive does not necessarily in which those risks are being managed, including any
need to be an expert in tailings management but failures, deficiencies or opportunities for improvement.
should have the competency to: They should be informed by evaluations of
performance and results of reviews conducted as part
— Understand the concepts of tailings management
of the TMS (Section 2.3), the results of the programme
and the associated risks.
for reviewing tailings safety (including Independent
— Know what key questions to ask of their personnel Review) (Section 2.6) and be apprised of any
relative to tailings management. significant developments in between these activities.

— Articulate a clear, honest assessment of tailings

Independent Review
risks to the BoD.
Independent Review is conducted by one or more
— Advocate for resources needed for tailings appropriately qualified and experienced individuals
management. who have not been directly involved with the design
or operation of the particular tailings facility. The
EOR qualifications and experience of reviewers should be
The EOR should have education, experience, aligned with the tailings facility’s complexity and risk
capabilities and knowledge commensurate with the profile. Similar to the EOR, Independent Reviewers
complexity of the facility and potential consequences should have education, experience, capabilities and
of a failure in the areas of design, construction, knowledge commensurate with the complexity of the
operation and performance evaluation, which are facility and potential consequences of a failure in the
gained through directly related experience. This areas of design, construction, operation and
includes facility-specific knowledge to a sufficient performance evaluation, which are gained through
level of detail that the EOR can demonstrate directly-related experience.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 35

Promoting Continual Learning informally. Formal programmes and materials should
Training should build skills and expand job knowledge be developed to cover essential elements required
and understanding. A training programme should be under the training programme. Additionally, informal
developed and implemented that considers: learning happens through experience and can be
developed through reading relevant publications,
— Training for new personnel.
engaging with subject matter experts, participation in
— Refresher training at a frequency determined by the inspections and reviews, interacting with an industry
Operator, considering the risk profile of the tailings network, internal knowledge sharing, and exposure to
facility. new approaches or technologies.

— Training associated with significant changes such Promoting continual learning will help to ensure that
as updates to the OMS manual or emergency personnel have the competencies and qualifications
preparedness plans. necessary for tailings management and can also help
to ensure staff retention and reduce turnover by
— Training for competency development.
creating more opportunities for career advancement.
Better trained personnel can help to facilitate
Training should address:
improved tailings management, and reducing
— General aspects, such as the Operator’s policy and
turnover reduces risks associated with changes in
commitments related to tailings management, and
personnel.
the overall goals of safe, responsible tailings
management for personnel with direct and indirect Operators should establish mechanisms that
roles related to tailings management. incorporate workers’ experience-based knowledge
into planning, design and operation for all phases of
— Specific aspects (eg technical, communication,
the tailings facility lifecycle. Operators should also
management) related to the roles and responsibilities
establish mechanisms that promote cross-functional
of personnel with direct roles related to tailings
collaboration to ensure effective data and knowledge
management.
sharing, communication and implementation of
Operators should aim to develop a corporate culture management measures to support public safety and
that promotes continual learning, both formally and the integrity of the tailings facility.

also be improved by better understanding the

experiences of others in tailings-related roles. When
planning a training programme, consider if there is an
opportunity to engage others involved with tailings
In Detail
management.
Providing appropriate training to those who are
involved in tailings management, including Training may be carried out using in-house resources
employees, contractors, consultants and suppliers, but there may be a need to involve external parties
will require different training at different levels. For such as the Design Team or EOR in development of
example, senior management should receive higher the training materials. Operators may consider some
level, conceptual training about the risks of tailings form of evaluation of personnel on their knowledge
management, while mine managers and others relative to their role to demonstrate competency. A
working directly on specific aspects of tailings tracking mechanism should be in place (eg training
facilities through various lifecycle phases should needs matrix) to ensure that all relevant personnel
receive detailed and relevant training that receive appropriate training.
corresponds to their work. Tailings management may

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 36

2.2.5 Community Engagement and the development of the closure plan (Section
Community engagement helps to build trust and 3.7.2).
prevent the potential for conflicts with communities. It
— Co-developing community-focused emergency
can help to ensure that communities have an
preparedness measures (Section 2.7).
understanding of the risks to them associated with
tailings facilities, and how the Operator is managing Community engagement related to tailings
those risks, including the emergency preparedness management should be integrated with broader
measures that are in place. It can also help to inform community engagement activities, although
better decisions about tailings management, including: engagement more specifically targeted to tailings
management may be appropriate on some topics (eg
— Evaluating alternatives (Section 3.3.4) for a new
community input during the Project Conception phase
tailings facility or extending the life of an existing
(Section 3.3)). Engagement should be coordinated with
facility.
and conducted in collaboration with personnel with
— Reflecting community concerns and values in specific expertise in community engagement, but
performance objectives (Section 3.3.3). tailings specialists involved in community engagement
should receive appropriate training.
— Identification of post-closure land-use objectives

Further Reading:
ICMM: Stakeholder Research Toolkit

ICMM: Community Development Toolkit

In Detail
ICMM: Understanding Company–Community
The Standard has specific requirements related
Relations Toolkit
to respecting the rights of project-affected people
which are outside the scope of this Guide and ICMM: Indigenous Peoples and Mining: Good
are addressed in other guidance from ICMM Practice Guide
(Section 1.3.1).
ICMM: Integrating human rights due diligence into
Community engagement may also extend to providing corporate risk management processes
a direct role in the development and implementation of
ICMM: Handling and Resolving Local-Level Concerns
some surveillance activities (eg downstream water
and Grievances
quality monitoring). This can help to:
ICMM: International Finance Corporation and
— Ensure that surveillance programmes include
International Committee of the Red Cross: Voluntary
parameters of concern to communities.
Principles on Security and Human Rights:
— Provide a direct mechanism for communities to Implementation Guidance Tools
share their unique knowledge and understanding
MAC: Towards Sustainable Mining Indigenous and
of the area (eg traditional knowledge).
Community Relationships Protocol (2019)
— Help to build trust through the direct involvement
of trained community members in surveillance,
including both data collection and analysis (eg
involvement in downstream water quality
monitoring).

— Help to build community capacity, developing

transferable skills and potentially providing a basis
for greater community involvement in surveillance
during the Post-Closure phase.

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 37

2.2.6 Communication — Breakdowns in communication should be investigated
An Operator should describe expectations for to learn from them and improve communication.
communication as well as lines of communication as
— The effectiveness of communication should be
they relate to tailings management and related
assessed regularly, with the aim of identifying
activities. Processes should be established and
deficiencies and opportunities for improvement.
implemented for two-way communication for personnel
who have accountability or responsibility tailings In addition, an Operator should establish mechanisms that
management, including reporting of significant recognise, reward and protect from retaliation, employees
information and decisions to senior management, the and contractors who report problems or identify
EOR, regulators and communities, as appropriate. opportunities for improving tailings facility management.
An Operator should respond in a timely manner and
While documenting and adhering to processes and
communicate actions taken and their outcomes.
lines of communication are important, there are limits to
what can be achieved through written policies and In accordance with international good practices for
procedures. Effective communication is a skill that whistleblower protection, an Operator should not
should be developed and addressed as part of training discharge, discriminate against or otherwise retaliate in
activities, including providing training on mechanisms any way against a whistleblower who, in good faith, has
for communication, and communication expectations reported possible permit violations or other matters
commensurate with the roles of personnel. In addition, relating to regulatory compliance, public safety, tailings
to help to improve communication: facility integrity or the environment.

ICMM Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 38

2.2.7 Sharing Information governance framework, and its policies, standard or
There is a wide range of information about tailings approaches to the design, construction, monitoring
management, including information about risks and and closure of tailings facilities. The Standard also
how the Operator is managing those risks, that outlines specific elements for Operators to summarise
Operators should plan to share with communities and for disclosure.
other stakeholders. In addition, there may be a range
An Operator may also be required to share a range of
of information that the Operator is required to provide
information with relevant jurisdictions to meet various
to meet legal requirements. However, sharing
legal requirements. An Operator should compile a list
information should be tailored to the needs and
of all legal requirements relevant to tailings
capacity of those with whom it is being shared.
management, including a description of the
Sharing information with communities about tailings information required to meet each legal requirement.
management helps to build trust, increase This list should also clarify whether the information
transparency, and provide evidence to demonstrate submitted to meet various legal requirements will be in
safe tailings management. It builds upon community the public domain. The Operator’s plan for managing
engagement (Section 2.2.5) and communication conformance (Section 2.3.2.2) should include this list,
(Section 2.2.6). Operators may consult with with a plan to ensure that all the relevant legal
communities to identify: requirements are met.

— Information about tailings management that they There is a wide range of information that an Operator
want the Operator to share with them. needs to be able to safely manage tailings (Section
2.5). This information provides the basis for what is
— Form in which the information should be provided
shared with communities and other stakeholders, but
by the Operator (eg language, level of detail).
it is up to the Operator to put this information in a form
— Mechanisms for sharing information (eg Operator’s (eg plain language summaries) that is useful to
website). communities and other stakeholders, and
constructively contributes to building trust and
— Frequency of sharing of information.
transparency. In determining the information to be
The Operator should consider developing a plan for shared and the form in which it will be shared, the
sharing information with communities based on input Operator should be cognizant of any legal limitations
from consultations and refine how it shares on the sharing in information, specifically if related to
information as engagement with communities evolves. securities-related limits on sharing forward-looking
In developing a plan to share information with information.
communities, an Operator should be cognizant of the
In addition, the Operator should respond in a
detailed requirements for public disclosure in the
systematic and timely manner to requests from
Standard (see Requirement 15.1).
interested and affected stakeholders for additional
In addition to communities, there are other information material to the public safety and integrity
stakeholders (eg shareholders, investors) with whom of a tailings facility. When the request for information
the Operator should consider sharing information is denied, the Operator should provide an explanation
about tailings management. The nature of the to the requesting stakeholder.
information shared and the mechanisms for sharing
The Operator should also commit to cooperate in
this information may be different than for information
credible global transparency initiatives to create
shared with communities, depending on the needs
standardised, independent, industry-wide and publicly
and nature of the stakeholder.
accessible databases, inventories or other information
Specifically, per the Standard, an Operator is required repositories about the safety and integrity of tailings
to publish and regularly update information on its facilities.
commitment to safe tailings facility management, its

Tailings Management Accountability, Policy and Related Elements 39

Tailings Management Systems 2.3

2.3.1 Introduction Implementation of TMSs should align with the

The development and implementation of a TMS is corporate policy on tailings management and follow
essential to the effective governance of tailings an iterative cycle throughout the lifecycle of a tailings
management, which, as described in Section 1.2.2, is facility (Figure 4):
one of the foundations of safe tailings management,
1) Plan: Developing Plans for Tailings Management.
together with the implementation of good engineering
The Operator uses the corporate policy as a basis
practice.
for establishing all systems, information and plans
A site-specific TMS integrates all of the Operator’s relevant to the current lifecycle phase and plans, at
systems, information, plans, practices and processes an appropriate level of detail, for future lifecycle
related to the management of a given tailings facility phases (eg begin development of OMS activities
into one comprehensive framework. It provides a: during the Project Conception phase, refine during
the Design phase, and implement, review and
— Governance structure with checks and balances on
update as necessary during subsequent phases).
decision-making, including third-party oversight (eg
Independent Review). 2) Do: Implementing the TMS. Systems and plans are
implemented as appropriate to the lifecycle phase.
— Mechanism to effectively implement good
engineering practices for tailings management. 3) Check: Evaluating Performance. The performance of
the tailings facility and the systems and plans in
— Means to facilitate effective communication
place to manage the facility are measured (eg
to address risk and drive action, including
surveillance, inspections, Independent Review,
communication between:
audits) to determine whether the performance
- Senior management accountable for tailings objectives are being met and to identify potential
management and those responsible for tailings problems. If the performance objectives are not
management. being met, the need for potential corrective actions
- Those with direct responsibilities for tailings is identified. Similarly, opportunities for continual
management and those with indirect improvement are identified.
responsibilities for tailings management (eg
4) Act: Identifying Actions to Improve Performance:
procurement, ore processing operations).
The results of performance evaluations are reviewed
— Mechanism to help to ensure that decisions are made: by senior management to understand whether the
- Consistent with the corporate policy, performance facility and systems, and plans to manage the
objectives, the design intent and the risk facility, are effective. Action plans to address
management plan. deficiencies or opportunities for continual
improvement are developed.
- Informed by risk.
- Taking into account relevant information (eg The cycle then repeats, beginning with reviews and
surveillance results, Independent Review, updates, as appropriate, to all systems, information and
community perspectives). plans to improve performance and in accordance with
- At the appropriate level within the organisation, the lifecycle phase. The revised plans are implemented,
commensurate with the risks associated with the and performance is evaluated.
decision.

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 40

The key to the success of implementing a TMS is — Elements within the scope of the TMS are
ensuring that: deliberately managed within the framework of the
management system.
— The scope of the TMS is clearly defined.
For existing facilities, a TMS can be developed and
— The relationships between the TMS and other
implemented at any phase of the lifecycle to provide
sitewide systems (eg sitewide ESMS, sitewide water
more effective integration and governance of tailings
management plan) are understood.
management activities.

leadership and commitment’ (International

Organization for Standardization (ISO)).

TMSs as described in this Guide are aligned with the

In Detail ISO 14001 definition of an environmental
A management system describes the set of management system which includes: an
procedures an organisation needs to follow in order organisational structure, planning activities,
to meet its objectives. The objective of implementing responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and
management systems is to ‘help organisations resources for developing, implementing, achieving,
improve their performance by specifying repeatable reviewing and maintaining policies.
steps that organisations consciously implement to
achieve their goals and objectives, and to create an Further Reading:
organisational culture that reflexively engages in a MAC (2019): A Guide to the Management of Tailings
continuous cycle of self-evaluation, correction and Facilities, Version 3.1
improvement of operations and processes through ISO 14001 – Environmental Management
heightened employee awareness and management

Figure 4: Elements of a tailings management system and application across the lifecycle

Act: Plan:
Review and develop Develop plans for
action plans Tailings Facility Lifecycle tailings management

Material Changes

Project
Design Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception

Construction

Check: Do:
Evaluate Implement the tailings
performance management system

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 41

2.3.2 Plan: Developing Plans for Tailings Developing Plans for Tailings Management should be
Management closely integrated with sitewide mine planning (Section
Developing Plans for Tailings Management involves 3.2.2) and should take into account anticipated
developing information and plans related to tailings transitions to different lifecycle phases, anticipated
management and updating the information and plans changes and evolution of the tailings facility, and
as appropriate throughout the lifecycle, in alignment anticipated changes and evolution of the overall mine
with corporate policy. This includes developing and plan.
updating as appropriate the following systems,
For new facilities, the development of the systems,
information and plans:
information and plans for a TMS should begin as early
— Site characterisation (Section 3.3.2) as possible in the Project Conception and Design
phases of the lifecycle.
— Risk assessment (Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4)
For Operators of existing tailings facilities developing a
— Multi-criteria alternatives analysis (Section 3.3.4)
TMS, many of the systems, information and plans
— Performance objectives, indicators and criteria items listed above may already exist, while others may
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3) not. The objective of the TMS is to bring all systems,
information and plans related to tailings management
— Risk management plan (Sections 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6)
under a single umbrella to help to ensure a consistent,
— Documentation of the design of the tailings facility, comprehensive, rigorous and systematic approach to
including the design intent and basis (Section 3.4.5) tailings management. Operators of existing facilities
developing a TMS should conduct a gap analysis and
— Water management plan (Section 3.2.3)
assess the adequacy of existing systems, information
— Tailings transportation and deposition plan (Section and plans. The gap analysis should also consider input
3.4.4) from previous reviews (eg Independent Review), audits
or other mechanisms to provide internal or external
— Closure plan (Section 3.7.2)
oversight or advice on how the tailings facility is
— OMS manual (Section 2.4) managed. An action plan should be developed and
implemented to address gaps, deficiencies or
— Emergency preparedness and response plan (EPRP)
inconsistencies/conflicts between these existing
(Section 2.7)
systems, information and plans.
— Competencies for key roles related to tailings
management (Section 2.2.4) 2.3.2.1 Managing Change
Managing change is critical to the safe and
— Plans for managing:
responsible management of tailings, and change may
- Change be a potential source of risk. Tailings facilities are
- Conformance subject to change throughout their lifecycle. This
- Information (Section 2.5) includes changes in a tailings facility itself (eg
increasing the size or height of the facility,
- Quality (Section 3.4.5 and 3.5.2)
implementing progressive reclamation) and changes in
- Construction (Section 3.5) the environment in which a tailings facility exists (eg
— Resources for tailings management mine plan changes such as a mine life extension,
ownership, personnel, legal requirements,
— Programme for reviewing tailings safety, including communities, climate). In addition, changes to
Independent Review (Section 2.6). implement continual improvement, such as good
Aspects to be addressed that are not addressed engineering practices, also need to be managed
elsewhere in the Guide are described below. appropriately.

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 42

Processes to manage change should be documented Changes that are beyond the Operator’s control such
and implemented to ensure that tailings continue to be as changes in legal requirements or changes in nearby
managed safely and responsibly. communities (eg new downstream social or economic
infrastructure) may also be very important but may be
All potential changes should be carefully considered to
more challenging to manage as the Operator may have
ensure that there are no adverse or unintended
less latitude for proactive actions. An important aspect
consequences associated with changes. Further
of managing such changes is remaining alert to
information is provided on three types of changes:
potential developments outside the Operator’s control,
— Potential material changes (Section 3.6.3). in order to have as much advance warning as possible
of a potential change.
— Changes in personnel in key roles (internal and
external) (see below). Processes for managing change should address
identifying and engaging internal and external
— Changes in ownership of a tailings facility (see
stakeholders relevant to the potential change.
below).

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 43

 — Deviance Accountability Report (DAR)

— Construction Records Report (CRR)

— TMS
In Detail
— OMS manual
Changes in Personnel in Key Roles
Succession plans should be in place for key roles — Closure plan
related to tailings management, including the EOR,
— Assignment of accountability and responsibility
RTFE, Accountable Executive and Independent
Reviewers. The focus of such planning is not on the — Competency of personnel in key positions
staffing or human resources aspects. Rather, it is to
— Performance of the tailings facility
ensure that a plan is put in place, proactively, to
manage changes in such key roles, whether the — Record of conformance, including compliance
changes are expected or unexpected. with legal requirements

Succession plans should include descriptions of the — Outcomes of the programme for reviewing tailings
roles and responsibilities, required qualifications, and safety, including Independent Review.
the process for filling external roles in the event of
This review will also help to inform actions taken in
change. With respect to a change in the EOR the
the event that the merger or acquisition proceeds.
succession plan should also address the transfer of
appropriate documentation to the new EOR.
Hand-over if a merger or acquisition occurs
If a merger or acquisition occurs, then the new
Changes in Ownership
Operator should consider the importance of
There are two aspects to be considered as part of a
continuity, versus the need for change to improve
change in ownership:
tailings management and reduce risks. If tailings are
being managed in a safe, responsible manner by
Due diligence of the prospective new Operator in
competent personnel with appropriate systems and
advance of a merger or acquisition
documentation in place, then it may be best to avoid
A prospective new Operator should include a
undue changes.
thorough review of all tailings facilities that may be
included within a merger or acquisition. A review of Changes, such as changes in key personnel (eg
potential risks and liabilities associated with tailings RTFE, EOR) are a risk, given the complexities of
management is as important as a review of the tailings management and the time it takes to properly
potential assets, perhaps even more so, to help to understand how a particular tailings facility is
ensure that the prospective owner is making an designed and operated.
informed decision.
However, if through the review before the merger or
Such a review may be limited by the amount of acquisition, or through further assessment after the
information available to the prospective new merger or acquisition, the new Operator concludes
Operator, but to the extent possible such a review that changes are needed to address deficiencies and
should include (Section 2.5): reduce risks, then these changes should be made.

— Site characterisation It is important that the existing Operator ensures the

transfer of all relevant information to the new
— Risk assessment
Operator, including:
— Risk management plan
— Documentation related to all the information listed
— Design basis report (DBR) above for a review prior to a merger or acquisition.

— Construction versus Design Intent Verification — All relevant archival information.

(CDIV)

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 44

2.3.2.2 Managing Conformance — Schedules of activities that integrate the required
The Operator should document and implement resources related to tailings management. Examples
conformance management processes to ensure that: of activities to be scheduled include the timing of
construction, access to construction material,
— Applicable legal requirements and commitments
reviews, inspections and any other item critical to
(including commitments/conditions associated
successfully implementing the TMS.
with environmental assessment and permitting) are
identified, documented, understood, effectively Measures should be in place for financial control as well
communicated and met. as competency and training (Section 2.2.4) and
communication (Section 2.2.6).
— Operator’s policies, guidelines, standards and
practices are identified, documented, implemented The Operator should establish and document a budget
and met, and are reviewed periodically. for tailings management, considering both short-term
(eg one to two years) and long-term (eg including the
— Those accountable and responsible for
Closure and Post-Closure phases) needs for safe,
conformance understand the conformance
responsible tailings management throughout the
management plan and have the necessary training
lifecycle.
and competence.
The Operator should establish and document the
— Procedures to assess the state of conformance,
associated financial controls, obtain budget approval
including frequencies, have been established,
and track capital and operating costs against the
implemented, documented and communicated as
budget. In addition, at a frequency documented and
required for safe, responsible tailings management.
appropriate to the tailings facility and its lifecycle phase,
— Status of conformance is documented and the Operator should re-evaluate the decommissioning
reported internally and externally, as required (eg and reclamation provision for each facility
as required as per legal requirements). commensurate with corporate policy, good practices
and the applicable legal requirements and
Documentation of conformance management
commitments.
processes should include processes to follow in cases
of non-conformance, including:
Further Reading:
— Documenting and reporting the non-conformance, ICMM: Financial Concepts for Mine Closure
internally and externally, as required.
2.3.3 Do: Implementing the Tailings
— Initiating investigations to determine the causes of
Management System
the non-conformance.
When fully implemented, a TMS will facilitate continual
— Addressing consequences of the non- improvement in safe, responsible tailings management.
conformance. The objective is to implement all the elements of the
TMS in a manner appropriate to the lifecycle phase of
2.3.2.3 Resources the tailings facility, to ensure that:
For effective implementation of a TMS, including
— Activities relevant to that lifecycle phase are
eventual decommissioning and closure, and sustained
effectively implemented.
post-closure management, the Operator should
identify, secure and regularly review adequacy of: — Performance objectives are met, risks are managed,
and the tailings facility is performing as expected
— Human resources and external contractors
and as per the design intent for the lifecycle phase
and consultants.
of the facility.
— Condition, function and suitability of equipment.
— Surveillance programmes and decision-making
— Financial resources needed to address both mechanisms are in place to be able to respond in a
operating and capital costs, including expected timely manner to variances from expected behaviour
costs in the Closure and Post-Closure phases. or performance criteria.

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 45

— Conformance requirements relevant to that lifecycle 2.3.4 Check: Evaluating Performance
phase are met. Evaluating Performance builds upon the results of
— Change is managed effectively throughout the surveillance (Section 2.4.3) and the programme for
lifecycle. reviewing tailings safety, including Independent Review
(Section 2.6). It occurs at a range of time scales and is
Implementing the TMS requires the implementation of intended to:
relevant plans, including action plans developed in
previous iterations of the management system process — Assess whether performance objectives (Sections
(Section 2.3.5). 3.2 and 3.3) are being met.

Integral to this for tailings facilities in the Operations, — Assess whether the design intent is being met
Closure and Post-Closure phases of the lifecycle is the (Section 3.4.5).
implementation of OMS activities (Section 2.4). OMS — Assess the effectiveness of risk management
activities are essential to the day-to-day implementation measures, including risk controls (Sections 3.2, 3.4
of the TMS and all associated plans and operating in and 3.6).
conformance with the performance objectives (Sections
3.2 and 3.3) and the design intent of the facility (Section — Establish a mechanism to conduct post-incident
3.4.5). The conceptual development of OMS activities analyses.
should begin during the Project Conception phase and — Inform Identifying Actions to Improve Performance.
be refined during the Design phase.
Aspects of performance that should be evaluated
The development and testing of the EPRP (Section 2.7) include:
should continue throughout the Operations, Closure,
and Post-Closure phases, and the Operator should — Performance of the tailings facility against
maintain a state of readiness to be able to implement performance objectives and the design intent
the EPRP if an emergency occurs. (Section 3.4.5).

During the Construction phase (Section 3.5), the — Compliance with legal requirements and
implementation of the TMS includes constructing in conformance with plans and commitments.
accordance with the design (Section 3.4.5) and the — Adequacy of the TMS and associated elements,
Quality Management Plan (Section 3.5.2). It also including the systems, information and plans listed in
includes developing and updating as appropriate the: Section 2.3.2.
— Construction versus Design Intent Verification (CDIV) — Documentation associated with construction
— Deviance Accountability Report (DAR) activities (Section 3.5):
- CDIV
— Construction Records Report (CRR).
- DAR
For tailings facilities in the Closure and Post-Closure
- CRR.
phases, implementing the TMS includes:
— Adequacy of resources for tailings management.
— Implementing the closure plan.
Evaluating Performance should include the identification
— Conducting long-term OMS activities, as necessary,
of deficiencies and opportunities for improvement.
in accordance with the closure plan.
Evaluating Performance is an ongoing, iterative process
In cases where changes are made, those changes
that involves two-way communication between a range
should be:
of personnel involved in tailings management. Through
— Documented, including incorporation into design the surveillance of performance criteria associated with
or operational documents where relevant. risk controls (Section 3.6.4), Evaluating Performance
provides essential short-term input to decision-making.
— Communicated to relevant personnel
The RTFE, EOR and Independent Reviewers all have
(proactively when possible).
roles to play including providing input to and receiving
— Supported with appropriate training, depending outputs from Evaluating Performance, depending on
on the nature of the change (Section 2.2.4). both the information and time scale involved.

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 46

Results of Evaluating Performance should be and level of detail documented in the Operator’s policies
documented in a performance review and reported to and procedures. The results of Evaluating Performance
the RTFE, the Accountable Executive and, as may also be reflected in the information provided to
appropriate, the BoD, at a frequency (at least annual) project-affected people (Section 2.2.7).

— How can a similar event be prevented from

happening in the future?

— Were any mistakes made that led to the incident,

In Detail or in responding to the incident? If so, how can
As part of Evaluating Performance, the Operator those mistakes be avoided in the future?
should establish a mechanism to conduct post-
— What can be done to improve response if a similar
incident analyses for incidents related to tailings
incident occurs in the future?
management that may occur, such as cases of
non-conformance, unanticipated upset conditions, or — Are there any recommendations for changes to
an emergency. This is particularly important for the TMS, EPRP or OMS manual as an outcome of
incidents with material impacts (eg business the post-incident analysis?
disruption, release of material, non-compliance with
If an incident occurs, a post-incident analysis should
legal requirements) and in such cases, post-incident
be initiated as soon as possible afterwards, while the
analyses may be conducted in more detail and with
memories of the personnel involved remain fresh. The
more intense scrutiny. It is important to learn from
results of the analysis should be documented and
such analyses to help prevent similar incidents from
reported to the RTFE, Accountable Executive and
occurring in the future. Post-incident analyses should
BoD, as appropriate. Operators are encouraged to
consider both the technical and governance aspects
share their analyses and outcomes with the industry
that potentially contributed to the incident and the
more broadly, so that others may learn and
Operator’s response to the incident. They could also
subsequently improve their tailings management
consider a range of questions such as:
practices.
— What was the root cause of the incident, and what
were the contributing factors?

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 47

2.3.5 Act: Identifying Actions to Improve of previously developed and approved action plans,
Performance including any deviations from approved action plans.
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should be
As part of Identifying Actions to Improve Performance,
conducted on a regular basis. The objective is to review
the Operator should also consider future plans, such as
current performance and future plans, and to drive
planned future construction, facility expansions or other
improvement in tailings facility performance by
relevant planned changes. Action plans should be
developing action plans to address deficiencies and
developed accordingly to ensure that the systems,
opportunities for continual improvement. This element of
information and plans developed as part of Developing
the TMS integrates and is informed by all available,
Plans for Tailings Management are revised as needed.
relevant information including the outcomes of Evaluating
This effectively completes the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle
Performance and inputs, advice and recommendations
of the TMS, in that the Act stage informs the
from a programme for reviewing tailings safety, including
subsequent Plan stage.
Independent Review (Section 2.6).
The frequency of Identifying Actions to Improve
Conducted by the RTFE, EOR and other personnel
Performance varies, but is typically annual except
involved in tailings management, this element of the
during the Post-Closure phase, when a lower frequency
TMS should evaluate:
may be appropriate.
— Suitability, effectiveness and the need for
To ensure that information is communicated to allow the
changes to:
Operator to understand whether tailings are being
- The TMS and all associated elements, including managed in a safe, responsible manner, the results and
the systems, information and plans listed in action plans developed should be reported, at an
Section 2.3.2. appropriate level of detail to:
- Controls related to construction (Section 3.5).
— RTFE
— Adequacy of resources committed to tailings
— EOR
management, including adequacy of human
resources and competencies required. — Accountable Executive (or delegate)

If deficiencies or opportunities for continual — BoD, where appropriate

improvement are identified, then action plans should be
These reports can also be provided to other business
developed with input from the EOR and mechanisms
units (eg management responsible for ore processing) to
implemented as part of a programme for reviewing
help ensure the continued coordination of activities
tailings safety.
directly and indirectly related to tailings management.
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should also
In addition, these reports can help to form the basis for the
provide an update on the status of the implementation
public disclosure of information (Section 2.2.7 and 2.6).

