Discovery Handout
Discovery Handout
All rights reserved. No part of this handout may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including
information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the copyright holder, except by a reviewer who may quote brief
passages in a review.
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The Contents
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Notice:
Warning of Copyright Protection: Any sample documents presented to you in this teleclass and are ALL copyright protected. Under no
circumstances can the copy in these documents be used or reproduced, in whole or in part, without the express written permission of Vicki
Voisin. The absence of a copyright notice on any given page or material should NOT be construed as an absence of copyright. These materials
and documents are provided for sample purposes only and only for your personal use. They are not to be distributed or used in any other learning
venues.
Legal Notice: This teleclass contains information gathered from many sources, as well as from the experiences of the author. It is produced for
general reference and not as a substitute for independent verification by users when circumstances warrant. It is presented with the understanding
that the author is not engaged in rendering any legal, accounting or psychological advice. In instances where the opinions or advice of legal,
financial, psychological or other professional advice are appropriate, such professional counsel should be sought. The author disclaims any
liability whatsoever for individuals use of any advice or information presented. Although the author has used care and diligence in the
preparation of this presentation, she assumes no responsibility for errors or omissions.
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1. What Is Discovery?
Discovery: the process whereby parties to litigation exchange information; used to elicit the basic facts of a case and
to clarify issues for trial; useful for determining the strengths and weaknesses of your case.
You must comply with discovery requests from opposing counsel unless you can demonstrate that the request
pertains to protected information.
The role of a paralegal in the discovery process can vary but a paralegal can be involved in most aspects so long as
the attorney supervises the paralegals work and takes responsibility for the final work product.
Ethics rules and opinions apply to discovery. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (available at
www.abanet.org) are referred to in this presentation.
2010 Vicki Voisin Inc and Christina L. Koch ACP
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Be sure you know your states ethics rules and opinions, as well as those of your professional association.
Rule 1.1 Competence A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.
Rule 1.3 Diligence A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
This would include performing the discovery necessary for representation.
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality Of Information A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph other provisions in this rule. Were going to
talk about what can be disclosed during discoveryand what should not.
Rule 3.2 Expediting Litigation A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent
with the interests of the client.
Rule 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And Counsel A lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another
partys access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act and in pretrial procedure,
make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request by an opposing party;
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness In Statements To Others In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or fail to disclose a material fact to a third
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6, which, if you remember, refers to confidentiality of information.
Rule 5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants With respect to a nonlawyer employed or
retained by or associated with a lawyer, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; this would include supervising the work of the
nonlawyers and reviewing the work product before it leaves the office.
Rule 8.4 Misconduct It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
Note: The above is a summary of each rule as it applies to discovery. Please go to www.abanet.org to review each
rule in its entirety.
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U.S. District Court: check the web site of the Court in which you are practicing
State, circuit court or administrative law jurisdictions: usually publish discovery rules on the Internet.
Check search engines such as Google or Lycos.
You should also check the applicable Rules of Evidence. For instance, the Federal Rules of Evidence:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre
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2. Is it Discoverable? Is it Privileged?
The following are discoverable:
The identity and location of fact witnesses or any fact relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit;
The identity and opinions of an expert witness who may be used at trial.
The identity and location of individuals likely to have discoverable information to disputed facts alleged in
the pleadings;
The facts that lead to a contention or belief that other persons or things caused or contributed to the incident
in question;
Any insurance agreements relevant to a pending action (included in the Initial Disclosures);
Income tax returns (discoverable but subject to protection);
Photographs;
Contention interrogatories (i.e., With regard to your contention that you were bit by Defendants dog,
please state every fact that supports your allegation. . .);
Similar incidents and complaints in products liability cases;
Trade secrets
Net worth is discoverable as to damages claimed;
Post-accident investigations, which are not privileged, if there is a substantial need and the investigation is
not available through other avenues;
Portions of the Experts File (again, we will discuss the new rule later);
Party Opinions;
Statements;
Medical Records;
Documents used to refresh recollection at a deposition;
Surveillance Materials; and
Attorney billing records (if relevant to a controlling issue).
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the identity of the parties from whom the facts were obtained, or the fact that the
work-product document exists.
The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence. To claim an attorney/client privilege, the following criteria
must be met:
2010 Vicki Voisin Inc and Christina L. Koch ACP
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The party for whom the privilege is invoked either is a client or seeks to become a client;
The attorney or a representative is engaged in the relationship for the purpose of rendering legal services to
the client;
The information is confidential and not intended to be disclosed to third parties for the purpose of obtaining
either an opinion on legal services or assistance in a legal proceeding.
The privilege has not been waived by the client.
The privilege protects only the confidential information, not the disclosure of underlying facts by those who
communicated with the attorney. It is the process rather than the factual content that is protected.
The privilege can be waived if the information is communicated directly to a third party, communicated in the
presence of a third party, or otherwise disclosed voluntarily.
Self-Analysis Privilege. A partys right to protect an analysis critical of the partys conduct.
The information must result from an internal review of the partys procedures or products conducted for the
purpose of evaluation or improvement;
Persons contributing to the evaluation intended their input to be kept confidential and not subject to public
dissemination; and
The information contained in the evaluation is the type that would be curtailed if subject to discovery.
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3. Scheduling Orders
Scheduling Orders: Set the major deadlines in the case and set the extent of discovery permitted, deadlines for
expert witness disclosures, motions, and additional parties or pleadings.
Federal Court:
Discovery normally closes no later than thirty-five days prior to the scheduled trial date.
Parties work together on a Joint Proposed Scheduling Conference Order; includes
jurisdiction,
timing of disclosures,
and any other items the parties feel are appropriate to be addressed by the Court.
State court scheduling orders may vary from state to state; parties can stipulate to extend the deadlines; if
no stipulation, file an Amended Scheduling Order
Pay close attention to the expert deadlines and what is required under those deadlines.
The proposed Scheduling Order is very important in planning your case, not just in terms of strategy, but
also in terms of knowing when you have to have certain information and for prioritizing tasks.
Calendaring the dates in the Scheduling Order requires a high degree of competency and accuracy.
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Complaint
What do the facts you have already uncovered determine? Regarding the facts you still need to uncover,
what is the best way to find those facts?
Do you need a protection letter to avoid the other side from disposing of evidence?
Do you need specialized discovery (discovery that is beyond your standard form requests)
What about cell phones, pagers, or the little black box in planes or trucks?
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Federal Court Scheduling Orders differ from State Court Scheduling Orders.
Federal Court requires the parties meet and confer about discovery and case progression as soon as
feasible, but not later than 21 days prior to the Scheduling Conference or the date a Scheduling Order is due
under Rule 16(b).
Parties joined or served after the Rule 26(f) Conference must file Initial Disclosures within 30 days of
being served or joined, unless given a different timeline by the Court.
It is a good practice to schedule your Rule 26(f) Conference as soon as possible, closely followed by your
Initial Disclosures, which are due within 14 days of the Rule 26(f) Conference.
No other discovery is allowed until after the parties confer, develop and submit a proposed discovery plan
to the court in advance of the scheduling conference
Parties review the Rule 26(f) form to choose deadlines; issues such as e-discovery, discovery deadlines
and limits in discovery, and preservation of evidence should be discussed.
Report of Rule 26(f) Planning Conference must be filed with the Court within 14 days of the conference.
Initial Disclosures must include certain information as required under Rule 26(A) (1) (a):
name, address and phone number of any person likely to have discoverable information and the subject of
that information used to support its case (unless used solely for impeachment);
copies of all documents (including e-discovery) disclosing party has in its possession to support its case
(unless used solely for impeachment);
computation of damages claimed by disclosing party, including supporting documentation on the nature
and extent of injuries; and
copy of any insurance agreements which a party may be able to use to satisfy any judgment or which could
be used to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy any judgment.
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The Court issues a Scheduling Order after receiving the parties Report of Parties Rule 26(f) Scheduling
Conference or after consulting with the parties attorneys and any unrepresented parties at a scheduling conference
(usually held by phone).
Generally completed within 120 days after the defendant has been served or within 90 days after a
defendant has filed his appearance or Answer.
May mimic the deadlines set forth in the Report of Rule 26(f) Scheduling Conference, or it may alter
deadlines.
Once Initial Disclosures are filed, additional discovery may be commenced, customarily beginning with written
discovery.
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6. Written Discovery
Main types of written discovery:
Interrogatories
Requests for Production
Requests for Admission
Subpoenas Duces Tecum
Interrogatories: written questions to the opposing party, designed to elicit the basic facts of the case.
Additional Interrogatories may be authorized by leave of Court under Rule 26(b) (2); requires filing of a
Motion to Expand Discovery.
Interrogatories must be answered in writing under oath within thirty (30) days. May request additional time
from the serving party; verify extensions in writing, either with a confirmation letter or an e-mail.
Interrogatories may be objected to; all objections are waived if not asserted within thirty (30) days.
Generally, stipulations for extensions will not extend the time in which to object to discovery.
Check your rules to verify who signs the answers and the objections. An example of a standard set of
Interrogatories is included in your handout. It is best to start with a basic form and then customize it to fit
your case.
compare initial pleadings to determine what facts are stipulated and what facts will be disputed;
probe into work product doctrine or information covered by the attorney/client privilege.
Note: if documents are withheld due to privilege, include the document and the reason for withholding it on
the Privilege Log.
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Requests for Production of Documents: written requests that the opposing party produce copies of documents.
Covered by Rule 34
No limit
Requests for Admissions: generally used to stipulate to the genuineness of a document or to set forth facts not in
dispute.
Failure to respond or object to a request within 30 days after its served results in the matter being deemed
admitted
Each request should be separate; responses generally short and simple: admit, deny, or state in detail why
you cant truthfully admit or deny.
Objection to a Request for Admission must state reasonable grounds for objecting
An admission under this rule is only good for the case in which it is issued.
when discovery has been served and opposing party fails to respond within the 30-day response
period
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Inspections. Covered by Rule 34 and refers to either inspections of land or products, or inspection of a persons
mental or physical conditions. Be sure to consider:
If it is a products case and you need an inspection, will the inspection destroy evidence?
Nonparties may be compelled to submit to an inspection through the use of a subpoena as provided in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 [Rule 34(c)]
The responding party must either respond or object to a Request for Inspection, in writing, within thirty
days of service of the request.
If medical causation or damages are issues, that will be enough to support an independent medical
examination (IME) or defense medical examination (DME).
The person subjected to the mental or physical examination is entitled to a copy of the report,
upon request.
Subpoena Duces Tecum is generally used to gather documentation and can be used in conjunction with a
deposition or by itself;
o
Should be directed to a specific person, designating what is requested of that person, including the
production of any documents.
Note: some jurisdictions issue subpoenas through Court Reporters and others are issued by the Court. Be
sure to check your local rules so you know
o
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Is there a limit to the subpoena power of the court? Example: mileage restriction
If documents are requested, how does your jurisdiction handle copying expenses?
Indicate that production of the documents will alleviate the necessity of an appearance.
before the earlier of the time specified for compliance or 14 days after the subpoena is served
serving party may move the issuing court for an order compelling production or inspection.
requires a person who is neither a party nor a party's officer to travel more than 100 miles from
where that person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person (with the
exception that a person can be commanded to attend a trial by traveling from any such place
within the state where the trial is held);
attempts to require a witness to incur substantial expense to travel more than 100 miles to attend
trial.
persons withholding subpoenaed information under a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as
trial-preparation material must make the claim of privilege and describe the nature of the documents.
if information produced in response to a subpoena is subject to a claim of privilege or protection as trialpreparation material, the person making the claim may notify the party that received the information of the
claim and the basis for it.
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After notification, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information
and any copies and cannot use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved.
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7. Depositions
Depositions: to elicit basic facts for discovery purposes and to preserve testimony for trial. Most common are:
expert depositions,
Rule 27 allows a deposition to be taken to perpetuate testimony. This can only be done by permission of the
court; used when a witness may be able to give material testimony but may be unable to attend a trial or hearing.
The petition must show five things.
1.
Petitioner must expect to be a party in a case but not presently be able to bring the suit.
2.
Must show the subject matter of the expected action and what interest the petitioner has in the action.
3.
The facts the petitioner believes will be established in the deposition and the reason it is important to
perpetuate it.
4.
The names or a description of the persons expected to be adverse in the filed case, and
5.
Oral Depositions: Rule 30 covers oral depositions, with or without leave of court. There are restrictions in federal
court:
No more than ten depositions are allowed by each side and each deposition is limited to one day of seven
hours.
Check local rules to determine if any additional restrictions are in place. If you are in state or circuit court,
check jurisdictional rules regarding the taking of depositions.
Give appropriate notice of the deposition; some jurisdictions require three days notice, while others require
fourteen days notice.
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Will probably schedule the deposition; requires a number of phone calls, coordination of multiple schedules
and planning.
o
Allow time for attorney to prepare for the deposition; amount may differ for the client as opposed
to the witness;
Set a reminder to pull the file and organize it for the attorney a few days prior to the deposition.
Should state the name of the deponent, the time and place of the deposition, method of
recording the deposition (i.e., transcription or videotaping), and any documents to be
brought to the deposition.
Send a copy of the Notice of Deposition to all adverse counsel, the witness, and the court
reporter.
Note: expert depositions are similar but may require additional preparation, depending on
how much of the experts file is discoverable under the local rules.
CAUTION: Significant changes to the federal rule regarding experts take effect in December 2010:
Draft expert reports and communications between attorneys and their experts will be deemed work
product.
2.
Still exempts a party intending to offer testimony from a non-testifying expert from producing a
report but that party must submit a disclosure with the subject matter on which the witness is
expected to present evidence and a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is
expected to testify.
3.
Will require the expert report to identify facts that the expert considered in forming the opinions.
The expert's qualifications must include a list of all publications going back ten years, the
compensation being paid and a list of all cases where the expert testified at trial or deposition
going back four years.
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Notice of Deposition should name the corporation or other entity you wish to gain information of, but must
state with reasonable particularity the matters for which the deponent will be requested to provide
information.
Notice of Deposition must advise the corporation of their responsibility to make a designation for the
deposition.
Docket for sufficient time to check back with the corporation or its attorney to find out who they wish to
designate. The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the
organization.
Deposition by Written Questions. Covered by Rule 31; allows you to serve written questions on a non-party in lieu
of an actual deposition. A Notice of Deposition Upon Written Questions
must be served on every other party with notice of the questions to be asked of the non-party, as well as the
name and address of the non-party to be deposed;
within 30 days of the notice and written questions are served, other parties may serve cross-questions on all
other parties;
within 10 days after being served with the cross-questions, a party may serve redirect questions upon all
other parties;
within 10 days of those questions, a party may serve re-cross questions on other parties.
after all questions have been submitted, the party requesting the Deposition by Written Questions should
serve the Deposition by Written Questions on the party to be questioned. A Court Reporter can be used to
present the questions to the deponent on the date of the deposition and attest that the answers are properly
sworn.
o
useful to establish authenticity of medical, employment or business records; be sure to depose the
custodian of records.
Limitations on where depositions can be taken, and how far a witness can be compelled to travel.
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Spoliation of Evidence.
Parties have a duty to preserve evidence and if they fail to do so, sanctions can be assessed.
Send a protection letter as soon as you get the case; especially important in products liability cases.
Try to preserve the evidence yourself by gaining access to the product through an inspection with your
expert and opposing counsels expert.
Different courts handle spoliation issues in a variety of ways. The most common is to treat it as an abuse of
the discovery process and issue sanctions pursuant to Rule 37
Freedom of Information Act Request (FOIA). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is a federal act that
allows the public access to all records of federal agencies under the control of the executive branch, unless the
records fall under an exemption to the Act.
There are 9 exemptions; if the requested information falls within one of those exemptions, the agency will
weigh the risk of foreseeable harm against the disclosure and determine whether or not to claim the
exemption.
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8. Experts
Experts how to deal with them
a detailed listing of the materials you are asking the expert to review.
Order the Curriculum Vitae or resume of your expert to be the expert will meet any Daubert challenges.
consulting experts are retained to give an opinion in anticipation of litigation, but are not expected
to testify.
In federal court, disclose not only the identity of the expert and the report, but also the
experts qualifications, experience testifying, list of publications, fees and opinions, any
materials the expert has reviewed or relied upon in forming his or her opinions.
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9. Electronic Discovery
Electronic Discovery refers to any process in which electronic data is sought, located, secured, and searched with
the intent of using it as evidence in a civil or criminal legal case.
Data collection
Key custodians
Contact Information
Procedural Guidelines
Data of all types can serve as evidenceincluding email (and its attachments), text, images, calendar files,
databases, spreadsheets, audio files, animation, web sites and computer programs.
Rule 26. At Rule 26(b)(2) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information says that a
party doesnt have to provide discovery of ESI from sources that the party identifies as not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.
Rule 34(b)(2) covers the production of electronically stored information in that a party must
produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or organize and label them to
correspond to the categories in the request. See Easley, McCaleb & Assocs., Inc. v Perry, No. E2663 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 13, 1994); Santiago v Mils, 121 F.R.D., 636, 640 (W.D.N.Y. 1988);
Gates Rubber Co., v Bando Chemical Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 112 (D. Colo. 1996); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v Teamsters Local 2000 et al, 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2460, (USDC Minn. 1999).
ESI requires that lawyers and paralegals have more technical expertise than in the pastand they have to
develop an adequate understanding of the clients data system. See Qualcomm v Broadcom, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 911 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7 2008
Native File Formats which are identified by the three character extension (i.e. .doc, .docx, .pst); examples
of vendors = fiosinc.com, and lexbe.com.
If claiming the privilege, you are required to disclose that the information exists but is not being turned
over due to some privilege; prepare a privilege log
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demand is hereby made that it shall be immediately returned if the document appears on its face to have
been inadvertently produced.
Email must be produced with attachments; attachments must be in a reasonably usable form, meaning
searchable data cant be produced in an unsearchable format.
Courts have held that documents must be produced with metadata intact.
Spoliation of evidence: consider sending a notice not to destroy, conceal or alter any paper or electronic
files.
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Know the Supreme Court Rule in your jurisdiction regarding the numbering of exhibits and begin this
process with the first deposition.
Consolidate similar areas, such as Research and Attorney Notes; make one file and include
both on the label.
Put all the pleadings and court papers together and in chronological order.
If you are utilizing your computer system, rearrange subfiles so they are grouped under general
headings matching the physical file.
In extremely large files, you may also need to index materials within the individual subfiles.
Use what is already available to you: telephone, fax, computers, copiers, file servers, scanners, laptops and
PDAs.
Use of technology in document control is crucial in maintaining deadlines and statutes of limitations.
The Internet is also a good resource; there are numerous websites you can use to find the information you
will use every day as a Paralegal.
Utilize list serves (those your firm subscribes to or those offered by local and national professional
associations
Whether or not you index all depositions and discovery will depend on the case, the status of the litigation,
and the complexity of the case.
Remember: summarizing means the end work product must be summarized; do not reiterate everything in
the document being summarized.
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The Conclusion
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DISCOVERYTOOLBOXINDEX
Tools
DiscoveryDeadlineCheatSheet
DiscoveryMotionsHandout
SampleInitialDiscoveryPlan Checklist
WrittenDiscoveryTools
SampleInitialDisclosures
SampleofInitialWrittenDiscoveryRequests(WC)
StateListingofEDiscoveryGuidelines
SampleEDiscoveryRequests
SampleofDiscoveryResponsesSummation
SampleofDiscoveryComplianceLetterPRIOR toMotionto
Compel
DepositionTools
ChecklistforPreparingaNoticeofDeposition
SampleMotionforAppointmentofInterpreter
SampleCorporateNoticeofDeposition30(b)(6)
SampleFederal30(b)(6)NOD.Corporate KROLLONTRACK
SampleFactWitnessNoticeofDeposition
SampleVideoNoticeofDeposition
SampleofDepositionbyWrittenQuestions
SampleDepositionSummation
FederalSchedulingProcessTools
SampleSchedulingConferencePacket
SampleReportofPartiesRule26(f)PlanningConference
SampleOrderforSchedulingConference
5
8
10
12
21
31
41
50
52
54
56
59
63
66
68
70
76
87
95
101
Subpoenas
SampleofMedicalRecordsSubpoena
EvidenceGatheringTools FOIA
U.S.DepartmentofJusticeFreedomofInformationAct
PrincipleContactsList(creditforthispublicationisincludedon
theform)
TipsfromTheNationalSecurityArchiveregardingFOIA
Requests
SampleFOIARequest
SampleFOIAAppealLetter
ProtectionandSpoliationTools
SpoliationRulesListfromAll50States(creditforthis
publicationisincludedontheform)
SampleofSpoliationProtectionLetter
SampleofSpoliationProtectionLetter WalMart
SampleofSpoliationProtectionLetter TruckingCases
SampleofSpoliationMotionforRelief
SampleofBriefinSupportofSpoliationMotion
Confidentiality/NonDisclosureTools
SampleConfidentialityandNondisclosureAgreement
LogsandOtherDiscoveryTools
SampleExhibitList(tokeeprunninglistforDeposandExhibits)
SampleofExhibitLog
SampleofSummaryofEvidenceLog
SampleofWitness/ExhibitCrossReferenceLog
SampleofProductionLog
SampleofPrivilegeLog
103
110
131
134
136
138
160
164
166
170
173
201
209
212
214
215
216
217
SampleofPhotographLog
SampleofPriororUnrelatedMedicalLog
SampleMedicationsLog
Timelines
SampleMedicalTimeline
SampleofEvent/CaseTimeline
EngagementLetters
SampleofExpertEngagementLetter
NewRuleEffective12/1/2010
2010NewRule26ExpertRule Effective12/1/2010
218
219
220
222
223
224
227
DISCOVERYDEADLINECHEATSHEET
Discovery
MeetandConferConference
Rule26(f)Meeting
ReportofRule26(f)PlanningConference
JointReport
InitialDisclosures
Eachpartyfilesseparately
FileaNoticeofFilingwiththeCourt
SchedulingOrder
Rule16(b)
IssuedbyCourtafterRule26(f)Scheduling
Conferencefiledorbydeadlines
MayusesamedeadlinesorCourtmayamend
DeadlinesfromRule26(f)Report
InitialWrittenDiscovery
Rule33Interrogatories
o Limit25unlessyoufileaMotiontoExpand
DiscoveryunderRule26(b)(2)oraStipulation
toExpandDiscoveryunderRule29
o Mustbeansweredin30days
Rule34RequestsforProduction
o NoLimit
o Mustbeansweredin30days
Rule36RequestsforAdmissions
o NoLimit
o Deemedadmittedifnotansweredin30days
Rule45SubpoenaDucesTecum
o Checklocalrulesre:thefollowing
Servicemethods
Witnessfees
Waitingperiods
Timeperiodtorespondorobject
Travelrestrictions
Expenses
Mileage
Copies
Travelexpenses
Wagereimbursementallowed?
