Also Published in this series Marxism and Anthropology Maurice Bloch Marxism and Philosophy Alex Callinicds Marxism and Law Hugh Collins Marxism and International Relations Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert A. Cruickshank Marxism and Morality Steven Lukes Marxism and Politics Ralph Miliband Marxism and Ideology Fcrruccio Rossi-Landi Marxism and Literature Raymond Williams Marxism and Ecology REINER GRUNDMANN C L A R E N D O N P R E S S· O X F O R D 1991 Contents List of Abbreviations of Marx's Works Introduction x 1 1 . Establishing Phenomena, Claims, and Explanations 1 . 1 . Phenomena 1 .2. Ecological claims and approaches 1 .3 . Causes of ecological problems 1 .3 . 1 . Technology 1 .3.2. Unintended consequences 1 .3.3. Industrial accidents 1 .3.4. Economic growth 1 .3.5. Market, externalities, and the tragedy of the commons 1 .3.6. Prisoners' dilemma lA. Summary 12 13 14 27 28 30 33 36 2. Ecology, the Social Sciences, and Marxism 2. 1 . How can we relate Marx to ecological problems? 2. 1 . 1 . Marx's anthropocentrism 2.1 .2. Population growth 2.1 .3. Future generations 2.1A. Unintended consequences and the 'tragedy of the commons' 2.2. Marx's motivation for his critique 2.3. Three Marxist approaches 2.3. 1 . First approach: capitalist production as a cause of ecological problems Excursus on law 2.3.2. Second approach: alienation 2.3.3. Third approach: man-nature metabolism 2.4. The concept of nature 2.5. Philosophical anthropology 2.5 . 1 . Man as both a natural and social being 47 37 43 46 57 58 64 65 71 72 75 75 82 88 90 91 98 98 viii Contents ix Contents 2.5.2. Human needs 2.5 .3. Human nature essential to Marx 3. Technology 3 . 1 . Marx as a student of technology 3 . 1 . 1 . Technology as part ol the human condition 3 . 1 .2. Evolurion and technological evolution 3 . 1 .3. Marx's machine definition 3 . 1 .4. The machinery question 3 . 1 .5. Science and technology 3 . 1 .6. What is wrong with machinery? 3 . 1 . 7. Progress? 3.2. Evolutionary approaches to technology in economic theory 3.2. 1 . The behavioural theory ol thefirm 3.3. Technology as a social system? 3.3 . 1 . Criticisms: system and environment 3.4. Marx: a technological determinist? 3.5. Technological alienation 3.5. 1. Technological alienation in the Manuscripts 1861-3 3.5.2. How Marx changed his view: Manuscripts 1861-3 v. Capital 3.6. Alienation and the division of labour 101 102 107 109 1 10 1 14 122 127 128 139 141 5.3. 144 144 147 154 157 162 5.6. 162 166 171 180 183 192 203 209 212 217 4. Historical Materialism 4. 1 . The spectre of functionalism 4.2. Capitalism and machinery as autopoietic systems? 4.3. Evolution and Darwinian systems 4.3 . 1 . A machino-capitalist hypercycle 4.3.2. Structural coupling 4.3.3. Summary 4.4. An empirical illustration: the transition from feudalism to capitalism 4.5. Evolution of technology and social institutions under ecological constraints 222 5. Communism 5 . 1 . Two faces of communism 5.2. Labour 232 232 238 217 5.4. 5.5. 5.2. 1 . The critical dimension of the concept oflabour 238 5.2.2. Labourand enjoyment 239 5.2.3. The realm of necessity 241 Habermas: Marx between Kant, Fichte, and Hegel 247 5.3. 1 . Labourand interaction 249 253 Messianic Marxism 253 5.4. 1 . Ernst Bloch: Marxism of technology 5.4.2. Walter Benjamin: the resurrection of 257 past generations Conscious control and central planning 262 5 .5 . 1 . Marx, Vico, and social complexity 262 5.5.2. Central planning? 266 5.5.3. Social complexity and personal differences 272 Technology and the limits ol the philosophy of the 277 subject Conclusion 282 Bibliography 296 Index 319 List of Abbreviations of Marx's Works Quotations from Marx's own writings are given by title of work. Quotations from other authors are given by year of publication and page. Marx, Engels: Collected Works CW ILondon: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975- ) Grundrisse der Kritik derpolitischen Grundrisse 6konomie IBerlin: Dictz, 1953; Eng!. translation Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) Zur Kriti1< der Politischen 6konomie: Manuscripts 1861-3 Manusl<ript 1861-63, in MEGAn Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, partn MEGAn IBerlin: Dietz, 1976- ) Marx, Engels: Wer1<e, 42 vols. IBerlin: MEW Dietz); supplementary volume i 1 1974) Economic and Philosophic Manu­ Paris Manuscripts scripts 1 1 844), in CW iii Preface to A Contribution to the 1859 Preface Critique of Political Economy 1 1859), in CW xxix Selected Wor1<s, 3 vols. IMoscow: SW Progress, 1975) Theories of Surplus Value, 3 vols. TSV ILondon: Lawrence & Wishart, 1972) Introduction Some fifteen years ago, Hans Magnus Enzensberger rightly remarked that the time when ecology confined itself within the limits of biology was over. During the last decades the term has undergone a change in meaning. When Haeckel coined it in the 1 870s, it denoted that branch of biology which deals with the relations of living organisms to their surroundings. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it is now also used in a broader meaning 'with reference to ecological issues such as industrial pollution considered in a political context'. Today it is the centre of bitter controversies within a discourse which draws on such different branches of sciences as biochemistry, biology, oceanography, mineralogy, meteorology, genetics, physi­ ology, medicine, demography, statistics, thermodynamics, cyber­ netics, game theory, and so on IEnzensberger 1974: 4). It oscillates between the claim to become a new super-science and its [partly) pseudo-scientific manifestations. Ecology is also a social and political movement which struggles for environmental protec­ tion Ithe career of 'green parties' is a clear expression of this); and it is the name for a general attitude towards nature. It affects politics, industrial production, city planning, law making, education-there is virtually no part of modern life which has not been submitted to ecological reasoning or criticism. Through­ out this book I shall use 'ecology' in this broader sense. 1 It seems to be commonly accepted that Marxism has little to say about ecological problems, that its implicit positions are far from illuminating them, and, what is more, that the Marxist position enables, causes, or legitimizes harm to the environ­ ment. At best Marxism is seen to be caught in the dilemma of rejecting the 'idiocy of rural life' andat the same time embracing the 'naturalization of man' and the 'resurrection of nature', The present work is a thorough reconsideration of any such I Ecology is also used in systems theory to denote the relations between systems and their environment. This meaning will be neglected here. 2 Introduction assumption. It tries to avoid simplistic answers. Instead, it tries to find out which sort of problems can be analysed by Marx's theory and which of its approaches are still convincing-a task which necessitates the reconstruction of his thought. In effect, this presupposes that I think there is something which can be exploited and reconstructed. Among the many ideas which have shaped the debate about ecological problems in recent years, the issues connected to the notion of (mastery over nature' or 'domination of nature' have been of great importance. A unifying element among ecologists is the belief that the Promethean project of mankind and modem attitudes towards nature are the ultimate causes of ecological problems. From this assumption they proceed to a rejection of the modem attitude towards nature and tend to embrace an ecocentric outlook. In their view mankind's attempts to master nature have resulted above all in a destruction of the natural environment. However, this is a faulty understanding of what domination means. Once we realize that domination only makes sense with respect to aims and interests, it becomes clear that a concern for the natural environment is not only compatible with a Promethean view but follows ineVitably from it. King Midas had the power to tum everything he touched into gold. However, such a power can hardly be included in a proper definition of