Leveraged Buyout
Leveraged Buyout
Leveraged buyout
A leveraged buyout (or LBO, or highly leveraged transaction (HLT), or "bootstrap" transaction) occurs when an investor, typically financial sponsor, acquires a controlling interest in a company's equity and where a significant percentage of the purchase price is financed through leverage (borrowing). The assets of the acquired company are used as collateral for the borrowed capital, sometimes with assets of the acquiring company. Typically, leveraged buyout uses a combination of various debt instruments from bank and debt capital markets. The bonds or other paper issued for leveraged buyouts are commonly considered not to be investment grade because of the significant risks involved.[1] Companies of all sizes and industries have been the target of leveraged buyout transactions, although because of the importance of debt and the ability of the acquired firm to make regular loan payments after the completion of a leveraged buyout, some features of potential target firms make for more attractive leverage buyout candidates, including: Low existing debt loads; A multi-year history of stable and recurring cash flows; Hard assets (property, plant and equipment, inventory, receivables) that may be used as collateral for lower cost secured debt; The potential for new management to make operational or other improvements to the firm to boost cash flows; Market conditions and perceptions that depress the valuation or stock price.
Characteristics
Leveraged buyouts involve institutional investors and financial sponsors (like a private equity firm) making large acquisitions without committing all the capital required for the acquisition. To do this, a financial sponsor will raise acquisition debt (by issuing bonds or securing a loan) which is ultimately secured upon the acquisition target and also looks to the cash flows of the acquisition target to make interest and principal payments. Acquisition debt in an LBO is therefore usually non-recourse to the Diagram of the basic structure of a generic leveraged buyout transaction financial sponsor and to the equity fund that the financial sponsor manages. Furthermore, unlike in a hedge fund, where debt raised to purchase certain securities is also collateralized by the fund's other securities, the acquisition debt in an LBO is recourse only to the company purchased in a particular LBO transaction. Therefore, an LBO transaction's financial structure is particularly attractive to a fund's limited partners, allowing them the benefits of leverage but greatly limiting the degree of recourse of that leverage. This kind of acquisition brings leverage benefits to an LBO's financial sponsor in two ways: (1) the investor itself only needs to provide a fraction of the capital for the acquisition, and (2) assuming the economic internal rate of return on the investment (taking into account expected exit proceeds) exceeds the weighted average interest rate on the acquisition debt, returns to the financial sponsor will be significantly enhanced.
Leveraged buyout As transaction sizes grow, the equity component of the purchase price can be provided by multiple financial sponsors "co-investing" to come up with the needed equity for a purchase. Likewise, multiple lenders may band together in a "syndicate" to jointly provide the debt required to fund the transaction. Today, larger transactions are dominated by dedicated private equity firms and a limited number of large banks with "financial sponsors" groups. As a percentage of the purchase price for a leverage buyout target, the amount of debt used to finance a transaction varies according to the financial condition and history of the acquisition target, market conditions, the willingness of lenders to extend credit (both to the LBO's financial sponsors and the company to be acquired) as well as the interest costs and the ability of the company to cover those costs. Typically the debt portion of a LBO ranges from 50%-85% of the purchase price, but in some cases debt may represent upwards of 95% of purchase price. Between 2000-2005 debt averaged between 59.4% and 67.9% of total purchase price for LBOs in the United States.[2] To finance LBO's, private-equity firms usually issue some combination of syndicated loans and high-yield bonds. Smaller transactions may also be financed with mezzanine debt from insurance companies or specialty lenders. Syndicated loans are typically arranged by investment banks and financed by commercial banks and loan fund managers, such as mutual funds, hedge funds, credit opportunity investors and structured finance vehicles. The commercial banks typically provide revolving credits that provide issuers with liquidity and cash flow while fund managers generally provided funded term loans that are used to finance the LBO. These loans tend to be senior secured, floating-rate instruments pegged to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). They are typically pre-payable at the option of the issuer, though in some cases modest prepayment fees apply.[3] High-yield bonds, meanwhile, are also underwritten by investment banks but are financed by a combination of retail and institutional credit investors, including high-yield mutual funds, hedge funds, credit opportunities and other institutional accounts. High-yield bonds tend to be fixed-rate instruments. Most are unsecured, though in some cases issuers will sell senior secured notes. The bonds usually have no-call periods of 35 years and then high prepayment fees thereafter. Issuers, however, will in many cases have a "claw-back option" that allows them to repay some percentage during the no-call period (usually 35%) with equity proceeds. Another source of financing for LBO's is seller's notes, which are provided in some cases by the entity as a way to facilitate the transaction.