ICMM Tailings Management Systems 48

 related to the performance of the tailings facility and
TMS, including:

— Conformance with the performance objectives

In Detail and design intent.
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance provides
— Compliance with legal requirements, conformance
an opportunity for the RTFE, EOR and other personnel
with standards, policies and commitments, and
involved in tailings management to:
status of corrective actions.
— Reconfirm alignment between design intent, risk
— Tailings facility maintenance and surveillance.
management plan, and OMS activities.
— Input from the programme for reviewing tailings
— Discuss realised or anticipated changes and their
safety ().
implications/management.
The outcomes of Identifying Actions to Improve
— Identify opportunities for improvement.
Performance should be documented and reported to
As part of Identifying Actions for Improving the Accountable Executive, including:
Performance, changes since the previous review that
— Conclusions regarding the performance of the
are relevant to tailings management should be
tailings facility, the TMS and associated plans,
identified and their significance should be evaluated,
OMS manual and EPRP.
such as:
— If needed, action plans to:
— Changes to legal requirements, standards and
guidance, industry best practice and — Ensure that performance objectives are met.
commitments to communities.
— Address non-conformance with requirements,
— Changes in mine operating conditions (eg standards, policy or commitments.
production rate) or site environmental conditions.
— Implement recommendations for continual
— Changes outside the mine property that may improvement.
influence the nature and significance of potential
— Any recommendations for modifications to the
impacts resulting from the tailings facility on the
TMS, OMS manual or EPRP.
external environment or vice versa.
— Any recommendations for additional resources for
— Changes in the risk profile of the tailings facility.
tailings management.
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance should
also provide a summary of any significant issues

Tailings Management Tailings Management Systems 49

Operation, Maintenance 2.4
and Surveillance

2.4.1 Introduction — Risk management plan including risks controls and

OMS activities are fundamental to the day-to-day associated performance criteria (Sections 3.6.4 and
management of tailings facilities. The TMS, 3.2.4).
performance objectives, risk management plan and
— Design intent (Section 3.4.3).
design intent provide a framework for safe, responsible
tailings management, but OMS activities are needed to — Conformance management plan (Section 2.3.2.2).
implement them on a day-to-day basis. Operators that
The OMS manual should also describe the linkages with
do not effectively implement OMS activities cannot
emergency preparedness and response (Sections 2.4.5
adequately understand their risks, proactively manage
and 2.7).
tailings, make informed decisions or have any
confidence that tailings and associated risks are being OMS is applicable across the lifecycle. It is important to
effectively managed. emphasise the operation does not just include activities
related to the active placement of tailings during the
OMS activities should be documented in an OMS
Operations phase of the lifecycle. It also includes
manual, and should be aligned with:
activities related to water management, reclamation
— TMS (Section 2.3) and overall governance structures and, where applicable, the management of other
for tailings management. materials (eg residues from water treatment such as
lime treatment sludge) that may continue to be
— Lifecycle phase of the facility (Section 1.2.1).
deposited into the tailings facility after the end of the
— Performance objectives, criteria and indicators to be Operations phase. Thus, in most cases, operation
included in the design of the surveillance activities will be necessary in the Closure phase and
programmes that measure performance throughout may also be necessary in the Post-Closure phase.
the tailings facility lifecycle (Section 3.3.3).
While the need for operation activities may cease at
— Closure plan and objectives. some point (eg reclamation is complete and there is no
longer a need for active water management), the need
for maintenance and surveillance activities continues
until the tailings facility reaches a point where ongoing
maintenance and surveillance are no longer needed to
ensure that the facility is safe and that the performance
objectives for closure continue to be met.

Further Reading:
MAC (2019): Developing an Operation, Maintenance, and
Surveillance Manual for Tailings and Water Management
Facilities

2.4.2 Development of an OMS Manual

An OMS manual is intended to be a practical, ‘hands on’
document describing plans and procedures for all
aspects of operation, maintenance, and surveillance
activities associated with a tailings facility. It can be
seen as the ‘owner’s manual’ for a tailings facility.

An OMS manual should be aligned with the

performance objectives and risk management plan for

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 50

the tailings facility to which it is applied, including the activities (eg monitoring of meteorological conditions)
closure plan. Linking the facility’s risk management plan may begin during these phases. By the end of the
with OMS activities is at the core of an effective OMS Design phase, the surveillance programme should be
manual. This includes specifying actions to be taken if designed so that relevant instrumentation can be
performance is outside the expected range, indicating installed during construction. The OMS manual should
upset or potential emergency situations, but also be refined during the Construction phase so that it is
ensuring that OMS activities are planned and ready for implementation at the beginning of the
implemented in a manner consistent with the design Operations phase, and reflects the as-built conditions
intent, the risk management plan and the closure plan. (eg final configuration of the tailings pipeline and
pumping system) and any deviations from the design
To be effective, an OMS manual should:
that were implemented during the Construction phase
— Be site specific, not ‘off-the-shelf’ and should: (Section 3.5). The OMS manual also should be updated
- Address the specific conditions and circumstances to reflect the final as-built conditions of the ore
of the site. processing facility as they relate to characteristics of
the tailings that will be produced (eg solids content of
- Contain or link to all information needed to
the tailings).
conduct OMS activities.
- Integrate the knowledge and experience of The OMS manual should be ready for implementation at
personnel who have worked on the site. the beginning of the Operations phase and should
continue to be reviewed and updated as needed
— Define roles, responsibilities and levels of authority
throughout the Operations phase. In addition, the OMS
for personnel involved in tailings management.
manual should address the potential for the temporary
— Be integrated with overall site plans and procedures. suspension of mine operations (Section 3.6.5), including
a short-term, emergency suspension or a longer-term
— Be written:
suspension of unknown duration. Having an OMS plan
- By personnel with specific and detailed knowledge for a temporary suspension helps to ensure that risks
of the tailings facility, with input from consultants are appropriately managed during the transition to
or other third parties as appropriate. suspension and during the period of the suspension.
- For personnel directly involved in tailings OMS activities associated with a transition back to
management, and not for other audiences such as operations should also be described.
regulators, senior management or communities.
The development of OMS activities for the Closure and
- In a clear, concise, easily understandable manner, Post-Closure phases should happen in concert with the
and include information regarding how more development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2). This is
detailed information can be accessed. important to ensure that OMS activities during the
— Be improved over time, reflecting feedback from Operations phase are consistent with the closure plan,
Performance Evaluation (Section 2.3.4), action plans lay the foundation for the implementation of the closure
to address deficiencies or for continual improvement plan, and address progressive reclamation activities to
(Section 2.3.5), and lessons learned by personnel be implemented prior to transition to the Closure phase.
involved in tailings management. For existing tailings facilities that do not have an OMS
manual, the Operator should develop a manual,
An OMS manual should describe the boundaries of its informed by:
scope of application. The scope should include all
operational controls that can influence the performance — Conducting a gap analysis.
and risk management of the tailings facility (eg tailings — Assessing current OMS activities and the degree to
transport, placement of tailings, physical containment which they are aligned with the performance
of the tailings, water management and seepage objectives and risk management plan.
management, reclamation activities). The scope is
defined on a site-specific basis, taking into account the OMS manuals should be regularly reviewed and
characteristics and lifecycle stage of the tailings facility updated as appropriate to ensure that they are up to
and linkages with other relevant plans and procedures. date. An out-of-date OMS manual may pose a risk to
the safety of the tailings facility.
For new tailings facilities or for material changes such
as a mine life extension, planning and development of There are many potential drivers for the need for a
OMS activities should begin during the Project review and update of an OMS manual, including:
Conception and Design phases, and some surveillance

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 51

— Updates to the risk assessment and the risk important. The Operator should define mechanisms for:
management plan.
— Review of the draft OMS manual and proposed
— Planned changes as the tailing facility evolves updates, including input from the EOR.
throughout the Operations phase (eg raising
— Approval of the OMS manual and subsequent
embankment structures to increase capacity).
updates, including clarifying who has the authority to
— Material changes to the design. approve major revisions (eg new procedures) versus
minor revisions (eg updating personnel contact
— Adoption of new technologies (eg surveillance
information, reflecting changes in personnel).
technology).
— Ensuring that all personnel have access to and are
— Transitions in the lifecycle phase of the facility.
working with the most up-to-date version.
— Changes in personnel.
2.4.3 Contents of an OMS Manual
— Changes in relevant infrastructure (eg pumping
An OMS manual should:
systems for tailings or water).
— Address site-specific aspects of OMS governance,
In conducting reviews, a wide range of information
building on overall accountability and responsibility
should be considered, including:
for tailings management (Section 2.2.2), and should
— Performance of the facility, including any deficiencies document site-specific OMS activities.
in performance.
— Define and describe plans and procedures for
— Tailings facility design and any deviations from the implementing activities related to the transport,
design. placement and permanent storage of tailings and,
where applicable, water and the recycling of water.
— Current constructed conditions (Section 3.5) and
construction history. — Define and describe plans for the preventative,
predictive and corrective maintenance of tailings
— Current lifecycle phase of the facility.
infrastructure and all equipment associated with the
— Status of progressive reclamation activities. tailings infrastructure.

— Relevant advice and recommendations from site — Describe surveillance activities (inspection and
inspections, and the programme for reviewing monitoring) associated with the tailings
tailings safety, including Independent Review. infrastructure including the documentation, analysis
and communication of results.
— Changes since the last review of the OMS manual,
such as changes in:
2.4.3.1 OMS Governance
- Characteristics of the tailings facility (eg increased
An OMS manual should describe:
embankment height since the last review).
- Performance objectives and indicators. — Tasks and functions related to OMS activities.

- Risk assessment and the risk management plan. — Roles, responsibilities and level of authority of
- Personnel or organisational structure. personnel or groups that assume these tasks and
functions, including the RTFE(s) and the EOR (Section
- Legal requirements.
2.2.2) and other key personnel involved in tailings
- Closure plan.
management.
— Plans to address any gaps or deficiencies in
— Competencies required for various roles.
performance.
— Functional relationships and lines of communication:
— Plans for continual improvement.
- Between personnel and groups involved in OMS
— Future plans for the tailings facility. activities.
As described further in Section 2.5, an OMS manual - With groups outside the scope of the OMS manual
should be a controlled document. Since OMS manuals and involved in activities that may affect tailings
are accessible to many people involved in tailings management.
management and are updated frequently, effective - With external parties, including reviewers,
document control for the OMS manual is particularly regulators and communities.

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 52

An OMS manual should also describe:

— Reporting relationships between different individuals

and business units with direct and indirect roles
related to tailings management.

— How information related to specific OMS activities

should flow.

— Processes and procedures for reporting outcomes

of OMS activities.

In describing roles, responsibilities, levels of authority

and relationships, an OMS manual development team
should focus on functional relationships, rather than
organisational relationships. This approach may be
useful for overcoming functional and communication
silos that may be unintentionally reinforced by
organisational structures.

An OMS manual should describe reporting procedures

for any surveillance results that are outside the
expected range of observations or performance, as
these results may be indicative of upset conditions or a — Construction during the Operations and Closure
potential emergency. Any such results should be phases (Section 3.5).
communicated in a timely manner so that appropriate
decisions can be taken by those with the responsibility — Management of water and seepage during the
and authority to act under the circumstances. Operations and Closure phases, and potentially also
in the Post-Closure phase (Section 3.2.3).
An OMS manual should clearly describe the roles,
responsibilities and authority of the RTFE and other — Reclamation activities during the Operations and
employees, the EOR, and the contractors or consultants Closure phases (Section 3.7).
involved in surveillance. This is particularly important — In some cases, operation may also include:
with respect to surveillance linked to critical controls. An
- Deposition of non-tailings materials in the tailings
OMS manual should describe:
facility (eg waste rock or lime treatment sludge)
— Who is responsible for surveillance data acquisition during the Operations and Closure phases, and
and analysis? potentially also in the Post-Closure phase.
–R
 emoval of tailings for reprocessing or other
— What are the lines of communication for reporting in
purposes during the Closure or Post-Closure phases.
the event that results are outside the range specified
for the critical control performance criteria? Thus, operation applies not just to the Operations phase
of the lifecycle but also to the Closure phase and in
— If critical control performance criteria are exceeded:
many cases the Post-Closure phase.
- What actions are the RTFE(s) and other employees
expected to take? This component of an OMS manual should define and
- What actions are contractors or consultants describe the plans and procedures for implementing
expected to take? operating controls that enable the tailings facility to be
operated in accordance with the design intent,
Actions to be taken should be clearly described so that performance objectives, risk management plan and
appropriate action can be taken in a timely manner. closure plan. Plans and procedures are typically
documented in standard operating procedures (SOPs).
2.4.3.2 Operation
Operation refers to the operation of the tailings facility The management of every tailings facility should follow
and associated activities, including: a range of SOPs that best reflect the characteristics of
that facility and support the performance objectives
— Transport and deposition of tailings (Section 3.4.4). and risk management plan. A typical approach is to
develop a suite of SOPs that serve as the foundation of

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 53

a well-managed facility. The SOPs described in an OMS There are three categories of maintenance activities:
manual will be dependent on the lifecycle phase of the
Preventative maintenance: Planned, recurring
tailings facility.
maintenance activities conducted at a fixed or
SOPs describe performance indicators and pre-defined approximate frequency and not typically arising from
actions (eg TARPs) to be taken if associated results of surveillance activities. Examples include:
performance criteria deviate from defined ranges. SOPs
— Regularly scheduled oil change on a pump, as per
include a description of the potential ramifications of
manufacturers specifications.
not responding to a deviation.
— Calibration and maintenance of surveillance
SOPs should be reviewed at an established frequency
instruments.
and updated as appropriate, and any changes in
procedures should be documented. Predictive maintenance: Pre-defined maintenance
conducted in response to the results of surveillance
2.4.3.3 Maintenance activities that measure the condition of a specific
The objective of maintenance is to provide preventative component against performance criteria. Examples
and corrective means to achieve performance objectives include:
and manage risk throughout the lifecycle of a tailings
— Replacement of a section of tailings pipeline based
facility. Maintenance includes preventative, predictive and
on monitoring of the pipe thickness.
corrective activities carried out to provide continued
proper operation of all infrastructure related to tailings — Removal of debris from a spillway based on debris
management, or to adjust infrastructure to ensure accumulation.
operation in conformance with performance objectives.
— Removal of trees growing on embankments.
The maintenance component of an OMS manual
Corrective maintenance: The repair of tailings facility
identifies and describes:
components to prevent further deterioration and ensure
— All infrastructure (eg embankments, associated their operation in conformance with performance
water management infrastructure, mechanical objectives. The need for corrective maintenance is
systems, electrical systems, instrumentation, etc) based on surveillance activities, with surveillance results
within the scope of the OMS manual that has identifying the need and urgency of maintenance.
maintenance requirements. Pre-defined actions based on surveillance results and
performance criteria (eg TARPs) may include specific
— Preventative, predictive and corrective maintenance
maintenance activities. Examples include:
activities.
— Repair of erosion gullies.

— Unplugging of toe drains.

— Replacement of a broken pump or failed

section of pipeline.

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 54

 For predictive maintenance, an OMS manual should
also describe:

— Items described above for preventative

In Detail maintenance.
For all categories of maintenance activities, an OMS
— Pre-defined maintenance activities that are
manual should describe (or link to relevant references):
conducted based on results of surveillance
— The nature of the activity and the specific activities (eg clearing of snow, clearing of debris
maintenance requirements (eg refer to from spillways).
manufacturers maintenance specifications, SOPs).
— Linkages with surveillance activities, including:
— Location of the infrastructure requiring - Associated surveillance parameters.
maintenance.
- Performance criteria linked to the need to carry
— Qualifications or competencies required to out the maintenance.
conduct the maintenance (eg must be an - Communication procedures to ensure that
electrician, must be certified to work in enclosed results of surveillance activities, and
spaces). recommendations for maintenance, are
— Safety hazards and procedures. documented and reported in a timely manner so
that the maintenance activity can be carried out.
— Personnel or groups responsible for carrying out
the maintenance. For corrective maintenance, an OMS manual should
also describe:
— Resources required to conduct the maintenance
(eg equipment, materials, personnel): — Items described above for preventative and
predictive maintenance.
— Communication procedures associated with
maintenance activities that potentially affect other — Credible failure mode based on risk analysis and
activities, eg for maintenance that requires that risk controls.
power be disrupted, what other infrastructure will — For each event, the pre-defined corrective
be affected, when will it be affected, for how long, maintenance activities.
when will power be restored, and who will need to
know this. — Surveillance activities associated with those events.

— Tracking and documentation requirements, such as: — Communication procedures to ensure that:

- Tracking to ensure activity was completed in a - Results of surveillance activities are documented
timely manner. and reported in a timely manner.

- Documentation of the condition of the - Necessary resources are mobilised.

equipment or other observations made by - Corrective maintenance is carried out.
personnel doing the maintenance.
— Procedures to return to normal operation (if
- Documentation to demonstrate the activity was applicable).
carried out appropriately.
While predictive and corrective maintenance are
- Recommendations from personnel doing the
linked to surveillance results, these maintenance
maintenance.
activities could include maintenance of surveillance
— Reporting requirements: instruments if surveillance results indicate that an
- Information to be reported. instrument is no longer functioning or is not
functioning reliably.
- How information should be reported.
- To whom information needs to be reported. An OMS manual should identify materials (eg parts,
- Reporting timelines. filter material, rip rap) that should be kept in inventory
on site to prevent delay in the maintenance of
For preventative maintenance, an OMS manual components tied to risk controls. In addition, resources
should also describe the frequency at which the identified in the EPRP should be kept in inventory on
maintenance activity is to be conducted. site, in the event that an emergency occurs.

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 55

2.4.3.4 Surveillance For surveillance to be effective in risk management
Surveillance involves the inspection and monitoring (ie and a risk-informed approach, the results should be
collection of qualitative and quantitative observations collated, examined, analysed and reported in a timely
and data) of activities and infrastructure related to and effective manner.
tailings management. Surveillance also includes the
An effective surveillance programme is:
timely documentation, analysis and communication of
surveillance results, to inform decision-making and — Conducted by a range of personnel with direct and
verify whether performance objectives (Sections 3.2 indirect responsibilities related to tailings
and 3.3), the risk management plan (Sections 3.2 and management.
3.4), and the design intent (Section 3.4.5), are being
— Applied across the lifecycle of a tailings facility, while
met. Surveillance results are used to identify trends
adapting to the specific surveillance needs of each
and behaviours that are indicative of the tailings
lifecycle phase and changing site conditions.
facility’s actual performance.
— Based on site-specific performance objectives and
An OMS manual should describe two types of
the risk management plan.
surveillance activities: site observation and
inspections, and instrument monitoring. The different — Used to inform decision-making related to tailings
activities are complementary, and are equally management, based on the clear, timely reporting of
important to safe, responsible tailings management. surveillance results.

For site observation an OMS manual should describe:

— Processes and procedures for documenting

observations (eg a checklist may be provided to
In Detail personnel with instructions for written and
Surveillance activities should be aligned with the photographic documentation of observed
design intent (Section 3.4.5), performance objectives conditions).
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3) and the risk management plan
— Processes for reporting any observations that
(Sections 3.2 and 3.4). A failure to conduct
have been documented.
surveillance of the necessary parameters or
conducting surveillance at an inadequate frequency For inspections, an OMS manual should describe the:
could result in a failure to identify instances where
— Scope and objective of the inspection.
action needs to be taken. Similarly, a failure to analyse
and report results in a timely manner could result in — Frequency for conducting the inspection (eg could
actions being taken too late, if at all, leading to a loss be once or more per shift for some types of
of control. inspections, weekly, monthly or quarterly for
others).
Site Observation and Inspections
— Circumstances that would trigger the need for
Site observation and inspections are used to identify
unscheduled inspections.
and track visible changes in the condition of the
tailings facility. Site observation and inspections — Conditions or aspects to be observed as part
include the direct observations by personnel on or of the inspection.
adjacent to tailings facilities and may also include
— Processes and procedures for documenting and
observations from helicopters, and photos/videos
reporting results of inspections.
taken from unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs/
drones and satellites) or surveillance cameras.
Instrument Monitoring
Site observation and inspections are an integral part Instrument monitoring provides information on
of the surveillance programme and may provide the parameters or characteristics that cannot be
first indication of changing or adverse conditions, detected through site observation or inspections (eg
particularly where instrument monitoring is scarce or groundwater movement, water quality), cannot be
absent, or where adverse conditions develop outside observed with sufficient precision and accuracy (eg
the area of sensitivity of the instruments present. movement or settling of a tailings facility), or need to

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 56

 be monitored at high frequency or continuously (eg results outside that range can be identified and
bird monitoring to activate deterrent systems). reported.

The objective of instrument monitoring is to collect — Methodology and procedures for data analysis,
data to be used to assess the performance of the including comparisons with expected
tailings facility against the performance objectives performance
and indicators, and the risk management plan. and risk controls.
Instrument monitoring and site observation and
— Who is responsible for data analysis for each
inspections function together as a comprehensive
parameter.
data set to enable the assessment of facility
performance and provide a basis for informed — Form in which surveillance results and analysis
decisions. need to be reported (eg written report, graph,
All are essential, and none of these forms of table).
surveillance can be neglected if performance
— Timeframes for data analysis and reporting.
objectives are to be met and risks are to be managed.
— Procedures for reporting results if:
For instrument monitoring, an OMS manual should
describe: - Observations and performance are within the
expected range.
— Parameters to be included as part of instrument
- Any observations or performance are outside
monitoring, including those not directly related to
the expected range.
the tailings facility (eg meteorological data,
seismic monitoring). — Who is responsible for reporting.

— The frequency of data acquisition for each — To whom the reports are to be provided.
parameter.
Considerations for the Design of a Surveillance
— Instrument(s) to be used for each parameter.
Programme
— Who is responsible for data acquisition for each There is no ‘one-size-fits all’ approach to surveillance.
parameter. Each surveillance programme should be designed on
a site-specific basis to be able to provide accurate,
— Locations of instruments, or locations where
meaningful information about the performance of the
samples are to be collected (eg sampling of pore
tailings facility.
water quality).
When designing or reviewing a surveillance
— Methodology and procedures for data acquisition,
programme, the following questions should be
including those related to quality management (eg
considered:
instrument calibration).
— What do you need to know? Why do you need to
— Processes and procedures for documenting the
know it? What will this information or data tell you?
results of instrument surveillance, and the
- What information do you need to understand
interpretation
the performance of the tailings facility?
of results.
- What is the risk management plan and what are
— Who is responsible for documenting the results. the surveillance requirements stemming from it?
- What are the performance objectives, criteria
Analysis of Surveillance Results
and indicators for the risk controls for the
For the effective use of surveillance results in tailings
tailings facility?
management and decision-making, results should be
collated, examined, analysed and reported in a timely — Who needs to know it, and why?
and effective manner.
— What types of information do you need that can
For all surveillance activities, an OMS manual should be acquired through direct, visual observation of
describe: the tailings facility? For this type of information:

— The expected range of observations or - How often should visual observations or

performance of surveillance parameters, so any inspections be made to give you the information
you need?

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 57

 - What should the person(s) observing or - How can results be calibrated to understand
inspecting be looking for? what they mean in the context of a specific
- Who should they tell if they see something of tailings facility and the performance objectives,
potential concern? design intent and risk management plan? For
example, a given degree of movement detected
— What types of information do you need that can in an embankment structure may be normal and
only be acquired indirectly, through measurement consistent with the design for one tailings facility
of associated parameters or analysis of samples? but may be cause for concern at a different
- What methodologies can be used to collect the facility.
data needed to provide this information?
— How does this data need to be analysed? How
- How frequently does this data need to be
frequently does it need to be analysed to provide
collected to provide the information you need?
the information you need?
- Is real-time or continuous monitoring possible?
If so, is it appropriate? — What form do the results need to be presented in
to allow you to understand what the information is
— How can surveillance results be verified and telling you, how it relates to other information, and
calibrated? For example: what it is telling about the performance of the
- How can results from remote sensing methods tailings facility?
such as satellite observations be verified or
‘ground-truthed’?

ICMM Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 58

2.4.4 Implementation of an OMS Manual As part of implementation of the OMS manual, and as
An OMS manual is only effective if it is properly and further described in Section 2.5.4, the Operator should
consistently implemented. This requires that the develop systems for the control of information (eg
manual be accessible and that all personnel expected maintenance records) generated by OMS activities, to
to use the manual: ensure that all necessary information is appropriately
recorded and is stored in a secure, retrievable manner.
— Are aware of its purpose and importance.

— Know how to access the current version of the 2.4.5 Linkages with Emergency Preparedness
OMS manual. and Response
It is important to understand the relationship between
— Understand their roles, responsibilities and level of
emergency preparedness and response (Section 2.7)
authority related to tailings management.
and OMS activities. Typically, OMS activities are
— Have the knowledge and competence to fulfil their conducted under normal, and upset or unusual
roles and responsibilities. conditions, while the EPRP functions when there is an
emergency. While different Operators may establish the
— Understand the OMS activities they are engaged in.
boundary between upset and emergency conditions
The Operator should consider providing training differently, it is important to define this boundary, and
(internal or external) to help ensure that personnel thus define the boundary between the scope of OMS,
have the necessary knowledge and competence. As and the scope of emergency response.
part of training, personnel should understand how to
The OMS manual and EPRP for a given tailings facility
recognise problems, upset or unusual conditions, and
should be aligned, such that there are no functional
understand the importance of reporting those to the
gaps between normal operation and emergency
appropriate person in a prompt manner. Training
response, and that procedures are in place to transition
should emphasise the importance of this and make it
from normal conditions to an emergency situation that
clear that personnel are strongly encouraged to do so.
may arise.
Furthermore, it should be made clear that reporting
problems, upset, or unusual conditions will not result A mine can have many types of potential emergency
in negative implications for the personnel reporting (eg situations, although it should be noted that credible
disciplinary measures, termination of employment). failure modes with negligible likelihood may not
This is key to the effective early recognition of necessarily need emergency plans. In terms of tailings
problems so that timely action can be taken. facilities specifically, for each potential emergency
associated with a credible failure mode, an OMS manual
The Operator should have a roll-out strategy, including
should describe:
a training component, for a new OMS manual or any
significant revisions to the OMS manual. — The performance, occurrences or observations that
would result in an emergency being declared (eg
Beyond training for new versions of the OMS manual,
based on risk controls and associated performance
regular refresher activities should be provided (eg
criteria) (Section 3.6.4).
annual), and new personnel should receive training
specific to their roles in OMS. The Operator may also — Roles and responsibilities of key personnel in
consider mentoring programmes or other activities to transition from normal or upset conditions to an
help encourage the retention and advancement of emergency.
personnel with roles related to tailings management.
— Actions to be taken to transition from normal or
This will help to ensure a higher level of competency,
upset conditions to an emergency situation.
lower staff turnover and provide a basis for succession
planning.

Tailings Management Operation, Maintenance and Surveillance 59

Managing Information 2.5

2.5.1 Introduction an identification of the information that Operators

The Operator’s access to and use of up-to-date, should have to enable safe tailings management.
accurate information is critical to enabling safe, For information and documents identified in Sections
responsible tailings management. Preparing and 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, Operators should also document, where
updating documentation on information on all aspects applicable:
of tailings management is critical to providing a
basis for: — Resources required (eg budget, human resources,
equipment, and material).
— Safe design, construction, operation and closure of
tailings facilities. — Specific accountabilities and responsibilities.

— Decision-making to ensure safe tailings — Competencies required of personnel with various

management. roles and responsibilities.

— Managing change. — Schedules for implementation and reviews/updates.

— Developing and implementing a closure plan. — Status of implementation.

— Mechanisms and reporting for documenting

— Fully understanding and effectively managing risks.
outcomes.
In addition, it is important to identify and retain key
information for future reference, including in the 2.5.2 Information Related to Governance of
long-term through the Closure and Post-Closure Tailings Management
phases. The Operator should appropriately document and
maintain information related to all aspects of
This includes documentation describing key aspects
governance of tailings management and ensure that
related to:
documentation is up to date. This includes the following
— Governance of tailings management. elements:

— Planning, design, construction, operation and OMS — Accountability and responsibility for key positions
activities, and closure of tailings facilities. (Section 2.2.2), including documentation on:

This also includes all documents developed by the - Lines of communication and associated
expectations.
Operator in response to legal requirements and
commitments to communities, including commitments - Succession process and information transfer for
to public disclosure. succession.

First and foremost, this information is critical to the — Corporate policy on tailings management (Section
Operator. However, it may also provide the basis for 2.2.3).
information that is disclosed to regulators, potentially — Documentation related to the implementation of the
affected communities, other stakeholders and the TMS, including (Section 2.3):
public (Section 2.2.7).
- Mechanisms for implementing the TMS.
In describing the information listed in the sections - Outcomes of Identifying Actions to Improve
below, it is important to emphasise that it is the Performance, including action plans developed.
concepts and content that are important. It is up to
— OMS manual (Section 2.4) and outcomes of OMS
the discretion of the Operator to determine how best
activities (eg surveillance results).
to structure and organise this information, including
what to call different documents. The sections below — Documentation related to the programme for
are not intended to be a ‘table of contents’ but rather reviewing tailings safety, including (Section 2.6):

ICMM Managing Information 60

 - Mechanisms for reporting results internally and gaps, such as a lack of detailed site characterisation,
externally. may increase uncertainty about the future performance
- Outcomes of reviews and the Operator’s responses of a tailings facility.
to outcomes (eg actions to implement Types of information that should be documented and
recommendations). maintained include:
— EPRP, including results of testing (Section 2.7). — Site characterisation, including plans for updating
and improving the site characterisation (Section
2.5.3 Information Related to the Project 3.3.2).
Conception, Design, Construction, Operation
and Closure of Tailings Facilities — Risk assessment, including (Section 3.2.4):
Information related to the project conception, design, - Outcomes and key conclusions.
construction, operation and closure of tailings facilities - A summary for senior management (eg
should be appropriately documented and maintained to Accountable Executive).
ensure that documentation is up to date.
- Schedule for periodic reviews.
It is important to note that Operators may not have all of - Factors that would trigger an unscheduled review.
this information for all of their tailings facilities, particularly
— Multi-criteria alternatives analysis, including a
older facilities that were designed and constructed many
summary for senior management of (Section 3.3.4):
decades ago. Such information may not have been
produced (eg multi-criteria alternatives analyses were not - Alternatives considered.
conducted) or may be inadequate compared to current - Factors considered in the decision-making
good practice (eg site characterisation information) or process.
may have been lost or destroyed over time (eg original - Key factors leading to the selection of the
drawings). In some cases, it will be impossible to fill such preferred alternative.
gaps (eg an Operator cannot retroactively do an
alternatives analysis). In other cases, Operators may — Performance objectives, indicators and criteria,
undertake studies to improve information (eg to improve including (Section 3.3.3):
site characterisation). It is important to recognise that

Tailings Management Managing Information 61

 - Schedule for periodic reviews. - During the Post-Closure phase:
- Factors that would trigger an unscheduled review. ◊S
 tatus of performance against the closure plan
and objective.
— Risk management plan including (Section 3.2.4):
◊S
 tatus of achieving the intended post-closure
- Status of development and implementation.
land use.
- A summary for senior management.
- A summary for senior management, appropriate to
- A description of risk controls, associated the lifecycle phase and the status of development/
performance criteria and surveillance implementation of the closure plan.
requirements, and pre-defined actions to be taken
if performance is outside expected ranges. 2.5.4 Control of Information
— Information on the design of the tailings facility, The use of inaccurate, incomplete or out-of-date
including (Section 3.4.5): information can increase uncertainty and pose a risk, as
can the loss of records of essential information (eg
- The design basis and approach.
reports, SOPs, photos, maps, drawings, surveillance
- Design of all stages of the facility, including
results).
construction drawings.
Information that is identified by the Operator as
— Quality management plan (Section 3.5.2).
necessary to safe tailings management, throughout
— Tailings transportation and deposition plan the lifecycle of the tailings facility, should be controlled.
(Section 3.4.4).
Control of information includes establishing and
— Water management plan (Section 3.2.3). implementing a process to ensure necessary
information is documented, and that key documents
— Information on the construction of the tailings facility
and information are maintained, retained and archived.
(initial construction and construction activities
There are two aspects to the control of information:
through the balance of the lifecycle) (Section 3.5).
— Access to, and use of, up-to-date, accurate
— Closure plan including:
information.
- Closure objectives and post-closure land use.
— Identification and retention of records that are
- Status of development of the closure plan.
potentially useful to the future management of the
- Community engagement activities related to tailings facility.
closure plan development and implementation.
- Schedule for review and updates to the closure
plan.
- During the Closure phase, the status of
implementation of the plan.