domination. Rather than enhancing the interests of the power-holder, it undermines them. Powers which tum into an existential threat for the power-holder do not contribute to domination. The use of the concept of domination of nature, therefore, can be understood only as a synonym for conscious control over nature. A eybemetic feedbaek loop rather than a reckless exploiter would be the appropriate image. Anthropo­ centrism and mastery over nature, far from causing ecological problems, are the starting-points from which to address them. To understand the meaning of the ecological discourse, it might be helpful to look back to world-views of the last century. A common world-view of the nineteenth century was that the growth of scientific knowledge, technological development, and economic activity, in a word, 'industrialism', was an inherently positive thing because it served human purposes. The twentieth century Saw the results of this unbounded productivism; it became manifest that although mankind succeeded in gaining Introduction 3 more wealth, the natural environment became more and more debased, which in tum was detrimental to human well-being. With this observation, it took little to conclude that productivism was responsible for this unpleasant state of affairs [see, for example, Jonas 1984, preface). Since human beings prosper at the expense of nature, so goes the claim of many environment­ alists, they do not take into account that this debased nature will not allow mankind to prosper or survive in a not-so-distant future. The Marxist opposition to this argument was a defence of productivism and a rejection of capitalism. In other words: the technological dynamism of the modem epoch was welcomed, and only its capitalist form was made responsible for ecologieal disasters. But there are also writers, whether Marxist or not, who claim that Marxism is of little help in investigating ecolo­ gical problems. Anthony Giddens, for example, writes that '[i]n Marx, nature appears above all as the medium of the realization of human social development. The universal history of man is traeed through the progressive elaboration of the produetive forces, maximised in capitalism . . . But Marx's concern with transforming the exploitative human social relations expressed in class systems does not extend to the exploitation of nature' [Giddens 1 98 1 : 59). Giddens concludes that this 'Promethean attitude' is indefensible in the twentieth century since 'the expansion of the productive forces can no longer be treated unproblematically as conducive to social progress' [ibid. 60). But Giddens confuses expansion of productive forces 'as such' with productive forces which are detrimental to the natural environ­ ment. This may be a mere verbal quarrel. However, it seems that, in his terminology, the expansion of productive forees leads inevitably to an 'exploitation of nature'. While I think that nothing is wrong with 'exploiting nature', there is certainly something wrong with nature transformations which lead to worse life-conditions of human beings. In other words, I think that the 'Promethean' attitude is not only defensible, but also superior to Giddens's suggestion that Marx should have extended his coneern to exploitation of nature. It is true that Marx welcomed the growth of productive forces and, what is more, praised even capitalism for developing the produetive forces in a hitherto unknown way. Thus, at first 4 Introduction sight, industrialism for him was part of the historical tendency of the productive forces to develop-an indispensable condition for the advent of a communist society. This outline has been summarized by Andre Gorz in the following way: Until recently most Marxists still thought of forces of production-in particular science and technology-as ideologically neutral, and they considered the development of these forces of production to be inherently positive. They usually held the view that as it matured capitalism was producing a material base on which socialism could be constructed and it was thought that the more the forces of production developed under capitalism the easier it would be to build socialism. Such productive forces as technol.ogy, science, human skills and knowledge and abundant dead labour (fixed capital) were considered to be assets that would gteatly facilitate the transition to socialism. (Gorz 1973: 159) But Gorz does not share this view; on the contrary he thinks that modern science and technology are 'ideological' in the sense that they are shaped in decisive ways by capitalist interests. Indeed, there are several authors who deny that there can exist something like 'innocent' productive forces. As we shall see, this question is a crucial one for Marx's own analysis. This discussion will lead to the result that we must be aware of a double meaning of the term 'growth of productive forces': it can mean ( I ) increasing mastery over nature and (2) production of wealth (material goods) with ever-diminishing effort or in increasing abundance. The first meaning is that mankind gains an ever-greater mastery over nature, in the sense that individuals develop into universal human beings, that they expand their control over the world around them, that they are able to shape a world according to their needs and pleasures. Let us call this the 'broad meaning' of historical materialism (which, for the sake of brevity, I also refer to as the 'philosophical' meaning). The second meaning is primarily economic; a growth in this sense can be measured with economic criteria of efficiency. Let us call this the 'narrow (economic) meaning'. Both mcanings in Marx are linked together. The dignity of human beings requires freedom from hunger as much as it does freedom from a hostile nature which acts upon them as an alien force. For Marx two altcrnatives are thus excluded: first, to accept modern civilization in which detrimental effects stem Introduction 5 from man's transformation of nature, and, second, to go back to a state in which the well-being of people could not be secured on the material level. Marx's position was a plea to expand human power and control over one's life-conditions to such a degree that the release of all human powers would lead only to beneficial consequences. A critique of Marx can only start at this point. If there is any basic flaw in his treatment of productive forces and the domina­ tion of nature it is in the insufficiently clear distinction between the growth of productive forces and increaSing mastery over nature. Marx, at times, seems to assume that the former does imply the latter. Against this I argue that there may be productive forces which do not lead to an increasing mastery over nature but, rather, to an increasing uncertainty, risk, and uncontrol­ lability as well as to unnecessary oppression in the production process. However, we may also find in Marx an impliCit distinc­ tion between these two meanings if we look at his awareness of the shortcomings of a purely economic approach. This awareness leads him to a radical opposition to the Political Economists who thought that capitalist market economies would maximize economic efficiency and thus human welfare and happiness. His attack on Political Economy thus embraces both elements: it offers arguments against the effiCiency claim as well as arguments against the maximization of human welfare and happiness, for capitalism is an irrational form of enhancing effiCiency (crises! ) and it decreases happiness. It only creates the material preconditions for a real human society. If this reasoning is true, Marx does not equate increases in economic efficiency with an increase of human mastery over nature. But some critics of industrialism go one step further: they make the basic claim that the development of productive forces per se is incompatible with the prospering of nature. From this proposition they conclude that industrialism should be limited (or even abolished) in the interest of nature and mankind. Although Marx rarely addressed ecological problems, this much is clear: he sharply opposed such