History
Origins of the leveraged buyouts
The first leveraged buyout may have been the purchase by McLean Industries, Inc. of Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company in January 1955 and Waterman Steamship Corporation in May 1955.[4] Under the terms of that transaction, McLean borrowed $42 million and raised an additional $7 million through an issue of preferred stock. When the deal closed, $20 million of Waterman cash and assets were used to retire $20 million of the loan debt.[5] Similar to the approach employed in the McLean transaction, the use of publicly traded holding companies as investment vehicles to acquire portfolios of investments in corporate assets was a relatively new trend in the 1960s, popularized by the likes of Warren Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway) and Victor Posner (DWG Corporation), and later adopted by Nelson Peltz (Triarc), Saul Steinberg (Reliance Insurance) and Gerry Schwartz (Onex Corporation). These investment vehicles would utilize a number of the same tactics and target the same type of companies as more traditional leveraged buyouts and in many ways could be considered a forerunner of the later private equity firms. In fact it is Posner who is often credited with coining the term "leveraged buyout" or "LBO"[6] The leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s was conceived by a number of corporate financiers, most notably Jerome Kohlberg, Jr. and later his protg Henry Kravis. Working for Bear Stearns at the time, Kohlberg and Kravis, along with Kravis' cousin George Roberts, began a series of what they described as "bootstrap" investments. Many of the target companies lacked a viable or attractive exit for their founders, as they were too small to be taken public and the founders were reluctant to sell out to competitors. Thus a sale to a financial buyer might prove attractive. Their
Leveraged buyout acquisition of Orkin Exterminating Company in 1964 is among the first significant leveraged buyout transactions.[7] . In the following years the three Bear Stearns bankers would complete a series of buyouts including Stern Metals (1965), Incom (a division of Rockwood International, 1971), Cobblers Industries (1971), and Boren Clay (1973) as well as Thompson Wire, Eagle Motors and Barrows through their investment in Stern Metals.[8] By 1976, tensions had built up between Bear Stearns and Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts leading to their departure and the formation of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts in that year.
Leveraged buyout Drexel Burnham Lambert was the investment bank most responsible for the boom in private equity during the 1980s due to its leadership in the issuance of high-yield debt. Drexel reached an agreement with the government in which it pleaded nolo contendere (no contest) to six feloniesthree counts of stock parking and three counts of stock manipulation.[17] It also agreed to pay a fine of $650 millionat the time, the largest fine ever levied under securities laws. Milken left the firm after his own indictment in March 1989.[18] On February 13, 1990 after being advised by United States Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F. Brady, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the New York Stock Exchange, and the Federal Reserve, Drexel Burnham Lambert officially filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.[18]
Leveraged buyout
Rationale
The purposes of debt financing for leveraged buyouts are twofold: 1. The use of debt increases (leverages) the financial return to the private equity sponsor. Under the Modigliani-Miller theorem,[33] the total return of an asset to its owners, all else being equal and within strict restrictive assumptions, is unaffected by the structure of its financing. As the debt in an LBO has a relatively fixed, albeit high, cost of capital, any returns in excess of this cost of capital flow through to the equity. 2. The tax shield of the acquisition debt, according to the Modigliani-Miller theorem with taxes, increases the value of the firm. This enables the private equity sponsor to pay a higher price than would otherwise be possible. Because income flowing through to equity is taxed, while interest payments to debt are not, the capitalized value of cash flowing to debt is greater than the same cash stream flowing to equity. Germany currently introduces new tax laws, taxing parts of the cash flow before debt interest deduction. The motivation for the change is to discourage leveraged buyouts by reducing the tax shield effectiveness. Historically, many LBOs in the 1980s and 1990s focused on reducing wasteful expenditures by corporate managers whose interests were not aligned with shareholders. After a major corporate restructuring, which may involve selling off portions of the company and severe staff reductions, the entity would likely be producing a higher income stream. Because this type of management arbitrage and easy restructuring has largely been accomplished, LBOs today focus more on growth and complicated financial engineering to achieve their returns. Most leveraged buyout firms look to achieve an internal rate of return in excess of 20%.