ICMM Managing Information 62

 Access to these documents may be interrupted (eg
loss of paper copies due to fire, temporary loss of
access to electronic copies due to loss of power).
The risks associated with the loss of access of
In Detail
documents should be assessed, particularly in the
The information described in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3
case of documents that are accessed electronically.
should be managed within controlled documents,
including: There may be certain documents or content that
should be accessible as a paper copy in the event
— Providing a procedure for the systematic
that electronic versions are not accessible. For
identification of documents (eg numbering system
example, a loss of power restricting access to
consistently applied).
electronic versions may be linked to certain risk
— Defining the process for reviewing and updating controls (eg loss of ability to operate pumps) and
the document, including both major and minor having access to a paper copy of the OMS manual
updates. (Section 2.4) during such periods may be necessary
for the effective response to the situation. Similarly,
— Identifying persons with authority to revise the
having access to paper copies of an EPRP may be
document, and the scope of their authority (eg
essential in some potential emergencies.
some may only have the authority to amend
certain sections). Specific risks and vulnerabilities associated with the
potential loss of access to documents should be
— Describing mechanisms for the approval of
identified and contingency plans and information
revisions to the document.
technology security plans should be developed,
— For electronic documents, developing and including:
implementing measures to prevent unintended
— Procedures for the backup and recovery of paper
changes, or to prevent any changes by personnel
and electronic copies.
without the appropriate authority.
— Plans to prevent unauthorised access, including
In addition, there should be defined procedures for:
access to documentation, as well as access to
— Providing relevant personnel with access to the instruments (eg surveillance instruments) and
document and any supporting documents (ie other technologies that may be connected to
distributing paper copies or providing access to mobile networks or wireless internet.
electronic versions).
— Retention of paper copies of critical sections of
— Informing personnel of changes to the document documents that can be used in the event of a loss
relevant to their roles and responsibilities. of access to electronic documents.

— Control of reference information used to develop Another consideration for the control of documented
and update the document or referred to in the information is the management of legacy electronic
document. formats. A plan should be developed, with input from
information technology and management experts, to
— Restricting access to out-of-date versions and
address the management of legacy electronic
clearly labelling those versions as out of date.
formats to ensure that records potentially useful to
— Identifying out-of-date materials that should be tailings management are not lost or made impossible
retained. to access in the future as a result of the
obsolescence of software, electronic file formats or
— Archiving or disposing of out-of-date materials,
data storage media.
as appropriate.

Tailings Management Managing Information 63

Programme for Reviewing 2.6
Tailings Safety

2.6.1 Introduction Responding to this challenge requires a well-designed

A strong emphasis on the review of safety of tailings review programme with multiple levels of safety
facilities is essential to provide oversight of all the assessment. Understanding safety cannot be
factors that influence safety. simplified to a verification of performance against a few
key technical parameters or criteria, unless they reveal
A significant challenge in reviewing and assessing the
that a failure is imminent. A review programme
safety of tailings facilities is that they are in a near
providing oversight needs to address a range of
constant state of change from their initial
questions related to a tailings facility and how it is
construction, throughout the Operations phase as the
being managed.
size of the facility increases, and throughout the
Closure phase when the closure plan is implemented. Responding to this range of questions requires a range
Given the complex, dynamic nature of tailings facilities of competencies in reviewers. In addition, there is no
and the mining operations within which they exist, and single review mechanism that can answer such a range
the nature of the governance structures needed to of questions, nor would it be desirable or effective to
ensure safe tailings management, the programme for rely on a single review mechanism and single team of
reviewing the safety of tailings facilities should be people to provide oversight of all aspects of tailings
multi-faceted and comprehensive if it is to be management. A review programme consisting of
effective. This is imperative given the potential for several different mechanisms, implemented in an
human error in so many different aspects of tailings integrated manner, is needed.
management.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 64

 — Has the Operator developed a tailings facility
design that is consistent with the objectives of safe,
responsible tailings management (Section 3.4)?

In Detail — Has the Operator developed a risk management

Questions that may be addressed by a review plan that eliminates risk where possible, and
programme include: describes measures to reduce or mitigate
remaining risks (Section 3.2.4.3)? Is the risk
— Are governance structures and systems
management plan being implemented effectively?
appropriate and are they being implemented
effectively? Do these structures and systems — Has the tailings facility been constructed in a
include adequate mechanisms to manage manner consistent with the design intent? Have
change, and are these mechanisms being deviations (Section 3.5.3) and as-built conditions
implemented effectively (Section 2.3.2.1)? (Section 3.5.4) been adequately documented?

— Do personnel with accountability, responsibility — Has the Operator developed OMS activities that
and authority related to tailings management have are aligned with the performance objectives, risk
the necessary competencies? management plan and design intent (Section 2.4)?
Are these OMS activities being implemented
— Are lines of communication clear and adequate,
effectively?
and is communication effective?
— Is the tailings facility performing in accordance
— Are personnel encouraged to report problems,
with the performance objectives, risk
errors or concerns in a prompt manner, and are
management plan and design intent (Section
they free from potential negative repercussions if
2.3.4)? Is the tailings facility expected to continue
they do so?
to perform in this manner?
— Does the Operator have information on the site
— Has the Operator identified closure objectives and
characteristics necessary to inform decisions
a post-closure land use (Sections 3.3.3 and 3.7)?
throughout the lifecycle (Section 3.3.2)?
— Has the tailings facility been planned,
— Does the Operator understand the risk to the
designed, constructed and operated in a manner
degree necessary to inform decisions through the
consistent with the closure objectives and post-
lifecycle (Section 3.2.4)?
closure land use?
— Does the Operator recognise and understand
— Are there deficiencies in the responses to any of
uncertainties associated with risk? Has the
the above questions?
Operator taken steps to reduce uncertainty
(Section 3.2.4)? — Are there opportunities for continual
improvement?
— Has the Operator developed performance
objectives, indicators and criteria that are
consistent with the objectives of safe, responsible
tailings management (Section 3.3.3)?

2.6.2 Designing a Programme for Reviewing — Reviews of the TMS

Tailings Safety — Audits or verifications.
There are several different review mechanisms that can
be implemented to provide a programme for reviewing To ensure that the review programme is effective for the
the safety of tailings facilities, including: tailings facility in question, the Operator should consider
the site-specific design of such a programme, including
— Independent Review
factors such as:
— Dam safety reviews (DSRs)
— What are the objectives of the overall review
— Tailings stewardship reviews programme and what are the topics or questions
to be addressed?

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 65

— What is the lifecycle phase of the tailings facility? Figure 5: Integration of a programme for tailings
safety review into the tailings management system
— How complex is the tailings facility and what are the
risks?
Act: Plan:
— What will be the relationship between reviewers and Review and Develop plans
the Operator’s employees and consultants, including develop action for tailings
plans management
the Accountable Executive, the RTFE and the EOR?

— How frequently is review needed to reflect the state

of change of the tailings facility?
Programme
— Are there relevant legal requirements or other to review
tailings safety
requirements or commitments that need to be
considered in the design of the programme?

The design of a review programme should describe:

Check: Do:
— Review mechanisms to be used. Evaluate Implement
performance the tailings
management
— Mandate, objectives and scope of each system
mechanisms.

— Frequency of application of each mechanism.

impartial and objective manner. Reviewers must be
— Competencies required for reviewers for each
empowered to bring forward observations, advice and
mechanism, taking into account the mandate and
recommendations for safe, responsible tailings
objectives, and the complexity and risks associated
management, including constructive criticism of the
with the tailings facility.
Operator. Reviewers must be able to conduct the review
— The degree of independence expected. free of the risk of negative repercussions, particularly in
the case of employees who are involved in reviews.
The Operator should also consider and describe the
relationship between different review mechanisms Reviewers would be considered independent if they
within the programme, how each mechanism is have not been directly involved with the design or
intended to address the overall objectives of the review operation of the particular tailings facility. Independence
programme, and how these mechanisms will be is important because an independent reviewer can bring
integrated with each other. Different Operators may, for a fresh, outside perspective. They may recognise
example, define the scope of Independent Review deficiencies or opportunities that someone more familiar
versus a tailings stewardship review differently. There is with the tailings facility may overlook or fail to recognise.
no ‘right’ definition of the scope of these mechanisms. Independence also lends credibility.
However, when designing a review programme the
— However, as noted above, tailings facilities and the
scope of these mechanisms should be made clear to
associated systems to manage them are complex.
avoid confusion.
It can take a long time to fully understand this
The review programme should be designed to be complexity. The more independent a reviewer is,
integrated with the TMS to ensure that reviews are fully the less familiar they may be. As a result, there is a
informed by, and in turn inform, the ongoing Plan-Do- potential for their observations or recommendations
Check-Act cycle of the TMS, including developing and to be based on an incomplete understanding of the
implementing action plans to address deficiencies and tailings facility and associated systems. On the other
opportunities for continual improvement. This is hand, this lack of familiarity may lead them to identify
illustrated in Figure 5. concerns not necessarily evident to those more
familiar with the facility. There is an important role to
A further consideration for an Operator in developing a
play in the review programme both for reviewers with:
review programme is balancing the need for the
independence of reviewers with the need for familiarity — Greater familiarity and a more complete
with the tailings facility and how it is managed. understanding of the tailings facility in question.

Regardless of who is involved in conducting a review, it — Less familiarity with the tailings facility in question,
is essential that they undertake the review in an but a greater degree of independence.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 66

2.6.3 Template for a Programme for — Results of Independent Review, tailings stewardship
Reviewing Tailings Safety reviews, and reviews of the TMS are considered by
Recognising the importance of designing a review the Operator in Identifying Action to Improve
programme on a site-specific basis, this section Performance (Section 2.3.5), and action plans should
proposes a template for an effective programme for be developed and implemented to address
reviewing tailings safety. This proposed review deficiencies and opportunities for continual
programme consists of the following elements, improvement.
implemented in an integrated manner:
A review programme rigorously implemented following
— As described in Section 2.3.4, the Performance this template, with close coordination between the
Evaluation element of the TMS should include the Independent Review and the tailings stewardship
preparation of an annual performance review by review, would provide effective oversight to help ensure
the EOR, addressing whether the tailings facility is safety. Furthermore, it would meet or exceed the level of
performing as intended. assurance that is typically provided by the use of dam
- This report is provided to those involved in safety reviews (Section 2.6.5).
tailings safety review for information.
2.6.4 Independent Review
- The design of the programme should specify
Independent Review provides periodic review of the
which review mechanism is responsible for
Operator’s engineering practices throughout the
reviewing this annual report and assessing its
lifecycle and provides the Operator with objective
conclusions.
opinions and advice, and potentially recommendations
— Independent Review is conducted periodically to regarding the risks and the state of tailings
review plans and engineering practices throughout management, independent of the personnel
the lifecycle. responsible for tailings management.

— Tailings stewardship reviews are conducted Independent Review is applicable throughout the
periodically to provide detailed reviews of lifecycle of a tailings facility. The input of Independent
operational practices. Review should be sought from the Project Conception
(Section 3.3) and Design (Section 3.4) phases, through
— The TMS and associated governance mechanisms
to reviewing performance during the Post-Closure
are reviewed periodically.
phase (Section 3.7). This includes seeking input from

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 67

Independent Review on the development of the typically included, based on consideration of
closure plan (Section 3.7.2) and consideration of surveillance data, input from a tailings stewardship
potential material changes (Section 3.6.3). However, review, and site inspection.
over the lifecycle the scope and focus of Independent
Independent Review is conducted by one or more
Review should be re-adjusted to ensure it remains appropriately qualified and experienced individuals.
relevant and effective. Mechanisms for Independent Review can include a
Independent Review typically provides an assessment multi-person board, commonly referred to as an
of the underlying drivers of tailings safety, such as the Independent Tailings Review Board (ITRB) or an
site characterisation and models (Section 3.3.2), individual reviewer, referred to in the Standard as
a Senior Independent Technical Reviewer.
design intent and assumptions, performance against
the design intent, and models used to verify design The Independent Reviewers do not have decision-
assumptions and to predict future performance. More making authority and do not replace the role of the
specific consideration of current performance is also EOR for assessing tailings facility safety.

- Performance objectives and the design intent

are being met.
- The facility is predicted to continue to perform
In Detail as intended.
Independent Review provides input to the — Effectiveness of plans and processes for tailings
Accountable Executive and RTFE on a range of management, such as the surveillance
aspects related tailings management, such as: programme.
— Adequacy of site characterisation. — Development and implementation of the closure
— Design and conduct of the multi-criteria plan.
alternatives analysis, and the conclusions of the — Opportunities for continual improvement.
analysis.
To be effective, Independent Review should consider
— Completeness/appropriateness of: plans for future mine development and associated
- The Operator’s understanding of the risks posed tailings management. This may include considering
by tailings management and the need to information such as the anticipated life-of-mine
conduct an up-to-date or more thorough risk based on current exploration results, as opposed to
assessment. the expected life-of-mine based on proven reserves
and resources. A difference of several years in
The planned or existing risk management plan.
life-of-mine may have significant implications for
— Design of the tailings facility and the adequacy of tailings management. However, this may require
associated documentation. disclosure to Independent Reviewers of forward-
looking information. Public disclosure of information
— Whether the design criteria and performance
of this nature may be limited by securities law,
objectives for tailings management are consistent
depending on the relevant jurisdiction. As a result, in
with legal requirements, industry guidelines and
such cases, it is important that the meetings and
best practices, and current theory, methodologies
detailed reports of Independent Review be
and experience.
confidential. However, an Operator may prepare a
— Current or anticipated performance of tailings summary that does not reveal forward looking
management including whether: information that may be provided to regulators,
investors, communities or other stakeholders.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 68

2.6.5 Dam Safety Reviews assessed in isolation from consideration of the facility
Dam safety reviews (DSRs) are a review mechanism as a whole. Thus, a more holistic approach is needed
adapted from practices for water dams and are when assessing the safety of tailings facilities.
commonly applied to tailings embankments. DSRs are
— The high degree of independence of DSRs, as noted
required under legal requirements in some jurisdictions
above, can also be a limitation. Persons performing a
and are required in the Standard.
DSR may lack the familiarity and knowledge needed
Ideally, a DSR is a review mechanism that is conducted to fully understand a tailings facility and its
in a systematic manner by an independent qualified management.
review engineer to assess and evaluate the safety of an
It is important that Operators, regulators, and other
embankment or tailings facility against failure modes, in
stakeholders recognise the limitations of DSRs and
order to make a statement on the safety of the facility,
recognise the importance of considering the outputs of
including whether or not it meets the design intent and
a range of review mechanisms for tailings safety. In
applicable safety criteria, and whether it poses any
addition, Operators should consider measures to
unacceptable risks. A DSR may include the
address these limitations, such as modifying the DSR
consideration of technical, operational and governance
methodology to take a more holistic view of the entire
aspects. An equivalence to this ideal DSR may exist,
tailings facility.
such as that described in Section 2.6.3.

DSRs consistent with the above description have 2.6.6 Tailings Stewardship Reviews
certain advantages when conducted in a multi- There is a review mechanism, sometimes referred to as
disciplinary manner, notably: a tailings stewardship review, that is complementary but
different than Independent Review.
— Recognition and acceptance by regulators and other
stakeholders. — It is more operationally focused than Independent
Review:
— Potentially, a higher degree of independence
- It may go into a greater degree of detail on
compared to other review mechanisms described in
operational performance, plans and practices (eg
this section.
OMS activities) related to the safety of the tailings
However, particularly given the widespread recognition facility and may highlight areas of focus for
and acceptance of DSRs, there is a risk of placing too Independent Review.
much reliance on and confidence in them. This - It would not typically include elements such as
confidence should be tempered by understanding the reviewing and providing input to the multi-criteria
limitations of DSRs and, as described in Section 2.6.1, alternatives analysis (Section 3.3.4), the
Operators should implement a review programme development of the design of the tailings facility
consisting of several different mechanisms to reduce (Section 3.4.3), or the development of the closure
reliance on any one mechanism. plan (Section 3.7.2).
DSRs also have important limitations, in part based on — It is conducted by an independent engineer,
their origins in practices for water dams: supported by the EOR, personnel from the site, and
— They are often not conducted at an adequate potentially personnel from other sites or the
frequency to reflect the dynamic nature of tailings Operator’s corporate team.
facilities. For example, conducting a DSR every five Given the more detailed focus of a tailings stewardship
years may be adequate for a water dam that has review compared to Independent Review, those
been operating for 10–15 years or more after conducting tailings stewardship reviews need a greater
construction is complete. However, in a five-year degree of familiarity with the tailings facility and the
period a tailings facility may have changed quite Operator’s plans and practices. As such, a tailings
considerably. stewardship review should consider the outcomes of a
— Methodologies for DSRs often focus on the review of the tailings management system.
embankments. However, the safety of an tailings The key activities of a tailings stewardship review
facility embankment cannot be appropriately include:

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 69

— Reviewing a detailed summary of information Tailings stewardship reviews may be conducted
provided by the Operator, including: annually for tailings facilities in the Operations and
- Current and planned operations. Closure phases of the lifecycle. They may be conducted
less frequently in the Post-Closure phase, depending
- Surveillance results.
on the risks posed, the state of reclamation, the
- Status of implementation of recommendations
performance of the facility and predicted future
of previous reviews.
performance.
— Conducting a detailed inspection of the tailings
The results of the inspection should be documented,
facility.
including supporting inspection checklists and
— Reviewing operational plans, practices and photographs. A report of the tailings stewardship review
procedures to assess the effectiveness of is then prepared by the independent engineer, including
implementation in supporting the achievement of any recommendations regarding:
the performance objectives and design intent of the
— Significant tailings facility safety concerns and/or
tailings facility. The plans, practices and procedures
concerns requiring immediate or time-sensitive
reviewed may include:
actions.
- OMS manual
— Tailings facility safety concerns or conditions
- EPRP
requiring time-sensitive action by a date
- Tailings transport and deposition plan. recommended in the review.
- Water management plan, including seepage
— Improvements to plans, practices and procedures.
control and collection, as they relate to stability
of the tailings facility.

— Status of actions taken on recommendations from

previous tailings stewardship reviews.

— Surveillance programme, including parameters,

In Detail frequency of data collection and instrumentation.
A tailings stewardship review considers a wide range
— Results of surveillance and inspections since the
of information, such as:
last tailings stewardship review.
— Current status and future plans regarding the
— Results of Independent Review.
tailings facility.
— Status of site characterisation and the site
— History of the tailings facility, including:
characterisation model.
- The design intent and the design basis.
- The evolution of the facility from the — Results of modelling of current and future tailings
Construction phase onwards. facility performance.

- Deviations from the design intent and design — Status of the OMS manual, EPRP, and related
basis. documents.
- Material changes that have been implemented — Status of training for personnel with direct roles
since the last stewardship review. related to tailings management.
— Risk assessment. — Current and future operational or technical
— Closure plan. challenges.

ICMM Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 70

2.6.7 Review of the Tailings Management A review of the TMS should identify deficiencies and
System opportunities for continual improvement related to the
The TMS and associated governance mechanisms tailing management system and governance
should be reviewed periodically to assess whether they mechanisms and make recommendations for actions to
are effective and fit for purpose for achieving the be taken to address any deficiencies or opportunities
objective of safe tailings management. for improvement.

The scope of a review of the TMS, also referred to as a These reviews may be undertaken internally or
governance review, should include a review of the externally. However, an external perspective may be
completeness and effectiveness of: particularly effective in identifying underlying
deficiencies, particularly those related to the overall
— Assignment of accountability and responsibility,
corporate culture of the Operator.
including the effectiveness of the Accountable
Executive in decision-making related to tailings The results of the review of the TMS should be
management (Section 2.2.2). considered by the Operator in Identifying Actions to
Improve Performance (Section 2.3.5). Results help to
— Corporate policy of tailings management (Section
facilitate informed decisions regarding tailings
2.2.3).
management so that tailings-related risks are managed
— Implementation of the TMS (Section 2.3). safely and responsibly.

— Management of information (Section 2.5).

2.6.8 Audits
— Functional and organisational structure. Audits (also referred to as verifications or validations)
are formal, systematic, documented examinations of a
— Lines of communication and effectiveness of
tailings facility’s conformance with explicit, agreed,
communication (Section 2.2.6).
prescribed criteria, including legal requirements, the
— Relationships with business units with indirect roles Operator’s policy and commitments, applicable
related to tailings management. standards, or performance expectations. Audits
evaluate and report on the degree of conformance with
— Ongoing integrated mine planning (Section 3.2.2).
stipulated criteria, based on the systematic collection
— Integration with sitewide systems, such as a sitewide and documentation of relevant evidence. These review
ESMS. mechanisms involve some degree of judgement but are
not designed to determine root cause of deficiencies, or
— Conformance with legal requirements, corporate
to evaluate effectiveness.
policies and practices, and commitments to
communities (Section 2.3.2.2). Audits can be conducted both internally (eg by
employees with appropriate knowledge and
— Effectiveness of response to any non-conformances,
competencies who are independent, impartial and
incidents, or complaints.
objective with respect to the management of the
tailings facility being audited) or externally. The
frequency would depend on several factors, including
the objective and scope of the audit.

Tailings Management Programme for Reviewing Tailings Safety 71

Emergency Preparedness 2.7
and Response

2.7.1 Introduction The objective of the EPRP is to prevent, mitigate or

Recognising that the ultimate goal of this Guide is to reduce impacts (eg injury or loss of life) in the event an
eliminate fatalities and catastrophic events, it is emergency occurs.
nonetheless important to be prepared for a potential
The EPRP should:
emergency.
— Describe measures the Operator will take to prepare
There is a wide range of potential emergencies that
for an emergency and to respond if an emergency
may occur associated with tailings facilities, and it is
occurs. This detailed description is primarily for use
essential for Operators to be prepared to effectively
by the Operator and should be integrated into the
respond if an emergency occurs. Such potential
sitewide emergency plan. This description should:
emergency scenarios may include: structural failure
- Identify potential emergencies that could occur.
of a facility, rising water levels within a facility,
unusual and excessive cracking of an embankment, ◊ Potential emergencies may be categorised based
a sudden loss of environmental containment of a on the nature of the potential emergency or the
facility, or other events. There are also other types of nature of the response that would be required.
emergencies that may affect a mine site more This may assist in describing the measures to be
generally, including a tailings facility, such as a loss taken if an emergency occurs.
of power, or extreme conditions such as an - Describe measures to be taken if an emergency
earthquake, wildfire, landslide or avalanche. occurs.

Operators should develop and be prepared to - Identify resources needed to respond to an

implement a site-specific EPRP for credible failure emergency.
modes that could lead to emergencies. This includes - Address any necessary coordination with off-site
credible failure modes that could lead to emergency responders, local communities, public
catastrophic failures. sector agencies and other parties that may be
involved in emergency response (eg other
Emergency planning related to tailings facilities
businesses).
should be integrated into broader, sitewide
- Describe mechanisms to implement the plan if an
emergency planning so that the Operator has a
emergency occurs.
comprehensive EPRP to address the full range of
potential emergencies that could occur. — Provide information to off-site emergency
responders, communities2 and public sector
Note that, as described in Section 2.4.5, different
agencies to assist in the development of their
Operators may establish the boundary between
emergency response measures and collaborate with
upset and emergency conditions differently.
them in that development.
Operator’s should clearly define this boundary, and
this defines the scope of potential events to be — Provide information to other parties that may be
addressed in the EPRP. The surveillance programme impacted if an emergency occurs.
(Section 2.4.3.4) should include surveillance activities
— Align with the OMS manual, as discussed in Section
capable of identifying the performance, occurrences
2.4.5.
or observations that would result in an emergency
being declared (eg based on risk controls and Operators should engage off-site emergency
associated performance criteria) (Section 3.6.4). responders, communities, public sector agencies, and

2. In the context of emergency preparedness, communities include places where people reside permanently or temporarily,
including individual residences and recreational sites such as campgrounds.

ICMM Emergency Preparedness and Response 72

where relevant, other parties that may be involved in — After updates to the risk assessment (Section 3.2.4)
emergency response, in the development of relevant if those updates lead to changes in the
components of the EPRP (ie components related to understanding of credible failure modes or potential
potential emergencies that could have off-site impacts, consequences of a failure.
or for which the Operator may require external support
— In response to material changes to the tailings
to respond to the emergency). This process should
facility (Section 3.6.3).
include supporting communities and public sector
agencies to develop their own EPRPs. It is up to the — When the lifecycle transitions to a different phase
Operator, in consultation with off-site emergency (eg transition from Operations to Closure phase).
responders, communities and public sector agencies, to
— To reflect relevant changes in:
determine how best to organise information related to
emergency preparedness. - Personnel or organisational structures related to
emergency response and referred to in the EPRP.
The EPRP should be tested throughout all phases of the
- Sources or contact information related to off-site
lifecycle at a frequency established in the plan, or more
support, such as suppliers of material or
frequently if triggered by a material change either to the
equipment that would be used for emergency
tailings facility or to the social, environmental and local
response.
economic context. Testing should involve communities
- Practices or technology related to emergency
and public sector agencies, including off-site
response (eg warning systems).
emergency responders, who would be involved in
responding to an emergency. Operators should - Legal requirements.
meaningfully engage with employees and contractors — Other changes on or off-site relevant to emergency
to inform the development and testing of the EPRP and response, such as changes to road access,
co-develop community-focused emergency communication or other infrastructure.
preparedness measures with project-affected people.
The EPRP should be revised, as appropriate, to reflect Further Reading:
outcomes and lessons learned from testing. ICMM and UNEP: Good practice in emergency
The EPRP should also be reviewed and updated as preparedness and response
appropriate: UNEP: Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at
Local Level (APELL)

Tailings Management Emergency Preparedness and Response 73

2.7.2 Assessing Credible Potential information is needed to help develop emergency
Consequences response measures.
The starting point for developing an EPRP is the
Such credible failure scenarios fall into two basic
identification of potential failure modes and
categories, based on behaviour of the material if a
determining whether those potential failure modes are
failure occurs, and thus the methods used to conduct
credible. Credible failure modes, discussed further in
more detailed analysis of potential consequences:
Section 3.4.3, are failure mechanisms that are
technically feasible given the materials present in the — Credible failure scenarios that would include a flow
tailings facility and its foundation, the properties of of materials – water alone or water and solids (ie
these materials, the configuration of the tailings tailings and other entrained solids such as soil)
facility, drainage conditions and surface water control – into the downstream environment.
at the tailings facility, throughout its lifecycle under the
— Credible failure scenarios with potentially
static and transient loading conditions the facility may
catastrophic consequences but not related to a
be subject to over that lifecycle. Credible failure
flow of materials into the downstream environment
modes are identified through the risk assessment
(eg a slump of tailings solids with limited water).
process (Section 3.2.4).
Flow failures are the failure mode most often
Once credible failure modes have been identified, a
associated with catastrophic consequences when
preliminary analysis should be conducted to identify
failures occur.
and assess the scenarios that could develop and the
potential consequences of those scenarios, including For credible failure scenarios that would include a flow
impacts on human health and safety, the environment of material, a breach analysis should be conducted to
and infrastructure. This provides the basis for estimate:
identifying and describing credible failure scenarios to
— The physical area that would be impacted by a
be addressed in the EPRP.
potential failure.
A credible failure mode and a credible failure scenario
— Flow arrival times at various downstream locations
are related, but different. A simplified explanation of
(eg communities, bridges).
the difference is as follows:
— Flow depth and velocities at various downstream
Credible failure mode = credible mechanism + credible
locations.
initiating event + credible failure process (each
element needs to be credible for the failure mode to — Duration of flooding.
be credible).
— Depth of material deposition.
Credible failure scenario = credible failure mode +
For credible failure scenarios which are not related to
credible consequences (each element needs to be
a flow of material, the Operator should conduct an
credible for the failure scenario to be credible).
appropriate analysis (eg simplified deformation
For credible failure scenarios that would not have analysis) to estimate in more detail the potential
catastrophic consequences, the EPRP may be consequences if a failure were to occur.
developed on the basis of this preliminary analysis.
The decision tree provided in Figure 6 illustrates this
For credible failure scenarios that could have process.
catastrophic consequences, more detailed analysis of
potential consequences should be conducted to Further Reading:
inform development of the EPRP. The purpose of more APEGBC: Flood Mapping in BC: Professional Practice
detailed analysis is to identify communities, Guidelines.
infrastructure, residences, farms, recreational facilities,
wildlife habitat and other features that could be
impacted in the event that an emergency occurs. This

ICMM Emergency Preparedness and Response 74

 pressure sensors and auto shut-off valves coupled
with visual observations and actions are in place.
Alternatively, depending upon where a tailings
pipeline is located, a break in that pipeline could
In Detail
result in a catastrophic failure if the pressure sensors
Failure modes may be geotechnical in nature, as
and the auto shut-off valves fail and if the facility is
described in Section 3.4.3.10. For the purpose of
remote with infrequent observations.
emergency planning, the following types of
geotechnical failure modes should be considered: Figure 6 is focused on decision-making for EPRP
development, recognising that risk controls would be
— Tailings are sufficiently saturated that they are
developed and implemented, and surveillance
potentially able to flow and could become mobile
measures would be in place to reduce the likelihood
in the event of a failure (ie credible flow failure
of failures (Sections 2.4, 3.2.4.3 and 3.6.4).
scenario).

— Tailings that are sufficiently unsaturated that they Figure 6: Decision tree for evaluating potential
could not flow in the event of a failure, but could consequences of credible failure modes to
become mobile (eg credible failure modes could inform development of EPRPs
lead to a slump).
No, or with
negligible Facility has one or more
However, not all credible failure modes are likelihood credible failure scenarios?
geotechnical in nature. For example, the EPRP for
Yes
tailings management may address credible failures
associated with tailings transportation such as a No, or with If a failure occurs could
negligible tailings and water flow
break of a tailings pipeline. In addition, sitewide likelihood impactfully?
emergencies such as wildfire could also lead to
Yes
credible failure modes related to tailings under some
circumstances. Thus, it is important that Operators Conduct a breach analysis

consider geotechnical as well as non-geotechnical

failure modes when developing EPRPs.
Analysis of potential
Some credible failure modes may or may not have impacts informs
development of EPRP
the potential to be catastrophic, depending on the
layers of controls in place. For example, a break in a
Note: The process of evaluating risks and informing/updating the EPRP
tailings pipeline could result in minimal spilled volume occurs throughout the life of the facility. For operating facilities, Figure 8
explains the process of reviewing credible failure modes, risk and uncertainty
and associated impact either due to where it is on an ongoing basis.
placed relative to the embankment and/or where

2.7.3 Description of Measures the Operator An EPRP for a tailings facility in the Closure or Post-
Should Take Closure phases of the lifecycle should be adapted to
The EPRP should include a description of the measures those phases, when there may be fewer personnel and
the Operator will take to prepare for emergencies, and less equipment on site, and thus fewer resources on
to respond if an emergency occurs. Although some hand to be able to respond to an emergency. The EPRP
aspects of this element of the EPRP may involve may need to involve local contractors who could provide
external parties, it is intended to be an internal heavy equipment and operators, as well as measures to
document. Elements of an EPRP that would be ensure that equipment, fuel and personnel can be
implemented by external parties should be developed transported to the site. Contingency plans may be
cooperatively and be provided to them. needed for power generation on site and
communication infrastructure.

Tailings Management Emergency Preparedness and Response 75

 - Communication systems, equipment and
materials.