pessimism. Instead of assuming the basic incompatibility of modern technology with the prospering of mankind he assumed-at least in Capital­ only the basic incompatibility of modern technology under capitalist relations with the prospering of mankind. As my 6 Introduction analysis will show, this judgement by Marx does not stand up to the empirical evidence. The twentieth century has seen a rapid development of productive forces which has been partly enhanced by public enterprises or by socialist enterprises Ii.e. enterprises in socialist countries). In both cases the damaging effects did not disappear las we might expect on the basis of Marx's prediction). On the contrary, it seems that socialist countries present an even worse ecological record than capitalist countries. Does this invalidate Marx's analysis? Are we to abandon his framework since the empirical facts have lonce more) belied his predictions? My answer is no. One reason is that he analysed the implications of machine technology labove all in the recently published Manuscripts 1861-3) and was aware that the techno­ logical structure of capitalism-not only the capitalist use of it-may be detrimcntal for 'the good society'. Another reason is that Marx's prediction, based on the concepts of the critique of Political Economy, may have been falSified, but not necessarily othcr parts of his theory. If I say that Marx's framework is still illuminating this does not mean that it gives uS a point of reference which is sufficient for the understanding of ecological problems. In investigating more deeply the philosophical argu­ ment, this work is also distinguished from some attempts at 'reconstructing' a 'green' Marx, a procedure which usually rests on a compilation of apparently 'green' statements by Marx Id. Schmied-Kowarzik 1984). One of them is the famous passage from the Paris Manuscripts where Marx spoke of a 'humanization ' of nature and naturalizing of man', which is usually interpreted as the young Marx's desire to bring about harmony between man and nature. In my view, such ad hoc 'reconstructions' of an 'ecological Marx' do not reveal interesting insights. For we all know that Marx was no eeologist, even if he could have been one. But still, the philosophical Marx may reveal fundamental and illuminating inSights. Marx's theory, after all, aims at human emancipation. If we forget this, Marx was not much different from an economist who measures human wealth in terms of prices and per capita income. Marx's life work consisted mainly in showing that capitalist economy is a state of affairs in which individuals are systematically unable to control the outcomes of their actions. Such a critique highlights economic crises, but Introduction 7 also 'business as usual' and its reification of social relations. Crises, alienation, and fetishism affect all members of capitalist society, that is, capitalists, too, are caught in a situation 'unworthy of their human nature'. Post-war prosperity and interventionist techniques of the Welfare State in the economy have led many to believe that the basis for a socialist critique of capitalism has vanished. Yet many Marxists and Marxologists feel that the range of Marx's theory is not exhausted by the fact that capitalism has brought about considerable economic growth. The decisive reason why Marx's theoretical range is wider is because he stresses the need for humans to have control over their fate. This is to say that, even granted that capitalist economy works smoothly Iwhich may still be doubted on good grounds), there may be other respects in which human control has not been established. Only if such a control is improbable, implausible, or even undesirable would we have reasons to oppose the underlying logic of his critique of capitalism. If we turn away, then, from Marx's political economy, and enter his philosophical discourse, we encounter, first, the abstract relation between man and nature, as a transhistorical condition, and then the specific historical forms which this relation assumes. Technologies serve as criteria to distinguish such historic for­ mations. Marx is equally concerned about people's ability to understand and control the world around them. As a writer of the nineteenth century he was rather optimistic as regards the possibilities of science and technology in this process. But again, although his expectations have not been fulfilled, one who is interested in human emancipation should not prematurely dismiss his theoretical outline. On the contrary, if science and technology have not been instruments for mankind to shape a world which is intelligible and controllable, we still live in conditions which have to be superseded in order to achieve human emancipation, a task in which Marx's theory may be of help. Whether or not this will yield valid or feasible solutions, it will articulate the ecological problems of industrial societies from his philosophical framework. This framework is a unique combination of various modern philosophies, such as Bacon's, Kant's, Hegel's, Feuerbach's, and others. In sharp contrast to this, the discourse of fundamentalist environmentalism proposes to industrial societies that they adopt 'a simpler life' in order to 8 Introduction safeguard the survival of this planet. If the ecological challenge is a challenge to basic assumptions of modern thinking, let us see; then, to what use one version of the modern view of nature, namely the theory of Karl Marx, can be put. I will therefore start with the hypothesis that two of Marx's expectations have been disproved: the expectation that science and technology would create an intelligible and controllable world as well as the expectation that only capitalist relations stand in the way of such a goal (but equally wrong are those environmentalists who foolishly believe that the basic fault has to be seen in the attempt to harness nature to human purposes or to develop productive forces). I argue that some productive forces may run counter to the aim of extending human control over nature. This study therefore investigates the conditions under which modem technology is developed and applied (ch. 3). If the growth of the productive forces does not lead automatically to an increase in mastery over nature, we also have to reconsider basic assumptions of historical materialism (ch. 4). A reformu­ lation of basic assumptions of historical materialism will inev­ itably affect our understading of what communism is, or should be (ch. 5). Alfred Schmidt in his pioneering study has already remarked that we have to collect many scattered remarks from a wide range of Marx's theory, sinee Marx never treated the concept of nature in a separate discussion. These scattered remarks, put together, open up a complex discourse, since its elements are interwoven in many ways. There are many possible connections with other elements of his theory or with the theories of others. This could take us to philosophy, natural sciences, history, epistemology, political economy, sociology, and further afield, where there is considerable danger in being distracted from the centrally important discussion. For this reason, I have largely excluded questions of epistemology, political economy, and history from this study, giving preference to an approach which locates Marx in a philosophical tradition and connects his thoughts to contemporary social theory and interpretations of his work. The framework of this book is as follows. Chapter 1 surveys the most common approaches to ecological problems which attempt an understanding of both phenomena and causes of Introduction 9 ecological problems. It also provides some minimal conceptual standard on which later chapters will rely. For example, I shall provide a definition of what an ecological problem is and why this is a preferable definition to what is often heard. It is distinguished from loose talk like 'destruction of nature', 'eco­ logical crisis', or 'ecological collapse'. Chapter 2 tries to relate Marx's thought to the findings of Chapter 1 in a direct way (s. 2. 