Management buyouts
A special case of a leveraged acquisition is a management buyout (MBO), which occurs when a company's managers buy or acquire a large part of the company. The goal of an MBO may be to strengthen the managers' interest in the success of the company. In most cases when the company is initially listed, the management will then make it private. MBOs have assumed an important role in corporate restructurings beside mergers and acquisitions. Key considerations in an MBO are fairness to shareholders, price, the future business plan, and legal and tax issues. One recent criticism of MBOs is that they create a conflict of interestan incentive is created for managers to mismanage (or not manage as efficiently) a company, thereby depressing its stock price, and profiting handsomely by implementing effective management after the successful MBO, as Paul Newman's character attempted in the Coen brothers' film The Hudsucker Proxy. Of course, the incentive to artificially reduce share price extends beyond management buyouts. It may be fairly easy for a top executive to reduce the price of his/her company's stock - due to information asymmetry. The executive can accelerate accounting of expected expenses, delay accounting of expected revenue, engage in off balance sheet transactions to make the company's profitability appear temporarily poorer, or simply promote and report severely conservative (e.g. pessimistic) estimates of future earnings. Such seemingly adverse earnings news will be likely to (at least temporarily) reduce share price. (This is again due to information asymmetries since it is more common for top executives to do everything they can to window dress their company's earnings forecasts). A reduced share price makes a company an easier takeover target. When the company gets bought out (or taken private) - at a dramatically lower price - the takeover artist gains a windfall from the former top executive's actions to surreptitiously reduce share price. This can represent tens of billions of dollars (questionably) transferred from previous shareholders to the takeover artist. The former top executive is then rewarded with a golden parachute for presiding over the firesale that can sometimes be in the hundreds of millions of dollars for one or two years of work. (This is nevertheless an excellent bargain for the takeover artist, who will tend to benefit from developing a reputation of being very generous to parting top executives).
Leveraged buyout Similar issues occur when a publicly held asset or non-profit organization undergoes privatization. Top executives often reap tremendous monetary benefits when a government owned or non-profit entity is sold to private hands. Just as in the example above, they can facilitate this process by making the entity appear to be in financial crisis - this reduces the sale price (to the profit of the purchaser), and makes non-profits and governments more likely to sell. Ironically, it can also contribute to a public perception that private entities are more efficiently run reinforcing the political will to sell of public assets. Again, due to asymmetric information, policy makers and the general public see a government owned firm that was a financial 'disaster' - miraculously turned around by the private sector (and typically resold) within a few years. Nevertheless, the incentive to artificially reduce the share price of a firm is higher for management buyouts, than for other forms of takeovers or LBOs.
Failures
Some LBOs in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in corporate bankruptcy, such as Robert Campeau's 1988 buyout of Federated Department Stores and the 1986 buyout of the Revco drug stores. The failure of the Federated buyout was a result of excessive debt financing, comprising about 97% of the total consideration, which led to large interest payments that exceeded the company's operating cash flow. In response to the threat of LBOs, certain companies adopted a number of techniques, such as the poison pill, to protect them against hostile takeovers by effectively self-destructing the company if it were to be taken over. The inability to repay debt in an LBO can be caused by initial overpricing of the target firm and/or its assets. Because LBO funds often attempt to increase the value of an acquired company by liquidating certain assets or selling underperforming business units, the bought-out firm may face insolvency as depleted operating revenues become insufficient to repay the debt. Over-optimistic forecasts of the revenues of the target company may also lead to financial distress after acquisition. Some courts have found that LBO debt constitutes a fraudulent transfer under U.S. insolvency law if it is determined to be the cause of the acquired firm's failure. [34] However, the Bankruptcy Code includes a so-called "safe harbor" provision, preventing bankruptcy trustees from recovering settlement payments to the bought-out shareholders.[35] In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that such settlement payments could not be avoided, irrespective of whether they occurred in an LBO of a public or private company.[36]
Secondary buyouts
A secondary buyout is a form of leveraged buyout where both the buyer and the seller are private equity firms or financial sponsors (i.e. a leveraged buyout of a company that was acquired through a leveraged buyout). A secondary buyout will often provide a clean break for the selling private equity firms and its limited partner investors. Historically, however, secondary buyouts were perceived as distressed sales by both seller and buyer, were considered unattractive by limited partner investors and were largely avoided. The increase in secondary buyout activity in 2000s was driven in large part by an increase in capital in the leveraged buyout space. Often, selling private equity firms will pursue a secondary buyout for a number of reasons: Sales to strategic buyers and IPOs may not be possible for niche or undersized businesses. Secondary buyouts may generate liquidity more quickly than other routes (i.e., IPOs). Some kinds of businessese.g., those with relatively slow growth but which generate high cash flowsmay be most appealing to private equity firms than they are to public stock investors or other corporations. Often, secondary buyouts have been successful if the investment has reached an age where it is necessary or desirable to sell rather than hold the investment further or where the investment had already generated significant value for the selling firm.[37]
Leveraged buyout Secondary buyouts differ from secondaries or secondary market purchases which typically involve the acquisition of portfolios of private equity assets including limited partnership stakes and direct investments in corporate securities.
