HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY, ET AL V.

ROY DEL ROSARIO, GR 124320, MARCH 2, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132
with an area of 96,235 square meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.On
March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a
portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden
Bay Realty and Development Corporation (―Golden Bay‖) under Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. (―TCT‖) 225254 and 225255. With the discovery of what happened to subject parcels of
land, petitioners filed a complaint for ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT
NO. 493363,493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative
Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARYINJUNCTION and/or
RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the
Regional Trial Court inImus, Cavite. Upon learning that ―Golden Bay‖ sold portions of the
parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with the ―RTC‖ an Amended
Complaint toimplead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to be
annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the Amended Complaint.Petitioners moved
for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was
granted by the RTC in an Order dated July 7, 1995, which further allowed the herein
petitioners to file a Second Amended Complaint, which they promptly did. On August 12,
1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that
they have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from
that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs‘ claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to
Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, holding
that petitioners ―have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the
allegations that they arethe legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays -that they have
been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Petitioners interposed a Motion for
Reconsideration but to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC in its Order of February
23, 1996. Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent
court‘s Orders under attack. Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determinedbefore
trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners‘ submission that the respondent court should
have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously resolved the issue of heirship in the same
case. The petition is not impressed with merit.

MONTAÑER V. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, GR NO. 174975, JAN. 20, 2009

FACTS: Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at
the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners
herein are their three children.

Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the
judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court. They claim to be the first
family of Alejandro.
Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss becasue Discangcopan failed to
pay the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners point to Disangcopan’s petition which
contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that
what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for “Complaint” for the judicial
partition of properties.

HELD: Yes, only because the petitioner children failed to present the clerk of court’s
assessment. Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the
case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiencyassessment lies with
the same clerk of court. In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically
lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment
of the docket fees. As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer
charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with
law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient
assessment. However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.

In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the
docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no
determination of whether Disangcopan correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of
court’s assessment.

REPUBLIC V. CA, G.R. NO. 163604, MAY 6, 2005(458 SCRA 200)

Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY
LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall
be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a
summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised
Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a
summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s order
sufficed. On the alleged procedural flaw in petitioner’s petition before the appellate court.
Petitioner’s failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial
court’s order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of
Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the appellate court
should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.

LUY LIM V. CA, GR. NO. 124715, JANUARY 24, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is
the subject of probate proceedings in special proceedings Q-95-23334 entitled, “In re:
Intestate Estate Of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, petitioner.”
Private respondents auto truck corporation, alliance marketing corporation, speed
distributing inc, active distributing inc, and action company are corporations formed,
organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered
under the Torrens system. On June 11, 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as
surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew, George Luy filed on March 17, 1995,
a joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Private respondents corporations whose properties were included in
the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of his pendens
an motion for exclusion of certain properties fromthe estate of the decedent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity is applicable to be
able to include in the probate proceedings the company formed by deceased Pastor Y.
Lim.

HELD: No. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the
persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its
stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and
separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction
and convenience is an entity shielded by protective mantle and imbued with by law with a
character alien to the persons comprising it. Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the
court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate
one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a
corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of
fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified
thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of the legal entity should come to naught.
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction is as follows: 1.) Control, not merely the majority or complete stock control,
but complete domination, not only of finances but of policy and business practice in
respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at
the time so separate mind, will or existence of its own; 2.) Such control must have been used
by the defendant to commit fraud on wrong to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or
other positive legal duty, on dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right;
and 3.) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust
loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent “piercing the corporate
veil.”
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate personalities. Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrong doing must be clearly and convincingly established, it cannot be
presumed.