1 ) and then reconstructs some possible approaches from within his body of thought (ss. 2.2 and 2.3). It will turn out that the concepts of nature and human nature, as developed by Marx, provide an excellent starting­ point for the discussion (ss. 2.4 and 2.5). Marx's philosophical anthropology provides the conceptual framework within which an illuminating analysis of the ecological problematic can be undertaken. For it turns out that Marx conceives of a transhis­ torical situation of mankind in which it has always to transform nature in order to survive. This is a process which takes place within soCieties and by means of technology. Both, societies and technology, are in constant development. Marx conceptualizes this in a theoretical model which is commonly called historical materialism. This model contains an interest both in the evolu­ tion of societies and also in the evolution of technologies. Chapter 3, therefore, focuses on the topic of technology and technological evolution. It confronts Marx's findings with those of post-Darwinian evolutionary theory, discusses the similarities and differences between science and technology, considers a systems theoretical analysis of technology, and addresses the question whether Marx was a technological determinist. Finally, some attention is dedicated to Marx's analysis of modern machine technology. Most interestingly, Marx conceived of the possibility that this technology may constitute a condition of alienation. However, there is a decisive difference between such suggestions (above all spelled out in the Grundrisse and the Manuscripts 1861-3) and his final pronouncements in Capital (see s. 3.5). This chapter thus provides some new findings as regards exeget· ical matters. But not only the analysis of machine technology has to be mentioned here. The division of labour is a topic on which much has been written without doing much justice to Marx. Section 3.6 will therefore clarify what Marx thought on this topic. 10 Introduction Chapter 4 links technological evolution with the evolution of social forms. My starting-point here is the 1859 Preface which I try to reconstruct in different terms from those of the base­ superstructure model. I try to conceive of technology and society as developing together in a process of coevolution. Again, I try to use models provided by post· Darwinian evolutionary theory and by systems theory. The reader will also notice that I give another interpretation to the formula of 'fettering of the pro­ ductive forces' which here is not interpreted along the lines of an orthodox reading which focuses on property relations. Instead, I take it in the broader sense that the development of the human race as such must not be thwarted (s. 4.5). It is argued that ecological problems can be illuminated using a historical materialist framework, if the dimension of Marx's philosophical anthropology is not neglected. If one interprets Marxism in terms of a narrow (economic) conception of the development of productive forces, it loses all of its critical impetus. For it is not the institution of private property which fetters the development of the productive forces in this (economic) sense; and it is not the institution of state planning which unfettered the develop­ ment of the productive forces in this sense. But likewise, the presence of ecological problems cannot simply be explained in a monocausal way, for instance that private property inevitably leads to ecological problems or that state planning leads to them (or helps to avoid them). This is to say that the present historical level of nature transformation (which takes place with certain technologies) makes ecological problems likely (from hidden to manifest, from chronic to catastrophical). It is far from clear that forms of property have a causal influence on this state of affairs. Chapter 5 embarks on a discussion of the concept of commun­ ism, both as originally formulated by Marx and as seen by other authors. Central for the discussion is the notion of labour which contains an emancipatory dimension. I argue that the distinction between a realm of necessity and a realm of freedom is important for Marx and parallels a distinction made earlier (s. 2.4) between first and second nature. According to Marx, true freedom is only possible within second nature. Where the untransformed first nature presses man to work, this is not free activity, although it can in principle be done with pleasure and in the absence of Introduction 11 alienation. Marx coins the term travail attractif for such a realization of labour in communist society. My aim here is also to destroy the myth that the later Marx became more pessimistic as regards the possibilities of the realm of freedom. In my opinion he always held the view that nature-imposed activities cannot count as free activity, although they could in principle be done in non-alienated ways. Freedom, for Marx, can be gained only in human objectifieations, in second nature. The more first nature is transformed into seeond nature, the more its laws are understood and the more mankind is able to free itself from its strains. Communism is the culmination of such a process. This is to say that only a society which is able to control its own workings on the natural environment is worth the name com­ munist. Chapter 5 also draws some attention to the question whether Marx was against or in favour of markets and central planning and whether he overlooked the problems which stem from scarcity, personal differences, and social complexity. Here it is argued that Marx faced a dilemma when addressing the problem of markets and plan-a dilemma which he was not able to solve. He was also ambiguous on the problem of scarcity; sometimes he thinks that abundance is unlikely to occur under communism. As regards social complexity, it seems that Marx took the simple epistemological standpoint that human creations are understandable by humans, that humans as creators and observers of their creations are able to discern them in an uncontested truthful way. This would be even easier if humans transformed first nature into second nature, thereby replacing nature more and more with culture. However, it escaped his attention that this process led to an increasing social complexity and made the conditions for social transparence vanish. Phenomena 13 ledge into commonsense language. This indicates that ecological problems are socially constructed. 1 Establishing Phenomena, Claims, and Explanations You want to live 'according to nature'? . To live-is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is living not valuating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different? (Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil) Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, elec­ tric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of human industrYi natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. (Karl Marx, Gnmdrisse) Since the first studies concerning ecological problems appeared, l the topic has been an ever-present issue in many contemporary debates. These studies were alarmist in tone. They led to a debate which altered the political dis.course in one important respect: the natural environment became an issue for political activity, for political parties and for governments. It became an issue for social and political sciences, for economics, moral philosophy, and law. Other parts of society increasingly realized that environmental questions were crucial; but just how crucial turned out to be a topic for many debates. These debates are still going on and partly taking place in the mass media. Their very logic seems to lead to a permanent switch of attention. The urge for novelty periodically discovers new ecological problems, from the ozone hole to. the greenhouse effect, from noxious chemicals in food chains to smog in big cities. However, the fact that it is the mass media that disperse this news should be no reason for neglecting the underlying problems. Very.often mass media reports are simply translating available scientific know! Carson 1962; Meadows el ai. 1972. Sec the criticisms of Heilbronner 1973, Myrdal 1973, and Galtung 1973 with respect to the latter. 