LBO Analysis
An LBO analysis is designed to estimate the current value of a company to a financial buyer, based on the company's forecasted financial performance. LBO analysis typically builds upon a medium-term forecast (typical investment horizon for financial sponsors is 37 years) to project future operating results. The analysis works similarly, in many respects, to a discounted cash flow. The analysis will project the debt repaid by the company during the forecast period and make assumptions about the multiple of earnings at which the business will be sold after a period of time. By targeting returns consistent with historical targets for private equity firms, the LBO analysis will provide an estimate of what purchase price a buyer would be willing to pay to achieve those returns.
In Art
LBOs form the basis of several cultural works. In addition to the aforementioned Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco and the film adaptation, based on actual events, a fictional LBO is the basis of the 1963 Japanese film High and Low.
Notes
[1] [2] [3] [4] http:/ / www. lbo-advisers. com/ LBO. asp Trenwith Group "M&A Review," (Second Quarter, 2006) https:/ / www. lcdcomps. com/ d/ pdf/ LoanMarketguide. pdf On January 21, 1955, McLean Industries, Inc. purchased the capital stock of Pan Atlantic Steamship Corporation and Gulf Florida Terminal Company, Inc. from Waterman Steamship Corporation. In May McLean Industries, Inc. completed the acquisition of the common stock of Waterman Steamship Corporation from its founders and other stockholders. [5] Marc Levinson, The Box, How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger, pp. 44-47 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006). The details of this transaction are set out in ICC Case No. MC-F-5976, McLean Trucking Company and Pan-Atlantic American Steamship Corporation--Investigation of Control, July 8, 1957. [6] Trehan, R. (2006). The History Of Leveraged Buyouts (http:/ / www. 4hoteliers. com/ 4hots_fshw. php?mwi=1757). December 4, 2006. Accessed May 22, 2008 [7] The History of Private Equity (http:/ / www. investmentu. com/ research/ private-equity-history. html) Investment U [8] Burrough, Bryan. Barbarians at the Gate. New York : Harper & Row, 1990, p. 133-136 [9] Taylor, Alexander L. " Buyout Binge (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,951242,00. html)". TIME magazine, Jul. 16, 1984. [10] David Carey and John E. Morris, King of Capital: The Remarkable Rise, Fall and Rise Again of Steve Schwarzman and Blackstone (http:/ / king-of-capital. com/ ) (Crown 2010), pp. 15-16. [11] Opler, T. and Titman, S. "The determinants of leveraged buyout activity: Free cash flow vs. financial distress costs." Journal of Finance, 1993. [12] 10 Questions for Carl Icahn (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171,1590446,00. html) by Barbara Kiviat, TIME magazine, Feb. 15, 2007 [13] TWA - Death Of A Legend (http:/ / www. stlmag. com/ media/ St-Louis-Magazine/ October-2005/ TWA-Death-Of-A-Legend/ ) by Elaine X. Grant, St Louis Magazine, Oct 2005 [14] King of Capital, pp. 31-44. [15] Game of Greed (http:/ / www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ 0,9263,7601881205,00. html) (TIME magazine, 1988) [16] Wallace, Anise C. " Nabisco Refinance Plan Set (http:/ / query. nytimes. com/ gst/ fullpage. html?res=9C0CE2D91E31F935A25754C0A966958260)." The New York Times, July 16, 1990. [17] Stone, Dan G. (1990). April Fools: An Insider's Account of the Rise and Collapse of Drexel Burnham. New York City: Donald I. Fine. ISBN1556112289. [18] Den of Thieves. Stewart, J. B. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. ISBN 0-671-63802-5. [19] SORKIN, ANDREW ROSS and ROZHON, TRACIE. " Three Firms Are Said to Buy Toys 'R' Us for $6 Billion (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2005/ 03/ 17/ business/ 17toys. html)." New York Times, March 17, 2005.