FederalDeadline
DateforSchedulingOrder
PLUS21days
MeetandConferConference
PLUS14days
ReportofRule26(f)Planning
PLUS14days
Typically120daysafterthe
defendantisservedOR
90daysafterdefensefiles
anAppearance
ForeignService
28U.S.C.A.1783
Objectwithin14daysafterSubpoena
servedortimeperiodspecifiedfor
compliance
Depositions
Rule30
o Limits10perpartyunderRule30(a)(2)(A)
o Limits7hoursperdepositionunderRule30(d)(2)
Rule30(b)(6)
o CorporateDeposition
Opposingpartydesignatesdeponent
Remembertogivelistofquestionsand
Listofdocumentsanditemstobereviewed
Rule31
o DepositionsbyWrittenQuestions
30daysforwrittencrossquestions;then
10daysforrecrossquestions
Answeredinfrontofanotary/courtreporter
Noticedependson
jurisdictionsome3
daysandothersare
14daysnotice
DISCOVERYMOTIONS
Motions
MotiontoCompelDiscovery
Expenses
o AttorneyFees
o Sanctions
MotionforProtectiveOrder
Expenses
AttorneyFees
MotiontoCompelInspection
Objections
o ResponseinWriting
o Within30days
MotionforPhysical/MentalExaminations
Physical/MentalStateatissue
GoodCause
o MedicalCausationIssue
o DamagesIssue
CopyofReporttopersonunder
Examinationauthorized
MotiontoQuash/ModifySubpoena
Travellimitedtow/in100milesof
Deponentsresidence,employmentor
wheredeponentregularlytransactsbusiness
Appropriateifsubpoenaattemptstoobtain
ConfidentialInformationoratradesecret
MotionforReliefDuetoSpoliation
IssueProtectionLettersEARLYINLITIGATION
MotionforAppointmentofInterpreter
UseonlyCertifiedInterpreters
ApplicableFederalRule
Rule37(a)
Rule37(a)(5)
Rule26(c)
Rule34
Rule34(b)
Rule35
Rule35(b)(1)
Rule45(c)(3)
Rule37
FederalRuleofEvidence604
IFDEPONENTDOESNOT
SPEAKENGLISH
DISCOVERY:
__ Discovery plan developed
__ Interrogatories sent ___ Answered by Opposition
__ Form Interrogatories sent ___ Answered by Opp.
__ Request for production of documents __ Answered by Opp.
__ Request for examination of plaintiff __ Answered by Opp.
__ Request to examine land or items __ Answered by Opp.
__ Requests for Admissions __ Answered by Opp.
__ Objections?
__ Depositions set:
__ Plaintiff
__ Defendant
__ Other_______________
_______________
_______________
__ Other discovery __________________________________
__ Motions to compel deadline checked ___________________
__ Motion filed
__ Motion served
RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION DISCOVERY
10
11
Example of Initial
Disclosures
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA
JEFFREY L. WILHITE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, A Corporation,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
JEFFREY L. WILHITES
INITIAL DISCLOSURES
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Jeffrey L. Wilhite, and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) provides
the following initial disclosures:
A.
The name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to
have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims
or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information.
Lauri Wilhite
124 DeLonge Avenue
Council Bluffs, IA 51503
Plaintiffs Attorneys:
Inserra & Kelley
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, NE 68106
Representatives of Defendant:
Jim Greelis
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Shawn Ossenfort
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
12
There may be other representatives of Union Pacific Railroad that will be called if
discovered during the pendency of the lawsuit.
Defendants Attorneys:
David J. Schmitt
Lamson, Dugan & Murray
10306 Regency Parkway Drive
Omaha, NE 68114
Potential Witnesses:
Anne Brummett
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Shirley Sinnott
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Jeanette McKowski
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Vicki Dotson
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Keith Waeda
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Brett (Manager
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Steve
Union Pacific Railroad
1400 Douglas Street
Omaha, NE 68179
Medical Providers:
Christopher Anderson, M.D.
Alegent Health Rehab Center
17021 Lakeside Hills Plaza, Ste. 200
Omaha, NE 68130
Robert Baron
CPAP Supplies
13
14
Shannon Nealon, PT
Excel Physical Therapy
9449 J Street
Omaha, NE 68127
Charlotte Ricke
UPREHS Clinic Omaha
1416 Dodge Street, Suite 100
Omaha, NE 68179
Michael Salerno, PT
Flex Physical Therapy, LLC
15
2429 M Street
Omaha, NE 68107-2715
Adrienne Connor, PT
Nebraska Medical Center
Pain Management Clinic
989100 Nebraska Medical Center
Omaha, NE 68198
Scott Wilt, MD
Northwest Anesthesia, P.C.
P.O. Box 31668
Omaha, NE 68131
Alegent Health
Immanuel Medical Center
6901 North 72nd Street
Omaha, NE 68122
Mercy Hospital
800 Mercy Drive
Council Bluffs, IA 51503
Walgreens
16
Family Counseling:
Carl Spence
Spence Counseling Center
12035 Q Street
Omaha, NE 68137
Economic Report:
Shelly Kinney
Kinney Consulting, Inc.
6315 South 79th Circle
Ralston, NE 68127
Retirement Benefits:
Railroad Retirement Board
111 South 18th Plaza, Suite C125
P.O. Box 815
Omaha, NE 68101-0815
B.
A copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party
that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment.
A complete copy of all medical records and bills, including the
detailed demand package has been provided to the defendant via
CD-Rom, along with a copy of the detailed narrative demand
package. Discovery is ongoing.
C.
17
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other
evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries
suffered.
Plaintiff requests special damages and general damages as listed in their
demand made upon defendant on or about July 28, 2010 and provided to the
defendant via CD-Rom.
D.
For inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which
any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for
payments made to satisfy the judgment.
None as to Plaintiff.
s/John P. Inserra
Nebraska Bar #15084
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, Nebraska 68106-3612
Telephone: (402) 391-4000
Facsimile: (402) 391-4039
Attorneys for Plaintiff
jpinserra@inserra.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
18
The undersigned hereby certifies that on September 21, 2010, the undersigned electronically
filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system, which sent
notification of such filing upon all parties who filed an appearance or motion by electronic filing in this
case.
David J. Schmitt, #19123
Lamson, Dugan & Murray, LLP
10306 Regency Parkway Drive
Omaha, NE 68114
dschmitt@ldmlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant
s/John P. Inserra
Nebraska Bar #15084
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, Nebraska 68106-3612
Telephone: (402) 391-4000
Facsimile: (402) 391-4039
Attorneys for Plaintiff
jpinserra@inserra.com
19
20
TO:
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
DOC.
PAGE
Defendants answer, under oath, the following requests for admissions, interrogatories, and motions
for production within thirty (30) days of service of this request as required by law.
It is understood that the answers will contain the composite knowledge of the Defendants and
any of the Defendants representatives or agents. These interrogatories shall be deemed continuing,
and if additional information should be discovered after originally answering them with respect to
any of the matters inquired about, then it is expected that such information will be promptly revealed
to the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's attorneys as required by law.
DEFINITIONS
1. The term "person" as used in these Interrogatories means all individuals and entities,
including any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, company, receiver, joint
venture, estate, trust, or other form of entity, including the parties to this litigation and their officers,
agents, employees and representatives.
2.
The term "document" as used in these interrogatories means any written, printed,
typed, recorded, or graphic matter of every type and description, however and by whomever
1
21
(b)
22
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
4.
the date on the document and the date the document was prepared;
the identity of person preparing the document and that person's name
and address;
the identity of the person for whom the document was prepared;
the name and address of each person to whom it addressed;
a description of the document;
the present location of the document; and
the contents and subject matter of the document.
As used in these requests, the terms "you", or "your", and "yours" refer to the
individual defendant answering these Interrogatories and its officers, employees, agents,
representatives, divisions, subdivisions, affiliated companies, parent companies, and any and all
other persons acting or purporting to act on its behalf.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
1.
out of and in the course of employment with the defendant on or about the date alleged in plaintiffs
petition.
RESPONSE:
2.
3. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION Please admit that the accident on the date alleged in
plaintiffs petition caused plaintiff to suffer the injury or injuries alleged in the petition.
RESPONSE:
4.
plaintiffs Petition is not the result of an intervening accident which occurred outside the scope and
course of plaintiffs employment with the defendant.
RESPONSE:
23
5.
6.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION Please admit that the plaintiffs claim is not barred
Name and phone number of all eyewitnesses to the accident and injury alleged in
plaintiffs petition;
b.
Name and phone number of all co-workers at plaintiffs work site on or about the
date of the accident and injury alleged in plaintiffs petition;
c.
ANSWER:
2.
INTERROGATORY Please provide the names and addresses of all witnesses the
insurer requested that the Plaintiff consult with or be examined by any physician?
ANSWER:
4.
24
please state:
(a)
(b)
(c)
The name and address of the person or persons providing the treatment or
conducting the examination.
ANSWER:
5.
INTERROGATORY In the event you have denied any Request For Admission,
please set forth the name and phone number of all persons who have knowledge or provided
information relied upon for said denial and your basis for each denial.
ANSWER:
6.
INTERROGATORY Please set forth the provider and the amount of each
hospital, medical, and drug bill which you have received concerning the Plaintiff's accident since
the date of the accident.
ANSWER:
7.
INTERROGATORY Please itemize those expenses which have been paid and
8.
in connection with the injuries claimed in the plaintiffs Petition, please list which bills defendant
refuses to pay.
ANSWER:
25
9.
INTERROGATORY
Please state the hours the plaintiff has worked for the
employer each week since the date of the accident or injury alleged in plaintiffs petition until the
date of maximum medical improvement, if such medical status has been reached, and wage rate of
each of those hours of employment. (If MMI has not been reached at this time, please provide said
wage and hour information through and including date of these Requests for Discovery).
ANSWER:
10.
INTERROGATORY Please set forth a true and correct listing of all amounts
paid by any Defendant to the Plaintiff in temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent
partial disability benefits and the dates or periods for which such payments were made.
ANSWER:
11.
12.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION Please produce to the plaintiff for inspection all
26
2.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION Please review the attached exhibit list for the
Plaintiff and produce any documents relating to the following that is in your possession and not
already on our list:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
All nurse case manager or similar records, including correspondence between the
nurse and employer or claims adjuster;
f.
g.
Wage and hour information from date of accident to the present date;
h.
i.
Job Descriptions of all positions worked by the plaintiff for the defendant;
j.
k.
RESPONSE:
3.
other documents concerning the investigation of plaintiffs injury, which was written or compiled by
someone not then acting on your behalf.
RESPONSE:
5.
27
6.
presentations (e.g., PowerPoint slides), stand alone databases (e.g., Acess), spreadsheets (e.g., Excel)
containing discoverable electronic information.
RESPONSE:
7.
8.
document and data retention policy designed to ensure the retention of defendants discoverable
electronic information.
RESPONSE:
By:
_____________________________
Jeffrey F. Putnam, # 21527
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover St. -- Suite 200
Omaha, NE 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000/391-4039 - Fax
28
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent by United States mail,
postage prepaid, to the following on the ___ day of ______ 2005 to defendants, by and through their
attorney of record, _____________
__________________________________
29
EDISCOVERYSTATEBYSTATELISTING
30
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http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/2008/10/articles/resources/current-listing...
Oklahoma
Rule 5. Pretrial Proceedings
Effective February 9, 2010
Chapter 39. Oklahoma Pleading Code
Section 2004.1 Subpoena
Chapter 41. Discovery Code.
Section 3226 General Provisions Governing Discovery
Section 3233 Interrogatories to Parties
Section 3234 Production of Documents and Things and Entry upon Land for Inspection and Other
Purposes
Section 3237 Failure to Make or Cooperation in Discovery Sanctions
Effective November 1, 2010
Ohio
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45
Effective July 1, 2008
Tennessee
Rule 16 Scheduling and Planning, Pretrial, and Final Pretrial Conferences and Orders
Rule 26 General Provisions Governing Discovery
Rule 33 Interrogatories to Parties
Rule 34 Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Rule Purposes
Rule 37 Failure to Make or Cooperate in Discovery: Sanctions
Rule 45 Subpoena
Effective July 1, 2009
Rule 502 Limitations on Waiver of Privileged Information or Work Product
Effective July 1, 2010
Texas
Tex. R. Civ. P. 196.4 Electronic or Magnetic Data
Effective January 1, 1999
Utah
Utah R. Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories to parties
Utah R. Civ. P. 34. Production of documents and things and entry upon land for inspection and other
purposes
Utah R. Civ. P. 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions
Effective November 1, 2007
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 General Provisions Governing Discovery
Effective November 2008
Utah R. Civ. P. 45 Subpoena
Effective April 1, 2009
Vermont
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure:
Vt. R. Civ. P. 16.2 Scheduling Orders
Vt. R. Civ. P. 26
General Provisions Governing Discovery
Vt. R. Civ. P. 33
Interrogatories to Parties
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Vt. R. Civ. P. 34
Vt. R. Civ. P. 37
Vt. R. Civ. P. 45
Effective July 6, 2009
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/2008/10/articles/resources/current-listing...
Virginia
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure 4:4, 4:8, 4:9, 4:9A, and 4:13
Effective January 1, 2009
Rule 4:1 General Provisions Governing Discovery
Effective May 3, 2010
Washington
ER 502 Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver
Effective September 1, 2010
Wyoming
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 16 Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26 General Rules Governing Discovery, Duty of Disclosure
Effective July 1, 2010
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 45
Subpoena
Effective Oct. 1, 2009
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 33
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 34
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 37
Effective July 1, 2008
Interrogatories to Parties
Production of Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and
Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes
Failure to Make Disclosures or Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions
Trackbacks (6)
Electronic Discovery Law - June 19, 2008 2:10 PM
Nebraska On June 4, 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court adopted amendments to Neb. Ct. R. of Discovery,
33, 34, and 34A that address the discovery of electronically stored information. The amended rules are
available here, and went into effect June...
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Comments (1)
Kae Warnock - July 8, 2008 11:58 AM
This is an excellent list of state laws and court rules.
NCSL is presenting a session on e-discovery for legislative attorneys at our Legislative Summit this month.
May I have permission to reprint the printable version of this list (with attribution, of course)
This blog/Web site is made available by the contributing lawyers or law firm publisher solely for educational
purposes to provide general information about general legal principles and not to provide specific legal advice
applicable to any particular circumstance. By using this blog/Web site, you understand that there is no
attorney client relationship intended or formed between you and the blog/Web site publisher or any
contributing lawyer. The blog/Web site should not be used as a substitute for competent legal advice from a
lawyer you have retained and who has agreed to represent you.
K&L Gates is comprised of multiple affiliated entities: a limited liability partnership with the full name K&L
Gates LLP qualified in Delaware and maintaining offices throughout the United States, in Berlin and
Frankfurt, Germany, in Beijing (K&L Gates LLP Beijing Representative Office), in Dubai, U.A.E., in
Shanghai (K&L Gates LLP Shanghai Representative Office), in Tokyo, and in Singapore; a limited liability
partnership (also named K&L Gates LLP) incorporated in England and maintaining offices in London and
Paris; a Taiwan general partnership (K&L Gates) maintaining an office in Taipei; a Hong Kong general
partnership (K&L Gates, Solicitors) maintaining an office in Hong Kong; and a Delaware limited liability
company (K&L Gates Holdings, LLC) maintaining an office in Moscow. K&L Gates maintains appropriate
registrations in the jurisdictions in which its offices are located. A list of the partners or members in each
entity is available for inspection at any K&L Gates office.
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http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/2008/10/articles/resources/current-listing...
Portions of this Web site may contain Attorney Advertising under the rules of some states. Prior results do not
guarantee a similar outcome.
Ediscovery Law Firm, Document Analysis Technology Group and Records Management Practice of K&L
Gates, offering services related to ediscovery, review of electronic documents, electronic discovery and
electronic evidence discovery.
K&L Gates LLP
925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900, Seattle, Washington 98104-1158
p. 206.623.7580, f. 206.623.7022
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TO:
Plaintiff hereby requests, pursuant to Nebraska Discovery Rule 36, the defendant
answer, under oath, the following requests for admissions of the truth of any matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request, including the genuineness of any documents
described herein, within thirty (30) days of service of this request as required by law.
It is understood that the answers will contain the composite knowledge of the Defendants
and any of the Defendants' representatives or agents.
continuing, and if additional information should be discovered after originally answering them
with respect to any of the matters inquired about, then it is expected that such information will be
promptly revealed to the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's attorney as required by law.
DEFINITIONS
1.
2.
41
Maintenance Data shall include any data sent to or from any member of
maintenance regarding any issue. All below requests shall be limited in time as
to the period of time from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit was
installed to the present.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 18:
the person with the most knowledge of the retention and destruction at your place of business.
ANSWER:
subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present, have any documents at your place of business
42
been destroyed? If so, please state which electronic files have been deleted from the magnetic or
optical storage media or overwritten from that date to the present, and dates of destruction or
overwriting.
ANSWER:
List
all
operating
systems
installed
on
all
computers, mobile phones, pdas, palm pilots, blackberries or other electronic equipment on
which data is stored used by your business, the specific equipment on which the operating
system was installed, and the period during which it was installed on the specific equipment.
ANSWER:
your computers, mobile phones, pdas, palm pilots, blackberries or other electronic equipment
(such as word-processor files, work orders, data files, and email):
If the data is backed up on tape or other media, please state:
a. The number of media currently existing with backup data;
b. The maximum storage size for each such media;
c. The brand name for each such media;
d. The last time each such media was backed up;
e. The computer or other hardware for each such backup.
ANSWER:
computer, mobile phone, pda, palm pilot, blackberry or other electronic equipment (such as
word-processor files, work orders, data files, and email) or other hardware listed in the previous
Interrogatories.
ANSWER:
maintaining computer hardware, data or information systems on computers for your place of
43
business, including name, position, title, contact information, and official job description and list
of duties.
ANSWER:
regarding use of removable media in its workstations, computers, mobile phones, pdas,
blackberries, or networks?
ANSWER:
externally to the computers, workstations, mobile phones, pdas, blackberries or networks of your
maintenance department during the period from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit
was installed to the present.
ANSWER:
computers, workstations, mobile phones, pdas, blackberries or your businesss network, and the
equipment and logical path where the log files or audit trails can be found.
ANSWER:
devices in the course of their employment that are not connected to your businesss network, and
that are not backed up or archived? If so, list all users and the devices they use.
ANSWER:
your computer network, and the relationship of those components to each other, including but
not limited to flow charts, videos or photos, and drawings.
ANSWER:
44
policies and procedures and the name and contact information for the person responsible for
security.
ANSWER:
information in its entirety, including but not limited to organizational charts, corporate policy
and procedure manuals, policy memoranda, system schematic, audit trail procedure, network
topology, system restart procedure, email retention policies, and other related information.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 7:
groups of connected computers that allow people to share information and equipment.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 8:
Produce any and all information related to email, including but not
limited to current, backed-up and archived programs, accounts, unified messaging, server-based
email, Web-based e-mail, dial-up email, user names and addresses, domain names and addresses,
email messages, attachments, manual and automated mailing lists and mailing list addresses as it
pertains to maintenance or the vendors used by maintenance.
RESPONSE:
45
REQUEST NO. 9:
Please produce copies of any and all written policies for the
retention of documents.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 10: Please produce copies of any and all written policies for the
destruction of documents.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 11: Please produce all backup and/or archive maintenance media,
during the period from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit was installed to the
present.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 12: Produce any backup or archived maintenance data during the
period from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 13: Provide the names of all of your businesss information systems or
information technology personnel during the period from when the door that is the subject of this
lawsuit was installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 14: Produce any and all devices used to place information on loose or
removable storage media, including but not limited to hard drives, floppy drives, CD-Rom
drives, tape drives, recordable DVD-ROM drives and removable drives.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 15: Please produce the blackberries, including their magnetic or optical
storage media, for inspection and copying, used by maintenance during the period from when the
door that is the subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
46
REQUEST NO. 16: Provide any and all documentation of software and hardware
modifications to the computers used by maintenance during the period from when the door that
is the subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present, including, but not limited to
modification dates, software/hardware titles and version numbers, names of persons performing
modifications, location of any backup of the data on the computer performed prior to
modification, and disposition of replaced software and hardware.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 17: Produce any and all software installed or used on the computers
used by maintenance during the period from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit was
installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 18: Produce any and all voice messaging records including but not
limited to caller message recordings, digital voice recordings, interactive voice response unit
(IVR/VRV) recordings, unified messaging files, and computer-based voice mail files to or from
maintenance during the period from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit was installed
to the present.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 19: Produce all phone use records for maintenance including but not
limited to logs of incoming and outgoing calls, invoices and contact management records,
manually or automatically created or generated during the period from when the door that is the
subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 20: Produce any and all manual and automatic records of equipment
use, including but not limited to fax, access, audit, security, email, printing, error and
transmission records regarding maintenance during the period from when the door that is the
subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
47
REQUEST NO. 21: Produce any and all portable devices used by maintenance and not
backed up or archived, including but not limited to handheld devices, set-top boxes, notebook
devices, CE devices, digital recorders, digital camera and external storage devices during the
period from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
REQUEST NO. 22: Produce copies of all maintenance manuals, policies and other
guidelines for employee access and use of Internet resources for maintenance issues during the
period from when the door that is the subject of this lawsuit was installed to the present.