1.1. Phenomena It is worth noting that the 'early' reports on environmental problems were stressing the interconnection of several factors which would lead to an ecological crisis or collapse, the most important of them being exhaustion of resources, population growth, and pollution. At least in respect of the problem of resources and population, recent studies, such as the Commission of the United Nations on Environment and Development, are more optimistic.2 The 1987 report of the commission lists the following phenomena: 1 . pollution (air, water); 2. depletion of groundwater; 3 . proliferation of toxic chemicals; 4. proliferation of hazardous waste; 5. erosioni 6. desertification; 7. acidification; 8. new chemicals (see United Nations 1987: 10) In a quite illuminating but little-discussed book, Passmore listed the following problems: 9. pollution; 10. depletion of natural resources; 1 1 . extinction of species; 12. ·destruction of wilderness; 13. population growth (cf. Passmore 1974: 43). Since ( 1 ), (3), (4), ( 7), and (8) are contained in the more general (9), I shall take Passmore's list as the basis for further discussion. Since ( 1 1 ) and ( 1 2) are contained in ( 1 0), we have baSically pollution, depletion of (renewable and non-renewable) resources, 2. 'The commission believes that widespread poverty is no longer inevitable' (United Nations 1987: 8). 'Global agriculture has the potential to grow enough food for all, but food is often not available where it is needed' (ibid. 12). 'Hunger often arises from lack of purchasing power rather than lack of available fooq' {ibid. 13). Note that the depletion of natural resources does not figure as a separate theme in the report. 14 Phenomena and population growth as ecological problems. Erosion and desertification fall out of the list. They are natural processes anyway and interesting in our context only in so far as they are caused by human intervention. In this case we might classify them under (10), distinguishing between renewable resources (agriculture) and non-renewable resources. Side-effects of chem­ ical substances (such as pharmaceutics) would have to be included under pollution. Population growth can be an ecological problem in two senses. First it can be seen as leading to ecological problems such as pollution or depletion of resources, because an increasing population might require more intense exploitation of resources or more technological development with pollution as a side-effect. Second, it can be seen as an ecological problem per se, that is, the increasing number in a specific place may be detrimental to human well-being. Taken in the first sense it is a cause of, taken in the second sense it is an instance of, an ecological problem. The issue has a practical and a theoretical dimension. The practical dimension is that almost every country has been affected by ecological problems in a more or less significant way; it has become one of the central political questions in the course of a few years. In many countries social movements have come into being which have already made an impact on political, legal, scientific, and economic matters. 1.2. Ecological claims and approaches Turning to the theoretical implications, I shall first devote some attention to looking at explanations of, and claims about, ecological problems. It is important to be precise here, since the way of defining and explaining the problem to a great extent determines the solution. I start with the most basic and most radical thesis which is put forward by environmentalists and shared by many others. This is the claim that ecological problems are the consequence of a specific attitude towards nature which has prevailed in the Western world for some centuries. This attitude towards nature is called 'domination of nature' and considered to be false and undesirable. It follows as a corollary that, in order to overcome Phenomena 15 ecological problems, the dominating attitude of man towards nature should be replaced by another. The roots of our, presum­ ably false, instrumentalist view of nature are usually dated back to the Enlightenment (mechanistic world-view; separation of body and soul, of subject and object) or even to Judeo-Christian religion. This latter claim was made by Lynn White Jr. when he said that the biblical creation story was responsible for the growth of technology and the consequent destruction of large elements of nature (el. White 1973; Norton 1987: 143): 'And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness; then let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth . . .' (Gen. 1 : 26-9). There are two lines in the ecological discourse regarding the strategy to overcome this false attitude towards nature. According to the first, mankind should retreat to a lower state of nature transformation and adopt a simpler way of life in order to restrict its interventions in natural processes;3 the other holds that such a way back is not open to us. As Amery put it, 'there is no way back to the ritual dance around the divine bear' (Amery. 1976: 197, my translation). When some authors ('New Age') speak of a social and cultural revolution which would be neces­ sary to bring harmony to man's relationship to nature, this can be understood in both ways. But no matter how we judge the many different projects and Utopias in this discourse, they all share the basic claim that the dominating attitude of mankind lies at the root of the problem. The basic thrust of this present work is to oppose such a claim directly. In my view 'domination of nature' is not responsible for ecological problems; quite the contrary: the very presence of ecological problems proves the absence of such a domination. In other words, it is still a reasonable approach with which we can make sense of the problem and stipulate solutions. Now, this seems to be such a bold contention that it might be discarded by many from the very beginning. Let me therefore proceed in more detail. Confronted with the dramatic events of the twentieth century, the temptation has been strong for many thinkers to regard the ,1 This view sometimes has an authoritarian flavour, especially in the version . of Gruh1 11975) and Harich 11975). 16 Phenomena heritage of Westem civilization and Enlightenment very critically and even reject its 'project of rationality'. As, for e;xample, Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialektik der Aufkldrung wrote: The conservatives' conclusion, that horror and civilization are bound together, is well established . . . Only under the sign of the hangman did culture develop . . . under the sign of the hangman are labour and enjoyment. To contradict this would mean to make a mockery at science and logic. One cannot abolish the horror and retain civilization . . . But different conclusions can also be drawn from this: one has to scorn logic, if it is against mankind. (Adorno and Horkheimer 198 1 : 245, my translation) In my view this position mistakenly identifies certain specific results of Western rationality with rationality as such. From this fallacy follows the rejection of Western-type rationality and the search for other world-views which promise to do better. Furthermore, this fallacy might suggest that another approach (mystical, religious, irrational) would avoid the problems in question; such a suggestion, however, could be quite dangerous for modern industrial societies. Utopian projects have to ac­ knowledge the highly complex character of modern technology if they want to bring about feasible changes. Marcuse, posing himself this problem, thought that there could be two types of mastery over nature, a repressive one and a liberating one (see Marcuse 1964: 185). To this position Habermas quite rightly objected that modern science can be interpreted as a historically unique project only if at least one alternative project is thinkable. And, in addition, an alternative New Science would have to include the definition of a New Technology. This is. a