ESTATE OF ISMAEL REYES V. REYES, GR 139857, NOVEMBER 22, 2000

FACTS: June 17, 1958 – probate court order approving the project of partition by the:
Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of said assets which pertains to her
share in the conjugal partnership;
 Beatriz, 1/16;
 Antonio, Jr., 1/16;
 Enrique, 1/16; and
 Jose, 1/16.
- Among the real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land covered by
and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 located in Antipolo, Rizal:
o Area: stated as 83,781 square meters,
o Assessed value of P6,430.00.
o NOTE: This statement of said area was repeated in said document four time, that is, in
adjudicating the corresponding portions of said land to:
 Pilar (12/15),
 Antonio, Jr. (1/15),
 Enrique (1/15), and
 Jose (1/15).
 The petitioner did not have a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she
relinquished her right thereto "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate
property."
January 29, 1973 - the respondent administratrix/spouse and the other three
distributes/sons filed a motion to reopen Special Proceedings No. Q-325 for the purpose of
correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 since, according to them, the correct land area is
803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781 square meters.
The heirs of Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes filed their opposition to said motion.
March 26, 1973 - The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City issued an
order in Special Proceedings Q-325, entitled "Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui,
Sr.", approved the motion.
September 19, 1977 - Court of Appeals affirmed the CFI order after appeal by the
petitioner
Petitioner’s Contention:
According to the petitioner, there was no such clerical error.
While it is not disputed that the area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 is
803,781.15 square meters, the petitioner insists that "the area intended by the heirs of Don
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., in the Project of Partition as approved by the trial court is the
area of 83,781 sq. m. and not 803,781,51 sq. m.
She claims that she would not have relinquished her share in said parcel of land if the true
area was not fraudulently concealed from her at the time the project of partition was
executed. She further contends that the fact that the description of the area as 83,781
square meters was repeated several times is sufficient evidence to show that such was the
area intended in the project of partition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot area indicated in the Project of Partition as approved by
the trial court is a clerical error

RULING: Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. There is, therefore, no reason to
disturb, much less to reverse, the factual finding of the lower court that a typographical or
clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the project of partition.
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and
intended to settle the entire estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be
absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof
undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the
community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or
segregation of shares.
It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be
a full and complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily
including the entire area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus
as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to
make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that
they did not make any further disposition of the remaining balance of 720,000 square
meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the distribution of
the difference of 720,000 square meters?
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or
mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or
supplied even after the judgment has been entered.
The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or
correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. The
court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the
pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as
expressed in the body of the decision.

- Alejandrino v. CA, GR 114151, September 17, 1998

- Pascual v. CA, GR 120575, December 16, 1998

- BORROMEO V. BORROMEO, GR L-41171, JULY 23, 1987

SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS, GR NO. 133743, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. He
contracted three marriages. His first was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, but Virginia died on 1963. On May 1, 1968, He married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son. But on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce at State of Hawaii which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody of December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, He married
Felicidad Sagalongos. He had no children but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate, filing a letter of
administration before RTC Makati. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Further claimed that Felicidad has
no legal personality to file the petition because she only a mistress of his father because at
the time of death, he was still married to his second wife. Felicidad presented the evidence
that prove the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry lee had already been dissolved. And she
claimed that Felicisimo had the capacity to marry her by virtue of par. 2 Article 26 of the
family code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad my file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s state.
HELD: Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status that as a surviving wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner
under the Art. 144 of the Civil code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry the respondent in 1974, the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as he
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation.

GARCIA-QUIASON V. BELEN, GR 189121, JULY 31, 2013

FACTS: Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma.
Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by
the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

HELD: 1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where
the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which
it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
1. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of
interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right
as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the
estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview
of the law.

URIATE V. CFI, GR L-21938-39, MAY 29, 1970

FACTS: Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines.
Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition
for the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental. However, said petition was opposed by the nephews of Juan stating
that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested.
Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the basis of the
alleged will of the deceased.

Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating
that the court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case.
The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement In the CFI of
Negros. Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate
settlement in the CFI of Negros.

ISSUE: Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper.
Under the Rules on the settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings
enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement was filed
prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be
dismissed to give priority to the testate proceeding.
- Roberts v. Leonidas, GR L-55509, April 27, 1974
- Vda Rodriguez v. CA, GR L-39532, July 20, 1979

ARANAS V. MERCADO, GR. 156407, JANUARY 12, 2014

FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria
Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin
L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of
Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering
that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25
in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of
jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and
30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3
supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir
Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407
Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of
stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.

Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory. The
RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita
to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.
Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine
Teresita on the inventory.

The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the
administratrix's motion for approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do
the inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her
possession.

Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of
March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located
in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty,

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301
square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and
the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17,
1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned.

ISSUE: Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are
all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement
and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.

Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing
to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the
surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of
the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator,
has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance
of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. — Within
three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall
return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In
the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the
inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by
the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory
implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the
inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of
the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of
the executor or the administrator, and in malting a final and equitable distribution (partition)
of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC
that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v.
Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue
of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of
"positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons,
"the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere
with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been
a positive abuse of discretion." As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent
and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial
court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v.
Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is
that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included
in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for
a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement
and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.

The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important
purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article
1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she)
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir
"may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings,
and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions
and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as
an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent
by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title
to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory
of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate
court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to
exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long
as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as
part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.

JOSE LEE, ET AL V. RTC QUEZON CITY, GR 146006, FEBRUARY 23, 2004

- FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, Inc. on 1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned
ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
- · On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado
Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate
children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her
siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez). <3 Peaches <3
- · Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the
estate of their father which included 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, representing 50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
- · Juliana (wife) and Jose (legit child) sold 1,014 and 1,011 shares respectively to
FLAG.
- · The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate among themselves. This was the basis of the
number of shares separately sold by them.
- · The lower court declared the shares of stock as null and void. CA affirmed.
- · Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the authorized
capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance company. Enderes filed an action at the SEC. The SEC
hearing officer dismissed the case acknowledging the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
- · Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary of Philinterlife ignored
the orders nullifying the sales of the shares of stock.

- ISSUE: WON the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void. (YES)

- RULING: YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that

- o (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir
pending final adjudication requires court approval and
- o (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the
probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
- · An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under NCC 533 which provides that possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final
adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall
have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
share in the estate, not any specific property therein. <3 Peaches <3
-
- · It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s authorized capital stock,
approved on the vote of petitioners’ non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to
make it difficult for Dr. Ortañez’s estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was
likewise void ab initio.

IN THE MATTER OF ESTATE OF DELGADO, GR 155733, JANUARY 27, 2006

FACTS: The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio
Campo. Josefa has five siblings. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence,
Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However,
before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
Josefa Delgado died without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had
any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, are merely ampun-ampunan.
However, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, Guillerma Rustia.
Respondents, nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate
of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. More than
a year after the death of Josefa, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption of
their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia.
Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr.,
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" This petition was opposed on the grounds that Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their
illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
Oppositors filed an appeal and the appellate court decided that 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in
accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as
the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in
accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee
Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her
appointment as administratrix of his estate. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a right of representation exists.

HELD: The court rules that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all
the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio
and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between
them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing
the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however,
court submits that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and
sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal
successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation.
The court notes, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil
Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised
by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or
their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have
a vested right to participate in the inheritance. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code.

- BAUTISTA V. BAUTISTA, GR. 160556, AUGUST 3, 2007

- Fernandez v. Dimagiba, GR L-23638, Oct. 12, 1967

NITTSCHER V. NITTSHER, GR. 160530, NOVEMBER 20, 2007

FACTS: Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed his petition for probate of his holographic will at
RTC of Makati on January 31, 1990 and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein
respondent Atty. Rogelio Nogales. On Sptember 19,1991, after hearing and with due notice
to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic
will. But on September 26,1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence Atty Nogales filed a petition for
letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. However, Dr.
Nittscher’s surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia Nittscher moved for the dismissal of
the said petition. But the court denied her motion to dismiss and granted the respondent’s
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and been granted by the court.

Where the Court contends that under Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court,
provides “when a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters
testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts
the trust and gives bond as required by these rules.” In the case at bar, petitioner Atty.
Rogelio Nogales has been named executor under Holographic Will of Dr. Werner Nittscher.
But the wife moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied for lack of merit.

And Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Then the
wife again appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as he RTC has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process. The appellate
court dismissed the appeal and the assailed order is affirmed in toto. Then the wife still filed
a motion for reconsideration for the said decision with the following grounds that his
husband, Dr. Nittscher has no property in the Philippines and also he is not a resident of the
Philippines and that Atty Nogales did not secure a certification against forum shopping
which was one of the requirement. And therefore she has all the rights to claim the
properties of his husband. But the respondent, Atty. Nogales pointed out that Dr. Nittscher
did reside and own real properties in Las Pinas, Metro Manila and the petition for the
issuance of letters of testamentary need not contain a certification against forum shopping
as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of the will.