RESPONSE:
By:___________________________
John P. Inserra, #15084
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, Nebraska 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000
(402) 391-4039 (Fax)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
document by regular, first class United States mail, postage prepaid this ____ day of May, 2009 on the
following:
David L. Welch
PANSING, HOGAN, ERNST & BACHMAN, LLP
10250 Regency Circle, #300
Omaha, NE 68114
Mr. John W. Iliff
Gross & Welch
1500 Omaha Tower
2120 S. 72nd Street
Omaha, NE 68124-2342
48
49
SAMPLE OF
INITIAL DISCOVERY SUMMARY
ANSWERS OF DR. TAYLOR
Interrogatories:
Key:
OB Overly Broad
I Irrellevant
NCLDE Not calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence
P Privileged
1
2
3
4
Persons Answering
Subject of Investigation
Liability Insurance
Liability Insurance
Bruce E. Taylor, MD
Objection OB/I/NCLDE/P
Yes
COPIC Ins Co Limits $200K/$600K;
qualified by Hosp. Med. Liab. Act0
None outside of practice
CV
Records Relating to I#2
Attached
Objection OB/I/NCLDE/P
50
51
Attorney name
52
53
DEPOSITION INFORMATION
_______ John P. Inserra #15084
_______ Craig L. Kelley #18341
Reschedule ______
______ Video
______ Teleconference
Contact: ____________________________________Phone:__________________________________
Case Name: _________________________________________________________________________
DOA: __________ or Docket:_________ Page:________ Case #: __________
_____ Expert
____ Plaintiff/Client
____ Defendant
Deposition Location:____________________________________________________________________
Time:___________
Prep Time:________
(Client Only)
Date:_______________________ /_________________
(mm-dd-yy)
(day of week)
_____
55
)
DOC. ____ NO. _____
)
)
) MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
)
OF INTERPRETER AND
) PAYMENT OF INTERPRETERS
) EXPENSE OUT OF THE SUPREME
)
COURT GENERAL FUND
56
By:
_________________________________
___________________, # ________
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street Suite 200
Omaha, NE 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000
(402) 391-4039 Fax
Attorneys for [Plaintiff/Defendant]
NOTICE OF HEARING
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the above matter will come for hearing on the
____ day of ____________ 200_____, before the Honorable __________________________,
Douglas County Courthouse, Courtroom No. ______. Omaha, NE at the hour of _____a./p.m., or
as soon thereafter as the same may be heard.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following by mailing said copy by regular U.S. Mail, portage prepaid on this the ____ day of
________________ 200____ to the following counsel of record:
_______________________________
57
58
)
CASE NO. CI 02-539
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
) PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF CORPORATE
vs.
) DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT METRO
)
MACHINE & ENGINEERING
METRO MACHINE & ENGINEERING )
CORPORATION PURSUANT TO
CORPORATION, a Minnesota
)
NEBRASKA RULES OF DISCOVERY
corporation,
)
30(b)(5), 30(b)(6) and 34
)
Defendant,
)
TO:
2.
59
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
The person with the most knowledge or information regarding the details
of the Purchase Order and accompanying Equipment & Tool
Specifications Agreement;
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
60
15.
16.
17.
Pursuant to Nebraska Rules of Discovery 30(b)(5) and 34, plaintiff requests that
METRO MACHINE & ENGINEERING CORPORATION produce the following
documents and tangible things, as well as permit Plaintiffs counsel to inspect and copy each of
the following documents and tangible items in the possession, custody, or control of METRO
MACHINE & ENGINEERING CORPORATION, its attorneys or other representatives or
agents:
SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS:
1.
2.
Any documents relating to the joint agreement regarding the guarding of the
machine as set forth in Defendants Answer to Interrogatory No. 9.
3.
Andy documents relating to any claims against Metro Machine for injuries related to
the Solo Shot machine or any other similar machine as set forth in Defendants
Answer to Interrogatory No. 19.
61
__________________________________
Jeffrey F. Putnam, #21527
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, Nebraska 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000
(402) 391-4039 (Fax)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed by United States
mail, postage prepaid, to the following on the _____ day of February, 2005.
Brian D. Nolan
NOLAN, OLSON, HANSEN, FIEBER
& LAUGHTENBAUGH, L.L.P.
300 South 19th Street, Suite 302
Omaha, NE 68102
Chad P. Richter
Paul E. Larson
BERENS & TATE, P.C.
10050 Regency Circle, #400
Omaha, NE 68114-3721
___________________________________
62
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that [Plaintiff/Defendant/Corporation] take(s) the deposition, before a qualified notary public by oral
examination, of [Plaintiff/Defendant/Corporation] on [date/time], commencing at [location]. The deposition will continue until
adjournment.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6), [Plaintiff/Defendant] corporate designee(s) shall be prepared to testify
regarding the following subjects, all with respect to [Plaintiff's/Defendants] information technology systems:
1)
Number, types, and locations of computers currently in use and no longer in use;
2)
Past and present operating system and application software, including dates of use;
3)
Name and version of network operating system currently in use and no longer in use but relevant to the subject
matter of the action;
4)
5)
6)
7)
Most likely locations of electronic records relevant to the subject matter of the action;
8)
Backup rotation schedules and archiving procedures, including any backup programs in use at any relevant
time;
9)
10)
visit www.krollontrack.com
for the latest version
Page 1 of 2
Last Revised 1/1/06
63
11)
Identities of all current and former personnel who have or had access to network administration, backup,
archiving, or other system operations during any relevant time period.
[Date]
BY:
[Counsel/law firm name and address]
Attorneys for [Plaintiff/Defendant]
visit www.krollontrack.com
for the latest version
Page 2 of 2
Last Revised 1/1/06
64
65
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P., )
c/o CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service )
Company, Registered Agent
)
)
Defendant.
)
DOC. 203
PAGE 1387
PLAINTIFFS NOTICE
TO TAKE DEPOSITION
OF JOHN PAYNE
Take notice that the said plaintiff will take the deposition upon oral examination of
JOHN PAYNE, at the offices of Penske Truck Leasing Co., LP, G5 Corporate
Woods Plaza, Bridgeton, Missouri, on Tuesday, March 30, 2004 at 11:00 oclock a.m.,
and thereafter from day to day as the taking of said deposition may be adjourned.
Deponent is directed to bring all documents and correspondence relating to the above
Plaintiff to the deposition. Said deposition is to be used in the above-entitled action. You
are hereby notified to appear and take part in said deposition. Said deposition to be
recorded and transcribed by a certified court reporter, which will be provided by the
plaintiff.
DATED on this
By: ____________________________
Jeffrey F. Putnam, #21527
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, NE 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000/ 391-4039 - Fax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
As one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, I do hereby certify that I caused
the above Notice to Take Deposition to be served upon the Defendant herein by mailing
same as First Class United States Mail, with postage prepaid, to its attorney of record,
John W. Iliff, Gross & Welch, P.C., 1500 Omaha Tower, 2120 S. 72nd Street, Omaha,
NE. 68124-2342, on this the
day of March 2004.
____________________________________
66
67
DEFENDANT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
NOTICE TO TAKE
VIDEO DEPOSITION OF
R. MICHAEL GROSS, M.D.
Take notice that the said plaintiff will take the video deposition upon oral examination, of
DR. MICHAEL GROSS, at 7710 Mercy Road Suite 224, Omaha, Nebraska on Nebraska
Spine Center, 11819 Miracle Hills Drive, Suite 102, Omaha, Nebraska, on Wednesday, May 5,
2004 at 9:00 oclock a.m., and thereafter from day to day as the taking of said deposition may
be adjourned. Deponent is directed to bring all medical records, documents and correspondence
relating to the above Plaintiff to the deposition. Said deposition is to be used in the aboveentitled action. You are hereby notified to appear and take part in said deposition. Said
deposition to be recorded and transcribed by Thibault Suhr & Thibault Court Reporters.
DATED on this
By:
John P. Inserra, #15084
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, Nebraska 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000/391-4039 - Fax
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
As one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff herein, I do hereby certify that I caused the above
Notice to Take Deposition to be served upon the Defendant herein by mailing same as First
Class United States Mail, with postage prepaid, to its attorney of record, Baylor, Evnen, Curtiss,
Grimit & Witt, L.L.P., Wells Fargo Center, 1248 "O" Street, Suite 600, Lincoln, NE 68508, on
the
day of February 2004.
_________________________________________
68
69
DEBORAH WANGBERG,
Defendant.
TO:
)
DOC. CI06
NO. 622
)
)
)
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE
) DEPOSITION BY WRITTEN QUESTIONS
)
OF DR. BERNARD KRATOCHVIL
)
)
)
)
Kratochvil, M.D., Drs. Gross, Iwersen, Kratochvil & Klein, P.C., Orthopaedic Surgery, 7710
Mercy Road, #224, Omaha, NE 68124 on the _____ day of _______________ at __:___ __.m.
and continuing thereafter until complete. Said deposition upon written questions will proceed
before a Certified Court Reporter at the offices of Dr. Bernard Kratochvil, M.D., Drs. Gross,
Iwersen, Kratochvil & Klein, P.C., Orthopaedic Surgery, 7710 Mercy Road, #224, Omaha, NE
68124, pursuant to Rule 31 of the Nebraska Civil Discovery Rules.
Dated:
By:
___________________________
John P. Inserra, #15084
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, NE 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000
(402) 391-4039 (Fax)
jpinserra@inserra.com
1
70
Certificate of Service
The undersigned hereby certifies that he served a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document by regular, first class United States mail, postage prepaid this ____ day of
March 2007 on the following:
Douglas L. Phillips
KLASS LAW FIRM, LLP
Mayfair Center, Upper Level
4280 Sergeant Road, Suite 290
Sioux City, IA 51106
______________________________
71
DEBORAH WANGBERG,
Defendant.
TO:
)
DOC. CI06
NO. 622
)
)
)
) DEPOSITION BY WRITTEN QUESTIONS
)
OF DR. BERNARD KRATOCHVIL
)
)
)
)
QUESTION NO. 2: With regard to the pending lawsuit, please state who hired you to
perform medical services, what you have been hired to do, and what your compensation is to be.
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO. 3: Please state what percentage of your medical practice is performed
as a medical-legal expert performing Independent Medical Exams and/or providing opinions to
requesting lawyers, claims representatives, or other legal representatives.
ANSWER:
3
72
QUESTION NO. 4: Please state what percentage of your answer to Question #3 above
is performed for all defendants as opposed to what percentage is performed for all plaintiffs.
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO. 5:
QUESTION NO. 7: Please state specifically each case in which you have actually
testified, whether by deposition or at trial within the past three years.
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO. 8:
Please state whether the report dated November 13, 2006 attached
as Exhibit A to these questions is a true and accurate copy of your assessment of the plaintiff
as a result of an Independent Medical Examination you conducted on or about November 13,
2006?
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO. 9:
Please state the number of times you have been employed by the
law firm of Fraser, Stryker, Meusey, Olson, Boyer & Bloch, PC during the past three (3) years in
an expert capacity.
ANSWER:
4
73
_______________________________________
BERNARD L. KRATOCHVIL, M.D.
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared BERNARD L.
KRATOCHVIL, M.D., known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing
instrument in the capacity therein stated, who being first duly sworn, stated upon his oath that the
answers to the foregoing questions are true and correct.
__________________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:_____________________
74
75
DEPOSITION SUMMARY OF
DR. BRUCE E. TAYLOR, M.D.
8:17-9:1
Dr. Lucas (partner of Dr. Taylor) saw Blake Werts 1x; general practice was to
deliver own patients but had patients meet at least one other person in case of
emergency (doctor out of town, etc.)
7:18-25
8:1-13
Covered Joe Rogers and Dr. Lucas also covered Taylors patience if he was out of
town
8:14-16
1996 on staff at Bryan and St. Es; courtesy staff at LGH; allows him to admit
patients and perform surgeries
9:16-10:2
76
10:3-7
10:8 -13
Deliveries average 12-14 patients per month, do not know how many in 1996
Usual protocol of OB through delivery see PA for 30 minutes for history and
lab; next 2-3 weeks to a month he sees them for physical exam and info, blood
work, develop pregnancy plan; back monthly until 32 weeks; then see every 2
weeks until 36 weeks; then weekly until delivery
34:20-35:12
Peggy Werts was a patient; reviewed her office and hospital records prior to depo
in his office; records given by counsel
12:1-19
First saw Peggy on 3/6/06, but she was prior patient; saw for OB history a couple
visits before they moved to CA; seen after moved back for routine exam.
12:20-23
12:24-13:3
13:4-24
Peggys History: prior C-section for fetal distress; infant hospitalized for heart
problems; per Peggy no reason not to have VBAC, low cervical transverse uterine
incision.
13:25-14:19
21:3-21:11
Only way to determine the incision type is by operating record; patient asked to
bring in and didnt.
29:17-25
30:1-21
Fact that original C-section was done because of fetal distress put Peggy at higher
ability to have VBAC because C-section was not done because of disproportion.
If breach, higher risk for cord prolapsed and head entrapment if delivered
2
77
36:6-37:1
Peggy admitted to St. Es on 9/16/96; not in labor; plan to induce before infant
grew larger; decision to induce made around 9/11; notation within hospital chart
to go ahead and start a Pitocin induction that was dated that date; Pitocin used to
cause contractions.
37:2-7
Felt needed to induce labor as she was closer to her due date and if you start in the
morning can get done before 2AM
37:22-38:14
Pitocin not started on September 11th. Note dated 9/11/96 state admit on 9/16 for
VBAC induction. Start Pitocin on admission.
38:24-39:7
Prior to 9/16/96, Peggy had not gone into labor or they would not have waited to
induce. Induction had nothing to do with size of baby.
39:21-41:19
Peggy checked into hospital at 7:05 a.m. and was administered Pitocin. He took a
look at her at noon according to the hospital record. At noon Pitocin was started
and she was having very mild contractions. Indication in nurses notes he was
there at 10AM and elected fetal monitoring strip and spoke with the patient.
42:11-18
45:2-25
46:1-47:1
Told them to go ahead and increase the Pitocin and wrote a note in the progress
sheet 9/16, noon, 30-year-old MWF, which stands for married white female,
gravid 2, para 1, with an EDC of 9/23/96, admitted for a trial of induction.
History of previous C-section. Chest clear, heart regular rate and rhythm without
murmurs. Cervix fingertip 20 percent effaced, fetal heart tones okay. Impression:
Term pregnancy, two, VBAC, pan trial of pit, type and screen. With VBACs
always get blood available just in case you need one, routine protocol for Taylor
in case of C-section or bleeding episode.
78
47:2-48:23;
49:21-50:13
Back to hospital when he called in and she was having fetal distress shortly before
she delivered. Called in at 8:04 according to hospital record. Believes the
hospital was trying to call him at the same time assumes thats what they would
be doing with the problems she started to have. Fortuitous that he happened to
call first. Doesnt know for sure. Has not asked whether anyone attempted to call
him. At 8:04, he was at 11th & South St, Zestos. After call, proceeded
expeditiously to St. Es. Told at time of call that the fetal heart tones were down
and she was complaining of abdominal pain and uterus was firm indicating
infant was having some distress, the uterus being firm could also go along with an
abruption where the placenta can sometimes separate from the uterus. Ordered
some Tributalene to stop contractions and asked if there were any other
physicians within the hospital to go ahead and start things sooner. There was
another C-section going on at the time from his records and no one else available
who could respond any faster. Indicated hospital should prepare Peggy for a CSection. He called labor and delivery and doesnt recall which nurse she talked
to.
48:24-49:3
When arrived at hospital, went up to the labor and delivery and reviewed the fetal
monitor and proceeded with C-section.
49:8-20
Took a look at fetal monitoring strips. According to his note fetal tones down to
around 70 with no increase indicating infant not tolerating current condition.
50:14-51:4
From hospital chart, it appears Peggy Cline was the nurse who made notations on
the chart. Other nurses taking care of Peggy were J. Ewoldson and Sandy Bleich.
Brenda Goodbar was circulating nurse. Worked with these nurses on a regular
basis.
51:17-52:16
Between noon and time he called hospital, Peggy feeling very mild contractions,
not changing anything cervix wise. Needs contractions to change cervix. Hadnt
progressed much at that point. At 4:30, according to nurse notes, called in and
increased Pitocin as still having mild contractions.
52:20-53:15
Pitocin increase every 15-30 minutes had been going on all day. Hard to say
what shows in flow record on whether it helped because no notation between
16:30 and 19:15, but on OB flow record Peggy still having mild contractions
until about 7 oclock. Hard to read copy. In nurses notes, says at 7:00, appears
to say moderate assumes inferring to contractions.
53:16-24
79
54:4-12
Risks of continuing Pitocin was water intoxication, which is why Taylor ordered a
double strength Pitocin; same amount of Pitocin or a little more and a lesser
amount of fluid so shes not getting as much fluid value.
54:13-56:3
56:4-24
Next Notation is 19:35; significance is they moved her from bed to chair, so
assumes fetal heart tones resolved as to variabilities or probably would have been
a notation. Normally do not move someone who is having heart tone changes to a
chair if they are still occurring. Doesnt have the strip and we dont either. Other
reasons for the move to try a different position, tired of lying in bed. Certainly
dont normally do that for fetal distress.
56:25-57:16
57:17-58:15
OB Flow record page 15 time 19:40, says focus, has FHTs fetal heart tones;
note indicates patient calls out with pain. Taylor assumes it says patient calls out
with complaint of pain, decreased Pitocin and individuals name. LAMSON
OBJECTION TO ASKING IF INDICATES PROBLEM WITH FETAL
MONITOR READINGS AS TO FORM AND LACK OF FOUNDATION
Taylor doesnt know if they are reading off the fetal monitor because it is not
noted at that point until 19:54 when its difficult to assess and had to get her back
to bed at 19:54; assume they were trying to assess fetal heart tones at that point.
58:16-60:1
80
much. Concern of her pain complaint would be whether she may have had a
placental separation or as what turned out a dehiscence of previous incision.
Blood in the abdomen can cause pain too.
60:2 -61:2
When did C-section according to OP note, opened the abdomen small amount
of blood hole within the uterus where infants head was starting to come out;
infant delivered, headed off to pediatrician who he did a very good resuscitation
and then repaired defect within the uterus. Defect appeared to be at area of the
scar from prior C-section. Blake was not breathing. He was immediately
intubated and when youre intubated you dont breathe, so cant answer how long
he wasnt breathing.
60:3-13
61:14-25
62:1-12
62:13-63:10
Followed-up with Peggy; last note in office chart baby seems to be doing better
is rolling over and acting more normally, although gets mad and pulls thumbs
into the inside. Not a neurologist doesnt know significance. Sounded like
baby was doing good for rolling over at 6 weeks. Did not see Peggy or Blake
again, but they sent him a note that says Thank you Dr. Taylor picture of Blake
and brother Bryce.
Guidelines for VBAC: 60-80% success rate in 1996; less side effects from
vaginal birth; complications present on both; in 1996 concern about C-section
rates encouraged to do VBACs, Peggy wanted. National concern ACOG and
news media.
16:2-11
Guidelines for VBACs in 1996 revised since then from ACOG; he is a member
16:13-17:24
81
journal; has access to 1996 guidelines; His atty has them. Also have old ones in
his files.
18:1-19:15
Guidelines are made through practice committee made up of experts in the field;
no knowledge of who formulated as committee changes; Has met some
committee members. Appointed by ACOG to panels. Trusts ACOG. No
knowledge of whether the guidelines are peer reviewed. Guidelines appear in
Williams Textbook of Obstetrics, GOBY obstetrical Textbook; Fetal and
Maternal medicine textbooks.
19:16-24
19:25-20:14
Doesnt recall guidelines by St. Es other than the OB/GYN rather than family
physician or midwife; does not have bylaws from 1996; hospitals did not
encourage VBAC. Physician-patient relationship makes the decision.
22:20-23:1
30 minute limitation for emergency C-Section was from ACOG. Doesnt know if
it was shorter prior to 1996.
Spoke with Peggy about VBAC; Only one notation where it says C-sectionVBAC, which indicates patient would like to try vaginal; On 8/28 in treatment
plan noted labor p.c. which is precautions discussed what to do if she went into
labor.
24:10-25:12
82
Risks discussed with Peggy hard to remember, but sure that he did; considered
the risks to be less than 1% of uterine rupture; no notes that risk was higher than
normal; normal is less than 1%; LAMSON OBJECTS TO FORM OF
QUESTION AS VAGUE AND INDEFINITE; Taylor believes risk is normal
for a VBAC higher than a non-VBAC.
34:1 -18
Peggy was adamant about vaginal delivery she wanted a trial of labor to deliver
normally; believes this because Most women do. Cant say specifically. No
special planning done for Peggy re: delivery.
37:8-21
Discussion with Peggy about doing induction of labor. Notes would be under
labor precautions; Recollection of game plan of what is usual and customary to
discuss with patients as a routine.
38:17-23
Decided on 9/11 to proceed with induction and made arrangements with hospital.