sobering consideration because technology, if based at all on a project, can only be traced back to a 'project' of the human species as a whole, and not to one that could be historically surpassed. (Habermas 1971b: 87) Analysing contemporary ccological thought, Oechsle found that a common world-view prevalent in it is naturalism. Naturalism, according to her, proceeds in the following way. It first juxtaposes nature and society and then tries to bring them together in such a way that society adapts its laws to the laws of nature. As she put it, naturalism here means the attempt to explain and under- Phenomena 17 stand society on the basis of specific natural laws and to deduce social norms and principles of social organization from ecological prinCiples (el. Oechsle 1988: 9). Haeckel, the founding father of ecology as a scientific discipline, already claimed in the nine­ teenth century that man should lead his life in accordance with natural laws. It is intriguing to see that this naturalistic world­ view is a common denominator of all political tendencies in the ecological discourse. We find it in conservative authors like Gruhl (1975: 33, 345); in communist-Stalinist authors like Harich (1975: 161); in anarchist writers like Bookchin (1977: IS), and in eco-socialist writers like Lalonde (1978: 53 ) . All of them claim the authority of nature and her laws to be the foundation stone of a new society which will solve ecological problems. Gruhl and Harich are alike in that they stress the iron necessity with which nature operates; from this they derive similar tough political measures. Bookchin argues that spontan­ eity in life converges with spontaneity in nature (1977: 10), and Lalonde stresses the fact that nature is and society should be self-organizing. This short overview shows that nature is an authority which many think to be uncontested; however, as closer analysis shows, each version of nature is a construction of its author. Therefore, what the 'nature of nature' is, is a matter rather of debate than certainty. This already makes clear that any discourse on nature and ecological problems is not without presuppositions; and these presuppositions lie within the cultural background of the parti­ cipants of the discourse; they are a product of history. A definition of 'nature' or of ecological problems, therefore, always relates to an anthropocentriC element. Since the reference point for evalu­ ation is human, non-anthropocentric approaches of nature pre­ servation, so I suggest, are defective. Oechsle rightly refuses ecological naturalism. However, she does not defend anthropo­ centrism in a straightforward way, as-in my opinion-she should have done. In my view, man's special position within nature is characterized by his domination of nature. In order to separate the question of whether mankind has a special status within nature from the question of whether mankind should dominate nature, Oechsle (approvingly) cites Mumford, who claimed that within occidental civilization there have been examples of a 'democratic' technology. This argument gives her 18 Phenomena the possibility of defending a sort of anthropocentrism without embracing the notion of domination of nature. However, a distinction between a democratic and an authoritarian technology makes sense only with respect to man, not with respect to nature. Every technology, even the softest, forms a part of man's domination of nature. Oechsle comes close to acknowledging this when she writes that even the most 'dialogical' approaches towards nature (as, for example, proposed by Prigogine) cannot but lead to a more perfect domination of nature. Ludwig Trepl expressed this in the following way: 'An ecological technology means total grip. For this reason ecology does not stand outside the logic of progress, but the latter culminates in it' (TrepI 1983 : 1 1, my translation). Oechsle agrees with authors like Amery, Bahro, and Meyer-Abich (inter alia) that we have to research the origins of destroying nature. These are seen in the specific occidental human self-understanding and world-view. As Amery put it: If one does not expose the roots of these historical and ideal attitudes, the necessary remedies will always meet political and social resistance; and only if one realizes how deeply rooted these attitudes are in our collective underground, can the necessary} i.c. radical and most painful, process of a planetary revolution be initiated. (Amery 1976: 10, my translation) But at the same time Oechsle defends the anthropocentric world-view to a certain degree. Man is Natur und Ubernatur, is part of nature and at the same time 'above' or even 'outside' nature. Human beings have no fixed place where they have to live; virtually every place on this planet can be inhabited by them. By this they distinguish themselves from most other animals (and, of course, plants) who survive only within a limited geographical, biological, climatic zone. How are human beings able to survive in an 'insecure environment'? The answer is: by constructing a second 'nature' around them.4 This artifi­ cial, man-made nature is the embodiment of their need to fight against nature; it is the solution of the apparent paradux that they are in and against nature. The solution of the paradox entails a wholly new dimension by which human beings dis tin4 In comp,lrison, an animal species in an unfavourable enVironment will undergo an evolutionary process in order to survive. Phenomena 19 guish themselves from animals: i t i s the use o f tools or techno­ logy. But something further follows from this. Because human beings are organizing their life in the described way, they have no 'natural enemies' as almost every other species has though, certainly, they sometimes have specific parts of nature in op­ position to them, nature which exerts its resistance upon them. As John Stuart Mill observed, the powers of nature 'are often towards man in the position of enemies, from which he must wrest, by force and ingenuity, what little he can for his own use' (Mill 1904: 1 5 ). This stresses again my objection to the ecological world-view which challenges the anthropocentric world-view. Nature, as such, is not always beneficial for human beings. It is completely mistaken to identify nature with 'good' and technology or , human culture with 'bad .5 Moralizing helps rarely, less so with respect to nature. As Passmore observed quite rightly, 'these natural processes may in fact be quite harmful, so that, let us say, oysters from granite regions ought to be condemned for human consumption. The "natural" is not necessarily harmless, let alone beneficial to man' (Passmore 1974: 47). In exactly the same vein, Adorno, reflecting on the landscape of the Swiss Alps, remarked: Both} the scars of civilization and the untouched zone beyond the timber line, are contrary to the idea that nature is a cheering, warming thing, dedieated only to man; it reveals what the cosmos looks like. The usual imago of nature is limited, narrowly bourgeois, sensitive only to the tiny zone in which historically familiar life flourishes; the bridle path is cultural philosophy. (Adorno 1968: 327, my translation) Passmore, in reply to Barry Commoner's Third law of ecology­ nature knows best', pointed out: It is true enough . . . that every human intervention in an ecosystem is likely to disturb the workings of that system in a way that is detrimental to some number of it. So much is true of every change, man-induced or nature-induced. But it by no means follows, as his 'law' might seem to suggest, that every such change, or even most such changes, will be detrimental to human beings. Unlike the watches to which he compares S As Kluge has shown in a detailed study, much of the ecological rhetoric consists of the juxtaposition of life and death-where nature stands for the former, industrialism for the latter (see Kluge 1985). 