— Procedures to activate the EPRP, including internal

In Detail and external notification and communication plans
An EPRP should describe the following, regarding the for emergency response, including up-to-date
measures the Operator will take to prepare for an contact information (eg phone numbers and email
emergency, and to respond if an emergency occurs: addresses) for relevant personnel, both internal
and external.
— Credible failure scenarios that may occur and the
conditions that would trigger implementation of — Training requirements and plans for relevant
the EPRP. personnel, including external parties such as
off-site emergency responders.
— Potential impacts of credible failure scenarios, and
the likelihood of those scenarios. — Procedures or actions to be taken to:

— Resources (people, equipment, materials) required - Prevent an upset or unusual condition from
to respond to an emergency, including identifying becoming an emergency.
resources that need to be retained on site (eg - Mitigate on and off-site safety, environmental,
equipment, stockpiles of rip rap or other and infrastructure impacts associated with
materials). emergency situations.

— Roles and responsibilities of the Operator’s - Mitigate consequences if an emergency occurs

employees, contractors, and consultants, and (eg through the development of evacuation and
relevant external parties (eg public sector rescue plans).
agencies, off-site emergency responders) and the — Mechanisms to alert potentially affected parties of
overall command structure (who is in charge of an imminent or developing emergency situation
response and associated reporting relationships) (eg alarms to notify downstream communities in
in the event of an emergency. the event of a tailings facility failure).
— Any mutual aid agreements with external parties, — Measures to provide humanitarian aid, if
such as public sector agencies, other industrial necessary.
facilities (eg nearby mines) or contractors (eg
heavy machinery). — Surveillance requirements to be described in OMS
manual (Section 2.4), to be able to identify the
— Description of features and characteristics on and onset of an emergency.
off-site relevant to emergency response, including:
— Procedures and frequencies to test the EPRP.
- Access, including primary and secondary means
to access the mine site, tailings facility and — Procedures for the administration and update of
potentially impacted areas, and means of the EPRP.
reaching the site of a potential emergency under
various conditions (eg foot, boat, helicopter,
all-terrain vehicle etc.).

ICMM Emergency Preparedness and Response 76

2.7.4 Provision of Information to External Procedures should be established and implemented for
Parties regularly scheduled review and testing of the EPRP to
For tailings facilities with credible failure scenarios that ensure that the plan is up to date and adequate. The
could lead to off-site impacts, the Operator should results of tests should be evaluated to identify any
provide information to off-site emergency responders, deficiencies or opportunities for improving the EPRP
communities and public sector agencies to assist in the and the plan should be updated accordingly.
development of their emergency response measures
Review and testing of the EPRP should involve
and collaborate with them in that development. The
communities and public sector agencies, including
information provided is typically similar to but less
off-site emergency responders, with roles or
detailed than the information in the Operator’s EPRP.
responsibilities related to emergency response.
This information should be tailored to the needs of
off-site emergency responders, communities and public The potential off-site consequences of a failure should
sector agencies and developed with their input. It be a key consideration in identifying communities and
typically includes descriptions of: public sector agencies to be engaged in EPRP
development and testing, and implementation in the
— The tailings facility, the credible failure scenarios and
event that an emergency occurs. However, in identifying
the potential impacts, including potential impacts if
stakeholders to be engaged, the Operator should
flow of material occurs.
consider the engagement of stakeholders beyond
— Roles and responsibilities of the Operator and those that would be directly impacted by an emergency.
external parties (eg off-site emergency responders, In addition, there may be stakeholders who have
regulatory agencies) and the overall command important response capacity that could assist in
structure (who is in charge of response, associated responding if an emergency occurs (eg a larger
reporting relationships, and relationship between the community more distant from the mine site, but with
Operator and other parties) in the event of an more response capacity than closer communities).
emergency.
Considering community-focused measures and public
— Notification procedures to be followed if an sector capacity, an Operator should take all reasonable
emergency occurs or is imminent. steps to maintain a shared state of readiness for tailings
facility credible flow failure scenarios by securing
— Mechanisms to alert potentially affected parties of
resources and carrying out annual training and
an imminent or developing emergency situation (eg
exercises. An Operator should conduct emergency
alarms to notify downstream communities in the
response simulations at a frequency established in the
event of a tailings facility failure).
EPRP (at least every three years) for tailings facilities
with potential loss of life. Simulations can range from
2.7.5 EPRP Development, Readiness and tabletop exercises to field exercises of an emergency
Response and can include the testing of multiple failure scenarios.
All relevant personnel, including external parties, should
be familiar with the EPRP and their roles and In the case of an actual catastrophic tailings facility
responsibilities if an emergency occurs. They should failure, an operator should provide immediate response
also know how to access relevant portions of the EPRP, to save lives, supply humanitarian aid and minimise
recognising the external parties may not be provided environmental harm.
access portions of the EPRP related to any emergencies
 
that would not have off-site impacts, or any portions
containing confidential information.

Tailings Management Emergency Preparedness and Response 77

Part 3: Implementation
of Good Engineering
Practices for Tailings
Management

Part 3: : Implementation of Good Engineering

ICMM Practices for Tailings Management 78
Overview 3.1

Sufficiently robust engineering — Overarching engineering concepts:

practices, coupled with governance - Integrated mine planning

- Integrated tailings and water management
described in Part 2, are essential to
- Managing risk and uncertainty.
safe, responsible tailings management.
Elements described in Part 3 of this — Engineering activities throughout the lifecycle:
- Project Conception
Guide include:
- Design
- Construction
- Operations
- Closure and Post-Closure.

While inadequate engineering has been a major factor

in many tailings facility failures, rigorous application of
this Guide across the lifecycle at all tailings facilities,
new and existing, will lead to improved engineering
practice and safer tailings facilities. The primary basis
for the following content is to establish integrated
procedures that prevent catastrophic failures.
Governance described in Part 2 of this Guide provides
the framework to be sure rigorous implementation of
Part 3 occurs.

This Guide encourages integrated procedures that may

help to prevent catastrophic failures. This may be
realised by implementing full application of the
precautionary approach or a performance-based
risk-informed approach to tailings facility lifecycle
management depending upon the nature of the tailings
facility. Comprehensive documentation, such as the
Design Basis Report (DBR), Design Report and the
Construction Records Report (CRR), irrespective of the
design approach, are important to tailings facility
lifecycle management. To underscore this point, of the
tailings failures reviewed by Morgenstern (2018),
inadequate characterisation of foundation conditions,
both geological and geotechnical, was a contributing
factor in about 40% of the cases.

Tailings Management Overview 79

Overarching Engineering 3.2
Concepts

3.2.1 Introduction — Development, analysis, and selection of alternatives

Mines and their multiple work areas, facilities, and during the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3.5).
personnel are complex systems. The mines are only
— Design of tailings facilities (Section 3.4).
able to function optimally and in a risk-informed manner
by integrating the various components and workflows — Development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).
within the mine site.
Examples of integration aspects include:
Through studying lessons learned in case histories,
— The life of the mine reserve and resource should be
Operators now understand the need to consider all
integral in determining tailings capacity
material aspects of the mine site when conducting
requirements.
‘mine planning’. Likewise, Operators increasingly
recognise the interdependence of sitewide water — Ore processing approaches and anticipated ore
management on the integrated understanding and variability.
management of tailings facilities.
— Tailings technology selection requires consideration
Once systems and personnel (operators, engineers, of production rate and material properties, climate
managers from relevant disciplines) are integrated, it is and water balance, power and closure objectives.
possible to ascertain and manage risk and uncertainty,
— Consideration of availability and quality of
in particular for tailings facilities, more fully. Managing
construction materials for components of the tailings
risk and uncertainty is part of the core culture of mining
facility, such as embankment fill, drainage features
Operators and this Guide expresses how to apply
and seepage control features.
available tools to improve risk-informed decision-
making throughout the tailings facility lifecycle. — Environmental objectives and controls considering
local conditions and broader operations and closure.
3.2.2 Integrated Mine Planning Across the
Lifecycle — Closure considerations such as plans, design, cover
As described in Section 1.2.2, an integrated approach to materials, progressive reclamation and post-mining
mine planning is essential to safe tailings management. land use.
Integrated mine planning involves the full integration of — Planning of mine economics should consider all
planning across the lifecycle of all aspects that can aspects of tailings management.
impact the project conception, design, construction,
operation, and closure of tailings facilities, including: Integrated mine planning is also important to optimising
decisions during the Operations phase (Section 3.6) and
— Commitments to stakeholders should be considered on the context of potential
— Ore extraction material changes. As described in Sections 1.2.1 and
2.2.3, integration begins with the corporate policy and
— Ore processing
the Operator’s executives conveying the importance of
— Sitewide water management and coordination of implementing integrated practices.

— Management of other mine wastes such as waste Change management is integral to integrated mine
rock planning as well, as described in Section 2.3.1.

— Mine closure. Figure 7 illustrates the lifecycle phases, the key tailings
management outcomes of each phase, and the
An integrated approach to mine planning is particularly
linkages with integrated mine planning across the
important for:
lifecycle, including closure plan development and
— Integration of water management (Section 3.2.3). implementation.

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 80

Figure 7: Tailings management lifecycle, key outcomes of each phase of the lifecycle, and the linkages with
integrated mine planning across the lifecycle, including closure plan development and implementation

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Temporary Suspension

Operations Closure Post-Closure

Project Design Construction Operate in Implement closure Implement
Conception Finalise detailed Construct in accordance with in accordance post-closure in
design and accordance with performance with the closure accordance with
Select preferred
obtain necessary the detailed objectives, design plan and final the closure plan
alternative to
approvals. design and intent and closure closure design. and final closure
advance to
document plan. Address Address design. Address
design and obtain deficiencies and deficiencies and deficiencies and
necessary deviations and
as-built implement implement implement
approvals. measures for measures for measures for
conditions.
continual continual continual
improvement. improvement. improvement.

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

3.2.3 Integration of Tailings and Water This inextricable linkage between tailings and water
Management management necessitates a good understanding of all
Water management is an important aspect in safety and water inflows and outflows to a tailings facility, including
stability considerations for all surface disposal tailings variations over time and uncertainties in those
facilities. This is true even for facilities where the tailings variations. Many credible failure modes for tailings
have been filtered and are unsaturated, with the tailings facilities are rooted in water management and the
stacked and no water storage pond associated with the presence of water exacerbates the consequences of a
tailings facility. It is important to evaluate efficient potential failure even if water is not an initial failure
measures to minimise the water in or on the tailings trigger.
facility as part of the site water management plan. That There are two concepts fundamental to water
said, in some cases, storage of water in a tailings facility management:
is integral to the design intent, as an environmental
— When practicable, keep water that has not come in
control or to manage seasonal fluctuations at a mine site.
contact with the mine site from coming into contact
Another driver in sitewide water management is to
with the tailings and other parts of the mine site by
ensure adequate supply of water is always available to
diversion of surface water or other means.
the ore processing facility while minimising impacts on
water supply for the surrounding area and communities. — For the water that does enter the site, establish
While these drivers are valid, safety of the facility must engineering controls to mitigate geotechnical and
always be paramount. geochemical risks across the mine site.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 81

Management of water needs to be carefully considered requirements. Design flood considerations should be
throughout the lifecycle of tailings facilities, and an consistently applied throughout all phases of the
integrated approach to sitewide water management is lifecycle. Water storage requirements, operating
needed to ensure effective water management freeboard of the tailings facility, and spillway design
(Sections 1.2.2 and 3.2.3). Water management is an should be based on the hydrology of the watershed and
integral component of the Project Conception and reviewed periodically to assess drying or wetting trends
Design phases. Fresh water demand for ore processing in the climate. Ideally, excess water from storms or
is typically tied to the tailings technology as well as site run-off volumes would be drawn down from the tailings
tailings characteristics. Beyond the tailings facility and facility in a relatively short period of time; regardless,
the mine site, water management should consider the post-flood event conditions should be considered in
broader watershed level and potential impacts to the facility stability analyses.
watershed. In this regard, ICMM’s Position Statement
Further, the water management plan should incorporate
on Water Stewardship (2017) and A Practical Guide to
the assessment of diversions, discharges, and strategies
Consistent Water Reporting apply sitewide, including at
for any water storage inventories. The plan should also
tailings facilities.
address seepage and managing impacts to groundwater
When developing a water management plan for a (ie ponds, interceptor systems, hydrologic sinks, liners).
tailings facility (within the context of a sitewide water Other important plan components include reuse
management plan), the plan should clearly define pumping systems and treatment systems for recycling or
sitewide strategies and objectives for water discharge. The plan should begin by defining a
management, including relevant legal requirements and conceptual flow schematic, operational rules for given
any additional social and environmental commitments facilities and performance indicators. With the inclusion
the Operator has made such as protecting against of the mine plan and associated sitewide water needs
unintentional releases. (sources, types, reliability), water management should be
an ongoing process underpinned by a regularly updated
Hydrology and hydrogeology data, including the
water balance model.
delineation of the mine site and tailings facility
catchment area(s) and all potential water sources A water balance for the mine site as a whole, and the
(process and non-process), should be considered in tailings facility in particular, should consider quantifying
the development of a water management plan and the inflows and outflows of water to the site and flows
design of the tailings facility. Throughout the lifecycle, within the site. A surveillance programme should be
it is helpful to identify plausible changes and challenges developed and implemented to measure flows and
considering operational and natural system variability calibrate the water balance. The water balance should
and uncertainties. For example, depending on site- consider the need for reused / recycled water and fresh
specific conditions, an active mining operation may water and maximum pond storage (where applicable) to
lower groundwater levels under a tailings facility, but ensure that the design intent is met. In line with this
post-closure, groundwater levels may rise. Similarly, Guide’s overarching theme of integrated mine planning
it is helpful to consider regional hydrogeology during that considers the tailings facility lifecycle, closure
the development of facility-specific models. Design considerations should be included in long-term water
parameters should be established and documented, modelling scenarios and planning.
then monitored to identify variances, validate
Forecast scenarios should also include potential future
projections and anticipate potential problems.
changes in climate conditions, including changes in
The appropriate design flood(s) should be identified, both mean annual conditions (eg mean annual
with reference to good design practices, input from the precipitation) and changes in return period and intensity
EOR and Independent Review, and consistent with legal of extreme events. Operators should use projections to:

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 82

— Identify vulnerabilities and assess risks associated plans should recognise and evaluate potential
with climate change. implications of uncertainty with the complexities of
tailings facilities. Water balance modelling and
— Seek to understand the vulnerability of their site
planning should be a continual improvement process
design criteria in the face of a range of incremental
with regular updates to the calibration and validation
risks associated with climate change.
The water management plan should clarify the
— Ultimately develop a path forward to implement
personnel who are assigned responsibility for water
appropriate mitigation measures.
management for specific facilities, description of the
Building on the results of the water balance model, the facilities and their context within the broader mine
plan should outline key risks and opportunities for a plan. The plan should also clarify who has
site (and given tailings facility) with respect to water responsibility to manage the water balance model and
management, as identified and explained using the update it regularly. Most importantly, the water
water balance model for critical facilities and balance and water management plans should be
consideration of regulatory, social and environmental incorporated into overall construction, operation, and
aspects of the broader catchment. Risks should be closure management planning of the tailings facility
considered and integrated with broader risk and coordinated with broader sitewide planning, such
processes and an action plan should be developed that they guide decision-making and are updated
and executed. Water modelling and management accordingly.

An effective approach to water balance modelling is to

consider the whole lifecycle of the site, from current
conditions through to the Closure and Post-Closure
phases. Useful deliverables from a successful water
In Detail
balance model are the model itself, flow diagrams and
Water Balance Modelling the associated list of flow components, and a water
Water balance models are tools for helping make balance report or user manual that details the
informed water management decisions. In addition to assumptions and input parameters used to develop
providing a historical accounting of the system flows the model. Model development typically starts simply,
and an understanding of makeup water needs, they and complexity is added carefully, if and when
can simulate the future behaviour of a site's water required, until the modelling objectives are met.
management system (if properly calibrated) and
Key considerations in tailings facility water balance
compare options for improving performance. Models
modelling:
should also be forward thinking to assess and adapt
to climate change needs. Water balance models are — Flow diagram and operational rules including
used to: connectivity with surrounding mine and/or
downstream environment where appropriate.
— Assess the system’s past performance.
— Tailings deposition method, history, plans, and
— Optimise short- to medium-term operational
associated modelling inclusive of depositional
decisions.
geometries.
— Assess the performance of future water
— Tailings deposit density and voids entrainment.
management improvements through evaluation of
scenarios. — Infiltration and seepage, and interaction of
groundwater with tailings facility.
— Support water reporting requirements on water
inflows/outflows, water use and reuse / recycle, — Evaporation.
and other water metrics.
— Metered and unmetered inflows and outflows
— Identify flow monitoring requirements. including contributions from precipitation run-off.

— Provide estimates of future flows for closure — Uncertainties and sensitivities of physical system
planning. such as difficult to measure parameters, error,
operational change and trends in climate.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 83

 By integrating the water balance with sitewide personnel responsible for managing the water
activities, consideration of sitewide mass balance can aspects of the site such as mining, ore processing,
be better coordinated, as well. Sitewide mass balance engineering, environment, tailings and water
(solids and liquids) is helpful for evaluating impacts to management.
tailings facility operation due to changes in ore body,
mining rate, ore processing technology or Attributes of Good Water Balance Models
performance, ore mineralogy, water chemistry and Water balance model development is site-specific
integrated closure plans. and attributes of a good water balance model
include:
Flow Diagrams
— The water balance model includes a clear
A flow diagram is a visual representation of the
definition of the tailings facility and its associated
water balance model and site water management.
storage capacity
Developing flow diagrams is the first step in the
and other relevant water management facilities
development of a water balance model and they
within a site’s footprint, accounting for inflows,
provide a conceptual model for model development.
outflows and storage and incorporate the site’s
Flow diagrams show the water infrastructure, key site
mine plan and water management plan.
features (pits, ponds, dumps, plants, tailings facilities,
etc.) and the links, or flow components, between the — The model is easy to understand, review and
features and which flows have reliable measurements. update including the use of notes and comments
Flow diagrams are complemented by descriptions of within the model.
each flow component. A set of flow diagrams and
— There is comprehensive documentation on the
associated descriptions of flow components may
input parameters and assumptions as well as the
be used to represent the evolution of the site
calculations used in the model.
through time.
— Model logic is simple and clean with easily
Attributes of good flow diagrams include:
identifiable input data. Examples of logic include
— The flow diagram elements are superimposed on operational rules/procedures such as hierarchy of
a site layout drawing/map, or an aerial photo or water use and variability of recycled versus fresh
satellite image is used as the background. water during wet and dry periods and after rain
events, management pond levels under various
— Intuitive symbols are used to represent key
conditions, etc.
features and are positioned where they are
physically located on the site layout map. — Model components naming convention is
deliberate and consistent throughout.
— Where possible, flow components (the links
between the various water features) follow their — The model is developed to a level of detail
physical alignment. necessary to:

— The flow diagram and list of flow components is - Meet the specific objectives decided upon by
comprehensive to include all flows (metered and the development stakeholders.
non-metered) that will be modelled and those - Inform and improve a site’s current and future
necessary to meet the objectives of the model. water management practices.
- Provide data to report on water metrics.
— The list of flow components contains a clear and
concise description for each flow component and - Assess water performance against pre-defined
the location surveillance instrumentation. targets.

— The flow components naming convention is — Model complexity and detail is supported by
consistent with the water balance model. available data and specific purpose to meet the
objective.
The flow diagrams and the associated list of flow
components should be reviewed and updated — The assumptions and uncertainties associated
periodically or following changes to site water with the model are considered:
management practices. During the water balance - Calibration is regularly reviewed and validated or
review process, input should be gathered from site adjusted as needed to improve forecasts.

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 84

 - Sensitivity analyses and/or probabilistic analyses conditions, typically a mixture of wet/dry and
are conducted to help to improve understanding average climate conditions.
and confidence in decisions. - Stochastic forecasting to provide an
— The water balance time step selected is granular understanding of climate/hydrologic variability
enough to represent the variability of flow including potential for climate change and the
conditions. Recommended minimum model time risks to current and planned water management
steps are: scenarios.

- Daily time step for the model runs (recognising — Results include graphs comparing modelled
that some input parameters could vary hourly, versus monitored data to allow for model
daily, monthly, seasonally or annually). validation at each update.
- Monthly results reporting.
Further Reading:
— The water balance model includes three types of — ICMM: A Practical Guide to Consistent Water
climate scenarios: Reporting
- Historical scenario with historical climate inputs
— ICMM: Adapting to a Changing Climate: Building
to calibrate and validate the model.
resilience in the mining and metals industry
- Deterministic forecasting scenarios, including
average climate conditions, relevant wet/dry ICMM: Mining Climate Assessment (MiCA) Tool
climate conditions, and user-defined climate (accessible to members at the following link)

3.2.4 Managing Uncertainty and Risk Figure 8: Framework for a risk-informed approach
for tailings management
3.2.4.1 Introduction
Requirement 10.1 of the Standard states, ‘Conduct and
update risk assessments with a qualified multi- Risk Assessment
disciplinary team using good practice methodologies at Risk Identification
a minimum every three years and more frequently
Risk Analysis
whenever there is a material change either to the
tailings facility or to the social, environmental and local Risk Evaluation

economic context. Transmit risk assessments to the

ITRB or senior independent technical reviewer for
Surveillance and Review Risk Management
review, and address with urgency all unacceptable
tailings facility risks.’ Surveillance Risk Mitigation

Performance Evaluation Risk Communication

Historically, there have been two approaches in dam
safety risk assessment and management; a prescriptive
approach and risk-informed decision-making. Risk-
informed decision-making builds upon prescriptive
approaches which are reliant on prescribed criteria.
These criteria are traditionally established through
risk-based approaches such as the use of and risk recording and reporting. The inter-related
consequence classification during the Design phase. nature of these components is shown in Figure 8.

Risk-informed decision-making is underpinned by risk Risk management considers all types and severities of
assessment, which comprises a series of steps: risk risks: this Guide primarily focuses on those risks that
identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation. In turn, have the potential to result in a catastrophic failure. As
risk-informed decision-making improves and informs described below, assessing risk involves consideration
risk management (risk reduction) activities. Risk of both the potential consequences of an event and the
management includes implementation of risk reduction likelihood of that event occurring and an adverse
measures, surveillance and review, risk communication, structural response to the event.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 85

There are several tools to support Operators in 3.2.4.2 Elements of Risk Assessment
identifying, analysing and evaluating risk, ranging from Safety is improved by first understanding a tailings
simple experience-based ones to more complex facility’s potential failure modes, the likelihood of these
quantitative tools. Qualitative or semi-quantitative risk hazards occurring, and then using that information to
assessment tools using the concept of event trees are develop and implement measures to mitigate, prevent,
typically the most helpful for aiding the understanding and/or reduce risk, where warranted. These safety
of tailings facility risks. Typically, fully quantitative improvements can be accomplished through effective
approaches are only appropriate to consider for specific risk assessment and risk management. The following
risk drivers. Fully quantitative processes may also outlines the components of risk assessment and
inadvertently lead to a false sense of certainty management. As stated, risk assessment includes the
with results. steps of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk
Risk-informed decision-making steps should be evaluation. The EOR should be a key contributor to this
conducted by an experienced team comprising the assessment and the Independent Reviewer should
Operator’s staff, the EOR and potentially other multi- review the assessment.
disciplinary experts as appropriate. The team should
challenge themselves to ensure that the risk process Risk Identification
remains unbiased and that it reflects actual credible The first step of risk identification is to identify site-
risks. As such, the risk process and outcomes should specific potential failure modes. A potential failure mode
be reviewed and updated throughout the lifecycle is a cause of failure, chain of events (event tree), or one
(regularly and when potential material changes are possible way a system can fail. In the context of tailings
being considered), and the resulting risk management management failure modes may include a range of
plan should be updated accordingly. Implementing a hazards or threats such as:
TMS, which includes Evaluating Performance and
— Natural hazards (eg earthquake, landslide, extreme
Identifying Actions to Improve Performance (Section
weather event).
2.3), provides a structured approached to reviewing
and updating the risk assessment and the risk — Events related to an engineered structure (eg piping
management plan. of water through a tailings facility embankment).

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 86

— Operational events (eg failure of a tailings pipeline). — The design flood occurs but there is a defect in the
crest height for a measurable distance along the
Once site-specific potential failure modes have been
embankment crest due to Operator error in
identified they should be characterised, first to
construction sequencing and the flood volume is
determine if they are credible and then to determine
ponded against the embankment until overtopping
the likelihood of occurrence if they are credible.
occurs at the low section. This overtopping erodes the
Credible failure modes are defined per the Standard.
embankment in an uncontrolled manner, ultimately
A potential failure mode may be non-credible if ruled
breaching the tailings facility and allowing flood waters
out categorically during initial screening. For example,
and tailings slurry to leave the facility.
overtopping by a flood event typically would not be
considered a credible failure mode if the facility has a In the first case, the events that occurred did not lead to
confirmed catchment and storage for multiple failure. However, in the second case, the unwanted events
maximum credible inflow events, and geotechnical compounded, ultimately leading to a failure. Consideration
analyses have demonstrated that storing this excess of compounding factors is important, and brainstorming
water (even if extended duration is necessary) would sessions to identify such combinations of events are vital
not create a stability concern. Further, investigations to the efficacy of the risk analysis and assessment
and analyses may be sufficient to determine from a process. Some credible failure modes may be
practical perspective that a failure mode is non- catastrophic failure modes (and may involve flow failures)
credible. For example, it may be determined that the and these are addressed in Section 2.7. Some tailings
tailings facility has design features that fully mitigate a facilities have credible failure modes, but these may not
potential failure mode and that confidence in the have potential catastrophic consequences. An Operator’s
design, as-built condition, and rigorous operating thorough evaluation of each of their tailings facilities can
controls render a failure mode as non-credible. This
be used to identify the subset of facilities that do have
assessment of credibility should be repeated through
catastrophic credible failure modes. This subset becomes
the life of the facility, particularly if there are material
the focus of the Operator for the application of
changes. As described in Section 3.4.3 and in the
appropriate levels of risk management to prevent any of
Standard, for closure design, an appropriate design
these modes from manifesting into an actual event.
criterion to consider in the analysis of credible failure
modes relative to non-credible failure modes may be
Risk Analysis
on the order of 1:10,000 with the provisos outlined in
Risk analysis involves the characterisation of what is
the Standard and this Guide regarding deterministic
known and what is uncertain about the present and
alternatives. This design criterion should not be
future performance of an existing or planned tailings
confused with likelihood of occurrence of a given
facility. During risk analysis, the likelihood of the specific
failure mode, though.
potential failure mode loading condition, the likelihood of
For each credible failure mode that still exists, an adverse structural response, and the magnitude of
the likelihood of the event leading to specific the consequences are estimated for each potential
consequences should be estimated, which includes failure mode. As discussed in Section 2.7, there are
the likelihood of the specific loading condition and various techniques for determining potential
the likelihood of an adverse structural response to the consequences and the appropriate tool should be
event. Event trees help to illuminate the likelihood of selected when considering specific failure modes. Risk
an event occurring (along with an adverse structural analysis is often facilitated by someone with significant
response). risk analysis experience, which can help to prevent bias
For example, for a tailings facility embankment to in the process.
breach and tailings to be discharged, a series of The nature of the decisions that the risk analysis will
events must typically occur in sequence. Potential inform determines the level of detail needed and the
scenarios include: degree of acceptable uncertainty. Typically, a lower level
— The design flood occurs but the facility has been of detail and a higher degree of uncertainty is
constructed and operated as expected and there is appropriate for the Project Conception phase (Section
no adverse structural response. 3.3) or for developing a conceptual closure plan (Section
3.7.2). Potential Problem Analysis is a tool that works well

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 87

in the Project Conception phase. As the design of a — Gaps in knowledge about hazards and potential
tailings facility or closure plan then advances to final, failure modes (site characterisation, Section 3.3.2).
executable form, more detail and less uncertainty in risk For example:
analysis is needed. Potential Failure Mode Analysis or
- Uncertainty in the results of models used to assess
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Semi-
hazards such as hydrogeological models, stability
Quantitative Risk Analysis with Event Tree Analysis are
models or climate change models.
tools that typically work well as design progresses and
a facility moves into the Construction and Operations - Lack of complete understanding of foundation
phases. Regardless of the tool selected, it is important conditions, including surficial and bedrock geology.
follow a consistent approach and to assume that one — Natural variability in any given process or event. The
does not know the answer to the questions that arise conservative nature of engineering analysis could
unless specific information, data and/or analyses are mute the range of this potential variability.
available to support assumptions.
— An incomplete understanding of the potential
Uncertainty is the result of imperfect knowledge about consequences of an event. For example,
the present or future state of a system, event, situation uncertainties in breach analyses (Section 2.7.2).
or population under consideration. To manage risk,
uncertainty should be acknowledged, assessed and — The challenging nature of accurately estimating
considered. In tailings management, uncertainty may be likelihood.
due to: — The effectiveness of risk management measures in
reducing likelihood, consequence, or both.

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 88

— The changing nature of some risks (hazard creep) for The process typically considers the following, among
which likelihood or consequence may change over other aspects: robustness of design, past and future
time (site characterisation, Section 3.3.2). This performance monitoring, site context, and practicality of
includes changes in climate, downstream conditions any remediation considered. Guidelines from regulatory
(eg new communities or infrastructure) or legal agencies, governing bodies, other industries associated
requirements. with tailings facility safety, and corporate governance
should all be reviewed to determine what risks are within
Risk estimates will have a degree of uncertainty that
normal operating limits. Understanding environmental,
should be characterised. This includes acknowledging
social, cultural, ethical, political, and legal considerations
that there is a degree of subjectivity in estimating risk,
should also be included in risk evaluation.
reflecting various factors such as the experience and
expertise of those involved in developing the estimate, The team typically considers risk mitigation alternatives
the models used, and the comprehensiveness of at this stage. The outcome of the risk assessment
available site characterisation information. Uncertainty includes recommendations for actions deemed justified
may be represented by assigning ranges to estimates by the team.
of both likelihood and consequence.
3.2.4.3 Risk Management
When uncertainty is high, it is important to consider
Risk management includes assessing effects due to
applying conservative assumptions in the selection of
changes or deviations both in isolation and as a
input parameters and the analysis of the likelihood or
compounding effect. Risk management builds upon the
potential consequences of an event. Steps should also
results of risk assessment as well as uncertainty
be taken to reduce uncertainty, such as:
analysis and involves the systematic development and
— Improving the understanding of the tailings facility implementation of strategies to eliminate or reduce
and factors influencing it through improved site risks. These strategies include potential actions to
characterisation (Section 3.3.3). reduce the likelihood of occurrence and/or the
magnitude of consequences of credible failure modes
— Refined modelling of potential consequences
that were evaluated to have a higher risk.
(Section 2.7.2).
Typical strategies may include recurring and monitoring
— Developing a robust tailings facility design with less
activities such as routine and special inspections,
uncertainty in design criteria (Section 3.4).
instrumentation and its evaluation, structural analyses,
— Accurately documenting constructed conditions to site investigations, development and testing of EPRPs,
reduce uncertainty about the characteristics of the Independent Review and regulatory reviews, and/or
tailings facility and associated embankments implementation of constructed risk reduction measures,
(Section 3.5.4). projects or improved operational controls.