VBAC Risks
25:13-26:18
Risks less than 1% of uterine rupture; not progressing in labor; 2nd C-section
with a first time VBAC for Peggy is about the same as someone who is having a
first-time delivery; risk of bleeding because of weak spot in uterus; most
significant risk is uterine rupture or placental abruption due to old scar can open
and create placental abnormalities and oxygenation to the infant depending on
where rupture is and tolerability of infant to the assault; variable no way to say
if it will or will not happen. Risk of death to infant or mother; same as any
pregnancy.
28:4-14
Risks of VBAC with macrosomic infant may not fit out; cephalopelvic
disproportion; some still successful at vaginal deliveries; guidelines did not say it
should not be done, depending on size of infant.
Mom/Fetal Weight
26:19-28:3
Ultrasound 2 weeks prior to due date showed a little over 7 lbs. not a
macrosomic infant 2 weeks prior to delivery; Notes in ultrasound LGA large
for gestational age; that was reason for the ultrasound to determine if infant too
large; coded for insurance; macrosomic means infants greater than 4500 grams ;
4000 grams is 8 lbs 8 oz.
28:15 -25
29:1-16
Weight of Mother not an issue in ACOG guidelines in 1996, but some suggestions
8
83
now that an elevated BMI make it less desirable because of fat dystocia more
difficult for mom to get legs apart sufficiently or labia apart sufficiently.
Time Factors RE: C-Section; Hospital Liability Factors
30:22-31:21
63:11-18
Dr. Lucas not on call for deliveries on 9/16/96 nobody else otherwise on call,
but thats why he called in and asked if anyone in-house; no one available. Made
that notation in hospital records. Significant from standpoint that no other easier
option to get things done faster than what he did. If infant has fetal distress, try to
do delivery, if necessary.
ON CROSS EXAM BY CHRISTENSEN
65:1-
Based on review of records, believe nurses followed his orders re: administration
of Pitocin.
Pitocin
39:8-20
Pitocin causes uterine contractions, works in the pituitary. One other choice
besides Pitocin Cytotec which is shown today to not be a good choice.
42:19-43:12
43:13-44:1;
54:4-12
44:2-45:1
Prolonged contraction lasting more than a minute and a half to two minutes.
Sometimes last 3-4 minutes. Average contractions are usually 60 seconds, maybe
90. Danger of a prolonged contraction: if contraction strong enough, will cut off
the cord supply blood wise to the infant and can cause fetal distress where you
have a decreased fetal heart rate. That why use fetal monitor when using Pitocin.
52:20-22
Pitocin done systematically. Start at low dose and increase every 15-30 minutes
depending on results.
84
53:16-24
Fetal monitor assesses fetal heart rate of infant and contractions of patient. Kept
by hospital in the records. St. Es does not have them in the record. No idea what
happened to them.
Nurse Responsibilities
51:5-16
10
85
86
Example of Scheduling
Conference Packet from Federal
Court
District of Nebraska
LYLE E. STROM
United States District Judge
Suite 3190
111 South 18th Plaza
FAX: (402) 661-7318
Omaha, Nebraska 68102-1322
----------
September 3, 2010
RE:
8:10cv306,
Jeffrey L. Wilhite v. Union Pacific Railroad Company
At the status conference, the court will ensure that the initial disclosure requirements have
been met. The parties will be expected to have named all known lay witnesses and identified expert
witnesses, even though disclosure of full reports may not yet have occurred. The court will rule on
any outstanding discovery disputes. The parties will be expected to discuss and schedule the
disclosure of expert witness reports and summary judgment motions. The court will explore the
possibilities for mediation. The parties will be expected to have discussed settlement with their
clients and obtained authority in advance of the status conference. A final progression order will
be established. Finally, the case will be scheduled for trial for a week certain before the assigned
district judge or magistrate judge. Based upon the trial schedule, a final pretrial conference date will
be set, as well as a date for the formal close of all discovery.
Consent Trials
Special trial settings before this Court are available.
A consent form is enclosed for your review. A consent to trial by a magistrate judge cannot
be initiated by motion. Rather, all parties must sign the consent form and submit it to the chambers
of the assigned district court judge. Upon the filing of the consent form, counsel will be contacted
by the chambers of the magistrate judge regarding scheduling and establishing a special setting for
trial. It is the courts experience that cases are most expeditiously handled when the issue of consent
is considered early on in the scheduling of the case in order to provide the parties with a greater
option of trial scheduling dates.
Deadline for Report to the Court
Please review the enclosed form. It provides an agenda for the parties initial conference.
I expect the completed form to be electronically filed on or before October 12, 2010.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
s/ Lyle E. Strom
LYLE E. STROM
United States District Judge
Enclosures
88
Plaintiff(s),
v.
Defendant(s).
Counsel for the parties met on
8:10CV
REPORT OF PARTIES
PLANNING CONFERENCE
in person/by telephone.
; representing defendant(s) was/were
Jurisdiction
b.
Venue
c.
CLAIM I:
Elements of Claim I: (list and number all substantive elements):
CLAIM II:
89
FIRST DEFENSE:
Elements (again, by number):
SECOND DEFENSE:
Elements:
6.
The parties submit that the following elements of the pending claims or defenses
may be appropriate for disposition by summary judgment or partial summary judgment:
; and state that the discovery necessary to
determine whether to file summary judgment motions on such element(s) can be completed
by
.
7.
The parties submit the following plan for their completion of discovery:
a.
Disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1), including a statement of how each
matter disclosed relates to the elements of the disclosing party's claims or defenses,
have been completed;
will be completed by
.
b.
Is the maximum number of interrogatories, including subparts, that
may be served by any party on any other party.
c.
Is the maximum number of depositions that may be taken by plaintiffs
as a group and defendants as a group.
d. Depositions shall be limited by Rule 30(d)(2) except the depositions of
, which by agreement are limited as
follows:
.
e.
All parties will identify experts (i.e., with full reports required by Rule
26(a)(2), by
.
8.
a.
The parties request that this case be referred immediately for
mediation in accordance with the court's Mediation Plan as amended October
1, 2000, to the following mediator from the court's list of approved mediators:
.
b.
The parties state that they intend to hire their own mediator or neutral
person for mediation or negotiation, and request that the court stay further
progression of this case for
days to accommodate their efforts to
settle now.
c.
The parties state that this case will not be settled, and the court should
not plan or schedule settlement conferences, mediation or other alternative
dispute resolution techniques.
d.
The parties submit that the minimum discovery necessary for counsel
to negotiate toward settlement is:
, and
state that it will be completed by
.
The parties anticipate the court will contact them at that time to further
explore settlement.
91
9.
The parties
do
do not consent to trial by a magistrate judge. If the parties
consent to trial by a magistrate judge, enclose the executed consent.
10.
The parties now anticipate that the case can be ready for trial in
,
200 . If more than eight months are required, state the special problems or circumstances
that necessitate that much time for trial preparation are:
.
11.
It now appears to counsel that the trial of this case, if necessary, will require
trial days.
12.
Other matters to which the parties stipulate and/or which the court should
know/consider:
92
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
v.
_____________________________,
Defendant
Name of Party
Date
_______________________________
For_________________________
_______________
_______________________________
For_________________________
_______________
_______________________________
For_________________________
_______________
_______________________________
For_________________________
_______________
_______________________________
For_________________________
_______________
ORDER OF REFERENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case be referred to the Honorable
__________________________________________, United States Magistrate Judge, for all further
proceedings and the entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and
the foregoing consent of the parties.
___________________________
Date
______________________________________________
United States District Judge
NOTE: RETURN THIS FORM TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT ONLY IF ALL PARTIES
HAVE CONSENTED ON THIS FORM TO THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY A
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
93
94
Example of Report of
Parties' Rule 26(f)
Planning Conference
95
96
97
98
99
100
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, )
A Corporation,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________)
8:10CV306
ORDER
101
102
TO:
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
DOC. 1092
NO. 291
Dr. Devin Fox and any other providers of medical treatment, Union Pacific Railway
Hospital Association, 1416 Dodge Street, Omaha, NE 68179
Pursuant to the authority granted in 25-1273 R.R.S. Nebraska and Neb. Ct. R. Disc.
334(A), YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before a representative of Inserra &
Kelley, 6790 Grover Street, Suite 200, Omaha, NE 68106-3612, a law firm within the State of
Nebraska, on or before January 27, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., in the above-entitled action.
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to have and bring with you, or mail, the following
records in your possession including, but not limited to:
All records in your possession relating to the care and treatment of DONALD R.
DAVIS; SSN: 508-64-6870; DOB: 07/11/1949 , comprising true, correct, and complete
copies of any and all medical records of any kind including, but not limited to, medical
reports, consultation reports, doctors notes, history and physical, operative reports,
nurses notes, correspondence, x-ray and other diagnostic reports or films, itemized
statements or other billing records, and any and all documentary material of any kind.
IN LIEU OF A PERSONAL APPEARANCE, YOU MAY DELIVER/MAIL A
CLEAR AND FULLY LEGIBLE COPY OF THESE RECORDS, PRIOR TO
JANUARY 25, 2010 TO:
Christina L. Koch, ACP, Paralegal
Inserra & Kelley
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, NE 68106-3612
103
A copy of Neb. Ct. R. Disc. 6-334(A) is attached to this subpoena in compliance with Neb. Ct.
R. Disc. 6-334(A)(3). Pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Disc. 6-334(A), a notice of the serving of this
subpoena was either sent to the following or notice was waived by:
Attorney for Defendant: Anne Marie OBrien, LAMSON, DUGAN & MURRAY, LLP,
10306 Regency Parkway Drive, Omaha, NE 68114
By:___________________________
John P. Inserra, #15084
INSERRA & KELLEY
6790 Grover Street, Suite 200
Omaha, Nebraska 68106-3612
(402) 391-4000
(402) 391-4039 (Fax)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
jpinserra@inserra.com
***Refer any inquiries to Christina L. Koch, ACP, Advanced Certified Paralegal, Inserra &
Kelley, 6790 Grover Street, Suite 200, Omaha, NE 68106-3612; Phone (402) 391-4000; Fax
(402) 391-4039
104
Procedure.
(1)
(2)
(B)
obtain entry upon designated land or other property within the scope of
Rule 26(b) that is in the possession or control of a person who is not a
party for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying,
photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any designated object
or operation thereon.
Notice. A party intending to serve a subpoena pursuant to this rule shall give
notice in writing to every other party to the action at least 10 days before the
subpoena will be issued. The notice shall state the name and address of the person
who will be subpoenaed, the time and place for production or entry, and that the
subpoena will be issued on or after a stated date. A designation of the materials
sought to be produced shall be attached to or included in the notice.
Such notice may be given by a party other than a plaintiff at any time. Such notice
may not be given by a plaintiff until the time at which Rule 30(a) would permit a
plaintiff to take a deposition.
(3)
(4)
Time, manner, and return of service. A subpoena pursuant to this rule shall be
served either personally by any person not interested in the action or by registered
or certified mail not less than 10 days before the time specified for compliance.
The person making personal service shall make a return showing the manner of
service to the party for whom the subpoena was issued.
105
(b)
(c)
(2)
Order. The party who gave notice that a subpoena would be issued
may apply to the court in which the action is pending for an order
with respect to any discovery for which another party has served a
written objection. Upon hearing after notice to all parties the court
may order that the subpoena be issued or not issued or that
discovery proceed in a different manner, may enter any protective
order authorized by Rule 26(c), and may award expenses as
authorized by Rule 37(a)(4).
(3)
Protective Order. After a subpoena has been issued any party may
move for a protective order under Rule 26(c).
(2)
106
(3)
(d)
(B)
(C)
(2)
107
Coordination.
(1)
Copies. If the party for whom the subpoena was issued creates or
obtains copies of documents or things, that party shall make
available a duplicate of such copies at the request of any other
party upon advance payment of the reasonable cost of making the
copies.
(2)
Authority to issue a subpoena pursuant to this rule is governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1273. The
procedure is similar to the practice for nonparty nondeposition discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P.
45, with certain topics such as the time of prior notice and coordination of the disclosure more
specifically defined. This procedure is optional, so a party may elect to use a deposition or any
other available discovery procedure instead.
Rule 34A and Comment adopted December 12, 2001; Rule 34A(c)(2)(B) amended May 19,
2004; Rule 34A(a)(1)(A), 34A(a)(2), 34A(b)(1), 34A(c)(2)(A-B) amended June 4, 2008,
effective June 18, 2008. Renumbered and codified as 6-334(A), effective July 18, 2008.
108
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http://www.mwl-law.com/
CM/Resources/Spoliationin-all-50-states.pdf
ALABAMA
DEFINITION:
Alabama defines spoliation as: an attempt by a party to suppress or destroy material evidence
favorable to the partys adversary. May v. Moore, 424 So.2d 596, 603 (Ala. 1982); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So.2d 166, 176 (Ala. 2000).
THIRD-PARTY TORT:
Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So.2d 429, 438 (Ala. 2000), holds that spoliation may be a basis for a cause of
action where a third-party has negligently destroyed material evidence, but states that adverse
inference instruction and discovery sanctions are the remedy when spoliation is charged against an
opposing party. Smith established a test to determine when a party could be liable for negligent
spoliation of evidence. Smith, at 771 So.2d at 432, analyzes the concepts of duty, breach, and
proximate cause. With respect to proximate cause, it held: in order for a plaintiff to show proximate
cause, the trier of fact must determine that the lost or destroyed evidence was so important to the
plaintiffs claim in the underlying action that without that evidence the claim did not survive or would not
have survived a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. 771 So.2d at 434.
In order for a defendant to show proximate cause, the trier of fact must determine that the lost or
destroyed evidence was so important to the defense in the underlying action that without that evidence
the defendant had no defense to liability. Id.
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
If the trier of fact finds a party guilty of spoliation, it is authorized to presume or infer that the missing
evidence reflected unfavorably on the spoliators interest. McCleery v. McCleery, 200 Ala. 4, 75 So. 316
(Ala. 1917). Spoliation is sufficient foundation for an inference of [the spoliators] guilt or negligence.
May v. Moore, 424 So.2d 596, 603 (Ala. 1982); see also Wal-Mart Stores, supra, 789 So.2d at 176;
Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Constr. Co., 658 So.2d 408, 412 (Ala. 1995).
138
SANCTIONS:
Spoliation can have special consequences, i.e., sanction under Rule 37, Ala. R. Civ. P., when a party
frustrates a discovery request by willfully discarding critical evidence subject to a production request.
Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So.2d 82 (Ala. 1989). In such a situation, where the plaintiff is guilty of
spoliation, the sanction of dismissal of the claim may be warranted. Iverson, supra. Dismissal for failure
to comply with a request for production may be warranted even when there was no discovery pending
or even litigation underway at the time the evidence in question was discarded or destroyed. Vesta Fire
Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Const., Inc., 901 So.2d 84, 93 -94 (Ala. 2004).
ALASKA
FIRST-PARTY INTENTIONAL TORT:
In Hazen v. Anchorage, 71 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986), the plaintiff was permitted to allege spoliation
against a municipal prosecutor, who was not a party to the underlying civil suit, but was an agent of the
municipality (Anchorage). Furthermore, in Nichols v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000),
the Court implied that spoliation of evidence by a partys agent creates a claim for first-party spoliation.
Additionally, the Hazen court permitted the plaintiff to bring a claim against the individual police officers
involved in her arrest (third-party spoliation).
THIRD-PARTY INTENTIONAL TORT:
In, Nichols the Alaska Supreme Court explicitly recognized intentional third-party spoliation of evidence
as a tort. These previous holdings were relied on by the Alaska Supreme Court in Hibbits v. Sides, 34
P.3d 327 (Alaska 2001). In Hibbits, the Court held that when alleging third-party spoliation, a plaintiff
must plead and prove that the defendant intended to interfere in his civil suit.
ARIZONA
INDEPENDENT TORT ACTION:
Arizona does not recognize an independent claim for either negligent or intentional spoliation of
evidence. Tobel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 988 P.2d 148, 156 (Ariz. App. 1999).
SANCTIONS/ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Generally speaking, innocent failure to preserve evidence does not warrant sanction or dismissal.
Souza v. Fred Carriers Contracts, Inc., 955 P.2d 3, 6 (Ariz. App. 1997). However, litigants have a duty
to preserve evidence which they know or reasonably should know is relevant or reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is reasonably likely to be requested during
discovery or is the subject of a pending discovery request. Id.
Issues concerning destruction of evidence and appropriate sanctions therefore should be decided on a
case by case basis, considering all relevant factors. Id. In doing so, the court noted the destruction of
potentially relevant evidence occurs along a continuum of fault and the resulting penalties should vary
correspondingly. Id. quoting Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988).
ARKANSAS
DEFINITION:
In Arkansas, spoliation is defined as the intentional destruction of evidence and when it is established,
[the] fact-finder may draw [an] inference that [the] evidence destroyed was unfavorable to [the] party
responsible for its action. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Barber, 356 Ark. 268, 298, 149 S.W.3d 325, 345
(Ark. 2004).
2
139
CALIFORNIA
FIRST-PARTY TORT FOR INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION:
The California Supreme Court has held that there is no tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence by
a party to the cause of action to which the spoliated evidence is relevant [i.e., first-party spoliation], in
cases in which ... the spoliation victim knows or should have known of the alleged spoliation before the
trial or other decision on the merits of the underlying action. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Ct., 18
Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 258, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
THIRD-PARTY TORT FOR INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION:
The California Supreme Court has also held that there was no cause of action for intentional spoliation
of evidence by a third-party. Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Sup. Ct., 20 Cal.4th 464, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 862,
976 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1999).
NO TORT OF NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION:
The California Court of Appeal extended these decisions to preclude causes of action for negligent
spoliation by first or third parties. See Forbes v. County of San Bernardino, 101 Cal.App.4th 48, 123
Cal.Rptr.2d 721, 726-27 (Cal. 2002).
SANCTIONS:
California recognizes the availability of standard non-tort remedies to punish and deter for the
destruction of evidence. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 517 (Cal. 1998).
The available remedies may include: (1) The evidentiary inference that the evidence which one party
has destroyed or rendered unavailable was unfavorable to that party. See California Evidence Code
413 (evidence which one party has destroyed or rendered unavailable was unfavorable to that party.);
(2) Discovery sanctions under California Code of Civil Procedure 2023; (3) Disciplinary action against
the attorneys. See Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 5-220 and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6077 and 6106;
(4) Criminal penalties for destruction of evidence under California Penal Code 135 (criminalizes the
spoliation of evidence, which creates an effective deterrent against this wrongful conduct).
POST JUDGMENT TORT OF SPOLIATION:
California courts have not addressed the issue whether a tort for intentional spoliation of evidence
exists in cases of first-party spoliation in which the spoliation victim neither knows nor should have
known of the spoliation until after a decision on the merits of the underlying action. Cedars-Sinai Med.
Ctr., 74 Cal.Rptr.2d at 258 n. 4, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). As a consequence, this court must decide
this issue as it believes the California Supreme Court would do. HS Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 109 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1997).
The Federal District Court in Central California concluded that the California Supreme Court would not
recognize an intentional spoliation of evidence tort where the spoliation victim did not know nor should
3
140
have known of the spoliation until after a decision on the merits of the underlying action. See Roach v.
Lee, 369 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
COLORADO
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Colorado recognizes adverse inference as a sanction for intentional destruction of evidence. The state
of mind of the party that destroys the evidence is an important consideration in determining whether
adverse inference is the appropriate sanction. In addition, in order to remedy the evidentiary imbalance
created by the loss or destruction of the evidence, an adverse inference may be appropriate even in the
absence of a showing of bad faith. Id. Special caution must be exercised to ensure that the inference is
commensurate with the information that was reasonably likely to have been contained in the destroyed
evidence. Pfantz v. K-Mart Corp., 85 P.3d 564 (Colo. App. 2003).
CONNECTICUT
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Although Connecticut has recognized that an adverse inference may be drawn when relevant evidence
is intentionally destroyed, the courts have also recognized as a general rule that the inference is a
permissive one. Leonard v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 264 Conn. 286, 306, 823 A.2d 1184,
1197 (Conn. 2003). An adverse inference may be drawn against a party who has destroyed evidence
only if the trier of fact is satisfied that the party who seeks the adverse inference has proven three
things: (1) the spoliation must have been intentional; (2) the destroyed evidence must be relevant to the
issue or matter for which the party seeks the inference; and (3) the party who seeks the inference must
have acted with due diligence with respect to the spoliated evidence. Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp.,
236 Conn. 769, 777-78, 675 A.2d 829 (Conn. 1996).
DELAWARE
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Delaware declines to recognize a separate cause of action for negligent or intentional spoliation. See
Lucas v. Christiana Skating Center, Ltd., 722 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Del. 1998).
SANCTIONS:
Criminal penalty: 11 Del. C. 1269(2), Tampering with physical evidence, states that a person is guilty
of tampering with physical evidence when ... believing that certain physical evidence is about to be
produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and intending to prevent
its production or use the person suppresses it by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction, or
by employing force, intimidation or deception against any person.
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Where a litigant intentionally suppresses or destroys pertinent evidence, an inference arises that
evidence would be unfavorable to his case. Lucas v. Christiana Skating Center, Ltd., 722 A.2d 1247,
1250 (Del. 1998).
FLORIDA
NO INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FIRST-PARTY SPOLIAITON
The Florida Supreme Court determined in Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2005),
that the remedy against a first-party defendant for spoliation of evidence is not an independent cause of
4
141
action for spoliation of evidence. This holding clarified a split regarding the tort of spoliation between the
Third and Forth District Courts of Appeals.
THIRD-PARTY TORT OF SPOLIATION:
The holding in Marino is limited to first-party spoliation. Florida Appellate Courts have recognized an
independent claim for spoliation against third-parties. Townsend v. Conshor, Inc., 832 So.2d 166, 167
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Jost v. Lakeland Regl Med. Ctr., Inc., 844 So.2d 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Third-party spoliation claims, however, do not arise until the underlying action is completed. Lincoln Ins.