20 Phenomena them, ecological systems were hot designed for man's USc. When men picked seeds off plants and sowed them on cleared ground, they acted in a way that was detrimental to the organic life which was accustomed to feed on the fallen seeds. But only the mOst unreconstructed primitivist would suggest that the actions of our agricultural forefathers were destructive of human interests. A nature left entirely alone as 'knowing best' would support only the dreariest and most monotonous of lives. IPassmore 1974: 185) The anthropocentric approach has the main virtue of offering a reference point from which to evaluate ecological problems, The reference point, as we shall see, can bc defined in different ways Icurrently living human individuals, society, mankind, future generations) but, no matter how we defirle it, it establishes a clear criterion of how to judge existing ecological phenomena. Any 'eco-centric' approach, on the other hand, is bound to be inconsistent, unless it adopts a mystical standpoint. It is incon­ sistent because it pretends to define ecological problems purely from the standpoint of nature. It starts with assumptions about nature and natural laws to which all human action should adapt.6 But it is evident that the definition of n�ture and an ecological balance is a human act, a human definition which sets an ecological balance in relation to man's needs, pleasures, and desires.7 Consider now the following clairns:" Ecological problems are the result of man's domination I C I ) of nature. Following from this, another model of man's relation to nature would eliminate ecological problems. The alternative model (, Note that the refusal of anthropoccntrism is followed by a conspicuous position which anthropomorphizes nature, Le. it projects human standards and inventions into the working of nature. But why should nature work in a 'balanced' manner? Or why should nature always be beautiful? Is it not man who introduces laws of beauty into nature? Cf. Dante: 'And therefore we need not praise man for his physical beauty which he gets by birth since it was not he who made it. Instead, we should praise the maker, that is, human nature which produces so much beauty in its material when it is not restricted by it' (Convivio, III, iv. 8), and Marx in the Paris Manuscripts, 'man forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty' (eW iii. 277). 7 From a systems theoretical viewpoint, this claim can be pUt in the follow­ ing way: 'society is a communicatively closed system and cannot communicate with the environment. It finds no one there to answer. And even if this were the case it would then be included within society' (Luhmann 1984a: 549, my trans.). K Cf. for the following also Buhl 1981. Phenomena 21 would be communicative instead of dominating. 'Harmony', 'conviviality', and 'co-operation' would be the underlYing prin­ ciples (el. Bloch 1986; Illich 1973). This claim having already been criticized above, let us turn to the next one: Ecological problems are basically the result of man's (C2) destruction of nature. This definition releases us from the difficulty of alternative rnodes of conceiving and treating nature. (C2) does not necessarily refuse the domination of nature; it only opposes some extremely negative features ( 'destruction'). However, this claim is equally misleading since it suggests the (false) belief that nature could be destroyed (by human action or otherwise). This definition leads us immediately to metaphysical arguments and tel the idealism-materialism opposition. Interestingly enough, many of the participants of the ecological debate are 'materialists' (virtu­ ally all natural scientists) and therefore should not believe in the possibility of nature's self-destruction, and, in fact, most of them would not subscribe to such a position, although many ecologists make use of this defioition. Scientists, quite explicitly, refer to the 'second law of thermodynamics' (entropy law) to express their preoccupation in this respect (see Georgescu­ Roegen 1971, 1980). But there remains another sense in which IC2) is understood. In this version the destruction of nature is not taken in the sense of physics but in an evaluative sense. 'Destruction of nature' here refers to the disruption of the environment human beings live in. This version is usually implied in the following claim: Ecological problems result ftom man's short-Sighted IC3) exploitation of nature. A 'short-sighted' exploitation of nature can have two different theanings: la) nature'S intrinsic values are violated; Ib) negative repercussions from exploited nature to man are not taken into account. As I shall explain below, only Ib) carl be used in a rneaningful way. The ecological discourse, however, does not usually speak of ecological problems, but of ecological crisis. The notion of crisis derives from medicine and has been widely applied, above all to economy. It denotes the turning-point of a pathological state Ifor example fever in medicine, depreciation of capital in 22 Phenomena economy). The notion of crisis thus introduces a dramatic dimension into the ecological discourse: it suggcsts that nature is undergoing an ;abnormal' development which has to culminate in a crisis which then gives way to a new, 'normal' state. But each crisis can also lead to the opposite result: in this case the 'infected' system (organism) will not recover but die. From this last alternative we get the following prediction: Current ecological crises lead necessarily to ecological (C4) catastrophes (and eventually to the final collapse). It goes without saying that much of the dramatic dimension of the ecological discourse rests on this element. To subscribe to this.�laim a clear analysis of the present situation and a reliable prognosis of the immediate future of the planet earth would be required. The following two cxamples may illustrate this. The first example is the problem of CO emissions into the atmo­ 2 sphere. One position holds that this process will lead to the 'greenhouse effect', that the planet's atmosphere will be heated up with consequences like change in global weather or the melting of polar ice and the consequent flooding of many big maritime cities. The counter-position holds that increasing emissions of dust will cause a counter-tendency which prevents the heating up and thus prevents the greenhouse effect (d. Miller and Miller 1989). The second example is the question of scarcity of natural resources. Again, scientists have expressed considerable disag­ reement; a judgement in this case depends on the answer to the question of how fast technological progress will be (in order to find substitutes for scarce resources). Thus I think that many of the 'alarmist' statements are the expression of one tendency within a variety of competing claimsY For this reason I shall abandon the catastrophic prediction, but also the following claim: Ecological problems are only temporary and not very (CS) severe; they will SOOn vanish. which is the symmetrical counter-argument to (C4). ') In saying this I do not deny the existence of ecological catastrophes (in the sense of Perrows's 'normal accidents', below). What I deny is the logical status of these catastrophes in the above definition. There, they have the status of an instance for a 'final crisis'. Phenomena 23 Passmore proposed the following, very broad definition: A prob­ lem is 'ecological' if it arises as a practical consequence of man's dealings with nature (see Passmore 1974: 43). Since this definition avoids the problems of (C] ) to (CS), and has the virtue of relating clearly to human action, I shall adopt it as the basis for further discussion-with one additional qualification: 'practical con­ sequences' means that man's dcalings with nature retroact upon society in a way which is detrimental to human well­ being. This definition takes into consideration the fact that nature by itself can also induce ecological problems. This is the case with floods, eruption of volcanos, fall of meteorites, etc. The important point here is that we are obviously interested in ecological problems which are produced by society and the solutions of which lie within the scope of social action. Man's dealings with nature are generally characterized by the following properties. First, man