— Using the results of Evaluating Performance (Section Risk management should also consider and document
2.3.4) including surveillance (Section 2.4.3) and the estimated risk after a remedial action and/or enhanced
programme for reviewing tailing safety, including operational practices or surveillance have been
Independent Review (Section 2.6) to review and implemented. Credible failure scenarios that that have
update the risk assessment and validate the design elevated levels of risk may require mitigation measures
basis of the tailings facility throughout the lifecycle. to reduce risk. The level of acceptable risk is defined by
each Operator using ALARP or by local regulatory
As uncertainty is reduced, input parameters and
requirements, as applicable.
analyses become more realistic as they are based on
facts rather than assumptions. For those risks that cannot be eliminated or avoided, a
key concept in risk-informed decision-making is
Risk Evaluation reducing identified risks (likelihood and/or
Risk evaluation compares the outcomes of risk analysis consequence) to levels that are ALARP. As defined in
for existing conditions to determine if risks are within the Standard, ALARP requires that all reasonable
acceptable limits, whether present risk measures and measures be taken with respect to ‘tolerable’ or
controls are adequate, and what additional alternative acceptable risks to reduce them even further until the
risk reduction measures could be considered. cost and other impacts of additional risk reduction are
grossly disproportionate to the benefit.

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 89

Factors involved in applying ALARP include: Figure 9: The concept of assessing benefit of
mitigation effort to residual risks with ALARP
— Application of relevant good practice.

— The level of incremental risk in relation to the

established risk guidelines.

— The cost-effectiveness of the risk reduction

measures in relation to likelihood and/or

Resources
Risk
consequence. Le
vel
of ri
sk
— Remaining life of the facility and potential alignment ALARP
with closure planning which may reduce likelihood Resources, effort
and/or consequence.

— Societal concerns as revealed by consultation with Cost / Benefit

the community and other stakeholders.

— Other factors such as consideration of standards- lower risk. This is indicated in Requirement 5.7 whereby
based approaches, benchmarking, direct business Operators identify additional reasonable steps to
impacts, constructability, implementation schedule reduce potential consequences (ie by re-evaluating
and environmental consequences. alternatives for new facilities or considering various
engineering solutions for existing facilities).
The concept of ALARP is illustrated in Figure 9. The
‘Resources, effort’ line in this graph represents a The Standard states that the Accountable Executive
multiple of potential factors whereby the sharp rise in must confirm and document that specific tailings
resources to reduce risks would be grossly facilities meet ALARP (Requirement 4.7, 5.7). The RTFE
disproportionate to the benefit realised. Each Operator should, with input from the EOR and the Operator’s site
will have its own processes to address such factors leadership, present the Accountable Executive with risk
including use of good practice guidance and management measure to achieve ALARP, ideally after
jurisdictional requirements on risk evaluations and seeking advice from Independent Review. It is good
management. practice to provide more than one option for
When a judgement is made that risks are ALARP, this is consideration such that risk levels and resource
often determined by comparing the effectiveness of requirements are understood and aligned with the
reducing risk further (evaluated by considering the cost Operator’s policy.
to further reduce risk and the amount of risk reduction The urgency of completing safety actions should be
achieved) and then comparing it to other risk reduction commensurate with risk. Prioritisation of risk reduction
actions implemented by peers in the industry. If the measures should be based on prioritisation of safety,
costs to achieve an additional level of risk reduction are while allowing for second-order factors as appropriate.
grossly disproportional to achieving the same
magnitude of risk reduction at other tailings facilities, Risk management plans may be used to describe risk
the current risk may be considered ALARP. This comes controls to reduced risks identified through risk
with the caveat that operating contexts differ and that assessment, as well as actions, persons responsible for
this will have a bearing on the determination of ALARP. completing the actions, and timelines for action
There are many factors that can contribute to the completion. Risk controls may include operating rules
decision that ALARP has been satisfied and no further with ongoing surveillance and validation or discrete
action is justified. There may be some instances when implementation of new mitigation measures. Typically, a
ALARP is achieved that an Operator may wish to conceptual risk management plan is developed during
consider other alternatives at their discretion to further the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3) and is

ICMM Overarching Engineering Concepts 90

refined and developed in greater detail during the management into the TMS (Section 2.3) and ensuring
Design phase (Section 3.4). A risk register, including the that risk management plans are integrated into and
associated prioritised risk controls, should be implemented through OMS activities (Section 2.4) with
developed, and it should be reviewed and updated clear accountability and responsibility (Section 2.2.2),
throughout the life of the facility. and input from a programme for reviewing tailings
The risk processes and outcomes should be safety, including Independent Review (Section 2.6).
reassessed, updated and reviewed regularly as Risk communication is an important element of
appropriate through the lifecycle of the facility, managing risk and includes open, two-way exchange of
particularly in the event of material changes. information and opinion about hazards and risks leading
The key to effective risk management is avoiding to a better understanding of risk management decisions.
complacency. Having a plan does not mean that risks It encompasses both internal communication (eg
are being properly managed, but it can give the illusion between the EOR, RTFE, Accountable Executive and BoD)
that they are. It is vital that risk management plans be and external communication (eg between the Operator
effectively implemented. This includes integrating risk and regulatory agencies or communities as appropriate).

Tailings Management Overarching Engineering Concepts 91

Project Conception 3.3

3.3.1 Introduction - Modification to the design of a tailings facility, such

Project Conception consists of the development and as the strengthening of embankments or reductions
analysis of a range of alternatives (eg the location of a in water levels.
new tailings facility, technologies to be applied). The
— Re-activation of an existing tailings facility for mine
primary output is the final, approved selection of the
re-opening.
preferred alternative and associated costing estimates
in accordance with corporate requirements. — Closure and Post-Closure phases.

The Project Conception phase is a process of making Key activities in the Project Conception phase are:
some of the most important decisions about tailings
— Risk identification and analysis which begins with
management, some of which will be difficult or
Potential Problem Analysis (Section 3.2.4).
impossible to reverse once the Design phase has been
completed and executed. Thus, Operators should — Site characterisation.
carefully consider the Project Conception phase before
— Definition of performance objectives and design
the Design phase is initiated.
criteria.
It is important to emphasise that Project Conception is
— Identification of alternatives, development of
not relevant only to new tailings facilities. It is a recurring
preliminary designs, and multi-criteria alternatives
activity through the lifecycle and can also be applied to
analysis to select the preferred alternative.
planning for:
As described in Section 3.2.2, an integrated approach to
— Potential material changes in design (depending on
mine planning is essential to safe tailings management
complexity), such as:
and involves the full integration of planning across the
- Extensions to the life of an existing tailings facility, lifecycle of all aspects that can impact tailings
beyond its initial design capacity. management. An integrated approach is particularly
invaluable in the Project Conception phase.

recognising that changes may be appropriate or

necessary if the project needs change from one
phase to the next. Independent Review provides
input to the Operator on a range of aspects
In Detail
related to Project Conception, such as:
Operators may consider the following:
- Design of site characterisation, to help ensure
— Appoint the EOR and engage the Design Team that the right information is collected and to help
(ideally from the same firm, but other models can eliminate gaps and reduce uncertainty.
work as well). Ideally, the EOR would follow the
- Conduct of the risk analysis, including the
project through to the Design, Construction, and
uncertainty assessment.
Operations phases (recognising that changing the
EOR is a significant effort at any phase). - Design and conduct of the multi-criteria
alternatives analysis.
— Appoint Independent Reviewer(s) (or a Senior
Technical Reviewer) and determine the initiation of — Independent Reviewer(s) can be a sounding board
and mechanism for Independent Review moving to test ideas: their experience with other projects
into the Design phase (Section 2.6.2). The may be invaluable to the Operator.
reviewer(s) at this state may follow the project — Initiate risk analysis and evaluation (Section 3.2.4).
through the next phases of the lifecycle, Risk analysis is used in the Project Conception

ICMM Project Conception 92

 phase to inform development of preliminary development of a preliminary design, which will be
designs and the multi-criteria alternatives analysis. refined moving into the Design phase (Section 3.4).
Potential Problem Analysis, including identification This stage would consider the options for siting and
of hazards and potential failure modes, is technology management technology (alternative
particularly important during the Project processing, dewatering, blending and/or comingling,
Conception phase. transport, storage, construction materials).

— Uncertainty Analysis to assess and recognise — Evaluate alternatives to select the preferred
uncertainty in the risk analysis. This analysis will alternative to advance to the Design phase
inform the multi-criteria alternatives analysis as (Section 3.4).
well as further site characterisation work aimed at
— Develop and submit documentation to support
reducing uncertainty. This uncertainty analysis
the approval of the preferred alternative, both
includes broad topics, such as climate change
internally by the senior management/Accountable
and foundation conditions.
Executive and, if applicable, by government
— Undertake preliminary site characterisation authorities.
studies and develop preliminary site
During this phase, an Operator may wish to initiate
characterisation models (Section 3.3.2).
community engagement (Section 2.2.5). Input from
— Consider the operating strategy including the community engagement is helpful in identifying
Operator’s forecast of ability to implement controls, community values to be considered in the Project
especially administrative controls (often found in a Conception phase and gathering information about
project’s future OMS), and a clear definition of the community knowledge and understanding of the
inherent risk posed by each option. area. This input helps to inform the multi-criteria
alternatives analysis.
— Identify alternatives and develop a preliminary
design for each alternative consistent with the Figure 10 highlights the key activities of the Project
guidance in Section 3.3.4, including a preliminary Conception phase of the lifecycle.
selection of design criteria (Section 3.4.3) and the

Figure 10: Key activities of the Project Conception phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Project Conception
Select preferred alternative to
advance to design, informed by:
– Site characterisation models
– Performance objectives Temporary Suspension
– Conceptual closure plan
– Risk identification and analysis
Prepare:
– Site characterisation models
– Evaluation of Alternatives Design Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure
– Design Basis Report (DBR)

Potential material
changes go to either
Project Conception
or Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

Tailings Management Project Conception 93

3.3.2 Site Characterisation — Informing the knowledge base for the site, which
Site characterisation is an iterative process that is focuses on the holistic consideration for social and
initiated during the Project Conception phase and economic factors as well as environmental and
continues throughout the lifecycle of the tailings facility. infrastructure factors (Section 1.3.1).
It involves the collection and compilation of a wide
The information collected through site characterisation
range of information about a site and the adjacent
informs a range of models that are aggregated to create
environment, and the development of a site
an overall site characterisation model such as:
characterisation model. Site characterisation typically
begins as a desktop assessment and field — Climate including predictions of potential changes
reconnaissance. It is refined with field investigations as
— Geology
alternatives are narrowed and the project proceeds to
the Design phase. (Section 3.4). Site characterisation is — Hydrogeology and hydrology
critical to the long-term stability of the tailings facility
— Tailings characteristics (geotechnical and
and it requires substantial field investigations and
geochemical)
analyses.
— Foundation characteristics
The information collected as part of the site
characterisation studies is used to inform integrated — Seismic conditions.
mine planning (Section 3.2.2), the Project Conception
During the Project Conception phase, at least
and Design phases (Section 3.4), and closure plan
preliminary site characterisation is conducted for each
development (Section 3.7.2). The site characterisation
alternative developed and evaluated. For preliminary
also serves as an input for:
screening of alternatives, this may focus on a few
— Conducting and updating the risk assessment specific parameters with a higher degree of uncertainty.
(Section 3.2.4). As alternatives are eliminated through pre-screening
and remaining alternatives are designed in more detail
— Developing and updating the risk management plan
and are then evaluated more rigorously, site
(Section 3.2.4).
characterisation information and models for those
— Identifying alternatives and developing preliminary alternatives should be refined to increase detail and
designs for alternatives and evaluating alternatives reduce uncertainty.
and developing the detailed design (Section 3.3.4).
Once the preferred alternative is selected and the
— Developing and updating the DBR (Section 3.4.5) and Operator proceeds to more detailed studies, and
helping to validate the design intent. ultimately the executable design for construction, the
level of detail should increase further, and models
— Development of the closure plan (Section 3.7.2).
should be refined to further reduce uncertainty.

The collection of site characterisation information

should continue throughout the lifecycle. The site
characterisation model should be refined and updated
based on updated site characterisation information,
constructed conditions (Section 3.5.4) and surveillance
results (Section 2.4).

Site characterisation information and the level of detail

required changes and expands through the project
lifecycle.

Site characterisation should also address the

information requirements identified through community
engagement and Independent Review, as well as the
collection of information related to relevant legal
requirements.

ICMM Project Conception 94

 — Features that could preclude a tailings facility at
that location (eg flora and fauna, hazards, social or
cultural features).

In Detail — Closure considerations and closure plan.

Site characterisation involves the collection and
— Site topography and other geographical
consideration of potential future changes with a wide
information.
range of information such as:
— Bedrock and surficial geology, and hydrogeology.
— Characteristics of the proposed mine.
— Site geotechnical characterisation.
— Characteristics and anticipated behaviour
(geotechnical and geochemical) of the tailings. It — Seismicity.
is especially critical for tailings facilities having
— Hydrology.
embankments or other structural elements
constructed of tailings. — Natural hazards (eg landslides, avalanches,
tsunami impact zones, etc).
— Characteristics of other materials intended to be
used in construction. — Terrestrial environment, aquatic environment,
archaeology, socio-economic factors, indigenous
— Availability and characteristics of impoundment
and other considerations within the footprint of
construction materials.
the planned tailings facility, and in upstream and
— Basic information about potential alternatives. downstream areas.

— E xisting and planned infrastructure. — Climate trend considerations.

— Air and water management related studies.

3.3.3 Performance Objectives crucial to providing a basis for the multi-criteria

Setting performance objectives underpins safe tailings alternatives analysis.
management. Performance objectives should be
Performance objectives should then be refined and
aligned with and translate the corporate policy on
developed in more detail, particularly during the Design
tailings management into specific performance
phase (Section 3.4) (eg more specific performance
expectations for a tailings facility throughout its
objectives for water management or geotechnical
lifecycle, including the Closure and Post-Closure phases
aspects of design and operation). Going into the
(Section 3.7).
Construction and Operations phases, performance
Performance objectives and associated performance objectives should be quantifiable for a given tailings
indicators and performance criteria should address: facility.

— Protection of employee and public health and safety. The tailings facility should be constructed, operated,
and closed in accordance with the performance
— Design objectives and criteria, including
objectives, while recognising that those objectives
geotechnical, geochemical, operational, community
should be reviewed and updated, as appropriate, during
and environmental performance objectives that the
these lifecycle phases.
tailings facility is expected to achieve.

— Mitigation of negative environmental impacts by 3.3.4 Multi-Criteria Alternatives Analysis

ensuring the continued physical and chemical Multi-criteria alternatives analysis (also known as
stability of the tailings facility. evaluation of alternatives or options assessment) is a
rigorous, multi-step process to inform decisions. In a
— Acceptable post-closure use within a feasible
tailings management context, this process should be
technical and economic framework.
used to inform decisions during the Project Conception
Setting performance objectives begins during the phase. Per the Standard, the primary goal of evaluating
Project Conception phase. Although performance alternatives for an overall development project is to: (i)
objectives set at this phase may be high level, they are select an alternative that minimises risks to people and

Tailings Management Project Conception 95

the environment throughout the tailings facility lifecycle; — Be appropriately scaled and scoped to the planning
and (ii) minimise the volume of tailings and water placed decision to be made.
in external tailings facilities.
— Have input from potentially affected communities as
From an Operator’s perspective the evaluation of appropriate (eg new tailings facilities, closure
alternatives for a tailings facility, including a multi- planning).
criteria analysis such as multiple accounts analysis
— Consider the performance objectives and risk
(MAA), provides a structured approach to assessing and
analysis and integrate those into decision criteria in
weighing various ‘musts’ and ‘wants.’ As such, an
the evaluation of alternatives.
effective evaluation is an invaluable tool during Project
Conception. It provides a means of integrating a wide — Consider all aspects of the project, direct or indirect,
range of relevant information into the decision-making that may contribute to the evaluation of each
process, and provides a basis for documenting alternative (eg design of the mine and ore
outcomes that can then be used to demonstrate the processing to the extent that they would impact
basis for decisions to: tailings production, water management and
treatment).
— Senior management
— Consider and integrate a wide range of information
— Regulatory agencies
about the characteristics of each alternative being
— Investors and insurance providers evaluated, and relevant to the planning decision to
be made, such as:
— Potentially affected communities.
- Technical considerations (eg geotechnical,
The process allows for the consideration of geochemical, mine operations).
environmental, technical, socio-economic and project
- Environmental considerations (eg potential impacts
economics factors in a transparent manner and allows
on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems).
the testing of the outcomes under different
- Socio-economic consideration (eg potential
assumptions.
impacts on communities and other economic,
The evaluation of alternatives can be used to inform recreational, spiritual or subsistence activities).
a range of decisions such as the selection of the - Project economics (eg short- and long-term
preferred options for: capital and operating costs).
— Locations to be used for new tailings facilities. — Consider the uncertainty of assumptions and design
— Tailings management technology. parameters and their potential implications of
outcomes of the analysis process. An example of
— Increasing the capacity of existing tailings facilities. managing these uncertainties includes use of
— A material change in tailings facility design. sensitivity analysis.

— Re-activation of an existing tailings facility. — Consider each alternative across the relevant phases
of the lifecycle of the tailings facility (eg for new
— Closure design. tailings facilities, consider the lifecycle implications
To be effective, it is essential that the evaluation of each alternative from the Construction phase
of alternatives: through to the Closure and Post-Closure phases).

— Be conducted by a multi-disciplinary team, in order One of the strengths of the methodology is that it
to be able to interpret and assess the full range of provides a mechanism to be transparent about biases
information considered in the process. and assumptions, and to test outcomes against those
biases and assumptions in a robust and rigorous
— Be informed by the work on site characterisation and manner. No decision is entirely objective and there is
the knowledge base for the site, which focuses on always an element of subjectively. Rather than trying to
the holistic consideration of social and economic remove that subjectivity, the methodology recognises it
factors as well as environmental and infrastructure and allows that subjectivity to be tested.
factors (Section 3.3.2).

— Have technical input from Independent Review

during the design of the evaluation of alternatives
and through the steps in the process.

ICMM Project Conception 96

 3. Identify possible alternatives.

4. Pre-screen possible alternatives to eliminate from

further consideration any that would have
In Detail characteristics that would be ‘show-stoppers’.
Decisions made based on the evaluation of
5. Characterise remaining alternatives.
alternatives require an understanding of the potential
positive and negative impacts of each alternative 6. Assess remaining alternatives using MAA or a
evaluated across a range of aspects encompassing similar decision-making tool. MAA can be broken
technical, environmental and socio-economic down into two sub-steps:
considerations, and project economics. Evaluating a . Describe all factors that will be considered in
and balancing these potential positive and negative the analysis by establishing accounts (eg
impacts is important in making the optimum decision, environmental, technical, and socio-economic
but it is challenging to evaluate such disparate considerations), sub-accounts within each
aspects. An evaluation of alternatives methodology, account, and indicators for each sub-account.
including MAA, provides a tool to do this, while
b. Conduct a value-based decision process to
allowing inputs to and outcomes of the decision-
assess the combined benefits and impacts
making process to be communicated internally and
(advantages and disadvantages) for each of the
externally in a transparent manner.
alternatives assessed.
Evaluation of alternatives should be conducted as a
7. Conduct a sensitivity analysis to test the
multi-step process:
robustness and validity of the outcomes of the
1. Identify the objective and scope – the decision MAA against various biases and assumptions.
that is to be informed by the evaluation of
MAA provides a method of integrated assessment of
alternatives process and factors that will be
different characteristics of alternatives (eg for
considered.
comparing potential impacts on wildlife with capital
2. Develop a plan for conducting the evaluation of costs). In effect, these tools provide a rigorous,
alternatives, including who will be involved. semi-quantitative means of comparing apples and
oranges.

Tailings Management Project Conception 97

Design 3.4

3.4.1 Introduction — Establishing the Design Team , including

The design process is iterative, starting during the Project engineering consultants (typically from the same
Conception phase when conceptual designs are firm as the EOR, recognising that other models may
developed for alternatives to be evaluated (Section 3.3.4). exist) including the Operator’s representatives who
Those conceptual designs are further refined to engage in the design process (typically includes
preliminary designs for the detailed analysis leading to the RTFE and other experienced operational
the selection of the preferred alternative. During the experts).
Design phase, the preliminary design for the preferred
— Defining the roles and responsibilities of the EOR
alternative is developed to the stage of a detailed design
and Design Team and their relationship through the
for approval, and ultimately to an executable design for
design process.
construction.
— Engaging Independent Reviewers in the design
The objective for this design process throughout the
process.
lifecycle of the tailings facility should be to limit credible
failure modes, either to having no credible failure modes — Developing a formal change management system.
or, where credible modes cannot be eliminated, ensuring
— Refining site characterisation information and the
that potentially catastrophic credible failure modes are
site characterisation model to a degree where
managed using the ALARP approach through the
residual uncertainties are acceptable.
phase(s) of the facility’s lifecycle where they are present
(Section 3.2.4). — Refining the risk assessment to reduce
uncertainties and addressing residual uncertainties
The main activities for the Design phase are:
in the design and risk management plan.
— Appointing an EOR for the Design phase if the EOR
— Developing the tailings facility design:
from the Project Conception phase is not retained.
- Develop the design initially using the
This EOR will likely have a longer-term responsibility.
precautionary-based approach.
- Enhance the design based on adoption of the
performance-based approach or define why this
is not necessary.

— Establishing quality management specifications

including requirements for consideration and
documentation of deviations and documentation of
constructed conditions.

— Documenting the design criteria and intent in the

Design Basis Report (DBR).

— Developing the tailings transportation and

deposition plan.

— Complete design verification.

The steps are similar, although they may be simplified

when the Design phase is being applied to other
decisions such as closure design or design for
material changes.

The outcome of the Design phase is an executable

engineering design with detailed specifications,

ICMM Design 98
Figure 11: Key activities of the Design phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Design
Finalise detailed design,
informed by:
– Site characterisation models
– Performance objectives
Temporary Suspension
– Conceptual closure plan
– Risk assessment
Prepare:
– Updated site
Project characterisation models Construction Operations Closure Post-Closure
Post-Closure
Conception – Updated DBR

Potential material
changes go to either
Project Conception
or Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

including quality management, to be used for the 3.4.2 Managing Uncertainty and Assessing
subsequent Construction, Operations and Closure Risk in Design
phases, as well as any other documents required for Risk assessment during the Design phase continues the
final approval and initiation of construction. The design work done during the Project Conception phase but is
should be reviewed and updated as performance and focused on supporting the design process.
site data become available and in response to material
The objectives are to:
changes to the tailings facility or its performance.
— Reduce the uncertainty associated with key design
In parallel, a full assessment of the potential social,
elements and design the tailings facility to reduce
environmental and local economic impacts of the
or eliminate specific risks, to the extent feasible.
tailings facility and of any credible failure modes
throughout its lifecycle should be undertaken, to inform — Develop a risk management plan to limit the impact
the design process. Where impact assessments predict of residual risks.
material acute or chronic impacts, the Operator should
— Develop a surveillance plan to sufficiently inform
develop, document and implement impact mitigation
implementation of the risk management plan.
and management plans using the mitigation hierarchy.
The conduct of social, environmental and local
economic impact assessments is not addressed
in this Guide.

Figure 11 illustrates the key activities of the Design

phase of the lifecycle.

Tailings Management Design 99

 A risk management plan should be developed in
detail as part of the Design phase, with components
of the risk management plan incorporated into the
design of the tailings facility, where applicable (eg
In Detail
seepage control features).

Reduce Uncertainty and Refine Risk Estimates To support the implementation of the risk
Reducing uncertainty may often be facilitated by management plan, a surveillance plan should be
additional site characterisation and more relevant developed and integrated into the OMS manual
modelling that targets key design elements. (Section 2.4). OMS requirements should be
considered in the final design, particularly for any
Risk estimates should be refined, based on a better
instrumentation that would need to be installed
understanding of both the likelihood and potential
during the Construction phase, and for any
consequences of various unwanted events. This
surveillance activities that would need to be initiated
guidance recommends semi-quantitative risk
during Construction.
assessment supported by event tree analyses where
such detail is appropriate, supported by the ALARP
principle.

3.4.3 Tailings Facility Design

3.4.3.1 Overview

Failure of a tailings facility is unacceptable, particularly

any failure that leads to fatalities or otherwise
catastrophic outcomes. Thus, designing, constructing,
operating and closing facilities to reduce or eliminate
credible failure modes is of paramount importance.

Conventional tailings facility design philosophy over the

past decades can generally be grouped into the
approaches depicted on Figure 12, all of which are best
implemented when risk-informed. The more layers that
are applied, the better risk informed the approach
becomes.

Figure 12: Management of uncertainty in design approaches

Considers the management of uncertainty and risk in

Risk Informed material decisions regardless of approach.

Extends problem interrogation beyond the Precautionary

approach, establishing flexible, meaningful and measurable
Performance-Based performance objectives throughout Construction,
Operations and Closure, and enhances the assessment
of safety in a more comprehensive manner.

Precautionary Extends the Prescriptive approach using the Observational

Method to monitor for performance that is indicative of
assumed potential failure modes to validate the design
basis, and to mitigate if not.

Applies prescribed criteria, such as Factor of Safety, to

Prescriptive assess the margin of safety against shear failure but is not
able to address complex or dynamic design considerations,
such as the risk of brittle failure and the magnitude of
seismic deformations.

ICMM Design 100

The following sub-sections explain each approach: As a result, the approach commonly used for water
prescriptive, precautionary and performance-based, dams to apply a lower FoS for construction than in
with risk-informed decision-making as an overarching operations is not transferable to tailings facilities since
theme. construction is often ongoing together with tailings
facility operation. Despite this, the approach is still used
3.4.3.2 Prescriptive Approach to Tailings too frequently for tailings facilities.
Facility Design
A further limitation of the FoS is that formulating a valid
The prescriptive approach to designing tailings facilities
FoS for a given tailings facility is dependent upon the
came to prominence in the 1970s as an adaptation from
selection of appropriate parameters and access to
design practices for water dams. In its basic form, the
reliable data (eg extensive field and laboratory studies
approach often uses a prescribed Factor of Safety (FoS)
as part of site characterisation (Section 3.3.3)). It is also
as a criterion that is perceived by some to denote
dependent upon the competency and experience of
whether or not a tailings facility is safe. Due to the
those involved. If the FoS has been erroneously
seemingly straightforward application of FoS, it has
calculated to be above a prescribed value, but the
broad appeal.
actual FoS is really below that value, then the tailings
facility may be less safe than assumed by the Operator.
3.4.3.3 Limitations of Prescriptive Approach
Additionally, since the FoS is calculated for an
A FoS is often misinterpreted as a sole measure of safety.
embankment as a whole, it may not adequately account
It is based on the premise that a higher FoS reduces the
for zones of local resistance and/or weakness within an
likelihood of failure. However, a FoS is not a measurable
embankment, thus potentially overlooking or not
value; it is an outcome based on inputs which are derived
recognising the significance of the ‘weakest link’ in an
by the designer based on site data, laboratory testing
embankment. Solutions to addressing these limitations
and modelling. Natural variations in site and laboratory
are outlined in the following sub-sections.
data give rise to uncertainty around the calculated FoS.
However, FoS values are rarely reported with uncertainty
3.4.3.4 Precautionary Approach to Tailings
limits. Further, a given value of FoS has an entirely
Facility Design
different meaning if an identical value exists for both a
Despite the limitations regarding FoS, many tailings
site with a brittle credible failure mode and one with only
facilities have been safely constructed and operated by
non-brittle credible failure modes.
combining a prescriptive approach with the
An over-reliance on FoS can lead to complacency – a oObservational method, which is referred to in this
sense that if the design FoS is met then the facility is Guide as the ‘precautionary approach’. Performance
safe. Complacency can also lead to an inadequate that is indicative of a potential failure mode is identified
standard of care regarding other factors that may be and monitored in order to validate whether the design
just as important, if not more so, to the safety of a given basis remains sound and if not, to initiate mitigation
tailings facility, such as using engineering analysis measures. The amount by which variances from
methodology that may not be applicable to a specific expected performance can be tolerated is often then
situation, just because the method is convenient or supported by additional design calculations and
familiar, or a lack of urgency to act in response to judgement. During the Construction, Operations, and
specific problematic observations in the field. Closure phases, performance behaviour surveillance is
conducted in accordance with the design criteria and
As noted, the concept of FoS was originally developed
expected ranges such that appropriate corrective
for water dams and has been adapted to tailings
action can be taken when exceedances are
facilities. One significant difference between water
encountered. The precautionary approach also requires
dams and tailings facilities is that water dams are
a contingency design to be implementable when and if
typically built to final height at the outset, whereas
observations require that mitigation is necessary.
tailings facility embankments are typically constructed
in stages, with a starter embankment before deposition Currently, the use of the precautionary approach is
of tailings commences, and raises to increase capacity widespread across the mining industry, and in many
through the Operations phase of the lifecycle. There cases the continued use of this approach is appropriate
may be further modifications during the Closure phase. and effective in ensuring safe tailings management.

Tailings Management Design 101

The precautionary approach is applicable and effective — It provides an initial Design phase as a first step to a
in many circumstances because: performance-based design which in turn leads to
improved safety and reliability of performance.
— There are existing tailings facilities that have been
safely designed, constructed and operated using this An illustration of the precautionary approach for design,
approach. If properly understood and calibrated with construction, operation, and closure is presented in
relevant experience, the precautionary approach can Figure 13. As illustrated, this approach relies on defining
continue to be used for such facilities. the acceptance criteria for the facility, which is often the
minimum acceptable FoS, either prescribed by
— The application of the precautionary approach can be
regulation or defined by the EOR or Design Team
validated by precedence and by confirmation that
(recognising that separate FoS values may be adopted
neither the foundation materials nor the foundations
for the Construction, Operations, and Closure phases).
themselves or other structural components of the
During the life of the tailings facility observations are
tailings facility are susceptible to strain weakening
made via surveillance to assess whether the facility is
failure under the design criteria or other elements of
meeting the intent of the design, and hence consistent
non-homogeneous straining.
with the required FoS.

Figure 13: Precautionary-Based Approach to Design, Construction, Operations and Closure

Select Design Geotechnical model

Acceptance Criteria Hydrogeological model
Geologic model
Seismic Hazard model
Develop Design Meeting
Climate
Acceptance Criteria for
Geomorphology
the most likely case and
worst case Experience and case studies

Define Trigger Levels

for Monitoring

Establish Surveillance
Programme to address
Credible Failure Modes

Apply Remedial Collect and Interpret

Measures Surveillance Data

Adopt reasonable Intent

worst-case contingency No Yes Continue Construction/
of Design
design or modify Being Met? Operation/Closure
accordingly

It should be noted that most of the recent high-profile representation of pore pressure conditions and external
failures of tailings facilities had an acceptable FoS within loading conditions, along with appropriate surveillance
the context of the precautionary approach, although for all credible failure modes is necessary with the
there were challenges with its application and precautionary approach.
understanding. The precautionary approach is not
A key point of the precautionary approach is that the
appropriate when brittle failure modes are present,
tailings facility response (via surveillance) is always
especially if they are not recognised and eliminated.
reactive, based on what has been observed.
Appropriate material characterisation with appropriate

ICMM Design 102

For the application of the precautionary approach to
design for static failure modes, this Guide
recommends that:

— Design FoS are not prescribed but should be

determined by the EOR and the Design Team and
should be endorsed by Independent Review.