Co. v. Home Emergency Servs., Inc., 812 So.2d 433, 434-435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In order to
establish a cause of action for spoliation, a party must show: (1) the existence of a potential civil action,
(2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the potential civil action, (3)
destruction of that evidence, (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit, (5) a causal
relationship between the evidence destruction and the inability to prove the lawsuit, and (6) damages.
Jost v. Lakeland, 844 So. 2d 656, 657-685 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
SANCTIONS:
In Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So.2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987), the court held that when evidence was
intentionally lost, misplaced, or destroyed by one party, trial courts were to rely on sanctions found in
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2), and that a jury could well infer from such a finding that the records would
have contained indications of negligence. If the negligent loss of the evidence hinders the other partys
ability to establish a prima facie case, then a rebuttable presumption of negligence for the underlying
tort will be applied. This presumption and sanction were upheld in Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908
So.2d 342, 346-47 (Fla. 2005).
GEORGIA
THIRD-PARTY TORT OF SPOLIATION:
The Georgia Court of Appeals declined to recognize an independent third-party tort for spoliation of
evidence. Owens v. Am. Refuse. Sys., Inc., 244 Ga.App. 780, 536 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. 2000).
FIRST-PARTY TORT OF SPOLIATION
In Gardner v. Blackston, 185 Ga.App. 754, 365 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. 1988), the court stated in dicta that
Georgia law does not recognize spoliation of evidence as a separate tort. In Sharpnack v. Hoffinger,
231 Ga.App. 829, 499 S.E.2d 363 (Ga. 1998), the court again reviewed the issue, but since the court
had already determined that the plaintiff in the case had assumed the risk of his injury, he could not
establish a meaningful link between his underlying claims and the alleged spoliation. Therefore, the
appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.
SANCTIONS:
Georgia courts do have the authority to impose sanctions to remedy the prejudice from the spoliation of
evidence. R.A. Siegel Co. v. Bowen, 539 S.E.2d 873, 877 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). Sanctions range from
adverse inference, dismissal and exclusion of evidence. Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d
783, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); see also, Cavin v. Brown, 538 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
Courts will look to a variety of factors in determining which sanctions to impose, including: (1) whether
the party seeking sanctions was prejudiced as a result of the destruction of the evidence; (2) whether
the prejudice could be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the party that
destroyed the evidence acted in good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse of expert testimony
about the evidence was not excluded. Bridgestone/Firestone North Am. Tire, L.L.C. v. Campbell, 574
S.E.2d 923, 926 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Chapman, 469 S.E.2d at 785.
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HAWAII
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Hawaii courts have not resolved whether Hawaii law would recognize a tort of spoliation of evidence.
See Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 102 Haw. 149, 168, 73 P.3d 687, 706 (Haw. 2003).
IDAHO
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Idaho Courts have discussed this tort, but have not formally recognized it. In Yoakum v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 177-178, 923 P.2d 416, 422-423 (Idaho 1996), the court found that assuming
Idaho law would recognize the tort of spoliation, it would require the willful destruction or concealment
of evidence. In this particular case, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the
defendants destroyed any evidence which would justify holding them liable for this tort.
EVIDENTIARY RULES/SANCTIONS:
Idaho courts have recognized the spoliation doctrine as a form of admission by conduct. By resorting
to wrongful devices, the party is said to provide a basis for believing that he or she thinks the case is
weak and not to be won by fair meansAccordingly, the following are considered under this general
category of admissions by conduct:destruction or concealment of relevant documents or objects.
Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 824, 87 P.3d 930, 933 (Idaho 2003), citing McCormick On
Evidence, 4th Ed. 265, pp. 189-94 (1992) As an admission, the spoliation doctrine only applies to the
party connected to the loss or destruction of the evidence. Acts of a third person must be connected to
the party, or in the case of a corporation to one of its superior officers, by showing that an officer did the
act or authorized it by words or other conduct. Furthermore, the merely negligent loss or destruction of
evidence is not sufficient to invoke the spoliation doctrine. Moreover, the circumstances of the act must
manifest bad faith. Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not sustain the inference of
consciousness of a weak case. Id.
There may certainly be circumstances where a partys willful, intentional, and unjustifiable destruction of
evidence that the party knows is material to pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation may so
prejudice an opposing party that sanctions such as those listed in Rule 37(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure are appropriate. Id.
ILLINOIS
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a party confronted with the loss or destruction of relevant,
material evidence at the hands of an opponent may either: (1) seek dismissal of his opponents
complaint under Rule 219(c); or (2) bring a claim for negligent spoliation of evidence. The mode of relief
most appropriate will depend upon the opponents culpability in the destruction of the evidence.
TORT OF NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION:
The Supreme Court of Illinois has declined to recognize spoliation of evidence as an independent tort
and instead held that a spoliation claim can be stated under existing negligence principles. Dardeen v.
Kuehling, 213 Ill.2d 329, 335, 821 N.E.2d 227, 231, 290 Ill. Dec. 176, 180 (Ill. 2004). In order to state a
negligence claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant owed him a duty, that the defendant
breached that duty, and that the defendants breach proximately caused the plaintiff damages. The
Court tailored the duty element to spoliation claims: The general rule is that there is no duty to
preserve evidence; however, a duty to preserve evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract,
a statute or another special circumstance. Moreover, a defendant may voluntarily assume a duty by
affirmative conduct. In any of the foregoing instances, a defendant owes a duty of due care to preserve
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evidence if a reasonable person in the defendants position should have foreseen that the evidence
was material to a potential civil action. Id. This claim requires conduct that is deliberate [or]
contumacious or [evidences an] unwarranted disregard of the courts authority and should be
employed only as a last resort and after all the courts other enforcement powers have failed to
advance the litigation. Adams v. Bath and Body Works, Inc., 358 Ill.App.3d 387, 392, 830 N.E.2d 645,
651-655, 294 Ill. Dec. 233, 239 - 243 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2005).
SANCTIONS:
Sanctions for spoliation require mere negligence, the failure to foresee that the [destroyed] evidence
was material to a potential civil action. Dardeen, 213 Ill.2d at 336, 290 Ill. Dec. 176, 821 N.E.2d 227.
Rule 219(c) permits sanctions only where a party unreasonably fails to comply with a discovery order
and that a party who had nothing to do with the destruction of evidence cannot be said to have
unreasonably failed to comply with a discovery order because [b]efore noncompliance can be
unreasonable, a party must have been in a position to comply.
INDIANA
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
First-party If an alleged tortfeasor negligently or intentionally destroys or discards evidence that is
relevant to a tort action, the plaintiff in the tort action does not have an additional independent
cognizable claim against the tortfeasor for spoliation of evidence. Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824
N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ind. 2005).
THIRD-PARTY TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence is actionable as a tort only if the party alleged to have lost
or destroyed the evidence owed a duty to the person bringing the spoliation claim to have preserved it.
Glotzbach, CPA v. Froman, 827 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ind. App. 2005). To determine the existence of a duty
Indiana courts balance three factors: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable
foreseeability of harm to the person injured; and (3) public policy concerns. Id. This balancing test is to
be used only in those instances where the element of duty has not already been declared or otherwise
articulated. Id. Indiana Code 35-44-3-4 provides that a person whoalters, damages, or removes
any record, document, or thing, with intent to prevent it from being produced or used as evidence in any
official proceeding or investigationcommits obstruction of justice. This is a class D felony.
SANCTIONS:
Indiana Courts may also sanction parties, but not third parties, for the spoliation of evidence through:
(1) evidentiary inferences that the spoliated evidence was unfavorable to the responsible party; (2)
sanctions for discovery violation under Indiana Trial Rule 37(B), which authorizes courts to respond
with sanctions which include among others, ordering that designated facts be taken as established,
prohibiting the introduction of evidence, dismissal of all or part of an action, rendering judgment by
default against a disobedient party, and payment of reasonable expenses including attorneys fees; and
(3) discipline for spoliating attorneys under Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct.
IOWA
SANCTIONS:
Evidence of spoliation may allow an inference that a party who destroys a document with knowledge
that it is relevant to litigation is likely to have been threatened by the document. Lynch v. Saddler, 656
N.W.2d 104, 111 (Iowa 2003). Such inference may only be drawn when the destruction of relevant
evidence was intentional, as opposed to merely negligent or the evidence was destroyed as the result
of routine procedure. Id. However, such inference does not amount to substantive proof and cannot
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take the place of proof of a fact necessary to the other partys cause. Smith v. Shagnastys, Inc., 2004
WL 434160 (Iowa App. 2004). Interestingly, the evidentiary inference is imposed both for evidentiary
and punitive reasons. Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625 N.W.2d 714, 721 (Iowa 2001). Adverse inference
instructions should be utilized prudently and sparingly. Lynch v. Saddler, supra.
KANSAS
TORT OF SPOLIAITION:
In Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987), the Kansas
Supreme Court considered the certified question of whether Kansas would recognize a common law
tort action for intentional interference with a civil action by spoliation of evidence under the facts
presented. The Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that absent some independent tort, contract,
agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or some special relationship of the parties, the new tort of
spoliation of evidence should not be recognized in Kansas under the facts presented. Id at 215, 734
P.2d at 1177. Consequently, the U.S. District Court for Kansas held that the Supreme Court of Kansas
would recognize the tort of spoliation under some limited circumstances. Foster v. Lawrence Memorial
Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (Kan. 1992).
ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION:
Kansas law generally provides that failure to throw light upon an issue peculiar with any parties own
knowledge or reach raises a presumption open to explanation, of course, that the concealed
information was unfavorable to him. Kansas utilizes a pattern jury instruction, K.P.J.I. 102.73,
borrowed from the Illinois Jury Instruction for Inferences Arising from Failure to Produce Evidence.
The applicable jury instruction, K.P.J.I. 102.73, provides: If a party to [the] case has failed to offer
evidence within his power to produce, you may infer that the evidence would have been adverse to that
party, if you believe each of the following elements: (1) The evidence was under the control of the party
and could have been produced by the exercise of reasonable diligence. (2) The evidence was not
equally available to an adverse party. (3) A reasonably prudent person under the same or similar
circumstances would have offered if (he) (she) believed it to be favorable to him. (4) No reasonable
excuse for the failure has been shown.
KENTUCKY
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Kentucky does not recognize separate torts for either first-party or third-party spoliation of evidence.
Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997).
SANCTIONS/ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Rather, the court counteracts a partys deliberate destruction of evidence through evidentiary rules, civil
sanction, and missing evidence instructions. Id.
LOUISIANA
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Louisiana courts have recognized the right of an individual to institute a tort action against someone
who has impaired the partys ability to institute or prove a civil claim due to negligent or intentional
spoliation of evidence. See Guillory v. Dillards Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So.2d 1, 3 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2000);
McCool v. Beauregard Memorial Hosp., 814 So.2d 116, 118 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2002). A plaintiff
asserting a state law tort claim for spoliation of evidence must allege that the defendant intentionally
destroyed evidence. Desselle v. Jefferson Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So.2d 524, 534 (La. App. 2004).
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Allegations of negligent conduct are insufficient. Quinn v. RISO Investments, Inc., 869 So.2d 922 (La.
App. 2004). Where suit has not been filed and there is no evidence that a party knew suit would be filed
when the evidence was discarded, the theory of spoliation of evidence does not apply. Desselle v.
Jefferson Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So.2d at 534.
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
The tort of spoliation of evidence has its roots in the evidentiary doctrine of adverse presumption,
which allows a jury instruction for the presumption that the destroyed evidence contained information
detrimental to the party who destroyed the evidence unless such destruction is adequately explained.
Guillory v. Dillards Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So.2d 1, 3 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2000).
MAINE
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
The Maine Law Court has apparently never recognized such a cause of action, for spoliation of
evidence. Gagne v. D.E. Jonsen, Inc., 298 F.Supp.2d 145, 147 (D. Me. 2003); citing Butler v. Mooers,
2001 WL 1708836 (Me. Super., June 13, 2001), at 1. In addition, federal courts sitting in Maine have
identified spoliation as a doctrine intended to rectify any prejudice the non-offending party may have
suffered as a result of the loss of evidence and to deter any future conduct, particularly deliberate
conduct, leading to such loss of evidence. Driggin v. American Sec. Alarm Co., 141 F.Supp.2d 113,
120 (D. Me. 2000).
SANCTIONS:
The remedy for spoliation of evidence is sanctions, including dismissal of the case, the exclusion of
evidence, or a jury instruction on the spoliation inference. Id. This view of the doctrine is not consistent
with the existence of an independent cause of action arising out of such deliberate conduct. Rather, the
injured party may seek sanctions that will affect its claims or defenses. See, e.g., Pelletier v.
Magnusson, 195 F.Supp.2d 214, 233-37 (D. Me. 2002); Elwell v. Conair, Inc., 145 F.Supp.2d 79, 87-88
(D. Me. 2001).
MARYLAND
ADVERSE INFERENCE/PRESUMPTION:
In Miller v. Montgomery County, 64 Md.App. 202, 214-15, 494 A.2d 761, cert. denied, 304 Md. 299, 498
A.2d 1185 (Md. 1985), Judge Bloom, writing for the Supreme Court of Maryland, explained the effect
spoilation of evidence might have on the spoliators case as follows: The destruction or alteration of
evidence by a party gives rise to inferences or presumptions unfavorable to the spoliator, the nature of
the inference being dependent upon the intent or motivation of the party. Unexplained and intentional
destruction of evidence by a litigant gives rise to an inference that the evidence would have been
unfavorable to his cause, but would not in itself amount to substantive proof of a fact essential to his
opponents cause. Under Miller, an adverse presumption may arise against the spoliator even if there is
no evidence of fraudulent intent. Anderson v. Litzenberg, 115 Md.App. 549, 559, 694 A.2d 150, 155
(Md. App. 1997). The presumption that arises from a partys spoilation of evidence cannot be used as a
surrogate for presenting evidence of negligence in a prima facie case.
SANCTIONS:
Maryland courts have condoned discovery sanctions as remedies for spoliation of evidence. See Klupt
v. Krongard, 728 A.2d 727, 738 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). The ultimate sanction of dismissal or default
when spoliation may be imposed when the spoliation involves: (1) a deliberate act of destruction; (2)
discoverability of the evidence; (3) an intent to destroy the evidence; (4) occurrence of the act at a time
after suit has been filed, or, if before, at a time when filing is fairly perceived as imminent. White v.
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Office of the Public Defender, 170 F.R.D. 138, 147 (D. Md. 1997). One court noted that the greatest of
sanctions is appropriate when the conduct demonstrates willful or contemptuous behavior, or a
deliberate attempt to hinder or prevent effective presentation of defenses or counterclaims. Manzano v.
Southern Md. Hosp., Inc., 698 A.2d 531, 537 (Md. 1997).
MASSACHUSETTES
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
In Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 544, 773 N.E.2d 420 (2002), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court declined to recognize an action in tort for spoliation of evidence.
SANCTIONS:
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has recognized that Massachusetts courts have remedies for
spoliation of evidence, i.e., exclusion of testimony in the underlying action, dismissal, or judgment by
default. See Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 499, 802 N.E.2d 521, 535 (Mass. 2003). Sanctions
should be carefully tailored to remedy the precise unfairness occasioned by the spoliation. Id. at 426;
see also, Keene v. Brigham & Womens Hosp., Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824, 833-34 (Mass. 2003). Sanctions
may be imposed even if the spoliation of evidence occurred before the legal action was commenced, if
a litigant knows or reasonably should know that the evidence might be relevant to a possible action.
Stull v. Corrigan Racquetball Club, Inc., 2004 WL 505141 (Mass. Super. 2004).
MICHIGAN
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Michigan does not recognize spoliation of evidence as a separate tort. Panich v. Iron Wood Prods.
Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). However, Michigan has never explicitly refused to
consider spoliation of evidence as an actionable tort claim if the right facts were present. Wilson v. Sinai
Grace Hosp., 2004 WL 915044 (Mich. App. 2004).
ADVERSE INFERENCE/PRESUMPTION:
Spoliation of evidence is controlled by a jury instruction, M. Civ. J.I.2d 6.01(d), which provides that a
trier of fact may infer the evidence not offered in a case would be adverse to the offending party if: (1)
the evidence was under the offending partys control; (2) could have been produced by the offending
party; (3) that no reasonable excuse is shown for the failure to produce the evidence. When these three
elements are shown, a permissible inference is allowed that the evidence would have been adverse to
the offending party. However, the trier of fact remains free to determine this issue for itself. Lagalo v.
Allied Corp., 592 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
When there is evidence of willful destruction, a presumption arises that the non-produced evidence
would have been adverse to the offending party, and when left unrebutted, this presumption requires a
conclusion that the unproduced evidence would have been adverse to the offending party. Trupiano v.
Cully, 84 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Mich. 1957). Generally, where a party deliberately destroys evidence, or
fails to produce it, courts presume that the evidence would operate against the party who destroyed it
or failed to produce it. Johnson v. Secretary of State, 406 Mich. 420, 440, 280 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1979);
Berryman v. K Mart Corp., 193 Mich.App. 88, 101, 483 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1992); Ritter v. Meijer, Inc.,
128 Mich.App. 783, 786, 341 N.W.2d 220 (Mich. 1983). It is well-settled that only when the complaining
party can establish intentional conduct indicating fraud and a desire to destroy [evidence] and thereby
suppress the truth. can such a presumption arise. Trupiano v. Cully, 349 Mich. 568, 570, 84 N.W.2d
747 (Mich. 1957), quoting 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, 185, p. 191; see also Lagalo v. Allied Corp., 233
Mich.App. 514, 520, 592 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 1999).
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MINNESOTA
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Minnesota does not recognize an independent spoliation tort. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield
Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Minn.1990).
SANCTIONS:
Spoliation sanctions are typically imposed where one party gains an evidentiary advantage over the
opposing party by failing to preserve evidence. See Himes v. Woodings-Verona Tool Works, Inc., 565
N.W.2d 469, 471 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. 1997). This is true where the spoliator knew
or should have known that the evidence should be preserved for pending or future litigation; the intent
of the spoliator is irrelevant. Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 1995). When the
evidence is under the exclusive control of the party who fails to produce it, Minnesota permits the jury to
infer that the evidence, if produced, would have been unfavorable to that party. Federated Mut., 456
N.W.2d at 437. Furthermore, the propriety of a sanction for the spoliation of evidence is determined by
the prejudice resulting to the opposing party. Prejudice is determined by considering the nature of the
item lost in the context of the claims asserted and the potential for correcting the prejudice. Patton, 538
N.W.2d at 119. Adverse Inference Instruction Michigan, Civ. J.I.G. 12.35, reads that, If either party
does not produce evidence that the party could reasonably be expected to produce and intentionally
destroys evidence which that party has been ordered to produce and fails to give a reasonable
explanation, you may decide that theevidence would have been unfavorable to that party.
MISSISSIPPI
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
In Dowdle, the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to recognize a separate tort for intentional spoliation
of evidence against both first and third-party spoliators. Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d
1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002). In Richardson the Court likewise refused to recognize a separate tort for
negligent spoliation of evidence. Richardson v. Sara Lee Corp., 847 So.2d 821, 824 (Miss. 2003).
ADVERSE INFERENCE/PRESUMPTION:
In Stahl v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 47 F.Supp.2d 783, 787 n. 3 (S.D. Miss. 1998), the court held that in
the absence of bad faith i.e., evidence of culpability on the part of the spoliator then there can be no
adverse influence or presumptioneven when there is prejudice to the innocent party. The court
further held it is a general rule that the intentional spoliation or destruction of evidence relevant to a
case raises a presumption, or, more properly, an inference, that this evidence would have been
unfavorable to the case of the spoliator. Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1372-73 (Miss. 1987),
quoting Washington v. State, 478 So.2d 1028, 1032-33 (Miss. 1985). Such a presumption or inference
arises, however, only when the spoliation or destruction was intentional and indicates fraud and a
desire to suppress the truth and it does not rise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no
fraudulent intent. Id.
SANCTIONS:
Spoliation remedies include discovery sanctions, criminal penalties or disciplinary actions against
attorneys who participate in spoliation. Dowdle, supra. Mississippi recognizes a refutable negative or
adverse inference against a spoliator. Thomas v. Isle of Capri Casino, 781 So.2d 125 (Miss. 2001).
MISSOURI
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
A party who intentionally destroys or significantly alters evidence is subject to an adverse evidentiary
inference under the spoliation of evidence doctrine. Baldridge v. Director of Revenue, 82 S.W.3d 212,
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222 (Mo. App. 2002). [T]he destruction of written evidence without satisfactory explanation gives rise
to an inference unfavorable to the spoliator. Garrett v. Terminal R. Assn of St. Louis, 259 S.W.2d 807,
812 (Mo. 1953). Similarly, where one party has obtained possession of physical evidence which [the
party] fails to produce or account for at the trial, an inference is warranted against that party. State ex
rel. St. Louis County Transit Co. v. Walsh, 327 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo. App. 1959). [W]here one
conceals or suppresses evidence such action warrants an unfavorable inference. Id. at 717-18.
When an adverse inference is urged, it is necessary that there be evidence showing intentional
destruction of the item, and also such destruction must occur under circumstances which give rise to an
inference of fraud and a desire to suppress the truth. In such cases, it may be shown by the proponent
that the alleged spoliator had a duty, or should have recognized a duty, to preserve the evidence.
Morris v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 73, 77-78 (Mo. App. 1995). Since the doctrine of
spoliation is a harsh rule of evidence, prior to applying it in any given case, it should be the burden of
the party seeking its benefit to make a prima facie showing the opponent destroyed the missing
[evidence] under circumstances manifesting fraud, deceit or bad faith. Baldridge, supra.. Simple
negligence is not sufficient to apply the adverse inference rule. Brissette v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 479
S.W.2d 176, 182 (Mo. App. 1972).