Leveraged buyout
[20] ANDREW ROSS SORKIN and DANNY HAKIM. " Ford Said to Be Ready to Pursue a Hertz Sale (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2005/ 09/ 08/ business/ 08ford. html)." New York Times, September 8, 2005 [21] PETERS, JEREMY W. " Ford Completes Sale of Hertz to 3 Firms (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2005/ 09/ 13/ business/ 13hertz. html)." New York Times, September 13, 2005 [22] SORKIN, ANDREW ROSS. " Sony-Led Group Makes a Late Bid to Wrest MGM From Time Warner (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2004/ 09/ 14/ business/ media/ 14studio. html)." New York Times, September 14, 2004 [23] " Capital Firms Agree to Buy SunGard Data in Cash Deal (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2005/ 03/ 29/ business/ 29sungard. html)." Bloomberg, March 29, 2005 [24] Samuelson, Robert J. " The Private Equity Boom (http:/ / www. washingtonpost. com/ wp-dyn/ content/ article/ 2007/ 03/ 14/ AR2007031402177. html)". The Washington Post, March 15, 2007. [25] Dow Jones Private Equity Analyst as referenced in U.S. private-equity funds break record (http:/ / www. boston. com/ business/ articles/ 2007/ 01/ 11/ us_private_equity_funds_break_record/ ) Associated Press, January 11, 2007. [26] Dow Jones Private Equity Analyst as referenced in Private equity fund raising up in 2007: report (http:/ / www. reuters. com/ article/ idUSBNG14655120080108), Reuters, January 8, 2008. [27] SORKIN, ANDREW ROSS. " HCA Buyout Highlights Era of Going Private (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2006/ 07/ 25/ business/ 25buyout. html)." New York Times, July 25, 2006. [28] WERDIGIER, JULIA. " Equity Firm Wins Bidding for a Retailer, Alliance Boots (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 04/ 25/ business/ worldbusiness/ 25boots. html)." New York Times, April 25, 2007 [29] Lonkevich, Dan and Klump, Edward. KKR, Texas Pacific Will Acquire TXU for $45 Billion (http:/ / www. bloomberg. com/ apps/ news?pid=20601087& sid=ardubKH_t2ic& refer=home) Bloomberg, February 26, 2007. [30] SORKIN, ANDREW ROSS and de la MERCED, MICHAEL J. " Private Equity Investors Hint at Cool Down (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 06/ 26/ business/ 26place. html)." New York Times, June 26, 2007 [31] SORKIN, ANDREW ROSS. " Sorting Through the Buyout Freezeout (http:/ / www. nytimes. com/ 2007/ 08/ 12/ business/ yourmoney/ 12deal. html)." New York Times, August 12, 2007. [32] [[Economist (http:/ / www. )].com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9566005 Turmoil in the markets] The Economist July 27, 2007 [33] Modigliani, Franco & Miller, Merton H. (1958), "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment" (http:/ / www. jstor. org/ pss/ 1809766), American Economic Review 48 (3): 261297, . [34] U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 548(2); Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 4. This is because the company usually gets no direct financial benefit from the transaction but incurs the debt for it nevertheless. [35] U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 546(e). [36] QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford, --- F.3d ---, Case No. 08-1176 (6th Cir. July 6, 2009). [37] See King of Capital, pp. 211-12.
License
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported http:/ / creativecommons. org/ licenses/ by-sa/ 3. 0/