— The sensitivities of safe design to material

characterisation and site characterisation should
be recognised by the EOR and the Design Team
and their evaluations should be endorsed by
Independent Review. Significant consideration
should be given to selecting appropriately
conservative material strength parameters for
deterministic analysis of the FoS.

— The reliance on and limitations of the observational

method should be recognised (see below).

Regarding the application of precautionary-based

design in practice for dynamic (seismic) failure modes, — The reasonable worst case considers what might
appropriate methods for assessing both potential occur in a worst-case scenario and how it might be
seismic deformations and post-earthquake stability mitigated. It is not intended to be an operational
should be selected by the EOR and the Design Team target but facilitates the proactive consideration of
and reviewed by the Independent Reviewer(s). There potential challenges leading to potential design
may also be occasions when using a FoS approach or modification. The provision of a constructible
simplified deformation analysis can be a preliminary contingency design is an integral part of the
screening tool, but screening should not replace the reasonably worst-case design.
need for more rigorous seismic deformation analyses
in highly seismic areas or with designs that contain 3.4.3.5 Limitations of the Precautionary Approach
fragile elements (eg a low permeability core prone to The precautionary approach has important limitations,
cracking, drains prone to clogging). The design criteria related to shortcomings inherent in the application of
to be adopted for these cases are: the observational method:
— There should be no loss of containment. — It is a reactive method. Once an observation is made
— There should be no secondary failure modes (eg that appears to be contrary to the intent of the design,
cracking, shear of filters, disruption of drains) that remedial actions may be required. Determining the
can lead to collapse. appropriate remedial measures may be complicated
by a lack of data, poor interpretation of the
Experience indicates that a specified post- surveillance data, and/or a lack of understanding of
earthquake FoS can be useful to ensure that runaway the origin or cause of the observation. In some cases,
displacements are precluded early in the design the lack of understanding could lead to the adoption
process. of an incorrect remedial measure. For more complex
Finally, as noted above, for the precautionary tailings facilities, there is an increased risk of reaching
approach, the tailings facility design should be an incorrect conclusion regarding the performance of
developed in terms of two cases: i) the recommended the facility if the surveillance programme is not
design case; and ii) the reasonable worst case. This designed or interpreted appropriately.
distinction has the following strengths: — It is not readily applicable in cases where the failure
— The recommended design case provides mechanism is predominantly brittle, which might
guidance on how to interpret variability in material occur in tailings prone to liquefaction or in cases of
properties based on detailed field and laboratory strain weakening foundations. Such mechanisms
characterisation as well as providing a first step typically evolve more rapidly than could be observed
towards the adoption of performance-based or responded to with contingency measures, or
design. where other constraints preclude the timely and

Tailings Management Design 103

 effective application of such measures. Brittle failure 3.4.3.6 Performance-Based Approach to Tailings
mechanisms have been involved in many of the Facility Design
historical catastrophic failures of tailings facilities. For some tailings facilities, including those with credible
brittle failure modes, the precautionary approach has
— It is only effective for variances in performance that
important limitations that can render it inappropriate. In
were foreseen, and for which remedial measures/
these cases, the application of a performance-based
actions have been identified in advance. If a variance
approach to tailings facility design, operation and
occurs that was not foreseen and monitored, the
closure serves to reduce risk and improve safe tailings
method will not detect the variance and often
management, consistent with the ultimate goal of
remediation cannot be applied.
eliminating catastrophic events and fatalities. The
— Implementation of remedial measures/actions performance-based approach moves toward adopting
requires that the initiation mechanism be well- a proactive procedure for managing tailings facility
understood among the Operator’s team working on performance data. This is accomplished by defining
the tailings facility (ie operators, managers, RTFE, performance objectives using sequential forecasts of
EOR). the tailings facility behaviour through all phases of the
lifecycle and verifying that the performance is behaving
— If contingency measures are not planned at the
as intended throughout the lifecycle.
outset the value of the observational method is
seriously impaired. For example, if an initiation The performance-based approach is made possible by
mechanism is observed that could be addressed by some of the major developments in tailings management
constructing a downstream buttress on the that have occurred, notably the expansion of surveillance
embankment, but the construction of an capacity, including remote data gathering and automated
embankment as a contingency measure was not processing, together with numerical simulation tools to
foreseen, then construction may not be possible due forecast tailings facility performance and behaviour in a
to a lack of adequate space to construct the buttress timely manner. The communication technology with
and/or a lack of construction materials. sometimes remote facilities and increased computational
speeds enable real- or close-to-real-time ability to
— For more complex tailings facilities, there is an
evaluate actual performance relative to predictive tools
increased risk of reaching an incorrect conclusion
and to continually improve those predictive tools to
regarding the performance of the facility if the
better inform future behaviour.
surveillance programme is not designed or
interpreted appropriately. This performance focuses on all observable, relevant
parameters and characteristics such as deformations,
piezometric pressures, seepage flows and cracking. The
validation of performance in this comprehensive
manner provides increased confidence that the facility
is behaving as intended and that safety is being
ensured.

As an example, a performance objective of limiting the

amount of strain/deformation within the foundation or a
layer within the foundation may be adopted in order to
prevent the material from reaching residual strength by
realising its brittle behaviour potential. Monitoring the
strain within this layer relative is a key performance
indicator; results are used to calibrate and forecast
strain (performance criteria) through modelling.

An illustration of the application of the performance-

based approach in design, construction, operation, and
closure is presented in Figure 14.

ICMM Design 104

Figure 14: Performance-Based Approach to Design, Construction, Operations and Closure

Select performance Geotechnical model

objectives Hydrogeological model
Geologic model
Seismic Hazard model
Develop preliminary
Climate
design
Geomorphology
Experience and case studies
Predict performance
outcomes

Does
Predicted
Develop surveillance
Revise design No Performance Yes
programme
and/or objectives Meet
and complete design
Objectives?

Collect and interpret performance

data

Analyse data and predict

performance
No

Analyse and predict

performance outcome
Does
Yes Is Design Performance Yes Continue Construction/
Revise design Change Meet Operations/Closure
Required? Forecast?

No

Recalibrate model and

reforecast performance

The following are key to this approach: forecasting may utilise advanced numerical
techniques such as finite element or finite difference
During the design process:
models. These tools are often initially constructed
— Use site characterisation data (geotechnical, using case study inputs and the somewhat limited
geologic, hydrogeologic, seismic, climate) to site characterisation data that are available during
establish performance objectives for the tailings the Design phase. The ability to calibrate many of
facility. These objectives should focus on the critical these models during the Design phase is limited.
elements that would affect safe construction,
During the Construction, Operations, Closure, and
operation, and closure.
Post-Closure phases:
— Forecast behaviour as part of the design process to
— Assess current behaviour.
inform the evolution and finalisation of the design to
meet the performance objectives. Forecasting tools — Calibrate and re-forecast the performance of the
are selected dependant on the complexity of the facility, comparing against the performance
challenges and the questions that need to be objectives. If the re-forecast does not meet the
answered. The tools may be relatively simple performance objectives, changes to the design and/
analytical models but, where appropriate,

Tailings Management Design 105

 or performance objectives may be required, as — Include a need to assess deformations resulting
indicated by the EOR. from earthquakes.

— Inform the need for potential changes to the design — Are potentially unstable due to high pore pressure
to improve facility safety and test proposed changes due to loading from the tailings facility.
to the design by predicting future behaviour if the
The EOR is responsible for recommending detailed
proposed changes are implemented.
design criteria and for utilising a Design Team with
The advantages of applying the performance-based adequate relevant experience compatible with the
approach include: complexity of the assignment. In addition, the EOR and
the Operator must always recognise legal requirements
— It provides a reliable and proactive basis for
applicable to the design process and the selection of
interpreting all of the significant aspects and
design criteria.
observations of tailings facility performance related
to evaluating safety. The EOR and the Design Team are expected to
formulate the procedures and the material property
— Design assumptions are continually challenged and
characterisation required to initiate the design process.
subject to validation in a comprehensive manner.
Relative to a precautionary approach, the required
— The staged simulation of behaviour and incremental instrumentation is expanded in order to maximise the
forward projection strengthens the confirmation of validation of performance to the degree considered to
safety. be of value. The EOR is responsible for determining
— Its adoption (including use of specific/specialised whether the facility’s embankment and foundation are
monitoring instruments for collecting data for adequately robust to meet the performance objectives.
updating analyses) overcomes some of the This Guide recommends the adoption of performance-
limitations associated with the definition of FoS to based design utilising the forecast of deformation, pore
shear failure modes as often defined in practice. (The pressures and seepage for all phases of the lifecycle of
FoS may not adequately highlight zones of local a tailings facility where conditions such as those
resistance and/or weakness.) outlined apply.
— The improved simulation and calibration with time Furthermore, the adoption of the principles of risk-
also provides a more authoritative record that the informed decision-making enhances the capacity to
overall response of the facility based on constructed convey safety assessments to multiple stakeholders.
conditions is in accordance with the design intent.

— Seismic resistant design relies on the approach to 3.4.3.7 Limitations of the Performance-Based
assess potential deformations. Approach
The performance-based approach is a natural
— The onset of localisation of deformations and extension of the observational method that is
progressive failure can be determined. established good practice within the precautionary
— E xperience indicates that regulators benefit from approach. It extends to the evaluation of total
more observable performance objectives to meet performance of the tailings facility throughout its
their needs and this is facilitated by the lifecycle from construction to closure. By validating total
performance-based approach. performance of the tailings facility, the evaluation of
safety is enhanced. Total performance includes
The performance-based approach can be applied to all
deformations, pore pressures, and other aspects such
tailings facilities, but based upon the analysis of past
as drain performance and cracking (if tolerable). The
failures, it can be particularly valuable to achieve robust
capacity to undertake performance-based design
design and maintain integrity to prevent the failure of
requires the knowledge of current advances in
tailings facilities that:
deformation and pore pressure modelling as well as
— Are spatially complex and variable, including having advances in surveillance technology and methodology
issues of strain compatibility and interaction of needed to be able to apply the performance-based
material within the facility and foundation zones. approach to validate performance. This relies on the
EOR and Design Team having the necessary
— E xhibit the potential for strain weakening (brittle).
competency to undertake design on this basis, and to
— Are susceptible to liquefaction leading to potential determine adequate deformation and resistance limits
flow failure. to ensure safety. Broad application of the performance-

ICMM Design 106

based approach will therefore require a focused building The ALARP concept is fully compatible with the
of capacity in the industry and sharing of case history principles of risk-informed design. As discussed in
examples, of which a number already exist. Section 3.2, while there are descriptions of the ALARP
process in the public domain, the application of ALARP
Further, the Operator’s tailings engineers, operators and
can be quite robust. ALARP can be implemented using
management team need to understand what is required
a range of semi-quantitative, qualitative or experiential
to use this approach. Because design assumptions are
methods, depending on the project conditions (eg
continually challenged and subject to validation, the
geographic location, social considerations/constraints,
successful application hinges on an Operator’s
environment considerations, etc) and complexity.
adaptability, planning and ability to embrace new Regardless of the method(s) used to implement ALARP,
technology (software and hardware). the process itself is a powerful tool to document the
decisions and approaches that were adopted to reduce
3.4.3.8 Risk-Informed Decision-making in Design risk during the lifecycle of the tailings facility.
Regardless of the design approach, designs should be
informed by an appropriate assessment of the risks and 3.4.3.9 External Loading Criteria for Design
uncertainties associated with the proposed or existing Recognising that Operators can follow the Standard
tailings facilities. An overview of a range of risk directly, as an alternative, this Guide proposes beginning
management tools available to inform design was the design process for new tailings facilities by assuming
presented in Section 3.2. the need for extreme loading design criteria because,
A design appropriately informed by risk applies the while not the only factor involved, robust design with
evaluation of uncertainty in material properties, external conservative criteria is supportive of preventing
loadings, analytical models and interpretations. It also catastrophic failures. Selecting conservative criteria is
consistent with the safety culture of the mining industry
requires an appropriately informed level of independent
and the ultimate goal of preventing catastrophic failures.
review; to do otherwise is in itself a risk to the design.
By beginning with extreme loading criteria, consequence
A risk-informed design takes the input from the risk
classification of a credible failure is not necessary for the
assessment at any level of sophistication, as sophistication
purposes of establishing design criteria.
should be commensurate with the design stage of the
facility (Section 3.2), and uses that information in setting Although this Guide enters the design process
performance criteria and analytical methodology, and the assuming extreme criteria, it provides the flexibility that
bounds of sensitivity applied to both. the EOR may recommend alternative criteria if

Tailings Management Design 107

appropriate, based on site-specific considerations, a Independent Review and approval by the Operator.
risk assessment that justifies a different approach as
There are nuances between this Guide and the
appropriately protective against catastrophic risk, and
Standard, with the common objective of selecting
endorsement by Independent Review. ALARP applies to
external loading criteria to support the safe design of a
existing facilities as well.
given tailings facility. While the Guide provides a design
The extreme loading design criteria proposed by process that does not require the use of a prescriptive
the Guide are: consequence classification process, the Standard
enters the design process for new facilities by formally
 esign flood: A maximum design flood (MDF) with a
D
determining the consequence of failure classification of
return period of 1 in 10,000 years should be considered
a tailings facility by assessing downstream conditions
for new facilities and for the screening of facilities
and consideration of credible failure modes as
already under construction (in operation) or already
described in Requirement 4.1.
closed. In the latter cases, a reduction in the MDF can
be considered based on a recommendation from the Further, the Standard provides a consequence
EOR, endorsement by Independent Review and classification (Annex 2, Table 1) as well as external
approval by the Operator. This should be supported by a loading criteria (Annex 2, Tables 2 and 3) applicable for
risk evaluation using the ALARP principle. the safe design of new tailings facilities while
recognising that other guidelines and/or legal
This Guidance also recognises that more extreme
requirements may be applied. The external loading
floods (probable maximum flood (PMF)) may be
criteria for the Operations and Closure phases vary
recommended by the EOR or they may be required
based on the consequence classification. The external
under legal requirements in some jurisdictions. In such
loading criteria for the Post-Closure phase are
cases, the judgement of the EOR and/or legal
associated with extreme consequence for tailings
requirements take precedence. Recent developments in
facilities Closure phases. During the Operations phase,
estimating extreme floods increases the confidence in
the design may be based on extreme loading criteria or
estimates of PMF and should be recognised.
the current consequence classification criteria. If the
Design earthquake: A maximum design earthquake current criteria are used, the Operator must maintain
(MDE) with a return period from a probabilistic seismic the ability to upgrade to extreme external loading
hazard analysis (PSHA) of 1 in 10,000 years should be criteria throughout the facility lifecycle and check at
considered for new facilities and for the screening of least every five years whether there is a material change
facilities already under construction (in operation) or that requires upgrade of the facility. If so, upgrade must
already closed. be completed within three years. Regardless, the design
for closure should ultimately use appropriate design
Alternatively, where appropriate for the seismological
criteria, such as those included in Annex 3 of the
setting, a deterministic maximum credible earthquake
Standard or should justify using lower criteria through
(MCE) may be adopted as MDE for new facilities and for
use of the ALARP principle for existing facilities per
the screening of facilities already under construction or
Requirement 4.7.
already closed. In either case, the selection of
probabilistic or deterministic methodologies and their The Guide recognises that consequences will need to
associated loadings and a reduction in the MDE from be considered in the risk assessment process and EPRP
those outlined above can be accepted based on a if catastrophic credible failures are present, even if
recommendation from the EOR, endorsement by using extreme loadings for the design process.

ICMM Design 108

3.4.3.10 Failure Modes Every historic catastrophic failure has resulted from one
Beyond establishing external loading criteria, many or more of the following failure modes:
other factors are critical to preventing catastrophic
— Overtopping (ie loss of containment through a
failures. The next piece of design is assessing potential
breach).
failure modes and the development of a design that
minimises or eliminates credible failure modes and thus — Seepage and erosion (eg piping, decant structure
sets a tailings facility up for success in the prevention of failure and any other failure related to water
catastrophic outcomes from credible failure modes. movement).

As described in Section 2.7.2 and 3.7.4 and consistent — Instability both due to excessive deformations within
with the goal of eliminating fatalities and catastrophic the embankment and/or its abutments/foundations.
failures, ideally each tailings facility would have limited
The following sections highlight some special
or no credible catastrophic failure modes. However,
considerations associated with each potential
some facilities do have credible failure modes that can
failure mode.
lead to catastrophic outcomes and these should be
addressed by appropriate design measures.

— The storage of the MDF event, or a portion thereof,

that results in temporary wetting and restoration
of the beach.

In Detail — Use of good practices for estimating the design

flood, considering climate trends and the potential
Overtopping
for a series of events to occur consecutively (wet
Tailings facilities are not typically designed to
season or year, as is appropriate for local conditions).
accommodate overtopping. Exceptions can exist when
the embankment(s) is composed of sufficiently coarse — Where present, the malfunction of spillways that
rockfill or other erosion-resistant material and is may be relied upon to manage the extreme design
designed to act as a flow-through embankment. In flood event.
general, safety with respect to overtopping is ensured
— Long-term settlement of tailings and
by the provision of adequate freeboard that can include
embankments.
a sufficiently sized and operating spillway. This design
consideration is incorporated in the water balance — Earthquake-related settlement of tailings and
(Section 3.2.3) around the tailings facility as an element embankments.
that reflects the construction schedule of the facility.
— The potential for cracking due to desiccation in
The construction plan should incorporate the the upper portion of the beach.
consideration of the ore processing facility’s tailings
— The operational beach length that would be a
production plan as well as the tailings transport and
performance requirement under normal operating
deposition plan, water management requirements,
conditions.
tailings deposit density, associated contingencies,
and adequate freeboard to safely manage the — Restriction on the migration of the reclaim pond(s)
extreme design flood event. Maintaining freeboard within the tailings facility.
requirements is a critical performance objective of
— Recognition of competing water utilisation
any tailings facility where overtopping is a credible
objectives such as management of geochemical
failure mode. Violating this requirement has been
risks or fugitive dust.
known to aggravate consequences even if initial
overtopping was not the cause of a failure. — Ice formation that may interrupt/impact the water
reclaim system.
Some design considerations related to freeboard
requirements are: — Presence of upstream hazards or structures that
could fail and cause a cascading failure of the
— The implications of wind-generated waves and
tailings facility.
reservoir setup.

Tailings Management Design 109

 Seepage and Internal Erosion tailings and/or foundation materials under
Design and construction to control seepage and consideration affect the hydraulic gradient at which
prevent internal erosion that may result in the failure suffusion becomes significant and the issue of
of a tailings facility falls into two classes of problems: internal stability needs to be considered. Critical
hydraulic gradients are very sensitive to the degree of
— Physical aspects of seepage control.
internal stability of a granular material.
— Chemical aspects of seepage control.
Simple prescriptive design measures are not well-
Piping is a form of internal erosion in a tailings facility, suited to accommodate the variations of materials
embankment, or foundation resulting from seepage that commonly occur in tailings facility
that causes progressive erosion and formation of a embankments. The EOR should be responsible for:
cavity or ‘pipe’ which may progress. Piping failures
— Establishing the parameters required for the
typically occur rapidly and Fell et al. (2003) noted that
evaluation of seepage-induced flows in both the
in the majority of cases there were less than 6–12
tailings facility and the foundation. Unsaturated
hours between the first observation of a
flow needs to be considered where appropriate.
concentrated leak and a breach of the tailings facility.
While piping may occur during the Construction and — Establishing critical hydraulic gradients to control
Operations phases, given the usual composition of internal erosion.
tailings, the occurrence of catastrophic failure from
— Establishing the capacity/demand ratio (FoS for
this mode is not common. However, it is noted that
drains) for all drainage elements.
decant towers and/or other engineered conduits
(pipelines) in tailings facilities may fail structurally and — Providing capacity for seepage modelling in both
may also lead to piping. The rate of filling of a tailings two- and three-dimensions, where appropriate.
facility of any significant size is generally low enough
— Providing specifications for all drainage control
to allow time to intervene and modify the design if
measures.
piping due to filter incompatibility is observed (finer
material is able to migrate into coarser material). — Design of the surveillance programme for
Nevertheless, the significance of controlling seepage seepage.
in tailings facilities and the prevention of piping is a
Some design considerations associated with
paramount consideration in tailings facility
seepage and internal erosion of tailings facilities
engineering and the principles follow those in use for
include the following:
water dam design.
— The capacity/demand ratio should be large
The physics governing seepage through both
enough to accommodate the uncertainties
saturated and unsaturated materials are well
associated with estimating seepage flows.
established. With the determination of the controlling
hydraulic conductivity properties at a given tailings — Care should be taken to avoid utilising materials in
facility, for both the foundation and tailings seepage control elements that can degrade with
embankment section(s), the calculation of seepage time.
discharges and associated piezometric distributions
— Design of control elements such as filters should
are readily computed. The critical hydraulic gradient
consider the ease of construction and related
at which upward directed flow reduces the effective
quality control to enhance reliable performance.
stress to zero is also determined by the porosity and
Design should also should recognise tailings
density of the local porous material. However, it is well
facility deformations including those anticipated
established that the gradient at which particles begin
by design earthquake ground motions and should
to move is less than the critical gradient at which
be robust enough to continue functioning
effective stress is zero, but there is no clear limit
following such events.
regarding the rate of particle migration at these
reduced hydraulic gradients. A variety of tests have — If the closure plan includes a functional water
been developed to aid in determining this limit. This is body on the surface of the tailings facility and if
made more complex by the occurrence of suffusion there would be active seepage as a result,
which is the selected transportation and washing out consideration should be given to reducing the
of fines from a coarse material. The uniformity of the allowable hydraulic gradient in the tailings facility.

ICMM Design 110

 — In addition to piezometric and discharge — The presence of brittle materials, either within the
monitoring, considerations should be given to embankment, abutment, or foundation of the
methods that can be invoked to locate zones of embankment, that could lead to the rapid loss of
excessive seepage if they are threatening safe shear strength.
performance. Techniques based on self-potential
— The development of static liquefaction due to
measurements (passive electrical geophysical
rapid construction loading or the development of
method) and differential temperature
undrained loading conditions in brittle materials
measurements have proved successful in practice.
at the onset of yield.
The development of powerful and effective numerical
— The development of dynamic liquefaction due
modelling software to forecast piezometric
to seismicity or blasting.
distributions and seepage discharges is an integral
component of performance-based design. While — E xcessive differential settlement of soft zones.
accurate prediction of both piezometric distributions
Many of these issues can be identified during site
and seepage discharges of tailings facilities is
characterisation (Section 3.3.2), however others, such
challenging and often not reliable, predictions can be
as construction loading, will need to be addressed as
improved by means of history-matching of model
part of the construction documentation and the
behaviour to historic data and incremental forward
quality management process.
projections conducted in a systematic manner. The
net result is an increased confidence in safe The driving forces of the tailings facility behind an
operation and the development of an insightful tool embankment and, in turn, on the foundations for the
for final closure design. embankment, need to be sufficiently met by the
resisting forces of the embankment at all phases of
Chemical aspects of seepage are typically thought of
the facility’s lifecycle. The driving forces can and will
in relation to the water quality of the process-
vary due to construction activities, external loads (ie
affected water and the composition of the
seismic events) and the size and shape of the facility
groundwater (which may be influenced by the
as it evolves. The nature of the foundation materials
construction and operation of the tailings facility).
and the embankment materials need to work in
These considerations are important throughout the
tandem to create a stable mass. As above, brittle
facility lifecycle to ensure Design and Operations are
materials in either the embankment or the foundation
in compliance with the permit / regulatory
require special consideration inclusive of design and
requirements for the facility. Seepage considerations
construction based upon either lower bound
should also include potential geochemical changes
strengths (eg assume the brittleness is triggered) or
to materials in the tailings facility and the foundation
sufficient robustness to prevent the sudden loss of
to assess whether such changes could affect the
strength from ever occurring.
physical stability of the tailings facility. For example:
Many tailings facilities have embankments
— Consideration of whether geochemical changes
constructed using tailings. This is a widespread, safe
could affect the strength of tailings (if used as a
and logical approach as it does not involve the use of
structural element in the facility), other
other natural materials and minimises disturbance
embankment materials and/or foundation
outside the tailings facility footprint. However, tailings
materials.
material varies in mechanical behaviour and it is
— Whether precipitates or other geochemical essential that the gradation, fabric (including grain
changes could reduce the permeability of angularity) and bulk density be determined.
structural elements such as drainage features or
Where tailings are used as a construction material or
embankment fill.
are present in the embankment foundation, likely pore
— Whether seepage water could increase or pressure conditions should be modelled during the
decrease permeability in the foundation due to Design phase and during construction they should be
geochemical reactions. appropriately measured and interpreted. A proper
combination of pore pressures and bulk density is
Tailings Embankment Stability required to correctly estimate in-situ stresses and,
The stability of the tailings embankments and hence, in-situ state. There can be considerable
abutments may be impacted by: non-conservatism involved in using incorrect values.

Tailings Management Design 111

 Tailings facility embankments are commonly — Having a relatively small ponded water on tailings
classified according to their geometry (ie upstream, facility surface.
centreline, downstream). There are variations of this
— Compaction of the downstream embankment
classification, but it is adequate for the purposes of
zone
this Guide. Experience indicates that failures have
occurred at a small percentage of each type of tailing — Having relatively flat embankment side slopes.
facility embankment geometry, but that instances of
In addition, upstream facilities require rigorous TMS
catastrophic failure have been relatively more
implementation.
common at upstream-type embankments, for
example due to static or dynamic liquefaction Recent experience has highlighted the challenges
conditions. While failures have occurred with associated with selecting the appropriate FoS to
upstream construction, there have also been prevent failure in a variety of facility configurations.
numerous successes. Instead of specifying fixed values, this Guide favours
the selection of site-specific design criteria based on
Setting aside failure associated with foundation
the evaluation of site complexity by means of the EOR
conditions, this Guide considers that upstream
(in accordance with applicable legal requirements)
construction embankments can be safely
and notes that the following particularly complex
constructed, operated and closed provided they are
circumstances should be recognised:
supported at the downstream embankment zone by
a dilative and/or unsaturated buttress that can be — Accumulated experience with a particular soil
monitored and that provides adequate resistance if or rock mass.
the upstream contents liquefy. This resistance does
— Variable construction and operating conditions
not preclude deformations associated with seismic
that may affect in-place properties and stability of
loading provided there is no loss of containment and
the tailings facility and embankments.
that no secondary failure modes develop. Examples
of physical features that are often helpful in achieving — Response of unconsolidated materials in the
upstream embankment stability include: foundation and variations in response under
different confining stresses and stress levels.
— Having a relatively low rate of increases in
embankment height. — Time-dependent, deformation-dependent and
stress path-dependent processes that may affect
— Using relatively coarse tailings with low clay
the critical material processes such as the
content for the construction of the embankment.
operational pore pressures and shear strengths.
— Having a well-drained foundation
— Potential for brittle failure.
— Being located in an area with a relatively arid
— Susceptibility to static and dynamic liquefaction
climate
that may include strain weakening.
— Being located in an area with relatively low
seismicity

ICMM Design 112

3.4.4 Tailings Transportation and Deposition — Potential impacts on risks.
Plan — Potential impacts on the implementation of the
The tailings transportation and deposition plan is
closure plan.
initially developed during the Project Conception phase
and refined during the Design phase. It should be In developing the tailings transportation and deposition
integrated with the design approach for the tailings plan, a range of site characterisation (Section 3.3.2)
facility and the overall plan for ore extraction and information should be considered. These characteristics
processing. It should describe how tailings will be should be validated and updated on a periodic basis
transported to and deposited in the tailings facility, and throughout the lifecycle. If some characteristics do not
how the capacity of the tailings facility will be increased meet the design specifications or intent, then the
over the life of the mine. It is crucial to successfully potential impacts and risks of these deviations should be
operating the facility from construction to closure. assessed, and appropriate actions taken to address
them.
The tailings transportation and deposition plan should be
integrated into the OMS manual (Section 2.4) and Depending on how water will be managed, and whether
implemented and regularly reviewed and updated during water will be stored in the tailings facility, the tailings
the Operations phase of the lifecycle (Section 3.6). transportation and deposition plan should be integrated
with the water management plan.
The plan should be developed, implemented and
updated in a manner that is aligned with the closure Deposition plans typically allow for the expansion of the
concept and closure plan (Section 3.7.2), to ensure that tailings facility over the life-of-mine to accommodate
the final tailings surface topography at the end of the increasing amounts of tailings solids. This could include
Operations phase facilitates the implementation of the staged lifts to increase the height of embankments to
closure plan and post-closure land use. accommodate additional tailings, or planned lateral
expansions into new cells of the tailings facility.
Proposed changes to the tailings transportation and
Depending on the water content of the tailings, and the
deposition plan should be carefully considered taking
relationship between tailings management and water
into account:
management, such expansions may also increase the
— Potential operational impacts. capacity to store water and increase the retention time
of water within the tailings facility.

Tailings Management Design 113

 Will there be separate ‘clean’ tailings and
potentially acid-generating tailings, which would
be managed differently? Will tailings be split
based on particle size distribution or other
In Detail
physical factors? If separated, how will these
The tailings transportation and deposition plan is
different types of tailings be managed?
integral to the selection of the tailings management
technology and the site-specific conditions of the — Consideration of whether alternative deposition
tailings facility. Examples of aspects to consider include: approaches might be feasible approaching the
end of the Operations phase to achieve closure
— Whether the tailings will be managed as slurry, or
objectives.
whether they will be dewatered to some degree
and managed as thickened, paste or filtered — Whether any other materials, such as waste rock
tailings. The planned moisture content and the or treatment sludge, will be managed with the
physical characteristics of the tailings are tailings. For example: Will potentially acid-
essential to the plan. generating waste rock be managed with the
tailings to prevent or control acidic drainage?
— What types of embankments, if any, will be
What quantities of these materials will be placed
constructed? What will the construction method
in the tailings facility, compared with the quantity
be? What materials are to be used? What will be
of tailings?
the method of raising those embankments during
the Operations phase? — How will the tailings be transported from the ore
processing facility to the tailings facility? Options
— Overall sitewide mass balance considerations for
include a pipeline in the cases of slurry, thickened
operation and closure and integration of
or paste tailings, and truck or conveyor belt in the
deposition planning with the water balance and
case of filtered tailings.
management plans.
— In colder climates, whether ice lenses could form
— Consideration of the potential range of tailings
in deposit and how to manage them.
index properties, moisture content, rheology,
swelling clays, etc, as relevant for project-specific — Methods to prevent the release of tailings into the
conditions. environment during transportation to the tailings
facility.
— Material placement/approaches planned.
— How will the tailings and any other materials be
— Methods, if any, to control seepage from the
placed or deposited within the tailings facility?
tailings facility, such as the use of liners, water
retaining embankments or underdrains. This — How much water will be retained in the tailings
should also consider the potential implications of facility? What measures are in place to deal with
the inclusion of liner materials on the geotechnical excess water, such as due to high intensity
stability of a facility. precipitation, extreme snowpack/melt, extended
periods of wet weather, extended periods of water
— Whether there will be a single type of tailings, or
retention, etc?
whether there will be different types. For example:

3.4.5 Documentation of Design documentation and refers to documents where

The Standard refers to a Design Basis Report (DBR) and information might be housed, for ease of writing this
a Design Report. Some Operators may wish to combine text; however, it is not intended to be prescriptive.
all this information into a single report, others will prefer The DBR is a foundational document that records the
to spread it out over a few reports. Regardless of design basis and the outcomes from the design
format, it is important to document the design basis as process. It also incorporates updates throughout the
well as issued for construction drawings, specifications, lifecycle of a tailings facility. The site characterisation
and construction quality management planning as key studies (Section 3.3.2) inform the DBR. The models and
elements of the Design phase. This Guide refers to the information described in the DBR underpin the
important components to be considered in developing decisions that the EOR (with the support of the Design

ICMM Design 114

Team) makes in setting design criteria for the facility. The DBR should describe the risk controls and
Development of the DBR should begin during the associated performance criteria (Section 3.6.4) that are
Project Conception phase (Section 3.3) to include the used in the design and implementation of the
alternatives evaluated (Section 3.3.4), and should be surveillance programme (Section 2.4.3.4). The EOR
refined during the design of the selected alternative to should review and update the DBR throughout the
provide the basis for construction, operation, and lifecycle of the facility to ensure the DBR reflects the
closure of the tailings facility. The DBR should be further current status of the tailings facility and future plans. A
updated throughout the lifecycle of the facility, with DBR should contain enough detail to provide a basis for
each phase informing subsequent phases. comparison of:

The DBR should include the following: — Constructed conditions (clarifying any deviations
from the original design).
— Design criteria considering site-specific conditions
that underpin tailings facility designs through field — Any changes to the original design intent.
investigation, laboratory work and modelling and
— Actual performance against performance objectives,
analyses. Where assumptions are made early in the
indicators, and criteria described in the DBR.
lifecycle, this should also be clearly defined until data
is available to confirm criteria. — Updates to the closure plan.