MONTANA
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Montana courts have adopted the torts of both intentional and negligent spoliation against third parties.
Negligent spoliation of evidence consists of the following elements: (1) existence of a potential civil
action; (2) legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence relevant to that action; (3) destruction of that
evidence; (4) significant impairment of the ability to prove the potential civil action; (5) causal
connection between the destruction of the evidence and the inability to prove the lawsuit; (6) significant
possibility of success of the potential civil action if the evidence were available; and (7) damages. See
Gentry v. Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc., 1998 Mont. 182, 290 Mont. 126, 962 P.2d 1205 (Mont. 1998);
Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 297 Mont. 336, 345-354, 993 P.2d 11, 18-23 (Mont. 1999). Intentional
spoliation consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a potential lawsuit; (2) the defendants
knowledge of the potential lawsuit; (3) the intentional destruction of evidence designed to disrupt or
defeat the potential lawsuit; (4) disruption of the potential lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the
act of spoliation and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages. Id.
Under Montana law, the tort of spoliation of evidence (whether intentional or negligent) requires the
existence of a potential lawsuit. Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 297 Mont. 336, 993 P.2d 11, 21 (Mont.
1999). Spoliation of evidence can only occur in connection with some other lawsuit; it is intrinsically
bound up in the same transaction as the underlying lawsuit. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 378 F.3d
1048, 1058 (9th Cir. Mont. 2004).
NEBRASKA
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
When intentional destruction of evidence is established, the fact finder may draw the inference that the
evidence destroyed was unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. See State v. Davlin,
263 Neb. 283, 639 N.W.2d 631 (Neb. 2002); Trieweiler v. Sears, 268 Neb. 952, 992, 689 N.W.2d 807,
843 (Neb. 2004).
NEVADA
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Nevada does not recognize a separate tort for first-party or third-party spoliation of evidence. Timber
Tech Engineered Bldg. Products v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 953-54 (Nev. 2002).
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ADVERSE INFERENCE:
It is well-established that a party is entitled to jury instructions on every theory of her case that is
supported by the evidence. Bass-Davis v. Davis, 117 P.3d 207, 209 (Nev. 2005). In Reingold v. Wet N
Wild Nevada, Inc., 113 Nev. 967, 970, 944 P.2d 800, 802 (Nev. 1997), the Nevada Supreme Court
recognized that under N.R.S. 47.250(3), when evidence is willfully destroyed, the trier of fact is
entitled to presume that the evidence was adverse to the destroying party. It further held that evidence
is willfully destroyed even if the evidence is destroyed pursuant to an established company policy.
Bass-Davis v. Davis, 117 P.3d at 210.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
An adverse inference that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable can be drawn only
when the evidence was destroyed deliberately with a fraudulent intent. See Rodriguez v. Webb, 141
N.H. 177, 180, 680 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1996). The timing of the document destruction is not dispositive on
the issue of intent, however, and an adverse inference can be drawn even when the evidence is
destroyed prior to a claim being made. See Id. at 178, 180, 680 A.2d 604; Murray v. Developmental
Services of Sullivan County, Inc., 149 N.H. 264, 271, 818 A.2d 302, 309 (N.H. 2003).
NEW JERSEY
ADVERSE INFERENCE AND SANCTIONS:
Spoliation of evidence in a prospective civil action occurs when evidence relevant to the action is
destroyed, causing interference with the actions proper administration and disposition. Manorcare
Health v. Osmose Wood, 336 N.J. Super. 218, 226, 764 A.2d 475, 479 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). In civil
litigation, depending on the circumstances, spoliation of evidence can result in a separate tort action for
fraudulent concealment, discovery sanctions, or an adverse trial inference against the party that caused
the loss of evidence. See Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 400-06, 766 A.2d 749 (N.J. 2001).
But, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that it did not recognize a separate tort action for
intentional spoliation. Id. at 404-05. An adverse inference instruction may be given during the
underlying litigation whereby it is presumed the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to
the destroyer. See Swick v. N.Y. Times, 815 A.2d 508, 511 (N.J. 2003).
Discovery sanctions may include a designation that certain facts are taken as established, a refusal to
permit the disobedient party to support or oppose claims or defenses, prohibiting the introduction of
designated matters into evidence, dismissal of an action, or entry of judgment by default. Id. An
appropriate remedy may include an award of counsel fees in exceptional cases, particularly where
there is a finding of intentional spoliation and the non-spoliating partys ability to defend itself was
compromised. Grubbs v. Knoll, 376 N.J. Super. 420, 435-436, 870 A.2d 713 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2005).
NEW MEXICO
TORT OF INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION:
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. Coleman
v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 120 N.M. 645, 649, 905 P.2d 185, 189 (N.M. 1995) overruled on other grounds,
Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 34 P.3d 1148 (N.M. 2001). Coleman established the following
elements for the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence: (1) the existence of a potential lawsuit; (2) the
defendants knowledge of the potential lawsuit; (3) the destruction, mutilation, or significant alteration of
potential evidence; (4) intent on the part of the defendant to disrupt or defeat the lawsuit; (5) a causal
relationship between the act of spoliation and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages.
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NEW YORK
THIRD-PARTY NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION:
The Court of Appeals of New York declined to recognize such a cause of action under the facts of MetLife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 478, 807 N.E.2d 865, 775 N.Y.S.2d 754 (N.Y.
2004). The court in this case focused its decision on the non-existence of a duty giving rise to
preservation of evidence and the lack of notice to preserve the evidence militated against establishing
such a cause of action.
SPOLAITION BY AN EMPLOYER:
Spoliation by an employer may support a common law cause of action when such spoliation impairs an
employees right to sue a third-party tortfeasor. See DiDomenico v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, 252
A.D.2d 41, 682 N.Y.S.2d 452 (N.Y. 2d Dept. 1998). But in other instances, New York Courts have
specifically rejected a cause of action for spoliation of evidence when the employer was not on notice
that evidence would be needed. Monteiro v. R.D. Werner Co., 301 A.D.2d 636, 754 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y.
2d Dept. 2003) (employer had no duty to preserve scaffold which allegedly caused plaintiffs injuries
and employer was not on notice that an action was contemplated against a third-party).
SANCTIONS:
C.P.L.R. 3126 permits sanctions, including dismissal for a partys failure to disclose relevant
evidence. Met-Life, 1 N.Y.3d at 482-83. New York courts will impose carefully chosen and specifically
tailored sanctions within the context of the underlying action to remedy spoliation of evidence. For
instance, a defendant may be granted summary judgment when the plaintiff negligently fails to preserve
crucial evidence. Amaris v. Sharp Elecs., 758 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). However, awarding
summary judgment to the plaintiff for the defendants intentional destruction of evidence may be too
drastic a remedy. Mylonas v. Town of Brookhaven, 759 N.Y.S.2d 752, 753-754 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
But see Herrera v. Matlin, 758 N.Y.S.2d 7, 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), affd 771 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. A.D.
2004) (physicians loss of records amounting to professional misconduct warranted striking of answer).
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NORTH CAROLINA
ADVERSE PRESUMPTION/INFERENCE:
The North Carolina Supreme Court recognizes a permissive, rather than mandatory adverse inference
may be drawn against a spoliator of evidence. McLain v. Taco Bell Corp., 137 N.C. App. 179, 182-192,
527 S.E.2d 712, 715 - 721 (N.C. App. 2000). [T]o qualify for the adverse inference, the party
requesting it must ordinarily show that the spoliator was on notice of the claim or potential claim at the
time of the destruction. McLain, 137 N.C. App. at 187, 527 S.E.2d at 718 (quotation omitted). The
obligation to preserve evidence may arise prior to the filing of a complaint where the opposing party is
on notice that litigation is likely to be commenced. Id. The evidence lost must be pertinent and
potentially supportive of plaintiffs allegations. Id. at 188, 527 S.E.2d at 718.
Finally, [t]he proponent of a missing document inference need not offer direct evidence of a cover-up
to set the stage for the adverse inference. Circumstantial evidence will suffice. Id. at 186, 527 S.E.2d
at 718; Arndt v. First Union Nat. Bank, 613 S.E.2d 274, 281-283 (N.C. App. 2005).
NORTH DAKOTA
ADVERSE INFERENCE/SANCTIONS:
Trial courts in North Dakota have the authority to sanction a party when key evidence is missing, even
where the party has not violated a court order and even when there has been a no finding of bad faith.
Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctrs., 544 N.W.2d 122, 124 (N.D. 1996). In sanctioning a party, the
district court should at least consider the culpability, or state of mind, of the party against whom
sanctions are being imposed; a finding of prejudice against the moving party, and the degree of this
prejudice, including the impact it has on presenting or defending the case; and, the availability of less
severe alternative sanctions. Id. at 124-25. Trial courts have the duty to impose the least restrictive
sanction available under the circumstances in the exercise of its inherit power. Id. at 125. Sanctions
can include dismissal, preclusion of evidence, or adverse inference. Id. at 126.
OHIO
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a cause of action exists in tort for intentional spoliation against
parties to the primary action as well as third parties. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d
28, 29, 615 N.E2d 1037 (Ohio 1993). The elements required are: (1) pending or probable litigation
involving the plaintiff; (2) knowledge on the part of the defendant that litigation exists or is probable; (3)
willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt plaintiffs case; (4) disruption of
plaintiffs case; and (5) damages proximately caused by defendants acts.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that spoliation of evidence may be the basis of an award of
punitive damages in an underlying medical malpractice action. Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635
N.E.2d 331 (Ohio App. 1994).
SANCTIONS/ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Courts also recognize discovery sanctions for an adverse partys failure to provide evidence if the same
was willful and prejudice is established. Barker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 WL 1661961, 7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 31, 2001). Ohio uses Jury Instruction 305.1. Tate v. Adena Regional Med. Ctr., 801 N.E.2d
930 (Ohio App. 2003).
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OKLAHOMA
TORT OF SPOLIAITON:
In Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 987 P.2d 1185 (Okla. 1999), the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated [n]either spoliation of evidence nor prima facie tort (for acts constituting spoliation of evidence)
has ever been recognized by this court as actionable.
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Spoliation occurs when evidence relevant to prospective civil litigation is destroyed, adversely affecting
the ability of a litigant to prove his or her claim. Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 987 P.2d at 1202. If
applicable, destruction of evidence without a satisfactory explanation gives rise to an inference
unfavorable to the spoliator. Manpower, Inc. v. Brawdy, 62 P.3d 391, 392 (Okla. Ct. App. 2002).
OREGON
ADVERSE PRESUMPTION:
Oregon has a statutory provision allowing that willful suppression of evidence raises an unfavorable
presumption against the party who suppressed it. O.R.S. 40.135, Rule 311(1)(c). see also Stephens
v. Bohlman, 909 P.2d 208, 211 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
PENNSYLVANIA
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Spoliation of evidence is not recognized as a separate cause of action under Pennsylvania law. Elias v.
Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
SANCTIONS:
Parties can be sanctioned for spoliation of evidence. Id. In Pennsylvania, spoliation provides that a
party cannot benefit from its own withholding or destruction of evidence by creating an adverse
inference that the evidence is unfavorable to that party. Manson v. Southeastern Transp. Auth., 767
A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 2001). Whether and how to sanction a party is within the discretion of the court. Eichman
v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305, 312-314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). A determination of the appropriate sanction
requires the court to determine three factors: (1) the degree of fault of the parties who alter or destroy
the evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing parties; (3) the availability of a lesser
sanction that will protect the opposing parties rights and deter future similar conduct. Id. (citing
Schroeder v. Commonwealth Dept of Transp., 710 A.2d 23 (Pa. 1998) (adopting the test from Schmid
v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir. 1994)).
RHODE ISLAND
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Neither the Rhode Island legislature or the courts have yet established or recognized the existence of
an independent tort for spoliation of evidence. See Malinowski v. Documented Vehicle/Drivers
Systems, Inc., 66 Fed. Appx. 216, 222 (R.I. 2003).
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Rhode Island does recognize that an adverse inference may be given as a spoliation of evidence
instruction. Mead v. Papa Razzi Restaurant, 840 A.2d 1103, 1108 (R.I. 2004). The party seeking the
spoliation of evidence has the burden of proof to establish that the destruction of evidence was
deliberate or negligent. See Malinowski v. United Parcel Serv., 792 A.2d 50, 54-55 (R.I. 2002).
Furthermore, it is not necessary to show bad faith by the spoliator to draw the adverse inference,
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however bad faith may strengthen the spoliation inference. Kurczy v. St. Josephs Veterans Assn, Inc.,
820 A.2d 929, 946 (R.I. 2003).
SOUTH CAROLINA
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
There is no case law in South Carolina discussing spoliation of evidence, specifically. However, South
Carolina apparently recognizes a type of adverse inference rule as it relates to loss or destruction of
evidence. Wisconsin Motor Corp. v. Green, 79 S.E.2d 718, 720-21 (S.C. 1954). It appears as though
such inference may be given when a party does not provide an explanation for its failure to produce
appropriate documents. Id.
SOUTH DAKOTA
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Under South Dakota law, if a party fails to present evidence or witnesses, such non-production justifies
an inference that the evidence would be unfavorable. Cody v. Leapley, 476 N.W.2d 257, 264 (S.D.
1991). The non-production or suppression by a party of evidence which is within his power to produce
and which is material to an issue in the case justifies the inference that it would be unfavorable to him if
produced. Id.; Leisinger v. Jacobson, 651 N.W.2d 693, 699 (S.D. 2002). The burden of proof with
respect to the adverse inference rule is on the spoliator to show that it acted in a non-negligent, good
faith manner in destroying the document sought. Wuest v. McKennan Hosp., 619 N.W.2d 682, 686
(S.D. 2000). The spoliator must show he acted in good faith without negligence or malice in destroying
the evidence. Id. A jury is required to determine if the explanation given is reasonable and if so, may
not infer that the missing information contained unfavorable evidence to the opposing party. Id.
TENNESSEE
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
The doctrine of spoliation of evidence permits a court to draw a negative inference against a party that
has intentionally, and for an improper purpose, destroyed, mutilated, lost, altered, or concealed
evidence. See Foley v. St. Thomas Hosp., 906 S.W.2d 448, 453-54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Bronson v.
Umphries, 138 S.W.3d 844, 854 -855 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
TEXAS
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Texas does not recognize an independent cause of action for intentional or negligent spoliation of
evidence by parties to litigation. Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1998).
ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION:
A spoliation instruction is an instruction given to the jury outlining permissible inferences they may
make against a party who has lost, altered, or destroyed evidence. Brewer v. Dowling, 862 S.W.2d 156,
159 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1993), writ denied. A party who has deliberately destroyed evidence is
presumed to have done so because the evidence was unfavorable to its case. A trial judge has broad
discretion in determining whether to provide a jury with a spoliation presumption instruction. See
Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1998); Texas Elec. Co-op. v. Dillard, 171 S.W.3d 201,
208-209 (Tex. App. Tyler 2005). The intentional spoliation of evidence relevant to a cause raises a
presumption the evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliators. Id. This presumption can be
rebutted by evidence that the spoliation was not a result of fraudulent intent and does not apply when
documents are merely lost. Cresthaven Nursing Residence v. Freeman, 2003 WL 253283, 8, 10 (Tex.
Ct. App., Feb. 5, 2003).
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The presumption does not arise unless the party responsible for destruction of evidence had a duty to
preserve it. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2003). However, such a duty
arises only when a party knows or reasonably should know that there is a substantial chance that a
claim will be filed and that evidence in its possession or control will be material and relevant to that
claim. Id. A party need not take extraordinary measures to preserve evidence, but must exercise
reasonable care in preserving evidence. Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 951. A court may determine there is no
breach of the duty to preserve evidence if the alleged spoliator offers an innocent explanation such as
that the evidence was destroyed in an ordinary course of business. Id. Finally, the party alleging
spoliation is not entitled to remedy unless it establishes prejudice. Id.
UTAH
There is no authority demonstrating that Utah has adopted the spoliation doctrine. See Burns v.
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah App. 1994).
VERMONT
The only Vermont case discussing destruction of evidence requires that a party must have reason or
obligation to preserve evidence before a presumption of falsity will arise. Lavalette v. Noyes, 205 A.2d
413, 415 (Vt. 1964).
VIRGINIA
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
Virginia law recognizes spoliation or missing evidence inference, which provides that [w]here one party
has within his control material evidence and does not offer it, there is [an inference] that the evidence, if
it had been offered, would have been unfavorable to that party. Charles E. Friend, The Law of
Evidence in Virginia 10-17, at 338 (5th ed.1999); see Jacobs v. Jacobs, 218 Va. 264, 269, 237 S.E.2d
124, 127 (Va. 1977) (holding principle is an inference rather than a presumption). Further, Virginia
acknowledges that spoliation issues also arise when evidence is lost, altered, or cannot be produced.
Wolfe v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 40 Va. App. 565, 580-583, 580
S.E.2d 467, 475-476 (Va. App. 2003). A spoliation inference may be applied in an existing action if, at
the time the evidence was lost or destroyed, a reasonable person in the defendants position should
have foreseen that the evidence was material to a potential civil action.
In a third-party spoliation context, an employer has no duty to preserve evidence on behalf of an
employee who seeks to bring a third-party claim. Austin v. Consolidation Coal Co., 501 S.E.2d 161, 163
(Va. 1998). Under the Virginia Workers Compensation Act there is no duty imposed on an employer to
preserve evidence. Id. at 163-64. However, this case applies only to an employers duty to preserve
evidence.
ADMISSION (PARTY OR AGAINST INTEREST):
In general, a partys conduct, so far as it indicates his own belief in the weakness of his cause, may be
used against him as an admission, subject of course to any explanations he may be able to make
removing that significance from his conduct conduct showing the concealment or destruction of
evidential material isadmissible; in particular the destruction (spoliation) of documents as evidence of
an admission that their contents are as alleged by the opponents. 1 Greenleaf Ev. (16 Ed.), 195, at
325. Neece v. Neece, 104 Va. 343, 348, 51 S.E. 739, 740-41 (Va. 1905); Wolfe v. Virginia Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 40 Va. App. 565, 580-583, 580 S.E.2d 467, 475-476 (Va. App.
2003).
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WASHINGTON
ADVERSE INFERENCE/REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION:
In Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 89 Wash.2d 379, 573 P.2d 2 (Wash. 1977), the court held: where
relevant evidence which would properly be a part of a case is within the control of a party whose
interests it would naturally be to produce it and he fails to do so, without satisfactory explanation, the
only inference which the finder of fact may draw is that such evidence would be unfavorable to him. 89
Wash.2d at 385-86, 573 P.2d 2. To remedy spoliation the court may apply a rebuttable presumption,
which shifts the burden of proof to a party who destroys or alters important evidence. In deciding
whether to apply a rebuttable presumption in spoliation cases, two factors control: (1) the potential
importance or relevance of the missing evidence; and (2) the culpability or fault of the adverse party.
Marshall v. Ballys Pacwest, Inc.. 94 Wash. App. 372, 381-383, 972 P.2d 475, 480 (Wash. App. Div. 2,
1999). In weighing the importance of the evidence, the court considers whether the adverse party was
afforded an adequate opportunity to examine it. Culpability turns on whether the party acted in bad faith
or whether there is an innocent explanation for the destruction. Id.
WEST VIRGINIA
TORT OF SPOLIATION - INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION:
West Virginia does recognize a tort of intentional spoliation of evidence as an independent tort when
committed by either a party to an action or a third-party. See Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 56364 (W. Va. 2003). The elements of the tort of intentional spoliation consists of: (1) a pending or potential
civil action; (2) knowledge of the spoliator of the pending or potential civil action; (3) willful destruction of
the evidence (4) the spoliated evidence was vital to a partys ability to prevail in the pending or potential
civil action; (5) the intent of the spoliator to defeat a partys ability to prevail in the pending or potential
civil action; (6) the partys inability to prevail in the civil action; and (7) damages. Once the first six
elements are established, there arises a rebuttable presumption that but for the fact of the spoliation the
party injured by the spoliation would have prevailed in the pending or potential litigation. Id.
NEGLIGENT SPOLIATION:
West Virginia does not recognize spoliation of evidence as an independent tort when the spoliation is
the caused by the negligence of a party to a civil action. Id.
NEGLIGENT THIRD-PARTY SPOLIATION:
West Virginia does recognize spoliation of evidence as an independent tort when the spoliation is the
result of negligence of a third-party and that third-party had a special duty to preserve the evidence. Id.
The element of the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence by a third-party consists of: (1) the existence
of a pending or potential civil action; (2) the alleged spoliator had actual knowledge of the pending or
potential civil action; (3) a duty to preserve evidence arising from a contract, agreement, statute,
administrative rule, voluntary assumption, or special circumstances; (4) spoliation of the evidence; (5)
the spoliated evidence was vital to a partys ability to prevail in the pending or potential civil action; and
(6) damages. (There arises a rebuttable presumption that but for the fact of the spoliation of evidence
the party injured by the spoliation would have prevailed in the pending or potential civil litigation if the
first five element are met). Id.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
In actions of tort where willful conduct affecting the rights of others appears a jury may assess
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages. Id.
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
A trial court may give an adverse inference jury instruction or impose other sanctions against a party for
spoliation of evidence after considering: (1) the partys degree of control, ownership, possession or
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authority over the destroyed evidence; (2) the amount of prejudice suffered by the opposing party as a
result of the missing or destroyed evidence and whether such prejudice was substantial; (3) the
reasonableness of anticipating that the evidence would be needed for litigation; and (4) if the party
controlled, owned, possessed or had authority over the evidence, the partys degree of fault in causing
the destruction of the evidence. Id. The party requesting the instruction bears the burden of proof.
