My aim in this paper is to examine Buridan's answer to the very basic question of what it means for the soul to inhere in the body.

Like virtually all of the questions in this work, QDA 2.7 is based on a lemma from Aristotle's De anima: in this instance, the observation in De anima 2.2 that it is possible for some plants and animals to survive physical division, from which we are to conclude that before division, their souls are actually one but potentially many.(3) For Buridan, this claim raises the question of how we are to understand the presence of the soul's nutritive and sensitive powers in corporeal bodies: in what sense does the whole soul of an organism inhere in its body if a single division of the quantitative parts of that body gives rise to two new whole souls?

The extensionality principle contends that when an animating power has been derived from an extended subject, it must commensurably inhere in that subject.

Likewise, Buridan finds that language used to refer to animate capacities must be carefully interpreted so as to avoid falling into the pluralist trap of assuming that distinct capacities inhere in really distinct essences or natures.