— Performance objectives which will be met by TARPs — Any extensions to the capacity of the tailings facility
(eg seepage stability, allowable deformation) and the beyond the original design intent.
tailings facility design components.
It is important to keep the DBR-related information up to
— Summary of supporting information used to date and integrated. For example, it is valuable to
demonstrate that the tailings facility, as designed, incorporate data and analyses from periodic material
will meet the design criteria and performance characterisation programmes with previous design/
objectives. material characterisation data to validate interpretation
and to document any in-situ changes. Likewise, if there
Facets of a DBR typically include site conditions,
are known changes to construction material/methods
geotechnical properties of and criteria used for
(eg to seismic loading models, input data, etc) these
foundation and tailings material, starter facility and
should be incorporated with DBR information. Similarly,
embankment characteristics, tailings transport
designs may change due to the permitting process and
(distribution) and deposition system, reclaim water
approvals. Important changes should be managed and
system, water management, environmental
integrated into the documentation.
components, supporting infrastructure, and a
description of battery limits (boundary for area of Independent Review is critical for the DBR due to its
responsibility). foundational nature in tailings management. The DBR
should also address the information requirements
The DBR should be updated throughout the design
identified through community engagement and
process to include increasing detail and complexity
Independent Review, as well as provide information
reflective of the design decisions and site-specific data
related to the relevant legal requirements and risk
that are collected as progress is made on the project
management plan.
design studies. Early design stages often include
assumptions or estimates for certain parameters until The DBR or other documents further include detailed
site-specific data become available as the design of the construction drawings and construction specifications.
tailings facility advances. It is important to note the These are used together with the construction quality
status of information in the DBR (assumed or estimated management plan for the basis for execution of the
from similar projects versus site specific) with the goal design.
of ultimately transitioning to ensure that the DBR is
reflective of site-specific investigations and studies.
 

Tailings Management Design 115

 — Embankment characteristics

— Slope stability

— Discharge and seepage controls

In Detail
A typical DBR includes the following sections with — Breach analysis and inundation studies (if
reference to the relevant technical references and appropriate based on risk assessment)
reports:
— Tailings distribution and reclaim water system
— Tailing facility general information
— Tailings deposition
— Mine production plan
— Earthworks and constructability
— Battery limits
— Structural design criteria
— Topographic survey methodology, datum/
— Design criteria for electrical infrastructure (eg
coordinate system
pumps, surveillance instruments, etc.)
— Climate and meteorology
— Closure design criteria
— Geology (including structural geology and
— Costing basis and drawing standards.
presence of faults) and hydrogeology
Beyond integrating the underpinning models, the DBR
— Geological and hydrogeological characterisation
defines whether the tailings facility approach will use
— Site geotechnical characterisation – including precautionary design or performance-based design
foundation and borrow materials and provides important design criteria such as FoS
and allowable deformations, potential for strain
— Seismicity and seismic design requirements
weakening, etc. It describes the scope and level of
— Surface water management detail of information and analyses used to make
decisions, along with applicable legal requirements
— Geochemical considerations
and guidelines, demonstrating the validity of those
— Tailings characteristics and rheology decisions.

— Water balance

ICMM Design 116

Construction 3.5

3.5.1 Introduction — If the EOR from the Design phase is not retained,
Construction is a recurring lifecycle activity that appointing an EOR for the Construction phase
progresses the Design phase outputs of a through a change management process. This EOR
construction design including drawings, technical is likely to have a longer-term responsibility.
specifications and quality management into a
— Developing a construction management plan.
commissioned facility that is received by the Operator
for ongoing operations. The initial stage of a tailings — Developing a project execution plan.
facility is commonly constructed by a contractor with
— Establishing the construction team, including
subsequent stages either continuing to be contractor
defining the roles and responsibilities of the EOR
built or alternatively built by the Operator’s site team.
and the construction team and their relationship
Sometimes at existing mine sites, the Operator’s team
through the design process.
may have the capacity to perform some of the initial
stage construction of a new tailings facility. — E xecution of the QA/QC programme based on the
Regardless of who performs the construction, a plans developed during the Design phase.
strong quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC)
— Developing and maintaining a construction risk
programme is important.
register to track risks to project schedule and cost.
Construction implementation should incorporate the The construction risk register is one piece of the
consideration of the ore processing facility’s tailings broader risk assessment and risk management
production plan, as well as the tailings transport and process for the tailings facility which should also be
deposition plan, water management requirements, considered through the Construction phase,
associated contingencies, and adequate freeboard to particularly when considering changes to the
safely manage the design flood event. design (Section 3.2.4).

The main activities for the Construction phase are: — Initiating the tender process and procurement with
clarity around required qualifications and

Tailings Management Construction 117

 experience in establishing potential bidders and the The outcome of the initial Construction phase is a
assessment of bids. commissioned facility constructed in accordance with
the design intent, detailed specifications, quality
— Developing a construction health, safety and
management programme for subsequent use in the
environmental plan.
Operations and Closure phases, as well as any other
— Advancing construction activities. documents required for final approval and initiation of
the Operations phase. Subsequent Construction phase
— Commissioning the constructed facility.
activities use similar elements to progress the tailings
— Developing accurate documentation including the facility through its lifecycle, as required per the Design,
Deviance Accountability Report (DAR) and the Operations, and Closure phases and/or if mitigation is
Construction Records Report (CRR). required.

Figure 15 illustrates the key activities of the Construction

phase of the lifecycle.

Figure 15: Key activities of the Construction phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Construction
Construct in accordance
with the DBR.
Prepare and update across
the life cycle:
– Construction vs Design
Intent Verification
– Deviance Accountability
Report Temporary Suspension
– Construction Records Report
Prepare:
– Updated site
Project Design characterisation models Operations Closure Post-Closure
Conception – Updated DBR

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

ICMM Construction 118

3.5.2 Construction Management Plan Quality management plan:
The execution of the engineering design requires a — Describes both the QA and QC requirements
well-developed management framework to ensure its determined by the EOR for construction, where:
successful implementation. The management
— Q A is the implementation of a system to ensure
framework encompasses the development of a
design and construction activities will deliver the
construction management plan to establish uniform
project requirements in accordance with the design
policies and procedures that ensure facility construction
intent.
is conducted safely in accordance with the construction
drawings, technical specifications and the QA/QC — QC is the inspection of the construction works and
programme. The construction management plan is an material verification, via testing, to ensure
overarching plan and is intended to be flexible in its compliance with the requirements of the drawings
application, and revised and improved as warranted. It is and technical specifications.
not intended to be a step-by-step procedure for each
Water management plan:
activity. Typically, it is a document that outlines general
— Details how water will be managed during
activities, procedures, requirements and schedules for
construction, outlines start-up water requirements,
successful completion.
and references overall objectives for safe water
The construction management plan typically includes management for the completed tailings facility and
several elements that may be packaged in a variety of is tied to the sitewide and tailings facility-specific
formats at the preference of the Operator. The planning water balance model and plan (Section 3.2.3).
process and clarity of outcomes is the important aspect
of the following, not the specific nomenclature or how 3.5.3 Deviations from Design
the outcomes are packaged: It is not uncommon for situations to arise during
construction that necessitate a deviation from the
Project execution plan: design or construction specifications. Such deviations
— Describes how the construction is to be undertaken. do not create any facility safety concerns provided they
It provides specific requirements for the activities, are assessed, reviewed and documented as part of the
schedules (including key milestone dates), and overall construction management process. These
organisational framework. deviations can range from very minor to material
changes requiring a design modification. Deviations are
— Construction execution plan:
a normal part of the construction process, as actual
Details how and when the construction activities are
conditions (eg foundation conditions or characteristics
to be undertaken.
of construction materials) will never be exactly the same
as those anticipated based on the information available
Risk management plan:
during the Project Conception and Design phases.
— Details results of facility risk assessment activities
Deviations may also occur due to permitting
conducted during the Design phase. This information
requirements.
should be referenced carefully when design changes
are proposed. Risk ownership and continuity from Proposed deviations should be carefully considered.
the Design phase across Construction and into the Haphazard or undocumented deviations should be
Operations phase is critical in managing change avoided. A clear process should be established in
during this transition period. advance of commencing construction for the
consideration and potential approval of deviations,
— Facility risk assessments are updated to reflect
including delegating responsibility and authority for
constructed conditions and any additional
such decisions. This process should be aligned with
information relevant to risk (eg hazards) collected
tailings management governance and involve the entire
during construction (new information, new
breadth of the team responsible for safe management
developments, changes required in design due to
of tailings (Accountable Executive, RTFE, EOR, Design
geomorphology, water management, climatic
Team and Independent Review).
changes, or unforeseen major events or topographic
conditions). The potential impacts of the proposed deviations on the
design intent, expected performance, and risk profile of
— Project-level risk (risks to schedule and cost) may
the tailings facility should be assessed and understood
also be captured in a construction risk register.
before any deviation is approved.

Tailings Management Construction 119

It is important to be aware of the potential cumulative Constructed conditions should be documented in a
effects of multiple minor deviations which may not be of CRR signed by the EOR and RTFE per Requirement 6.3
consequence on their own. In assessing proposed of the Standard. Through the CDIV and Independent
deviations, previous deviations should be considered Review, this includes verification of whether the
and the potential for a cumulative effect should be constructed conditions meet the design intent and
evaluated. specifications.

Construction QA processes may identify non- The CRR should also summarise the results of the CDIV
conformances with design specifications from time to to ensure that all changes to the design or any aspect
time. If not immediately resolved, a non-conformance of construction are documented, together with any
report should be issued and tracked until it is resolved. non-conformances and their resolution.
The intent is to eliminate these, and this is the typical
Any unresolved deviations identified in the CRR can be
outcome. However, some non-conformances may be
carried into the DAR process. The DAR process can be
disputed and unreasonable to resolve due to costs and/
used throughout the lifecycle of the tailings facility,
or schedule implications. Under these few
identifying and reviewing potential implications of
circumstances, the non-conformances can be
changes to the facility and evaluating their acceptability.
considered deviations from the design.
The DAR is discussed further in Section 3.6.3.
A CDIV process should be conducted by the Operator
The CRR should document the initial construction of a
with support from the EOR to ensure:
new tailings facility and should be updated to reflect
— The design intent, as per the DBR, has been other construction activities when they occur
implemented and is still being met if the site throughout the lifecycle, including:
conditions encountered during construction varied
— Ongoing construction through the Operations phase
from the design assumptions.
to increase the capacity of the tailings facility.
— Any discrepancies between the field conditions
— Construction for any material changes.
encountered during construction and the design
assumptions are clearly identified and reviewed, — Design modifications and implementation of the
such that the design can be reviewed and adjusted closure plan.
as required to account for the actual field conditions.
Construction records, including QA/QC documentation,
This information is critical for the design of
construction surveys and as-built drawings, and
subsequent facility stages.
commissioning documentation should be retained to
The results of the CDIV should be included in a CRR for provide the documentation that the construction was in
new tailings facilities or other relevant documents such accordance with the construction drawings and
as an annual report for operating tailings facilities. technical specifications. These may be consolidated in
the CRR. These records are important for the ongoing
3.5.4 Documentation of Constructed management of the tailings facility and provide a critical
Conditions database for ongoing construction and geotechnical
Accurate documentation of as-constructed conditions assessments. If construction is conducted in multiple
is critical. Such documentation provides the information stages, it is helpful to consolidate the CRR and drawings
needed to: as a complete reference of the cumulative facility
construction or develop another equivalent approach to
— Continue construction of the tailings facility during
integrating information.
the Operations phase.
To facilitate ease of access and the analysis of
— Inform any future consideration of changes in the
constructed conditions this information may include
design of the tailings facility.
detailed geo-location data and be compiled in a
— Understand and remedy problems that may arise comprehensive GIS-based retrievable system. This may
in the future. not be possible for existing sites with incomplete
construction records.

ICMM Construction 120

Operations 3.6

3.6.1 Introduction — Risk management plan is implemented and is

The Operations phase is the period in the lifecycle when reviewed and updated regularly (Sections 3.2.4 and
tailings are transported to, and placed in, the tailings 3.4).
facility. It may also include the temporary suspension of
— OMS activities are implemented to operationalise the
mine operations (Section 3.6.5).
TMS and risk management plan (Section 2.4).
The full range of concepts, principles and practices for
— Tailings transportation and deposition plan is
tailings management are deployed during the
implemented, reviewed and updated regularly
Operations phase to ensure safe, responsible tailings
(Section 3.4.4).
management.
— Risk assessment is updated periodically (Section
— Tailings are managed in accordance with overall
3.2.4).
governance for tailings management, with
accountability and responsibility appropriately — Construction activities continue to increase the
assigned (Section 2.2). capacity of a tailings facility and the volume of
stored tailings as mining and ore processing
— TMS is implemented (Section 2.3).
operations proceed (Section 3.5). Constructed
- Evaluating Performance is ongoing. conditions are accurately documented, including
- Identifying Actions to Improve Performance deviations from the design intent and design basis.
includes the reporting of performance to the Deviations are assessed through the change
Accountable Executive. management system (Section 2.3.2.1).
- Action plans are developed and implemented to — A programme for reviewing tailings safety is
address deficiencies or opportunities for continual implemented (Section 2.6).
improvement.
— Community engagement continues (Section 2.2.5).

Tailings Management Operations 121

— TMS and OMS manual are reviewed and updated as characterisation) and the DBR is updated accordingly
appropriate (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). (Section 3.3.2).

— EPRP is tested and updated as appropriate (Section — All updates and operational changes are assessed
2.7). through the change management system (Section
2.3.2.1).
— Development of the closure plan continues (Section
3.7.2). During the Operations phase, the Operator should plan
for the possible temporary suspension of mine
— Site characterisation information is updated and
operations. The Operator may also implement
improved through sample and data collection,
progressive reclamation, depending on the nature of
testing and analyses to identify any changes that
the closure plan.
could affect the design or operation of the tailings
facility. This information is used to confirm site Figure 16 illustrates the key activities of the Operations
characterisation models (eg tailings material phase of the lifecycle.

Figure 16: Key activities of the Operations phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Operations
Conduct OMS activities in
accordance with:
– Performance objectives
– Risk management plan
– Design intent
– Closure plan
Evaluate performance of
tailings facility and tailings
management governance:
– Address deficiencies
– Implement measures for
continual improvement
Review/update:
Temporary Suspension
– DBR
– Tailings management system
– OMS manual
– EPRP
Project Design Construction – Site characterisation models Closure Post-Closure
Conception – Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

ICMM Operations 122

3.6.2 Applying to Existing Tailings Facilities models to validate understanding of stability
This Guide is intended to support the management of performance, updated or more comprehensive risk
both new and existing tailings facilities. However, assessment). Prioritisation of gaps and the development
determining how to apply the Guide to an existing of action plans should be done with input from the EOR
facility can be challenging and a site-specific and Independent Review.
approach should be taken.
A key consideration in prioritising gaps and the
The first step should be to conduct a gap analysis development of action plans is appropriately scaling
against the elements related to governance of tailings application of the guidance to the tailings facility in
management (Part 2) and the implementation of good question. Considerations in scaling application of the
engineering practices described in Part 3. Depending guidance will typically include:
on the Operator, conducting a gap analysis may
— Availability of meaningful information about the
require external expertise and input. This analysis
history of the tailings facility.
should include inspection and identification of any
immediate concerns followed by a more detailed — Uncertainties associated with credibility of potential
analysis that includes review of the: failure modes.

— Application of the TMS (Section 2.3) and its — Complexity and size of the tailings facility.
integration in sitewide integrated mine planning
— Risks and the potential consequences of failure.
(Sections 1.2.1 and 3.2.2).
— Lifecycle phase.
— Risk assessment (Section 3.2).
— Closure plan.
— Documentation related to tailings facility
engineering and management, if available, even if In addition, the Operator should consider the continued
under different name/format: suitability of application of the precautionary approach,
- Site characterisation information and models versus adoption of a performance-based approach
(Section 3.3.2). (Section 3.4.3).

- Design information including the design, the The Operator should develop a schedule for
design intent and design basis (Design Report sequencing and implementing action plans, develop a
and DBR, Section 3.4.5). budget, and obtain budget approval. Action plans
- Information on the construction of the tailings should then be implemented in accordance with the
facility, including as-built conditions (CRR, schedule, cognizant of the importance of effectively
Section 3.5.4), and deviations from the design managing change through this process (Section 2.3.2.1).
(DAR, Section 3.5.3).
- OMS activities (OMS manual, Section 2.4).
- Closure plan (Section 3.7.2).

— Current and historical performance of the tailings

facility, including conformance with the design
intent, corporate policy on tailings management,
legal requirements and commitments to
communities (Section 2.3.4).

— EPRP and results of any tests conducted

(Section 2.7).

— Reports from a programme for reviewing tailings

safety (eg Independent Review) (Section 2.6).

Once a gap analysis has been completed, the

Operator should prioritise gaps that present the
highest potential facility safety risks and develop
action plans to address those gaps (eg operational
improvements to address identified potential
instability, additional site investigation or data
collection to develop or refine site characterisation

Tailings Management Operations 123

 — Are facility performance objectives, indicators and
criteria identified and described, including
quantification (Section 3.3.3)?

In Detail — Does the Operator have an up-to-date risk

assessment (Section 3.2.4)? Does the Operator
Questions to consider in this gap analysis include:
understand the uncertainties associated with the
Questions related to governance of tailings risk assessment? Has the Operator identified
management credible failure modes and assessed the potential
— Does the Operator have a corporate policy on consequences of failure?
tailings management? Does this policy include a
— Does the Operator have an up-to-date risk
goal of eliminating fatalities and catastrophic
management plan and is it being implemented
failures (Section 2.2.3)?
(Section 3.2)? Does the risk management plan
— Have accountability and responsibility been reduce risk according to ALARP? Are additional
assigned for roles described in Section 2.2.2 and mitigations needed?
are persons in these roles appropriately
— Does the Operator have documentation on the
competent as per Section 2.2.4? Are there clear
design, the design intent, and the design basis for
lines of communication between key roles?
the tailings facility (eg a Design Report and DBR)?
— Has a TMS been developed and implemented Is this documentation adequate and updated as
(Section 2.3)? Are processes in place to manage appropriate (Section 3.4.5)?
change (Section 2.3.2.1)?
— Has an integrated tailings and water management
— Has an OMS manual been developed and plan been developed and is it based on up-to-
implemented? Is it up to date, accessible, date data and operating rules (Section 3.2.3)?
understood and utilised by relevant personnel
— Does the Operator have a plan for construction
(Section 2.4)?
management, including quality management
— Is the Operator effectively managing information (Section 3.5.2)? Is construction being done in
related to tailings management (Section 2.5)? accordance with this plan?

— Does the Operator have a programme in place to — Does the Operator have an accurate, up-to-date
review tailings safety, including Independent record of the constructed tailings facility, including
Review (Section 2.6)? and accurate understanding of:

— Does the Operator have an EPRP? Is the plan - Current conditions (Section 3.5.4)?
tested and updated appropriately (Section 2.7)? - Deviations from the design intent and design
Are communities and public sector agencies basis, including the rationale for such decisions
engaged (Section 2.2.5)? and assessment for implications to facility
performance (Section 3.5.3)?
Questions related to engineering practice
— Does the Operator have and use an up-to-date
— Is site characterisation information (including
closure plan towards which progress is being
tailings material characterisation) adequate and is
made?
this information up to date (Section 3.3.2)?

ICMM Operations 124

3.6.3 Potential Material Changes - Climate conditions.
As described in Section 2.3.2.1, managing change is - Upstream or downstream infrastructure or
essential to safe tailings management. Potential material conditions.
changes, in particular, should be carefully considered.
This may also include changes to address deficiencies
A material change is a change to the design or in performance or changes to improve performance (eg
operation of a tailings facility, proposed or made after adoption of improved engineering practices).
the design for the initial construction has been finalised
It is important to be aware of the potential cumulative
and initial construction has commenced. A material
effects of multiple changes or deviations which may
change would be a change important enough to merit
not, on their own, be material. In considering non-
attention, such as a change that has the potential to
material changes, previous changes or deviations
influence the risk or performance of a tailings facility.
should be considered and the potential for a cumulative
The criteria for what would constitute a material change
effect should be evaluated.
should be defined by the Operator, with input from the
EOR and Independent Review. Potential material changes should be carefully
considered by the Operator and EOR, taking into
Examples of potential material changes include
account both short- and long-term implications, before
changes to:
making any decision on implementation, to determine:
— The tailings facility design, design intent, or design
— Whether or not to proceed with the change, if
basis as documented in the design report and DBR
applicable.
(Section 3.4.5).
— How best to proceed with the change.
— Operating plans or procedures (eg tailings
transportation and deposition plan (Section 3.4.4). On a case-by-case basis, the Operator and EOR should
engage personnel with the appropriate competencies
— Business case and overall mine plan, such as a mine
and qualifications in the evaluation, planning and design
life extension.
of potential material changes. In some cases, a multi-
— Other changes such as: disciplinary approach may be appropriate and may
involve personnel outside the RTFE’s immediate
- Behaviour or characteristics of tailings associated
organisation. For example, a proposed change in ore
with the ore or ore processing.
processing that would result in different tailings
- Behaviour or characteristics of construction
characteristics may require ore processing and tailings
materials for embankments.
management teams to collaborate, consistent with the
- Site water management and water balance (eg integrated mine planning approach (Sections 1.2.2 and
increase in volume of water from underground 3.2.2).
mine workings as mine development progresses).

Tailings Management Operations 125

Depending on the complexity of the potential material Decisions to be made during these lifecycle phases
change, it may be appropriate to evaluate the potential can be categorised as:
change using the steps outlined for the Project
— Immediate or short-term operational decisions,
Conception phase (eg risk analysis and multi-criteria
such as responding to unusual or upset conditions
alternatives analysis) (Section 3.3). In other cases, a less
(eg a decision to implement predictive
rigorous decision analysis approach may be
maintenance (Section 2.4.3.3) or a decision to
appropriate, and the proposed material change can
increase surveillance frequency (Section 2.4.3.4)).
proceed to the Design phase (Section 3.4).
— Medium- or longer-term decisions, such as:
Input should be obtained from the EOR on potential
material changes. Some Operators may wish to seek - Responding to deficiencies in performance or
input from Independent Review as well. opportunities to continual improvement (eg
responding to recommendations from
As part of the planning to implement a material change, Independent Review) (Section 2.6).
the Operator should consider not only the need to
- Material changes to improve performance (eg
update relevant aspects of the design, but also other
construction of a buttress).
plans and processes. For example, implementing the
- Adjusting the design or operating practices in
material change may necessitate changes to the OMS
response to an updated validation of the design
manual.
basis or updated predictions of the future
The decision to implement the proposed material performance of the tailing facility.
change should be made at a level in the organisation
Decision-making for medium- and longer-term
commensurate with the significance of the change (eg
decisions would typically be addressed through the
RTFE, Accountable Executive or BoD, as appropriate).
process to manage change (Section 2.3.2.1) as these
The process of considering potential material changes, would be considered material changes (Section 3.6.3).
and of implementing approved material changes should These types of decisions are also addressed in Section
be properly documented. The DAR (Section 3.5.4) is 3.4.3 in the context of the discussion of the
intended to contain a record of all the deviations from precautionary-based approach and application of the
the design across the lifecycle, including both material observational method (Sections 3.4.3.4 and 3.4.3.5),
and non-material changes. The records contained in and the discussion of the performance-based
the DAR also provide a basis for assessing the potential approach (Section 3.4.3.6).
cumulative effects of proposed changes or deviations. If
The balance of this section is focused on decision-
any material changes are proposed that are outside the
making for immediate and short-term operational
scope of the DAR, these should also be properly
decisions.
documented.
Good information is essential to all decisions. The
3.6.4 Decision-Making effective implementation of risk-informed decision-
making is predicated upon the effective surveillance
3.6.4.1 Introduction
of tailings facility performance. A properly designed
Making risk-informed decisions is essential to safe
and implemented surveillance programme, aligned
tailings management through the Operations phase and
with the performance objectives and risk
the subsequent Closure and Post-Closure phases. This
management plan, is essential to making good
applies equally to new tailings facilities planned,
decisions (Section 2.4.3.4).
designed and constructed following the guidance in
Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, and to facilities that are
3.6.4.2 Developing a Framework for
many decades old that were constructed to very
Decision-making
different standards.
To facilitate making immediate and short-term
No matter how a tailings facility was originally designed, decisions in a risk-informed manner, Operators should
constructed and operated, a rigorous approach to develop a framework for decision-making. A TMS
decision-making, conducted within an effective provides a governance framework for decision-
governance structure, can help to ensure that tailings are making and surveillance plays an essential role in
safely managed. Elements of a risk-informed approach to providing information. However, without a rigorous
decision-making are described in Section 3.2.4. approach to decision-making for tailings

ICMM Operations 126

management, informed by surveillance results, there is Clear, effective, timely communication is essential to
an increased risk that decisions: decision-making (Section 2.2.6), particularly in the case
of any variances from the expected ranges of
— Are based on incomplete or inaccurate information.
performance. Communication procedures and lines of
— Are ad hoc and short-sighted in nature. communication associated with decision-making
should be documented and communicated to relevant
— Fail to recognise and account for embedded
personnel. Similarly, the pre-defined risk controls should
ignorance, increasing the potential for human error.
be documented, and personnel who may be
— Fail to support the objective of the safe management responsible for the implementation of those risk
of tailings. controls should be informed and trained appropriately
so that they are able to act if necessary.
— Fail to account for interactions between seemingly
unrelated decisions. The advantage of this approach, including pre-defining
the risk controls to be implemented, is that it facilitates
— Defer or transfer risks to the Closure phase without
prompt action if the performance is outside the
fully considering the potential implications.
specified range, since the Operator, with input from the
A rigorous approach to decisions provides a structured, EOR, has already identified the action to be taken. It also
consistent mechanism for decision-making, helping to empowers junior staff with the authority to act in the
ensure that decisions are taken by persons with the event that the RTFE and EOR cannot be contacted in a
appropriate authority and competencies, and are based timely manner.
on relevant information.
Other business units that could be affected by or
A decision-making framework is based on the intersection involved in the implementation pre-defined risk controls
between credible failure modes, performance indicators should be engaged in developing the decision-making
and criteria, and the risk management plan. A decision- framework and understand the actions to be taken. For
making framework should identify: example, if exceeding the minimum freeboard behind
an embankment means that risk controls need to be
— Credible failure modes potentially subject
taken to reduce or stop the flow of tailings into the
to immediate or short-term decisions (ie
tailings facility, then those responsible for ore
implementation of mitigation).
processing / generating tailings material need to be
— Performance indicators and criteria able to aware of this and need to be part of the process.
measure and assess performance relevant to
those credible failure modes.

— Surveillance measures aligned with the

performance criteria.

— Pre-defined risk management measures (risk controls)

to be taken if the performance criteria associated with
the credible failure modes are not met.

Once the framework is established, surveillance

measures are then implemented, results are measured
against the performance criteria, and if those criteria
are not met, then the pre-defined risk controls are
implemented.

Risk controls may include a subset of controls referred

to as critical controls, which are risk management
measures to mitigate credible failure modes that could
lead to a catastrophic failure (Sections 2.7 and 3.2.4).
Risk controls may include operating rules with ongoing
surveillance and validation or discrete implementation
of new mitigation measures.

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3.6.4.3 Trigger Action Response Plans The most appropriate approach to take depends on the
When defining the performance criteria and the risk nature of the credible failure mode and associated
controls to be implemented if those criteria are not performance indicators. Where the second approach is
met, there are two basic approaches. For a given feasible, it will provide the Operator with greater flexibility
performance indicator associated with a credible and capability to manage risk.
failure mode the Operator may:
This second approach is sometimes referred to as a
— Define a single threshold for the performance trigger action response plan (TARP), although other terms
criteria and define the risk control(s) to be are also used to describe this concept. TARPs may be
implemented if that threshold is exceeded. used to define escalating risk management actions
under upset or unusual conditions and may also define
— Define a series of thresholds corresponding to
the transition to emergency situations. It is up to the
increasing concern or risk. For each threshold level,
Operator to determine what is considered upset versus
define the risk controls to be implemented. The risk
emergency conditions, and the role of TARPs in the
management response is escalated as the concern
management of upset conditions.
(magnitude of variance of performance) increases.
The number of levels of thresholds is dependent
upon the performance indicator and the associated
risk controls.

emergency. Pre-defined risk controls are

implemented. Surveillance activities are intensified
to monitor the performance indicator in question,
related performance criteria, and the effectiveness
In Detail
of the risk control implemented. Expert advice
An example of a four risk-level framework for a TARP may be sought as appropriate. Results of follow-
is: up surveillance activities are documented and
reported. The accumulation or combination of
—  Green – Acceptable Situation. Normal operating
moderate-risk situations could lead to a high-risk
conditions. Performance is in line with
situation and threshold values may need to be
performance criteria.
assessed accordingly.
— Yellow – Minor Risk Situation. The EOR and RTFE
— Red – High Risk Situation. Depending on the
should be notified. There may be a pre-defined
credible failure mode and how the thresholds are
risk control to be implemented, or the pre-defined
defined, reaching this level means there is an
action may be to increase the frequency of
imminent loss of control or that a loss of control
surveillance and analysis. Additional surveillance
has occurred. Depending on the potential
activities may be undertaken. Surveillance results
consequences, this may trigger very significant
and corresponding actions are documented and
pre-defined risk controls (eg ceasing ore
reported.
processing operations, emergency release of
—  Orange – Moderate-Risk Situation. In addition to water through the spillway) or it may trigger the
the EOR and RTFE, the Accountable Executive is implementation of the EPRP. It is important to note
notified. Depending on the credible failure mode that the accumulation or combination of
and associated level of concern, regulators, local moderate-risk situations could lead to a high-risk
emergency responders and communities should situation and threshold values may need to be
be notified if further escalation could lead to an assessed accordingly.