SANCTIONS:
Rule 37, of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, is designed to permit the use of sanctions
against a party who refuses to comply with the discovery rules. Id.
WISCONSIN
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Wisconsin has not recognized independent tort actions for the intentional and negligent spoliation of
evidence. Estate of Neumann ex rel. Rodli v. Neumann, 242 Wis.2d 205, 244-249, 626 N.W.2d 821,
840 - 843 (Wis. App. 2001).
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
The trier of fact can draw an adverse inference from intentional spoliation of evidence. Id.; Jagmin v.
Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis.2d 60, 80-81, 211 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 1973). The Supreme Court affirmed
the trial courts refusal to give an adverse inference instruction in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that the defendant had intentionally destroyed or fabricated evidence. Jagmin, 61
Wis.2d at 80-81, 211 N.W.2d 810.
SANCTIONS:
Wisconsin trial courts have discretion in imposing sanctions for spoliation of evidence. See State v.
McGrew, 646 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). However, sanctions cannot be considered unless
there is clear and convincing proof that evidence was deliberately destroyed or withheld. Hoskins v.
Dodge County, 642 N.W.2d 213, 228 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). When deciding whether and how to
sanction a party who has destroyed evidence, Wisconsin courts consider the circumstances, including
whether the destruction was intentional or negligent, whether comparable evidence is available, and
whether at the time of destruction the responsible party knew or should have known that a lawsuit was
a possibility. Farr v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 287 Wis.2d 827, 705 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. 2005); Id. In Garfoot v.
Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 228 Wis.2d 707, 724, 599 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999), the court held
that dismissal as a sanction for destruction of evidence requires a finding of egregious conduct, which,
in this context, consists of a conscious attempt to affect the outcome of litigation or a flagrant knowing
disregard of the judicial process. The spoliation rule does not apply in administrative proceedings. Yao
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 649 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
WYOMING
TORT OF SPOLIATION:
Rather than recognize an independent tort claim for fraudulent creation of evidence (or spoliation of
evidence), Wyoming law allows courts to draw an adverse inference against a party responsible for
losing or destroying evidence. See Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 775-776 (10th Cir.
1999) (applying Wyoming law).
ADVERSE INFERENCE:
It is well-settled that a partys bad-faith with holding, destruction, or alteration of a document or other
physical evidence relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise to a presumption or inference that the
evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its non-production, destruction, or
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alteration. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that, for example, in a negligence action, where a party
demonstrates that evidence was concealed or destroyed in bad faith (either deliberately or with
reckless disregard for its relevance), that fact should be admitted, counsel should be permitted to argue
the inference to the jury, the court should instruct the jury as to the inference, and the jury may infer that
the fact would have helped prove negligence; a courts refusal may be an abuse of discretion. Indeed,
some courts have held that such destruction creates a presumption that shifts the burden of production,
or even persuasion, to the party responsible for the destruction. Abraham v. Great Western Energy,
LLC, 101 P.3d 446, 455-456 (Wyo. 2004).
SANCTIONS:
Where the evidence, rather than being destroyed, has been tampered with in bad faith, a court has the
option of excluding it, thus denying its use by the tampering party. Where the alteration is not in bad
faith and is not so egregious, however, the evidence itself should be admitted, together with information
relating to how it was altered, and counsel may argue the issue to the jury. Id. Where the loss or
destruction of evidence is not intentional or reckless, by contrast, some courts give the trial court
discretion to admit or exclude testimony relating to the missing evidence, and discretion to give or
withhold a missing evidence instruction and a court should refuse to give such instruction if the nonproduced evidence is cumulative or of marginal relevance. Id.
In a case that warrants imposition of a sanction against the spoliating party, the court may choose to
instruct the jury on the spoliation inference, i.e., inform the jury that the lost evidence is to be
presumed unfavorable to that party; preclude the spoliating party from introducing expert testimony
concerning testing on the missing product or other evidence concerning the product; or dismiss the
plaintiffs claim or the defendants defense or grant summary judgment to the innocent party. Abraham
v. Great Western Energy, LLC,101 P.3d at 455-456, citing Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Effect of
Spoliation of Evidence in Products Liability Action, 102 A.L.R. 5th 99-100 (2002).
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Accordingly, electronic data and storage media that may be subject to our discovery requests and
that your client{s} are obligated to maintain and not alter or destroy, include but are not limited to
the following:
Introduction: description of files and file types sought
All digital or analog electronic files, including deleted files and file fragments, stored in machinereadable format on magnetic, optical or other storage media, including the hard drives or floppy
disks used by your clients {clients} computers and their backup media (e.g., other hard drives,
backup tapes, floppies, Jaz cartridges, CD-ROMs) or otherwise, whether such files have been
reduced to paper printouts or not. More specifically, your client{s} is {are} to preserve all of your emails, both sent and received, whether internally or externally; all word-processed files, including
drafts and revisions; all spreadsheets, including drafts and revisions; all databases; all CAD
(computer-aided design) files, including drafts and revisions; all presentation data or slide shows
produced by presentation software (such as Microsoft PowerPoint); all graphs, charts and other
data produced by project management software (such as Microsoft Project); all data generated by
calendaring, task management and personal information management (PIM) software (such as
Microsoft Outlook or Lotus Notes); all data created with the use of personal data assistants
(PDAs), such as PalmPilot, HP Jornada, Cassiopeia or other Windows CE-based or Pocket PC
devices; all data created with the use of document management software; all data created with
the use of paper and electronic mail logging and routing software; all Internet and Web-browsergenerated history files, caches and cookies files generated at the workstation of each employee
and/or agent in your clients {clients} employ and on any and all backup storage media; and any
and all other files generated by users through the use of computers and/or telecommunications,
including but not limited to voice mail. Further, you are to preserve any log or logs of network use
by employees or otherwise, whether kept in paper or electronic form, and to preserve all copies of
your backup tapes and the software necessary to reconstruct the data on those tapes, so that
there can be made a complete, bit-by-bit mirror evidentiary image copy of the storage media of
each and every personal computer (and/or workstation) and network server in your control and
custody, as well as image copies of all hard drives retained by you and no longer in service, but in
use at any time from ________________ to the present.
Your client{s} is {are} also not to pack, compress, purge or otherwise dispose of files and parts of
files unless a true and correct copy of such files is made.
Your client{s} is {are} also to preserve and not destroy all passwords, decryption procedures
(including, if necessary, the software to decrypt the files); network access codes, ID names,
manuals, tutorials, written instructions, decompression or reconstruction software, and any and all
other information and things necessary to access, view and (if necessary) reconstruct the
electronic data we [are requesting/will request] through discovery.
1. Business Records: [All documents and information about documents containing backup
and/or archive policy and/or procedure, document retention policy, names of backup and/or
archive software, names and addresses of any offsite storage provider.]
a. All e-mail and information about e-mail (including message contents, header information
and logs of e-mail system usage) {sent or received} by the following persons:
[list names, job titles]
b. All other e-mail and information about e-mail (including message contents, header
information and logs of e-mail system usage) containing information about or related to:
[insert detail]
161
c.
All databases (including all records and fields and structural information in such
databases), containing any reference to and/or information about or related to:
[insert detail]
d. All logs of activity (both in paper and electronic formats) on computer systems and
networks that have or may have been used to process or store electronic data containing
information about or related to:
[insert detail]
e. All word processing files, including prior drafts, deleted files and file fragments,
containing information about or related to:
[insert detail]
f.
With regard to electronic data created by application programs which process financial,
accounting and billing information, all electronic data files, including prior drafts, deleted
files and file fragments, containing information about or related to:
[insert detail]
g. All files, including prior drafts, deleted files and file fragments, containing information
from electronic calendars and scheduling programs regarding or related to:
[insert detail]
h. All electronic data files, including prior drafts, deleted files and file fragments about or
related to:
[insert detail]
2. Online Data Storage on Mainframes and Minicomputers: With regard to online storage
and/or direct access storage devices attached to your clients {clients} mainframe computers
and/or minicomputers: they are not to modify or delete any electronic data files, deleted files and
file fragments existing at the time of this letters delivery, which meet the definitions set forth in
this letter, unless a true and correct copy of each such electronic data file has been made and
steps have been taken to assure that such a copy will be preserved and accessible for purposes
of this litigation.
3. Offline Data Storage, Backups and Archives, Floppy Diskettes, Tapes and Other
Removable Electronic Media: With regard to all electronic media used for offline storage,
including magnetic tapes and cartridges and other media that, at the time of this letters delivery,
contained any electronic data meeting the criteria listed in paragraph 1 above: Your client {clients}
is {are} to stop any activity that may result in the loss of such electronic data, including rotation,
destruction, overwriting and/or erasure of such media in whole or in part. This request is intended
to cover all removable electronic media used for data storage in connection with their computer
systems, including magnetic tapes and cartridges, magneto-optical disks, floppy diskettes and all
other media, whether used with personal computers, minicomputers or mainframes or other
computers, and whether containing backup and/or archive data sets and other electronic data, for
all of their computer systems.
4. Replacement of Data Storage Devices: Your client {clients} is {are} not to dispose of any
electronic data storage devices and/or media that may be replaced due to failure and/or upgrade
and/or other reasons that may contain electronic data meeting the criteria listed in paragraph 1
above.
162
163
Our Client:
Claim:
Accident Location:
Date of Accident:
Dear Ms. Dubose:
By this letter, Wal-Mart is hereby given notice not to destroy, conceal or alter any paper
or electronic files and other data generated by and/or stored on your clients computers
and storage media (e.g., hard disks, floppy disks, backup tapes), or any other electronic
data, such as voice mail, video surveillance tapes, and photographs, including digital and
hard copies. As you know, Wal-Marts failure to comply with this notice can result in
severe sanctions being imposed by the Court and liability in tort for spoliation of
evidence or potential evidence.
Through discovery we expect to obtain from Wal-Mart a number of documents and
things, including files stored on its computers and computer storage media, the
surveillance tapes from the date of the accident, any accident reports or incident reports,
maintenance logs, photos, and any and all other relevant documents. Enclosed is a draft
of the Complaint we intend to file early next week. As part of our initial discovery
efforts, you will receive initial interrogatories and requests for documents and items.
In order to avoid spoliation, you will need to provide the data requested on the original
media. Do not reuse any media to provide this data. Electronic documents and the
storage media on which they reside contain relevant, discoverable information beyond
that which may be found in printed documents. Therefore, even where a paper copy
exists, we will seek all documents in their electronic form along with information about
164
Ms.TeresaDubose 2
March18,2010
those documents contained on the media. We also will seek paper printouts of only those
documents that contain unique information after they were printed out (such as paper
documents containing handwriting, signatures, marginalia, drawings, annotations,
highlighting and redactions) along with any paper documents for which no corresponding
electronic files exist. Courts have made it clear that all information available on
electronic storage media is discoverable, whether readily readable (active) or deleted
but recoverable.
Evidence Created Subsequent to This Letter: With regard to electronic data created
subsequent to the date of delivery of this letter, relevant evidence is not to be destroyed
and Wal-Mart is to take whatever steps are appropriate to avoid destruction of evidence.
In order to assure that Wal-Marts obligation to preserve documents and things will be
met, please forward a copy of this letter to all persons and entities with custodial
responsibility for the items referred to in this letter. If you wish to discuss this claim,
please give me a call.
Sincerely,
Honest Hank
Attorney at Law
XXX:xx
Enclosure
165
As you may be aware, my law firm represents XXXXXXXX as a result of personal injuries
resulting from an accident which occurred on XXX in XXXX. We specifically request that the
following evidence be maintained and preserved and not be destroyed, modified, altered,
repaired, or changed in any matter:
1.
7. Maintenance, inspection, and repair records or work orders on the tractor and the trailer
for the day of the accident and for the six month period preceding the accident.
8. Annual inspection report for the tractor and trailer covering the date of the accident.
9.
The complete drivers qualification file, including but not limited to:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
166
11.
12. Any lease contracts or agreements covering the tractor or trailer involved in this
accident.
13.
Any interchange agreements regarding the tractor or trailer involved in this accident.
14. Any data or printout from on-board recording devices, including but not limited to ECM
(electronic control module), any on-board computer, tachograph, trip monitor, trip recorder, trip
master, or other recording device for the day of the accident and the six month period preceding
the accident.
15. Any post-accident maintenance, inspection, or repair records or invoices in regard to the
tractor and trailer.
16. Any weight tickets, fuel receipts, hotel bills, or other records of expenses regarding the
driver or the tractor or trailer involved in the collision for the day of the accident and the eight
day period preceding the accident.
17. Any trip reports or dispatch records regarding the driver or the tractor or trailer involved
in this collision for the day of the accident and the eight day period preceding this accident.
18. Any e-mails, electronic messages, letters, memos, or other documents concerning this
accident.
19. The accident register maintained by the motor carrier as required by federal law for the
one year period preceding this accident.
20.
21. Any reports, memos, notes, logs or other documents evidencing complaints about the
driver.
167
22. Any DOT or PSC reports, memos, notes or correspondence concerning Chip P. Bledsoe
or the tractor or trailer involved in this accident.
In regard to the tractor and trailer involved in this incident, we would like to set up a mutually
convenient time for our expert to inspect, examine, and conduct tests on the unit. We
specifically request that you make no repairs or adjustments to the tractor or trailer until this
inspection is completed. I must have a response within the next ten (10) days.
168
169
Case 2:03-cv-00294-DAK-BCW
Document 778
Filed 09/25/2006
Page 1 of 3
v.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MACHINES CORPORATION,
Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, The SCO Group, Inc. (SCO), for the reasons set
forth in the Memorandum in Support of Its Motion For Relief for IBMs Spoliation of Evidence
moves this Court to (1) enter an order precluding IBM from contesting that it relied on AIX and
Dynix/ptx source code in making contributions to Linux development, and (2) impose an
170
Case 2:03-cv-00294-DAK-BCW
Document 778
Filed 09/25/2006
Page 2 of 3
adverse-inference instruction against IBM, consistent with the common-sense and wellestablished principle that a party who has notice that evidence is relevant to litigation and who
proceeds to destroy it is more likely to have been threatened by that evidence than a party in the
same position who does not destroy the evidence.
DATED this 25th day of September, 2006.
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE, P.C.
Brent O. Hatch
Mark F. James
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
Robert Silver
Stuart H. Singer
Stephen N. Zack
Edward Normand
By:__/s/Brent O. Hatch______________
Counsel for The SCO Group, Inc.
2
171
Case 2:03-cv-00294-DAK-BCW
Document 778
Filed 09/25/2006
Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, The SCO Group, Inc., hereby certifies that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SCOs Motion For Relief for IBMs Spoliation of Evidence was
served on Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff International Business Machines Corporation on the
25th day of September, 2006 by the Courts CM/ECF system or by U.S. Mail to:
3
172
173
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. MEDICAL HISTORY: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. THE MOTION LEADING TO THIS APPEAL: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
POINT I
THE LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF THE FETAL MONITOR STRIPS
WAS WILLFUL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
POINT II
PROOF OF WILLFULNESS IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO STRIKE A SPOLIATORS
PLEADINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
POINT III
ALL OF THE TESTS TO MEASURE THE WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS
SPOLIATION WARRANTS STRIKING THEIR PLEADING, HAVE BEEN MET
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SPOLIATION HEREIN WAS
NOT SO PREJUDICIAL AS TO WARRANT STRIKING THE DEFENDANTS
ANSWER, AND IN LEAVING THE PLAINTIFFS REMEDILESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
ii
174
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Cabasso v. Goldberg, 288 A.D.2d 116, 733 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1st Dept, 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Christian v City of New York, ___ A.D.2d ___, 703 N.Y.S.2d 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
DiDomenico v. C&S Aeromatik, 52 A.D.2d 41 (2nd Dept. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 16, 19
Fada Industries, Inc. v. Falchi Building Co., L.P., 189 Misc.2d 1, 730 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. Sup.
06/22/2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Goldman v. Gateway Toyota, 283 A.D.2d 457, 724 N.Y.S.2d 630 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Regenerative Bldg. Constr, 271 A.D.2d 862, 863, 706 N.Y.S.2d 236
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Healey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 212 A.D.2d 351, rev=d on other grounds 87 N.Y.2d 596
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Kirkland v. New York City Housing Authority, 236 A.D.2d 170 (1st Dept., 1997) . . . 14, 17, 19
Klein v. Seenauth. 180 Misc. 2d 213, 687 N.Y.S.2d 889. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Lane v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 276 A.D.2d 136. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Liz v. William Zinsser & Co., 253 A.D.2d 413 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 21
Long Island Diagnostic Imaging v. Stoney Brook Diagnostic Imaging 286 A.D.2d 320, 728 N.Y.S.2d
781 (2nd Dept., 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander & Ferdon v. Penguin Air Conditioning Corp., 221 A.D.2d 243 (2nd
Dept., ___) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 16, 21
New York Cent. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Turnerson's Elec., Inc., ___ A.D.2d ___, 721 N.Y.S.2d 92
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Turnerson's Electric Inc., 280 A.D.2d 652, 721
N.Y.S.2d 92 (2nd Dept., 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Puccia v Farley, 261 AD2d 83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
iii
175
Roman v North Shore Orthopedic Assn., 271 A.D.2d 669 (2nd Dept., 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Romano v Scalia and DeLucia Plumbing, ___AD2d ____ (2nd Dept., 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose LLP, 275 A.D.2d 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 16
Squiteri v. City of New York, 248 A.D.2d 201 (1st Dept., 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 19, 20
Stroebe v. Martin, 272 A.D.2d 318, 272 A.D.2d 318, 707 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1st Dept., 2000) . . . . 16
Vaughn v. City of N.Y., 201 A.D.2d 556, 607, N.Y.S.2d 726 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Velasquez vs. Brocorp, 283 A.D.2d 423, 723 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1st Dept. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
STATUTES:
Education Law 6530, Definitions of Profession Misconduct, subdiv. 32 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 18
New York City Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Sec. 405.10(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 18
iv
176
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. MEDICAL HISTORY:
Overview:
HOSPITAL on July 13, 1994, and, according to the newborn hospital chart, was discharged from
the hospital as a normal term baby boy after only two days (R. 85).
The principal issue in this case is whether DOMINICK suffered fetal distress during his
mothers labor, that required a cesarian section or other intervention that was not offered or
performed. The available hospital records provide no direct evidence of fetal distress. There are some
indirect indicia that there might have been fetal distress, but the incomplete documentation is
inadequate proof to allow plaintiffs experts to form opinions with the requisite medical certainty to
make out a prima facie case. There is no evidence showing when the possible distress began, the
character or degree of the distress, or the duration of the distress. These details are essential to prove
that the distress was sufficiently severe and prolonged to cause injury. Without complete records,
is impossible to prove (or disprove) malpractice, but the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs, so that
the plaintiffs lose when the lack of records makes proof impossible.. The singular reason for this lack
of proof, is that the defendant hospital either lost or destroyed the fetal monitor strips that document
the babys well-being during labor. The missing fetal monitor strips are the key to the case.
The fetal monitoring: From her time of arrival at the hospital until the delivery, the mother,
CARMELINA BAGLIO, was routinely put on a fetal heart monitor - a machine that detects and
records the fetal heart rate relative to the mothers uterine contractions, to assess how the baby is
177
faring under the stresses of labor. There are characteristic patterns to the babys heartbeat that are
printed out by the fetal monitor machine, which indicate if the baby is doing well or poorly. If the fetal
monitor shows alarming heartbeat patterns, medical intervention, such as oxygenating the mother or
delivering the baby by cesarian section, may be necessary to prevent brain damage to the baby (R. 1213, 356-357). The fetal monitor generates a paper strip, or tape, that looks somewhat like an EKG
strip, as a permanent objective record of the readings (R. 12-13, 356-357).
According to the mothers hospital record (R.49-84), the fetal monitoring ran for about ten
hours, from admission to the hospital (3 a.m.) until delivery (1:17 p.m.). The fetal monitor machine
generates its paper strip record at the standard rate of three centimeters per minute (slightly more than
five feet per hour), so there should be a paper tape approximately fifty feet long documenting
DOMINICK BAGLIOs heartbeat during the last ten hours before his birth. By law, the fetal monitor
tracings must be retained and preserved at least until the infant reaches his nineteenth birthday.
The delivery: DOMINICK was delivered using obstetrical forceps to pull the babys head out of
the birth canal (R. 74). Forceps are not used casually; they are used only if there is fetal distress (R.
13, 357). Nothing in the hospital record explains why forceps were needed in this case (R. 13, 357).
However, the doctors note for the delivery describes the [umbilical] cord around neck x 4 tight meaning that the babys umbilical cord looped around his neck four times (R. 13, 357), possibly
kinking up, and/or strangling the baby like a hangmans noose. If the umbilical cord was kinked, or
strangled this baby in the womb, it would create characteristic patterns of fetal asphyxia which would
be reflected on the fetal monitoring (R. 13, 357). Therefore, the delivery note creates an expectation
that the fetal monitor strips would document fetal distress, that was not recognized at the time.
2
178
However, without the fetal monitor strips, it is impossible for plaintiff to make a prima facie case,
as it is impossible to prove the degree, character, or duration, of the distress., or exactly when or how
it should have been treated. This underscores the critical nature of the fetal monitor strips - the only
objective record of the babys condition during labor..
Conflicting evidence: Blatant disparities exist between what is found in the limited available medical
records surrounding the birth, and the reality of the child. DOMINICKs mother, CARMELINA
BAGLIO, testified that her baby didnt cry when he was born (R. 181), and that he was pale and still
in the newborn nursery (R. 290-201). The mothers sworn testimony is both credible and consistent
with the subsequent developments, but is irreconcilably inconsistent with the Apgar scores and
observations recorded in the newborns chart. Of a possible maximum Apgar score of 10 points,
consisting of the sum of up to two points for each of five different criteria, DOMINICKs birth
records show high-normal Apgar scores of 8 at one minute and 9 at five minutes after birth (R. 91).
