Vertical Integration 1
Vertical Integration 1
Owning a portfolio of businesses comes with a cost – the costs associated with
running a bureaucracy. The benefits should outweigh the costs for corporate-level strategy
to make sense. The benefits typically come in the form of synergies. In the case of vertical
integration, the key benefit comes in the form of value chain economies.
Value Chain Economies: Value chain economies are those economies that are
created by integrating a market transaction into the boundaries of the firm. For example, a
firm that buys one of its suppliers may realize an economy by coordinating the production of
the supply with the needs of the parent firm.
For example, Leprino Foods as the focal firm, point out that backward integration is
going back in the value chain (Leprino Foods buying a dairy producer), while forward
integration is moving forward in the value chain (Leprino Foods getting into the business of
food distribution). At present, Leprino Foods buys milk from dairy companies, makes
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cheese in its facilities, and sells the cheese to large food distributors such as Sysco and
Gordon Foods, who sell to pizza chains such as Pizza Hut and Domino’s. Does it make
sense for Leprino Foods to expand by owing dairy companies or by getting into food
distribution? Leprino Foods has to look at two metrics in making the decision: cost
reduction and revenue enhancement. Synergies may help in cost containment and the ability
to capture above normal profits helps on the income side.
(“Amazon your industry: Extracting value from the value chain,” Strategy & Business, First
Quarter 2000)
Once the overall value maximization logic of vertical integration is discussed, the
focus can shift to specifics. Vertical integration can create value – decrease costs or increase
revenues – in three situations:
Opportunism is when a firm is unfairly exploited in an exchange. In other words, one of the
two firms in an exchange holds up the other to the financial benefit of the first firm. The
hold up can occur with regard to price, delivery terms, quality, etc. For the firm that is being
held up, the exchange creates an economic loss. To avoid this, the firm can vertically
integrate. By bringing the activity in-house, the firm controls it and therefore removes the
possibility of opportunistic behavior causing economic losses. The decision to vertically
integrate, though, has to be made by comparing the costs of vertical integration with its
benefits. If the cost of opportunism is less than the cost of vertical integration, then the
decision should be to continue with market exchange.
A transaction-specific investment is any investment in an exchange that has
significantly more value in the current exchange than it does in alternative exchanges. The
example of the oil refinery in the book is a good one to use because it describes a
transaction-specific investment in visual form and examines its effect on value in numerical
form. Once this example is gone through, the instructor can use a second example (given
below) to reinforce the concept.
If the pipeline laying company is the focal firm in the discussion, look at the issue
from its perspective. It costs money to lay the pipeline but it brings value ($750,000) to the
firm. But the value comes with a catch. The full value ($750,000) is only realized in the
specific context of serving the oil refinery. Because of location issues, the value is
diminished considerably (to around $10,000) if the context is changed. If the two firms agree
on a 5-year contract on terms favorable to the oil pipeline company, then the transaction-
specific investment makes strategic sense for the focal firm. But what happens after the
initial contract runs out? That’s when opportunism (or its possibility) comes into play! In
negotiating the second contract, who has the advantage? Obviously it is the oil refinery.
They can bring down the price of the exchange so that they can profit. But the focal firm
stands to lose because of this opportunism. It is likely, then, that the focal firm will not be
motivated to make this investment in the first place. Vertical integration is the recourse for
the oil refinery because it takes care of the opportunism problem.
Birds Eye, the U.S. frozen foods maker, wanted to expand to the U.K. in the
1950s, attracted by the large market and the absence of a frozen food
industry. One of the first products they sought to introduce in the U.K. was
frozen vegetables. They contracted with farmers to grow vegetables for
them. Their U.S. experience had taught them of the need to process the
vegetables within 90 minutes of harvest. Processing vegetables after 90
minutes typically resulted in the product lacking freshness. Because the
farmlands were on the outskirts of London, there were no processing plants
in existence within the 90 minutes radius. Birds Eye contacted a number of
processors and asked them to invest in a facility near the farmlands. Birds
Eye could not find a single taker. Why would this happen? Investing near
the farmlands is a transaction-specific investment. Its value would be great
only in the context of serving Birds Eye and nobody else. Why would a
processor make such a transaction-specific investment when the possibility
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(Birds Eye and the U.K. Frozen Food Industry, Harvard Business School
Case)
► Example
/ Important Point: What if the two motivations for vertical integration provide
contrasting results? In other words, what if the opportunism argument points to vertical
integration while the capabilities argument point to a market exchange?
In its 2004 Annual Report, Hershey Foods indicated that Wal-Mart accounted for 22
percent of total sales in the year 2003. Wal-Mart was responsible for 16 percent of Procter
and Gamble’s 2004 revenues. It is very likely that similar percentages can be found for many
of Wal-Mart’s leading suppliers. Wal-Mart clearly has tremendous bargaining power over
these companies. Many of these companies have well-staffed offices in Bentonville,
Arkansas, where Wal-Mart’s corporate headquarters is located. These are transaction-
specific investments made by these companies to serve one customer, Wal-Mart. The
opportunism minimization logic would indicate that these firms should forward integrate
into retailing to reduce the possibility of losses due to Wal-Mart’s opportunistic behavior.
But, do these firms have the resources to obtain a competitive advantage in retailing? Not
likely. So, forward integration into retailing does not make sense from a capabilities
viewpoint.