ICMM Operations 128

3.6.5 Temporary Suspension of Mine During temporary suspension, OMS activities continue
Operations and the closure plan is not implemented. However, in
During a temporary suspension of operations, ore some cases temporary suspension may lead to closure
extraction and processing have been suspended and of the mine and implementation of the closure plan.
the placement of tailings into the facility is not
occurring. A suspension may be short-term (eg 3.6.6 Progressive Reclamation
temporary suspension due to wildfires, labour Progressive reclamation is the reclamation or
disruption) or of a longer, indeterminant duration (eg remediation of certain portions of a mine site during the
due to low commodity prices). Operations phase, in advance of the Closure phase and
implementation of the closure plan (Section 3.7).
The specific timing, duration and circumstances related
to a temporary suspension are not usually known in Progressive reclamation may not be possible at some
advance. However, a temporary suspension is a tailings facilities. Where progressive reclamation is
significant change and, like all changes, must be possible, it may be temporary, or intended to be a
appropriately managed to reduce the risks associated component of the closure plan. However, where non-
with tailings management. temporary progressive reclamation can be undertaken,
it should be planned and undertaken:
The Operator should consider developing a contingency
plan for different credible scenarios for a temporary — In accordance with the operating plans (eg tailings
suspension, including identifying the resources (eg transportation and deposition plan) and the closure
personnel, power supply, equipment) needed for the plan (Section 3.7.2).
continued safe management of the tailings facility for
— In a manner consistent with the performance
the duration of a temporary suspension and
objectives and risk management plan (Sections 3.2,
coordination with the regulatory authority as
3.3 and 3.4).
appropriate. Such plans should also address OMS
activities specific to temporary suspension (eg — In a manner consistent with ongoing OMS activities
suppressing dust from areas of the tailings facility that (Section 2.4).
are normally wet) and the re-start of mine operations.
As progressive reclamation proceeds, the risk
Contingency plans should also address the potential
assessment should be reviewed accordingly, and the
implications of a longer temporary suspension, such as
risk management plan updated as appropriate. OMS
changes in water management and implications for
activities should also be reviewed and revised as
water levels in the tailings facility or changes to seepage
appropriate. The closure plan should be updated to
volume and chemistry.
reflect the state of progressive reclamation.

Tailings Management Operations 129

Closure and Post-Closure 3.7

3.7.1 Introduction facility become a landform. Landforms, as used in this

Planning for closure and operating a tailings facility in a guidance, are not prescriptive, but meet the objective of
manner consistent with the closure objectives are being long-term stable earth structures which are
activities that crosscut the entire lifecycle. Thus, while capable of being closed with surveillance and limited
Closure and Post-Closure can be regarded as distinct management or maintenance requirements. To be
phases of the lifecycle, planning and design for these considered a landform, the facility cannot develop a
phases begin at the outset of the Project Conception credible catastrophic failure scenario. Irrespective for
phase and continues throughout the lifecycle. Closure the closure configuration selected, it is good practice to
planning for an existing tailings facility that is not yet reference not only this section, but also the ICMM
closed does not exclude it from this process; rather, it Integrated Mine Closure: Good Practice Guide (2019)
accelerates the need to apply the scope of work and any site-specific regulatory criteria to ensure
described in this section to ensure a successful outcome. long-term sustainability is achieved.

The guidance presented here is focused on the theme of Considerations when following this guidance will
preventing catastrophic tailings facility failures from the include the recognition of application in variable
beginning of the tailings facility’s lifecycle through to the environments, under different (and sometimes
Closure and Post-Closure phases. For many tailings changing) legal requirements, and sometimes changing
facilities, a post-closure objective can include having the stakeholder objectives and success criteria. The ability

ICMM Closure and Post-Closure 130

to adapt to these considerations is key to a successful Designing and operating for closure requires a long-
outcome. Also key is to look for opportunities to term view. Tailings facilities should be planned,
execute progressive reclamation (when/where designed, constructed, operated and closed on the
possible) to test closure concepts, ensure regulatory assumption that they will be permanent landforms.
acceptance and integrate stakeholder engagement Tailings facilities, designed for closure, are true future
into the process. engineered landforms, intended to remain physically
and chemically stable for the long-term. It is important
3.7.2 Development of the Closure Plan to ensure that short-term financial or operational
For new tailings facilities or major expansions, the priorities do not prevail over better design and
development of closure plans and performance operational practices that would have lower long-term
objectives for closure and post-closure should begin impacts, complexity or risks.
during the Project Conception phase (Section 3.3).
The development of the closure plan should be
Tailings facilities should be planned and designed,
informed by a range of available references materials
from the outset, with closure and post-closure in
and tools including ICMM Integrated Mine Closure:
mind. Realising that many Operators are dealing with
Good Practice Guide (2019). In addition, it is important to
existing facilities and legacy facilities, the guidance
have an established DBR. Through the DBR
provided here expresses the importance and urgency
development process, the Design Team should identify
around the acceleration of a timeline for the guidance
information gaps to fill prior to finalising the closure
that follows to arrive at the goal of a final closure plan
detailed design. Closure plans typically evolve and
that will achieve a stable landform status.
should be viewed as living documents throughout the
A conceptual and final closure plan requires a vision, mining lifecycle.
principles and objectives. It should become more
detailed and elaborated during the Design phase 3.7.3 Execution of Closure Plan
(Section 3.4). The closure plan should then be refined, The execution of the closure plan can be a period of
elaborated, verified and updated periodically during the rapid change. It is vital to have established performance
Operations phase of the lifecycle, and in preparation for objectives and success criteria in order to establish
transition to the Closure phase. The closure plan and metrics and achieve designated goals during the
objectives should be considered in the multi-criteria Closure phase when the plan is executed. It is important
alternatives analysis conducted during the Project that the Operator continues to be diligent through this
Conception phase of the tailings facility and should be phase, and does not become complacent about tailings
a key consideration in the facility design and location, safety because tailings are no longer being produced
and in the technology decisions of the facility. The OMS and deposited in the tailings facility. In particular:
manual (Section 2.4) should be aligned with the closure
— Overall governance structures should remain in
plan and objectives so that activities during the
place, with accountability and responsibility
Operations phase (Section 3.6) are consistent with and
appropriately assigned.
support the closure plan and objectives.
— Change management should remain robust as
For existing tailings facilities that do not have closure
transitions occur in processes and personnel from
plans, the development of closure plans should begin
the Operations phase to the Closure and Post-
as soon as possible. If the facility was not planned and
Closure phases.
designed from the outset with closure in mind, then
options for closure vision, principles, and objectives — TMS continues to be implemented to the extent
may be more limited, but it is none the less imperative appliable and this is revised to reflect post-closure
that the Operator begins the process of planning for activities.
closure. The development of the closure plan may lead
— Risk assessment should be updated for closure, and
to changes in current practices or the adoption of
the risk management plan updated accordingly.
newer technologies to reduce risk and better position
the tailings facility for closure. Regular review of such — OMS manual should be updated for closure and
opportunities is central to continual improvement for implemented to meet the requirements for the
any tailings facility. Closure and Post-Closure phases.

Tailings Management Closure and Post-Closure 131

— Construction activities are carried out as per the — EPRP is updated to reflect closure conditions,
closure plan, with adherence to design specifications including a potential change in the role of the
and quality management requirements. Operator and third parties in responding to an
emergency as the Operator’s on-site resources
— Independent Review continues with a focus both on
change.
implementation of the closure plan and preparations
for the Post-Closure phase. Figure 17 illustrates the key activities of the Closure
phase of the lifecycle
— Community engagement continues.

Figure 17: Key activities of the Closure phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Closure
Implement closure in
accordance with closure plan
and final closure design.
Conduct operation,
maintenance and surveillance
activities in accordance with:
– Performance objectives
– Risk management plan
– DBR
– Closure plan
Evaluate performance of
tailings facility and tailings
management governance:
– Address deficiencies
– Implement measures for
continual improvement
Review/update:
– DBR
Temporary Suspension
– Tailings management system
– OMS manual
– EPRP
– Site characterisation models
Project Design Construction Operations Post-Closure
Conception – Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

ICMM Closure and Post-Closure 132

3.7.4 Post-Closure — Ensure a form of governance structure remains,
In contrast to the Closure phase, the Post-Closure with accountability and responsibility appropriately
phase begins when the changes from the Closure assigned (this may include a hand-over process of
phase have been fully implemented, and the facility the Operator itself).
enters a period of long-term maintenance and
— Continue to implement the TMS, although the
surveillance. Complacency remains a significant risk,
frequency of Identifying Actions to Improve
however, since the consequences of a tailings facility
Performance and reporting to the Accountable
failure may be the same as if the facility were still in
Executive may be decreased.
the Operations or Closure phase. It is important that all
stakeholders are engaged in and understand the — Maintain the tailings facility site characterisation
Post-Closure phase objectives and success criteria. and knowledge base.
A tailings facility in the Post-Closure phase may
— Periodically update the risk assessment,
require the same level of care as it did in earlier phases
particularly if there are changes in the facility
of the lifecycle. This can be a challenge, since the
performance or external changes that could
Operator will have few if any personnel on site at all
impact the risk (eg increased population in the
times, and depending on the location there may be
potential area of inundation).
more limited access to a power supply,
communication infrastructure, etc. — Update the risk management plan as appropriate.

For the Post-Closure phase, the Operator should: — Update the OMS manual and review periodically
through the Post-Closure phase and update as

Tailings Management Closure and Post-Closure 133

 appropriate. There may be a greater role for met. The EPRP should be updated, in particular to
community engagement in surveillance in the Post- reflect that the Operator may have a limited capacity for
Closure phase. immediate response to an emergency, and emergency
response may be much more reliant on third parties.
— Continue to conduct Independent Review, although
The EPRP should also reflect changes in other
the frequency can be reduced.
resources available to respond to an emergency, such
— Continue community engagement, although the as a lack of heavy equipment, power supply, fuel or
frequency may be reduced once established communication infrastructure. Continued testing of the
success criteria have been achieved. EPRP is imperative.

Performance/success monitoring is needed to Figure 18 illustrates the key activities of the Post-
determine whether specific pre-set criteria are being Closure phase of the lifecycle.

Figure 18: Key activities of the Post-Closure phase of the lifecycle

Integrated planning of ore extraction and processing, management

of tailings, water, and other waste, and closure planning

Tailings Management System

Post-Closure
Conduct operation,
maintenance and surveillance
activities in accordance with:
– Performance objectives
– Risk management plan
– DBR
– Closure plan
Evaluate performance of
tailings facility and tailings
management governance:
– Address deficiencies
– Implement measures for
continual improvement
Temporary Suspension Review/update:
– DBR
– Tailings management system
– OMS manual
– EPRP
Project Design Construction Operations Closure – Site characterisation models
Conception – Risk assessment

Potential material
changes go to
either Project
Conception or
Design, depending
on complexity
Material Changes

Note: The red boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships expected to occur for all tailings facilities.
The yellow boxes and lines indicate activities/relationships that may occur.

ICMM Closure and Post-Closure 134

Glossary

Accountability: The answerability of an individual for Breach analysis: A study that assumes a failure of the
their own performance and that of any personnel they tailings facility and estimates its impact. Breach
direct, and for the completion of specified deliverables analyses should be based on credible failure modes
or tasks in accordance with defined expectations. An where loss of containment is possible. The results
accountable person may delegate responsibility for should determine the physical area impacted by a
completion of the deliverable or task, but not the potential failure, flow arrival times, depth and velocities,
accountability. duration of flooding, and depth of material deposition.
The breach analysis is based on scenarios which are
Accountable Executive: One or more executive(s) who
not connected to probability of occurrence. It is
is/are directly answerable to the CEO on matters related
primarily used to inform emergency preparedness and
to this Standard, communicates with the Board of
response planning and for determining the potential
Directors, and who is accountable for the safety of
consequences of failure. [based on the definition
tailings facilities and for minimising the social and provided in the Standard]
environmental consequences of a potential tailings
facility failure. The Accountable Executive(s) may Catastrophic failure: A tailings facility failure that results
delegate responsibilities but not accountability. [based in material disruption to social, environmental and local
on the definition provided in the Standard] economic systems. Such failures are a function of the
interaction between hazard exposure, vulnerability, and
As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP): ALARP the capacity of people and systems to respond.
requires that all reasonable measures be taken with Catastrophic events typically involve numerous adverse
respect to ‘tolerable’ or acceptable risks to reduce them impacts, at different scales and over different
even further until the cost and other impacts of timeframes, including loss of life, damage to physical
additional risk reduction are grossly disproportionate to infrastructure or natural assets, and disruption to lives,
the benefit. [based on the definition provided in the livelihoods and social order. Operators may be affected
Standard] by damage to assets, disruption to operations, financial
Authority: The power to make decisions, assign loss or negative impact to reputation. Catastrophic
responsibilities, or delegate some or all authority, as failures exceed the capacity of affected people to cope
appropriate. The ability to act on behalf of the Operator. using their own resources, triggering the need for
outside assistance in emergency response, restoration
Board of Directors (BoD): The ultimate governing body and recovery efforts. [based on the definition provided
of the Operator typically elected by the shareholders of in the Standard]
the Operator. The BoD is the entity with the final
Community: A social group possessing shared beliefs
decision-making authority for the Operator and holds
and values, stable membership and the expectation of
the authority to, among other things, set the Operator’s
continued interaction. It may be defined geographically,
policies, objectives and overall direction as well as
by political or resource boundaries, or socially as a
oversee the firm’s executives. As the term is used here,
community of individuals with common interests.
it encompasses any individual or entity with control over
the Operator, including, for example, the owner or Construction versus Design Intent Verification (CDIV):
owners. Where the State serves as the Operator, the Intended to ensure the design intent is implemented
BoD shall be understood to mean the government and still being met if the site conditions vary from the
official with ultimate responsibility for the final decisions design assumptions. The CDIV identifies any
of the Operator. [based on the definition provided in the discrepancies between the field conditions and the
Standard] design assumptions, such that the design can be

Tailings Management Glossary 135

adjusted to account for the actual field conditions. of a critical control would disproportionately increase
[based on the definition provided in the Standard] the risk despite the existence of the other controls.
[based on the definition provided in the Standard]
Construction Records Report (CRR): Describes all
aspects of the ‘as-built’ product, including all Dam Safety Review (DSR): A convention from the water
geometrical information, materials, laboratory and field dam industry to describe periodic and systematic
test results, construction activities, schedule, equipment process carried out by an independent qualified review
and procedures, quality control and quality assurance engineer to assess and evaluate the safety of a dam or
data, results of Construction versus Design Intent system of dams against failure modes, in order to make
Verification (CDIV), changes to design or any aspect of a statement on the safety of the facility. A safe tailings
construction, non-conformances and their resolution, facility is one that performs its intended function under
construction photographs, construction shift reports, both normal and unusual conditions; does not impose
and any other relevant information. Instruments and an unacceptable risk to people, property or
their installation details, calibration records and readings environment; and meets applicable safety criteria. An
must be included in the CRR. Roles, responsibilities and alternative approach that involves regular review of the
personnel, including Independent Review, should be entire facility though use of a programme for reviewing
documented. Detailed construction record drawings are tailings safety as outlined in this Guide. [based on the
fundamental. [based on the definition provided in the definition provided in the Standard]
Standard]
Design Basis Report (DBR): Provides the basis for the
Continual improvement: The process of implementing design, operation, construction, monitoring and risk
incremental improvements and standardisation to management of a tailings facility. [based on the
achieve better environmental and management system definition provided in the Standard]
performance.
Deviance Accountability Report (DAR): Provides an
Credible failure mode/scenario: Refers to technically assessment of the cumulative impact of changes to the
feasible failure mechanisms given the materials present tailings facility on the risk level of the achieved product
in the structure and its foundation, the properties of and defines the potential requirement for updates to the
these materials, the configuration of the structure, design, Design Basis Report (DBR), and operation,
drainage conditions and surface water control at the maintenance, and surveillance (OMS) activities. [based
tailings facility, throughout its lifecycle. Credible failure on the definition provided in the Standard]
modes can and do typically vary during the lifecycle of
Embankment: A term used to denote engineered
the facility as the conditions vary. A tailings facility that
structures designed and built to retain tailings solids
is appropriately designed and operated considers all of
and, where applicable, water. Constructed of tailings
these credible failure modes and includes sufficient
and/or other materials, embankments may include
resilience against each. Different failure modes will
dams, dikes or other structures.
result in different failure scenarios. Some tailings
facilities will have no credible failure modes. Further, Emergency: A situation that poses an impending or
even more tailings facilities will have no credible immediate risk to health, life, property, and/or the
catastrophic failure modes. The term ‘credible failure environment, and which requires urgent intervention to
mode’ is not associated with a probability of this event prevent or limit the expected adverse outcomes.
occurring and having credible failure modes is not a
Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP):
reflection of facility safety. The process of assessing
A site-specific plan developed to identify hazards,
credibility or non-credibility of failure modes for a given
assess capacity, and prepare for an emergency based
tailing facility should consider, among other factors
on tailings facility credible failure scenarios, and to
such as construction and operations, whether the
respond if it occurs. This may be part of operation-wide
facility is designed to extreme external loads. [based on
emergency response planning and includes the
the definition provided in the Standard]
identification of response capacity and any necessary
Critical controls: A control that is critical to preventing a coordination with off-site emergency responders, local
potential undesirable event or mitigating the communities and public sector agencies. The
consequences of such an event. The absence or failure development of the EPRP includes a community-

ICMM Glossary 136

focused planning process to support the co- — Construction and Operations phases of new tailings
development and implementation of emergency facilities.
response measures by those vulnerable to a tailings
— Closure and Post-Closure phases of tailings facilities.
facility failure. [based on the definition provided in the
Standard] — Any material changes to the design or operation of
tailings facilities.
Engineer of Record (EOR): The qualified engineering
firm responsible for confirming that the tailings facility is — Re-commissioning of an existing tailings facility for a
designed, constructed and decommissioned with mine re-opening.
appropriate concern for integrity of the facility, and that
Project Conception consists of the analysis of a range
it aligns with and meets applicable regulations, statutes,
of alternatives (eg location of a new tailings facility,
guidelines, codes and standards. The EOR may
technologies to be applied).
delegate responsibility but not accountability. In some
highly regulated jurisdictions, notably Japan, the role of Design: A recurring lifecycle activity that builds upon the
EoR is undertaken by the responsible regulatory decisions made in the Project Conception phase. Once
authorities. [based on the definition provided in the a preferred alternative has been selected, all aspects of
Standard] that alternative are designed in detail, based on the
design intent and defined performance objectives.
Independent Review: Independent, objective, expert
commentary, advice, and, potentially, recommendations Construction: A recurring lifecycle activity that includes:
to assist in identifying, understanding and managing
— Initial construction prior to the start-up of a new
risks associated with tailings facilities. This information
tailings facility (eg starter embankment, tailings
is provided to the Operator to:
lines).
— Facilitate informed management decisions regarding
— Ongoing construction through the operating life of
tailings management so that tailings-related risks are
the mine to increase the capacity of the tailings
managed responsibly and in accordance with an
facility (eg facility raises).
acceptable standard of care.
Construction may also include:
— Ensure that the Accountable Executive has a third-
party opinion regarding the risks and the state of the — Construction for any material changes (eg increase
tailings facility and the implementation of the TMS, capacity beyond original design intent, buttress to
independent of the teams (employees, consultants strengthen a tailings facility).
and contractors) responsible for planning, designing,
— Construction during the Closure phase (eg
constructing, operating and maintaining the facility.
installation of covers).
Legal requirement: Any law, statute, ordinance, decree,
Operations: The period in the lifecycle when tailings are
requirement, order, judgement, rule or regulation of, and
transported to, and deposited in, the tailings facility,
the terms of any license or permit issued by, any
inclusive of any periods of inactivity prior to the
governmental authority.
commencement of implementation of the closure plan.
Lifecycle: The series of activities or phases in the life of Construction may be ongoing or periodic throughout
a tailings facility, consisting of: Project Conception, the Operations phase. In addition, progressive
Design, Construction, Operations, Closure and Post- reclamation in preparation for closure and consistent
Closure. At some sites, the lifecycle may also include with the closure plan may occur during the Operations
temporary suspension of mine operations. Some phase. In some cases, after the end of the active
phases, such as Operations, Closure and Post-Closure, deposition of tailings, tailings may be removed from the
typically only occur once in the lifecycle of a tailings tailings facility for reprocessing or other uses. Such
facility, while other activities, such as Project activity would also be considered Operations.
Conception, Design and Construction, may be recurring
Temporary suspension of mine operations: A period of
at different periods through the life of a tailings facility.
time when mine operations have been suspended and
Project Conception: A recurring lifecycle activity that is tailings are not being deposited into the facility. The
the first step in the planning and design for: suspension may be short-term (eg temporary suspension

Tailings Management Glossary 137

due to wildfires, labour disruption) or of a longer, or performance of a tailings facility. The criteria for what
indeterminant duration (eg due to low commodity prices). would constitute a material change should be defined
by the Operator, with input from the EOR and
During temporary suspension, maintenance and
Independent Review.
surveillance continue and some operation activities (eg
active water management) may also continue. The Management system: Processes and procedures
closure plan is not implemented. However, temporary that collectively provide a systematic framework for
suspension may lead to closure in some cases. ensuring that tasks are performed correctly,
consistently and effectively to achieve a specified
Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when deposition of
outcome and to drive continual improvement in
tailings into the tailings facility ceases permanently and
performance. A systems approach to management
the closure plan is implemented, including:
requires an assessment of what needs to be done,
— Transitioning from the Operations phase to the planning to achieve the objective, implementation of the
Closure phase and the Post-Closure phase. plan, and review of performance in meeting the set
objective. A management system also considers
— Removal of infrastructure such as pipelines.
necessary personnel, resources and documentation
— Changes to water management or treatment. requirements. Other definitions associated with
management systems are:
— Construction of covers, recontouring or revegetation
of tailings and any embankments or other structural  Policy: The expression of management’s
elements. commitment to a particular issue area that presents
the stance of the company to interested external
— Other reclamation and decommissioning activities
parties.
Post-Closure: This lifecycle phase begins when the
Practice: Documented approaches to carrying out a
closure plan has been implemented and the tailings
task.
facility has transitioned to long-term maintenance and
surveillance. The Post-Closure phase should recognise  Procedure: A documented description of how a task
all the aspects of safety and environmental compliance is to be carried out.
related to long-term stability and legal requirements.
Observational method: A continuous, managed,
During the Closure or Post-Closure phases, tailings integrated, process of design, construction control,
facilities could return to the Operations phase. In monitoring and review that enables previously defined
addition, tailings could be removed for reprocessing to modifications to be incorporated during or after
recover additional commodities of value, or to be used construction as appropriate. All of these aspects must
for other purposes (eg construction material). be demonstrably robust. The key element of the
observational method is the proactive assessment at
In some jurisdictions, during the Post-Closure phase,
the design stage of every possible unfavourable
responsibility for a tailings facility may transfer from the
situation that might be disclosed by the monitoring
Operator to jurisdictional control.
programme and the development of an action plan or
Maintenance: Includes preventative, predictive and mitigative measure to reduce risk in case the
corrective activities carried out to provide continued unfavourable situation is observed. This element forms
proper operation of all infrastructure (eg civil, the basis of a performance-based risk management
mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, etc), or to adjust approach. The objective is to achieve greater overall
infrastructure to ensure operation in conformance with safety. See Peck, R.B. (1969), ‘Advantages and
performance objectives. Limitations of the observational method in Applied Soil
Mechanics’, Geotechnique 19(2), pp.171–187. [based on
Material change: A change to the design or operation of
the definition provided in the Standard]
a tailings facility, proposed or made after the design for
initial construction has been finalised and initial Operation: Includes activities related to the transport,
construction has commenced. A material change would placement and permanent storage of tailings and,
be a change important enough to merit attention, such where applicable, process water, effluents and residues,
as a change that has the potential to influence the risk and the recycling of process water, inclusive of any

ICMM Glossary 138

periods of inactivity prior to commencement of Responsibility: The duty or obligation of an individual or
implementation of the closure plan. The term ‘operation’ organisation to perform an assigned duty or task in
applies throughout all phases of the lifecycle of a accordance with defined expectations, and which has a
tailings facility and is not limited to the Operations consequence if expectations are not met. An individual
phase of the lifecycle when tailings are being actively or organisation with responsibility is accountable to the
placed in the facility. As a result, operation also includes person that delegated that responsibility to them.
reclamation and related activities.
Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer (RTFE): An
Operator: An entity that singly, or jointly with other engineer appointed by the Operator to be responsible
entities, exercises ultimate control of a tailings facility. for the tailings facility. The RTFE must be available at all
This may include a corporation, partnership, owner, times during the Construction, Operations and Closure
affiliate, subsidiary, joint venture or other entity, including phases of the lifecycle. The RTFE has clearly defined,
any State agency, that controls a tailings facility. [based delegated responsibility for management of the tailings
on the definition provided in the Standard] facility and has appropriate qualifications and
experience compatible with the level of complexity of
Performance: There are three key terms related to
the tailings facility. The RTFE is responsible for the
performance, defined as follows:
scope of work and budget requirements for the tailings
 erformance objectives are overall goals, arising from
P facility, including risk management. The RTFE may
the Operator’s policy and commitment, which are delegate specific tasks and responsibilities for aspects
quantified where practicable. They may be defined at of tailings management to qualified personnel but not
various levels of detail such as this tailings facility will accountability. [based on the definition provided in the
not experience a catastrophic failure versus Standard]
deformation of the embankment will be minimised.
Risk: A potential negative impact, detrimental to
Performance indicators are detailed performance operations, a facility, the environment, public health, or
requirements that arise from the performance safety, that may arise from some present process or
objectives and that need to be established and met future event. When evaluating risk, both the potential
in order to achieve those objectives. Performance severity and consequence of the impact and its
indicators must be measurable and quantifiable. probability of occurrence are considered.

Performance criteria are established based on

 Risk controls: Measures put in place to either:
expected or predicted performance and are used to
— Prevent or reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of
evaluate performance indicators and define limits of
an unwanted event; or
performance outside which risk management action
needs to be taken. — Minimise or mitigate the negative consequences if
the unwanted event does occur.
Personnel: Includes employees, contractors and
consultants (eg designer, Engineer-of-Record) and Risks need to be managed via controls, and risk
includes those with direct responsibilities for tailings controls should have designated owners and defined
management as well as those with indirect accountabilities. Some risk controls are designated as
responsibilities whose roles may be related in some critical controls.
manner to tailings management (eg heavy equipment
Stakeholders: Persons or groups who are directly or
operators working on or adjacent to tailings facilities).
indirectly affected by a project, as well as those who may
Quality: The degree to which a set of inherent have interests in a project and/or the ability to influence
characteristics fulfils requirement. its outcome, positively or negatively. Stakeholders may
include workers, trade unions, project-affected people or
Quality assurance (QA): All those planned and
communities and their formal and informal
systematic activities implemented to provide
representatives, national or local government authorities,
adequate confidence that the entity will fulfil
politicians, religious leaders, civil society organisations
requirements for quality.
and groups with special interests, the academic
 uality control (QC): The operational techniques and
Q community, or other businesses. Different stakeholders
activities that are used to fulfil requirements for quality. will often have divergent views, both within and across

Tailings Management Glossary 139

stakeholder groupings. [based on the definition provided management system (ESMS), the operation-wide
in the Standard] management system, and the regulatory system. This
systems interaction is fundamental to the effective
Surveillance: Includes the inspection and monitoring (ie
implementation of the Standard. [based on the
collection of qualitative and quantitative observations
definition provided in the Standard]
and data) of activities and infrastructure related to tailings
management. Surveillance also includes the timely Technical: In this Guide, the term ‘technical’ refers to
documentation, analysis and communication of the physical science and engineering aspects of tailings
surveillance results, to inform decision-making and verify management.
whether performance objectives and risk management
Trigger Action Response Plan (TARP): A TARP is a tool
objectives, including critical controls, are being met.
to manage risk controls, including critical controls.
Tailings: A by-product of mining, consisting of the TARPs provide pre-defined trigger levels for
processed rock or soil left over from the separation of performance criteria that are based on the risk controls
the commodities of value from the rock or soil within and critical controls of the tailings facility. The trigger
which they occur. levels are developed based on the performance
objectives and risk management plan for the tailings
Tailings facility: A facility that is designed and managed
facility. TARPs describe actions to be taken if trigger
to contain the tailings produced by a mine. A tailings
levels are exceeded (performance is outside the normal
facility includes the collective engineered structures,
range), to prevent a loss of control. A range of actions is
components and equipment involved in the
pre-defined, based on the magnitude of the
management of tailings solids, other mine waste
exceedance of the trigger level. [based on the definition
managed with tailings (eg waste rock, water treatment
provided in the Standard]
residues), and any water managed in tailings facilities,
including pore fluid, any pond(s), and surface water and
run-off.

Tailings management system (TMS): The site-specific

TMS comprises the key components for management
and design of the tailings facility and is often referred to
as the ‘framework’ that manages these components.
The TMS sits at the core of the Standard and is focused
on the safe operation and management of the tailings
facility throughout its lifecycle (see above). The TMS
follows the well-established Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle.
Each Operator develops a TMS that best suits their
organisation and tailings facilities. A TMS includes
elements such as: establishing policies, planning,
designing and establishing performance objectives,
managing change, identifying and securing adequate
resources (experienced and/or qualified personnel,
equipment, scheduling, data, documentation and
financial resources), conducting performance
evaluations and risk assessments, establishing and
implementing controls for risk management, auditing
and reviewing for continual improvement, implementing
a management system with clear accountabilities and
responsibilities, preparing and implementing operation,
maintenance and surveillance (OMS) activities and the
emergency preparedness and response plan (EPRP).
The TMS, and its various elements, must interact with
other systems, such as the environmental and social

ICMM Glossary 140

List of Acronyms

ALAR: As low as reasonably practicable

BoD: Board of Directors
CRR: Construction Records Report
CDIV: Construction versus Design Intent Verification
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
DAR: Deviance Accountability Report
DBR: Design Basis Report
DSR: Dam Safety Review
EOR: Engineer of Record
EPRP: Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
ESMS: Environmental and Social Management System
FoS: Factor of Safety
ICMM: International Council on Mining and Metals
ITRB: Independent Tailings Review Board
ISO: International Organization for Standardization
MAA: Multiple Accounts Analysis
MAC: Mining Association of Canada
MCE: Maximum Credible Earthquake
MDE: Maximum Design Earthquake
MDF: Maximum Design Flood
OMS: Operation, maintenance and surveillance
PMF: Probably Maximum Flood
PSHA: Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
QA: Quality assurance
QC: Quality control
RTFE: Responsible Tailings Facility Engineer
SOP : Standard operating procedure
TARP: Trigger Action Response Plan
TMS: Tailings Management System

Tailings Management List of Acronyms 141

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