The Apgar scores recorded by the defendants are impossible, if the mothers testimony that the
newborn didnt cry after delivery, is believed. The baby was given one Apgar point (out of a possible
maximum of two) for his cry, representing a weak cry (R. 105). If the baby had no cry at all, as the
mother swore (R. 181), that part of the Apgar score should have been assigned a zero. Likewise, at
5 minutes after the birth, the baby was given perfect scores of two points each for muscle tone and
color (R. 105), which is incompatible with the mothers testimony that the baby was pale and still in
the nursery (R. 290-291).
Of course, the Apgar score is entirely subjective, dependent on the accuracy of the examiners
assessments, just as the mothers observations are. All of the handwritten narrative descriptions of
3
179
the labor (R. 71-72) and the appearance of the baby (R. 89-94), are likewise subjective, as they are
filtered through the eyes and the perspectives of the observers.
For this reason, and the many additional reasons that will immediately follow, that objective
proof, namely, the fetal monitor strips, is essential to break the impasse of contradicting factual
assertions, and to prove that the baby experienced fetal distress prior to his birth.
Subsequent developments: From the time he came home from the hospital, the baby was shaking
(R. 212). At age one week, he was taken back to the hospital screaming (R. 212). These episodes
were seizures, and little DOMINICK was eventually diagnosed with cerebral palsy. DOMINICK has
a seizure disorder (R. 243-244) requiring anti-convulsant medications (R.245, 249). His neuromuscular problems were apparent at age 3, in his impaired gait. When he walked, he could not swing
his arms back and forth like a normal child, holding them still by his sides (R. 235) He needed
orthotics on his legs (R. 241), and was found to have hearing problems (R. 256). At age 3, he still
did not speak (R. 234). His coordination, speech, hearing, and cognitive delays posed challenges
beyond the abilities of the Special Education program in the public schools (R. 237-239), so that he
now goes to a United Cerebral Palsy School (R. 237) instead. He needs speech therapy three times
a week, and both occupational and physical therapy twice a week each (R. 253). Certainly, the
prognosis for his ability to function as a normal, independent adult, is bleak.
The cause of these terrible problems is very much in dispute. The mothers labor and delivery
record is inadequate and incomplete, but what is there shows nothing alarming per se. These records,
at face value, will not support a prima facie case.
180
The irreconcilable inconsistencies between the delivery and newborn records on the one hand,
and the mothers testimony and the subsequent course of the childs development on the other, make
objective records of the babys condition in the hours leading up to the birth, (i.e., the fetal monitor
strips) of crucial and dispositive importance
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
On March 10, 1997, as part of the pre-suit investigation, plaintiffs attorney requested that
the hospital supply the infants complete medical records, including the fetal monitor strips (R. 309).
At first, the hospital produced some normal fetal monitor strips, which displayed reassuring heart
patterns (R. 310-353). CARMELINA BAGLIOs name was hand-written on the strips, giving the
illusion that these were the plaintiffs; however, simple analysis proved that the strips that the hospital
produced were not CARMELINA BAGLIOs, notwithstanding the labeling to the contrary.1
On June 17, 1997, the plaintiffs attorney wrote to the hospitals Medical Records
Department, protesting that the strips that had been supplied were not of this labor and delivery (R.
354).
The lawsuit was started on July 25, 1997 (Summons, R. 20-21).
Throughout this litigation, the hospital never claimed that the strips it originally produced are the
bona fide tracings from Mrs. BAGLIOs labor.
There are multiple tip-offs that prove that these tapes (R. 310-353) are not of the plaintiff.
For instance, a machine-generated date and time stamp appears in fine print on almost every page.
The date is 12/01/04. (The correct date would be 7/13/94-7/14/94.) Similarly, the time of day recorded on
the strips is wildly off. The tape supplied is interrupted after several hours while the mother had a
sonogram (R. 321). (There was no mid-labor sonogram in Mrs. BAGLIOs labor.) The tape also has notes
showing where the mother was given oxygen (R. 321); Mrs. BAGLIO was never given oxygen during her
labor. There are other major discrepancies, too.
It appears that someone elses normal tracings were supplied, with the plaintiffs name
inscribed, in order to mislead us.
181
The Summons & Complaint crossed with a letter dated July 30, 1997, wherein the hospitals
Director of Medical Information Services confirmed although fetal monitoring had indeed been
performed, the hospital was unable to find the strips, concluding that should we locate them, I will
contact you immediately. (R. 355).
Five years later, the missing fetal monitor strips still have not been turned over.
Plaintiff moved to strike the defendants Answer for spoliating this crucial evidence, but
withdrew that initial motion when the hospital promised to produce the fetal monitor tracings if they
were found, and agreed to produce a person knowledgeable about their procedures for storing such
records, and the search to find the missing strips, for deposition (R. 16).
On May 31, 2001, the hospitals chosen witness, Ms. Maritza Payamps of the Medical
Records Department, was deposed to explain the loss of the fetal monitor strips. Ms. Payamps
testified that the fetal monitor strips are supposed to be stored with the mothers chart (R. 373); that
in sixteen years in the Medical Records Department; that she had never encountered the loss of fetal
monitor strips in any other case (R. 382); and she had no explanation for their loss (R. 16).
Ms. Payamps deposition revealed glaring inadequacies in the hospitals efforts made to find
these missing tracings. No inquiry as to what happened to the fetal monitor strips was ever made of
the doctors or nurses actually involved in this labor or delivery (R. 405). No inquiry of the medical
records personnel who handled DOMINICK BAGLIOs records at the time of preparation was made
(R. 405), nor of the hospitals Risk Management Department, either (R. 405).
Thereafter, plaintiff demanded further discovery in an effort to locate the missing fetal monitor
tracings, get secondary evidence or their contents, or explain their loss (R. 412-415, 462):
182
1. Any records of the fetal monitoring that were stored in an electronic or computerized
medium;
2. A copy of the relevant Joint Commission Accreditation of Hospitals standards for the
completion of incomplete hospital records;
3. A copy of the hospitals computer program for record keeping, so as to see if the missing
fetal monitor tracings had been computerized;
4. Inspection of the unfiled fetal monitor strips which Ms. Payamps testified were stored
in a small box, in order to see if DOMINICK BAGLIOs lost tracings were in that
box;
5. The depositions of Records Room employee Irene Ngai (who assembled the babys chart)
and Risk Managements Azarean Cameron (who did the original search for the
missing records);
6. A copy of any deficiency report that details what portions of a medical record are
missing; and
7. The identity of the unidentified Obstetrics Department representative, who represented to
the Medical Records Department that the Obstetrics Department did not have the
missing records.
Except for identifying one name, the hospital never moved for a protective order against this
discovery, but simply stated boiler plate objections and refused compliance (R. 433-434).
A Compliance Conference was held on February 27, 2001. At the Compliance Conference,
the court so ordered a stipulation that directed the depositions of a Risk Manager by April 31,
2001, and defendant DR. CUOCCO by June 29, 2001, and the plaintiff was required to put the case
on the calendar by August 31, 2001 (R. 421).
The courts tight deadline to put the case on the calendar by August 31, 2001, forced
plaintiffs attorney to do so without obtaining six of the seven items of discovery listed above.
183
184
The defense did not submit any contrary experts affirmation, did not deny the loss of the fetal
monitor strips, did not explain the loss of the fetal monitor strips, did not dispute that they were
necessary to evaluate the extent or duration of fetal distress, did not dispute the inference that a
backup of the data may exist on a computer disk (but also did not search for the computer disk), and
did not deny the fatal effect that the loss of the strips caused.
Despite this uncontradicted demonstration of significant and gross prejudice to the plaintiff,
and based solely on the motion papers, without conducting a Vaughn hearing (named for Vaughn
v. City of N.Y., 201 A.D.2d 556, 607 N.Y.S.2d 726) to explore the circumstances or significance of
the spoliation, the lower court found, that while the fetal monitoring strips are clearly significant to
the plaintiffs case, there is other evidence that is available [that would compensate for the loss of the
strips]. Indeed, the plaintiffs medical records and progress notes are included in the case file. Thus
the court cannot conclude that the loss of the strips prejudices the plaintiff as to warrant the drastic
sanction of striking St. Johns [Hospitals] answer. (R. 5-6). No sanction whatsoever was imposed,
and no compensating remedy was provided. The plaintiffs motion was denied.
Plaintiff appeals from that Order.
185
New York City Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Sec. 405.10(4):
Medical records shall be retained in their original or legally reproduced form for a period of at least
six years from the date of diskharge, or three years after the patients age of majority (18 years),
whichever is longer...
10
186
POINT I
187
188
13
189
POINT II
PROOF OF WILLFULNESS IS NOT ESSENTIAL
TO STRIKE A SPOLIATORS PLEADINGS
Although plaintiffs believe that wilfulness has been fully demonstrated not just by the loss of
the fetal monitor strips and the unexplained substitution of someone elses tracings mislabeled to give
the false appearance of being the plaintiffs, and further buttressed by the hospitals actions and
obstructions subsequent to the loss of these records, proof of willful intent is not a necessary element
to strike a spoliators pleadings. The evolving rule is Spoliator, beware! Klein v. Seenauth. 180
Misc. 2d 213, 687 N.Y.S.2d 889.
The unintentional loss of evidence, absent intentional destruction, can be just as fatal to a
litigant as if it were deliberate, so as to justify striking a pleading. DiDomenico, supra, Squiteri, supra
at 201-203. The court below explicitly recognized this. (Order Appealed From, R. 6).
Thus, this drastic sanction@ has been applied even if the destruction occurred through
negligence rather than willfulness, and even if the evidence was destroyed before the spoliator was
a party to litigation, provided it was on notice that the evidence might be needed for future litigation.
See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York City Housing Authority, 236 A.D.2d 170 (1st Dept. 1997) (dismissal
of third- party action appropriate where crucial evidence was negligently destroyed); accord, Healey
v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 212 A.D.2d 351, rev=d on other grounds 87 N.Y.2d 596; see, also,
Squiteri v. City of New York, 248 A.D.2d 201 (1st Dept. 1998). A pleading may be struck absent
willful or contumacious conduct, depending on the extent of prejudice to a party and when necessary
as a "matter of elementary fairness" Puccia v Farley, 261 A.D.2d 83, 85; Kirkland, supra. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Regenerative Bldg. Const., 271 A.D.2d 862, 863, 706 N.Y.S.2d 236, quoting Puccia,
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supra; Lane v. Fisher Park Lane Co., 276 A.D.2d 136. Appropriate remedial actions include striking
the pleadings. New York Cent. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Turnerson's Elec., Inc., ___ A.D.2d ___, 721
N.Y.S.2d 92 [holding that where a party destroys key physical evidence "such that its opponents are
' prejudicially bereft of appropriate means to confront a claim with incisive evidence,"' the spoliator
may be punished by the striking of its pleading; Squiteri, supra, at 202- 203 ["when a party alters,
loses or destroys key evidence before it can be examined by the other party's expert, the court should
dismiss the pleadings of the party responsible for the spoliation"]; Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander
& Ferdon, supra at 493 [dismissing plaintiffs claim due to its "negligent loss of a key piece of
evidence which defendants never had an opportunity to examine"]; see, also, Liz v. William Zinsser
& Co., 253 A.D.2d 413.
Accordingly, proof of willfulness is not essential - nor should it be - as the important element
of spoliation is that it results in same prejudice, and requires the same remedial steps to restore
balance to the scales of justice, whether the spoliation was intentional or not.
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POINT III
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Public policy demands, for obvious reasons, that a spoliator never be permitted to benefit from
its spoliation of evidence. The spoliator must bear the consequences of its own acts or omissions,
whether those were intentional or negligent, and suffer the consequences necessary to restore justice.
In some cases, a lesser penalty than striking of pleadings may satisfactorily bring the scales of justice
back into balance, but in this case, there is no way to do so except by striking the pleadings.2 The
long list of citations above shows that the striking of pleadings as a penalty for spoliation of evidence
is not anathema to either the First or Second Departments, because they recognize that permitting
a litigant to obtain any benefit from spoliation serves only to create an incentive that encourages more
spoliation in the future.
Conversely, imposing severe, negative consequences for spoliation creates a beneficial and
necessary disincentive to prevent spoliation and encourages the proper preservation of evidence that
is essential to our system of justice.
Applying the various tests espoused in these cases to the facts of this case, the plaintiffs= two
pre-suit letters to the hospital=s Medical Records Department (R. 309 and 354) prove that the hospital
was on actual notice that this evidence was crucial to the prosecution of this action even before
litigation was commenced. Therefore, the criteria for striking a pleading based on pre-litigation
notice, per Kirkland, supra, has been satisfied. At a minimum, the loss or destruction of that crucial
In Kirkland, infra, this Court suggested that the drastic remedy of striking a partys pleadings
might not be appropriate in a product liability action if the missing product could be reconstructed from
the manufacturers design plans. However, in the present action, the reconstruction of the fetal monitor
tracings or their contents from other sources is totally impossible. Those tracings show continuous,
moment-to-moment objective proof of the fetal hearbeat in relationship to the mothers uterine
contractions, which is not documented anywhere else in the existing records, and cannot be reconstructed
from any other source. This essential element of the plaintiffs case is totally precluded and lost forever,
due to the spoliation of the strips by the defendant Hospital.
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evidence despite advance knowledge of its importance, was negligent, and the supply of someone
else=s strips falsely labeled as Mrs. BAGLIO=s suggests an intentional and deliberate attempt to
mislead, that surely is Awillful and contumacious.@ This justifies striking the spoliator=s pleadings.
Applying the test of prejudice to the facts of this case, the statement by the plaintiff=s medical
expert that Awithin a reasonable degree of obstetrical certainty, [the loss of the fetal monitor strips]
significantly and grossly prejudices [the plaintiffs=] ability to fully evaluate and present this case,@ is
uncontested. Thus, gross and significant prejudice to the plaintiffs is established without dispute.
Applying the test of elemental fairness to the facts of this case, we reach the ultimate
question. Inevitably, the loss of these records must cause one side or the other to lose the case.
Who should that be? The newborn baby, who is non sui juris and blameless for his own awful
injuries, or the defendant who either negligently or wilfully lost or destroyed the records that would
prove (or disprove) the merits of the case, and then impeded all efforts to find them? The just
resolution of this question of fairness is easily and instantly resolved by looking to the statutory and
regulatory mandates of New York City Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Sec. 405.10(4) and
Education Law '6530, ADefinitions of Professional Misconduct@, subdiv. 32, both of which impose
the clear legal duty of preserving these records on the defendants, for the benefit of the plaintiffs use
in litigation (hence the implicit references to the statute of limitations in both), in addition to the duty
to avoid destruction of evidence imposed by the common law, obstruction of justice rules, and
ordinary ethics. The scales of justice overwhelmingly tilt in the infant=s favor, as he is utterly innocent
but nonetheless grossly prejudiced under any circumstances. The hospital was charged with the clear
statutory, regulatory, common law, and ethical duty of preserving the crucial fetal monitor records,
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and is responsible for their loss or destruction in violation of that duty, so that Aelemental fairness@
mandates that they, rather than the newborn, should suffer the consequences.
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POINT IV
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case file. Thus, the court cannot conclude that the loss of the strips prejudices the plaintiff [so] as to
warrant the drastic sanction of striking St. John=s Answer.@
Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that this finding is clear error. There is nothing whatsoever in
the Record on Appeal that supports the lower courts conclusion that the available Amedical records
and progress notes@ can possibly compensate for the lost fetal monitor strips. On the contrary, the
existent medical records and progress notes can not support a prima facie case. In their opposing
papers, the defense never suggested that the prejudice from the absence of the monitor strips could
be compensated or overcome through the use of other records. The plaintiffs= expert=s medical
affirmation showing Asignificant and gross prejudice@ was uncontradicted. If the case were to go to
trial, the defense would certainly emphasize the plaintiff=s complete inability to prove the depth or
duration of the presumed fetal distress to maximum advantage. The plaintiffs simply cannot make out
a prima facie case, far less a persuasive prima facie case, without this evidence. Indeed, given the
expert=s frank concession of Agross prejudice@ to his ability to evaluate and present the case, the
expert would be devastated on cross-examination, and would have to concede that any opinions on
causal connection were speculative. No adverse inference charge to the jury can fill the gaps in the
the necessary expert testimony that is lacking. The result would have to be a dismissal, or a
defendant=s verdict
As such, the court=s conclusion that the consequent prejudice would not be fatal, is utterly
unfounded and unsupported by the Record on Appeal..
ARemedial action is obligatory in instances in which the lost or destroyed evidence is crucial
to the determination of the key issue. Fada Industries, Inc. v. Falchi Building Co., L.P., 189
Misc.2d 1, 730 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. Sup. 06/22/2001), citing Squitieri v. City of New York, supra;
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Kirkland v. New York City Housing Authority, supra; Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander & Ferdon
v. Penguin Air Conditioning Corp., supra; Liz v. William Zinsser & Co., 253 A.D.2d 413. The court
below erred, as it extended no remedy to the prejudiced party, leaving a terrible harm unaddressed
and unpunished.
While striking a pleading is unquestionably a Adrastic remedy@, it is the only remedy that can
compensate for the Agross prejudice created by the loss of the fetal monitor strips. Here, the defense
clearly gains an immense, unfair advantage from their spoliation of crucial records, yet the plaintiff
was awarded no remedy to compensate for this massive wrong, forcing the plaintiff into the hopeless
position of having to try a case to a certain defeat.
While the court=s assessment of an appropriate penalty for spoliation is discretionary, that
exercise of discretion must have a proper foundation. It cannot be unsupported whimsy or caprice.
Here, there is no foundation for either the finding that other records compensated for the loss of the
fetal monitor strips, or the lower court=s refusal to penalize the spoliator, leaving the plaintiff
remediless despite the destruction of evidence that is fatal to the case.
Accordingly, the Order Appealed from is error, and should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
The court below erred in finding that the plaintiff was not irreparably prejudiced by the loss
or destruction of the fetal monitor strips. There is powerful inferential proof that the spoliation was
willful, but even if it was unintentional, it was so negligent and so prejudicial as to warrant striking
the defendant=s pleading just the same. The spoliation will inevitably cost one side or the other a
certain loss at trial. As between the spoliator and the innocent baby, elemental fairness mandates the
loss be borne by the spoliator.
The Order Appealed From should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
___________________________
Mark R. Bower
The Law Offices of Mark R. Bower, P.C.
Appellate Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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BACKGROUND
The Disclosing Party and Receiving Party wish to discuss and exchange certain
items and information related to business programs, products, applications, systems,
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consider highly confidential and proprietary.
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1.1.
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Disclosing Party.
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relating to the Invention.
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4. NON-ASSIGNABLE
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5. GOVERNING LAW
This Agreement and all questions relating to its validity, interpretation, performance and
enforcement (including, without limitation, provisions concerning limitations of actions),
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of
_______________ (State), notwithstanding any conflict-of-laws doctrines of such state or
other jurisdiction to the contrary, and without the aid of any canon, custom or rule of law
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Neither party does, by virtue of disclosure of the Confidential Information, grant, either
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8. Provisions Separable
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SAMPLE LOGS
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Depo
#
Trial
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When
Offered
Depo/Tr
ial/Hrg
Offered
By:
Received?
Yes or No
Description of Exhibit
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Our
#
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Trial
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Offered
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Additional Notes
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Exhibit Log
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Summary of Evidence
Case Name:
Evidence
Case ID:
Bates
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Date
Source
Relevance
Foundation
Objection
Supporting
Exhibits
Ruling
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Case ID:
Name of Individual
Who Collected Evidence
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Production Log
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Photograph Log
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Offered as Exhibit?
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Provider
Medical Treatment
Impairment or
Permanency
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Date Produced
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Column4
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Medications
Case Name:
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SAMPLE Timelines
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Medical Timeline
Case Name:
Date
DOA:
Provider
Medical Treatment
Charges Incurred
Doc.
Prescriptions
Physician
Page
Notes
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11:00 AM
3:00 PM
7:00 PM
11:00 PM
Sep 16 1996
3:00 AM
Sep 17
Mom complains of abdominal pain; abdomen very firm; fetal heart rate dropped into 70's (7:55 PM)
Nurse's Notes indicate moved to left side; FHT's at 70BPM with questionable variability (7:58 PM)
Nurse's Notes indicate No FHT response (8:00 PM)
Nurse's Notes indicate moved to right side: scalp stim done with no response (8:02 PM)
Nurse's Notes indicate Dr. Taylor calls in and given report on deceleration; Ordered terbuline and C/S
prep (8:04 PM)
Nurse's notes indicate FHT's remain in 70's with no LTV; scapt unable to be applied. No response
(FHT's) despite interventions. C/S explained; permis obtained (8:05 PM)
Nurse's notes indicate FHT's asculated 80 BPM with no variability; proceeded with Cesarean birth. Dr.
Taylor here. (8:12 PM)
Delivered by Dr. Taylor (8:25 PM)
Sep 16 1996
7:00 AM
Sep 17
11:00 AM
3:00 PM
7:00 PM
11:00 PM
3:00 AM
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9.
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If you should need any further information prior to our next conference call, please let me
know. Once you have had the opportunity to review the enclosed documents and conduct your
investigation, please give me a call to discuss the case prior to authoring your report. My
paralegal, Christi Koch, is available to assist you with any additional information needed or to set
up a conference call should you wish to speak with me directly. Please let her know if we can
provide anything additional to you.
As you are aware, all work under this engagement, including any reports, data, notes, work
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Your fees as indicated in your Fee Schedule provided to our office are acceptable and we
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We look forward to working with you on this case.
Sincerely,
Craig L. Kelley
clkkelley@inserra.com
CLK/ck
Enclosures
cc:
Kelly D. Gibbs
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