Flexibility pertains to the cost (and time) of changing the strategic and operational decisions
of an organization. A flexible organization can change its strategic/operational choices
quickly. In other words, such an organization can pivot on a dime! Less flexible
organizations find this change difficult and costly. In general, vertical integration reduces a
firm’s flexibility. Why? A vertically integrated organization has expanded its bureaucracy to
include multiple activities. It has changed its structure, control system, and compensation
practices to reflect this increased bureaucracy. Changing these take time.
Flexibility is not always a virtue. It is important to be flexible when the future is
uncertain. In such situations, alternatives to vertical integration, particularly strategic
alliances, may be better options.
Intel, the chip maker, has a venture capital arm called Intel Capital. Its
mission is to identify and invest in promising technology companies
worldwide. Founded in 1991, Intel Capital has invested more than $4 billion
in approximately 1,000 companies in over 30 countries. These investments
help Intel in two ways: it allows Intel to profit when these companies go
public or are acquired by other companies. More importantly, though, these
investments give Intel a first right of refusal on new technologies without the
company having to vertically integrate into any of these when their future is
uncertain.
because its technology may quickly become obsolete. Outsourcing this function reduces the
uncertainty for firms.
Rarity in vertical integration may be because of one of two things: a firm is rare in being
able to operate its vertically integrated units very efficiently. Or, it could the one firm in the
industry that is not vertically integrated while all others are.
A firm may be able to create value (more than others in the industry) through vertical
integration because of three reasons:
In the first case, the firm has developed a special technology or a new approach to
doing business, while others in the industry have not. Because this special
technology/approach to doing business requires transaction-specific investment, the firm is
vertically integrated, while others in the industry are non-integrated.
In the second case, the firm has a valuable capability that allows it to benefit from
vertical integration. Others do not have this capability and hence are not vertically integrated.
In the third reason, the firm has the ability to resolve the uncertainty that all firms in
the industry face. While others may be non-integrated because of this uncertainty, the focal
firm may be vertically integrated.
In all the cases above, the focal firm decides to vertically integrate while others in the
industry do not. But, there may also be a case where others are vertically integrated while
the focal firm benefits from being de-integrated. It creates value for itself by being able to
manage these market economic exchanges efficiently.
The ability to create value through vertical integration (or by de-integration) may not be rare
for too long if it can be imitated. Imitation can be through direct duplication or through
substitution.
Direct duplication of a firm’s vertical integration involves two things: copying the
form and copying the value creation potential. While copying the form may not be costly,
copying the value creation potential may be costly because of factors such as historical
uniqueness, causal ambiguity, and social complexity. Imitation may also be difficult if there
are not very many firms to acquire in order to vertically integrate (the small numbers
problem) or where entry barriers are quite high.
An imitator may choose not to directly duplicate the value creation potential of
another firm’s vertical integration strategy. Instead, it may choose substitute modes that give
it the same benefit. Internal development and strategic alliances are two important substitute
modes.
As vertical integration strategies typically require that one business be integrated with an
existing business (in the case of acquisition). Such integration presents some potentially
challenging management issues. These issues revolve around aligning the interests of
managers, new and existing, with the interests of the newly combined firm.
Once in implementing a vertical integration strategy is established, the discussion
should turn to management control processes. Two key ones need to be addressed here:
budgets
management committees
Budgets help in the control process by identifying the metrics by which performance
is to be measured. A vertically integrated firm may develop budgets in a variety of areas:
sales, costs, etc. Typically budgets are tied into the compensation process, in that managers
may receive bonuses depending on how close they are to their budget. While budgets help
in the control process, they may have serious downsides. Primary among them is the fact
that budgets are likely to promote short-term behavior (controlling expenses today to meet
budget but not preparing for the future) at the cost of long-term actions. Involving
managers in the budgeting process and using qualitative measures in addition to quantitative
ones can help in this regard.
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Internal management committees that meet periodically also help in the control
process. Two common ones (though they may go by different names in organizations) are:
The difference between the two types of committees is essentially in their focus:
the executive committee tends to focus on short-term firm performance while the
operations committee has a long-term view of firm performance. Both committees are
staffed by the CEO and key functional area managers. They meet regularly (typically,
weekly for the executive committee and monthly for the operations committee) to
identify problems and come up with solutions. Such committees also help in reducing
the conflicts among departments.
Compensation is the third piece of the “Organizing” puzzle. As such it complements both
structure and control systems and helps guide behavior toward desired ends. The three
explanations for vertical integration (opportunism, capabilities, and flexibility) have
important compensation implications. The instructor should structure this discussion
around this idea.
Very often employees make firm-specific investments of their own. They expend
energy cultivating skills valuable to the organization, imbibe the organizational culture and
establish contacts within and outside the firm. Such investments are valuable only in the
context of the firm, in that, once the employee leaves the firm, much of the investment
declines in value. Employees know that if they make such firm-specific investments, they are
vulnerable because the firm can treat them badly without worrying that the employee will
seek employment elsewhere. So how should an organization encourage its employees to
invest in firm-specific skills in light of this possibility? They should do it by providing
incentives as part of their compensation.
While the previous paragraph talked about providing incentives for individuals to
invest in firm-specific skills, there is also the fact that groups of employees make firm-
specific investments. Very often, it is the tacit collective knowledge of these groups of
employees that give the firm valuable costly-to-imitate capabilities. The firm’s compensation
policy must encourage such collective firm-specific investment.
Compensation practices must also take into account the importance of flexibility.
Employees must be encouraged to engage in activities that allow the firm to be flexible in
order to take advantage of opportunities.