ISSUE: 1.)Whether or not the appointment of Dr. Nittscher to Atty. Nogales as his executor of
his estate is valid.
2.)Whether or not the petitioner, Dr. Nittscher’s wife, was denied of due process in the
probate proceedings.

HELD: Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas,
Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent making him as his executor.

And as to the petitioner’s contention that she was denied of due process, the records show
that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his
previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings.
Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of
her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to
defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the
probate proceedings is without basis.

As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is
conclusive only as to its due execution. The authority of the probate court is limited to
ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the
properties forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary action
before the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

BONILLA V. ARANZA, GR L-38509, DECEMBER 7, 1982

FACTS: Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce
the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of
the Rules of Court;
2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after
death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it
was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and
colleges founded by the decedent;
3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise
it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved
by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as
required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that
“in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that ‘in the matter
of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the
material proof of authenticity of said wills.”
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo
B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will
could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the
alleged holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved
to forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE: W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means
of a photostatic copy.

HELD: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the
will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the
testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it
shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court,”

PALAGANAS V. PALAGANAS, GR 169144, JANUARY 26, 2011

FACTS: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless.
Inthe last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio,
as theexecutor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.Ernesto,
another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will
and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, Manueland
Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta , opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is
invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full
understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified
toact as administrator of the estate. Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign -based siblings,
Gloria and Sergio, were on separateoccasions in the Philippines for a short visit, Ernesto filed
a motion with the RTC for leave totake their deposition, which it granted. The RTC directed
the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will
may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippiines.The RTC issued an order: (a)
admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointingErnesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated inthe will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto. Manuel and Benjaminappealed to the CA arguing that
an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.cannot be probated for the
first time in the Philippines. The appellate court, in its decision,affirmed the order of the RTC,
holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will,
subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2,
Rule76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the
country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippinesalthough it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it
was executed?

RULING: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although thesame have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution. A foreignwill can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil
Code states that the willof an alien
who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with theformalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the
formalitiesobserved in his country.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the courtof
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for
thereprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will
alreadyprobated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the
will ispresented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter
rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local courtacknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate
court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DAL;AYON, GR. 139868, JUNE 8, 2006

FACTS: 2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter.
The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the
wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will
where he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company
which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal.
Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a
partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land
(Maryland).

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the
property is situated

RULING:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.
However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed
by her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose
succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be
found in the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are
governed by the national law of the testator.

ATCI OVERSEAS CORP., V.ETCHIN, GR. 178551, OCTOBER 11, 2010

FACTS: Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner,
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year
contract with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was terminated for
not passing the probationary period which was under the Memorandum of Agreement.
Ministry denied respondent‘s request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her
own fair. Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of
respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her $3,600.00, her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision and
denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court
Appeals contending that their principal being a foreign government agency is immune
from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them.
Appellate Court affirmed NLRC‘s decision. It noted that under the law, a private
employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract
of employment of an overseas worker; hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the
foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically
stipulates that respondent‘s employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait.

RULING: Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: “The obligations covenanted in
the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of
the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to
and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and
employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us.

- Guerrero v. Teran, GR L-4899, March 19, 1909

VANCIL V. BELMES, GR 132223, JUNE 19, 2001

FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased
son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for
removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural
mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. Trial court
rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached the
age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine who
between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.

RULING: Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his
guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s
decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove
Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like
her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero
vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the
jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA V. CA, GR 116835, MARCH 5, 1998

FACTS: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two
illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in DavaoCity. Upon
the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of CotabatoCity a petition
for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.
Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the
decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and
not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said
matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the
evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate
of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident
of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating
that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991
filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the
decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court
ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This
was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of
marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in
holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the
petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has
submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage
was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage
that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the
Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the
best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original
marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented.
Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.