is part of nature, he is living in nature; biology defines him as the most highly developed mam­ mal. Nature, however, is the realm of competition for survival. Thus human beings have to secure their position in nature as do other animals. But human beings distinguish themselves from other animals in their own particular way of maintaining life. lf we characterize human beings as living in and dominating nature, this does not present two statements which are incom­ patible with cach other. When we say that a problem is ecological when it arises as a consequence of man's dealings with nature, many might agree. But I think it useful to push the point a bit further. It does not mean that the very fact of dealing with nature ( manipulation, domination, harnessing, or seduction) is the crucial point, the 'cause', so to speak, of ecological problems. Ecological problems arise only Out of specific ways of dealing with nature. To repeat my claim from above: both man's existence in nature and his attempt to dominate nature are compatible; human beings live in, and dominate, nature. Out of a misunderstanding of this relation, both ecologists and their declared enemies conclude the mutually exclusive character of the two predicates. Both positions are wrong in that they identify the problem of dominating nature as the heart of the matter. Consider the following argument which takes the eco­ centric approach to extremes, thereby demonstrating its absurdity. Recall (C4) from above. There we saw that a 'pathological' state 24 Phenomena was distinguished from a 'normal' state of nature. But it is difficult to know what is 'normal' for nature. Ecologists will probably argue that the 'normal' state of nature is a balanced state of nature. Since I cannot see how this definition can work without reference to human interests and definitions, I claim that nature is always in 'balance with itself'. Take the example of a river in which, as a result of pollution (detergents), no fish survive. But instead of fish other animals and plants (e.g. algae) are flourishing. The ecologist, confronted with such an argument, would probably say that if the river cannot return to the former ('normal') state with its own powers, its ecosystem would have to be called 'unbalanced'. But in so arguing, she would only reveal her preference for higher living organisms. Usually lower animals such as insects and bacteria are outside the concern of ecological reasoning. Albert Schweitzer tried to be consistent and defended the right of living for the tsetse fly and the tubercle. This position, radical in ethical and religious respects, makes a consistent course of human action impossible. Consider the case of the AIDS virus! Let us take the argument a step further and consider the example of a river which is drying out. In this ease again we have 'nature': sand, rocks, plants, insects, reptiles, mammals. The .ecologist would now probably reply that nature's diversity and complexity has been destroyed. And here, ironically, we have the resurrection (if only implicit) of the anthropocentric view, namely that it is man who has an interest in conserving natural complexity. Now an adherent to the ecocentric view could argue that nature 'for itself' should be complex. But unless one adopts a mystical or religiOUS standpOint, there is always a human interest behind the attitude that nature should be left out there 'for itself'. The reasons behind such a human interest are either of an aesthetic or a purely selfish character or spring from man's general care about his environment. Take the ex­ ample of pollution. Mary Douglas provided the following insight into the problem. She claims that 'uncleanness is matter out of place' (Douglas 1966: 40). What makes a place wrong is depehdent on the cultural value system of a given society. With respect to Western societies we may say that it might be wrong aesthetically, that it is detrimental for health, or that it detroys Wildlife, plants, and animals (d. also Passmore 1974: 45-6). If we do not Phenomena 25 conceive of the 'selfish' character in a narrow, economic, short­ term way, all criteria can be reduced to this category lO My suspicion is that the ecological discourse shaped its arguments in a counter-position to economics, and also took over a basic flaw of that theory: the identification of short-term rationality (as expressed in economic behaviour) with rationality as such. Out of this identification it is only logical to refuse an anthropo­ centric approach as a guiding line in solving ecological problems. Human beings are seen as inherently short-sighted; it follows that their needs must not count as criteria for ecological polities. Doing away with this confusion, the anthropocentric standpoint makes perfectly possible a concern about the 'flourishing of nature'; it is by no means bound to be an accomplice to the tendencies which cause ecological problems. Yet, what is more, I claim that this standpOint is the only one which can consistently speak in terms like 'flourishing nature' and the only one which lays its standard of critique open, thus facilitating analyses and solutions for these problems. As Norton aptly observed, environmentalists often make two typical confusions. The first is the belief that one must choose between attributing intrinsic and instrumental value to an object, that no object can be valued for its intrinsic value and simultaneously for its usefulness. The second is the belief that one must either attribute intrinsic value to an object or else leave it without any protection from the vagaries of human consumptive demands. Such beliefs sometimes lead to the confusion that protection of nature on anthropocentric·assump­ tions is a contradiction in terms. As regards the first belief, Norton rightly contends that 'one can assign instrumental value to an object without automatically denying that it has value beyond that usefulness . . . Attributing intrinsic value to an object limits the ways in which that object can be used but need not prohibit all use of it' (Norton 1987: 219). As regards the second belief, Norton shows that it is wrong as well. A simple thought can make this clear: 'One need not attribute intrinsic It) Consider the case of a domestic animal which falls ill and would die without medical care. Its 'natural' destiny would be to die. But, if the owner of the animal so wants, he tries to get it cured. This attempt need not be attributing intrinSic value to the animal because he may try to cure it on purely selfish grounds, I.e. simply because he would feel bad if the animal died without his effort to prevent it from dying. 26 Phenomena value to a neighbour's property in order to have a good reason not to destroy it. Nor need one attribute intrinsic value to nature in order to have good reason not to use it destructively' INorton 1987: 219). Interestingly, from this instrumental view of nature we can derive a rationale for the protection of species which is again anthropocentric. One might believe that humans who protect rather than destroy other living things are less likely to be violent in their dealings with other humans. One should, therefore, value wild birds, for example, 'as providing occasions for the uplifting of human attitudes and values' libid. 221). One cannot escape the cultural value system of contemporary Western societies when criticizing it. This is to say that ecological fundamentalists are bound to participate in rational debates, to presuppose rationality standards, etc. As Krohn put it: 'The critique of science must take the form of science, in order to be effective' IKrohn 1983: 128, my translation). I I The results of an 'ecologically inspired' research Ifor example, the emerging dis­ cipline of ecosystems research) may thus, again ironically, con­ tribute to a better domination of nature. As van den Daele 11987) has shown, ecology does not mean the transition to a non­ technological or to a purely contemplative concept of nature, but to a better technological concept. The Baconian vision of domination of nature is thus not abandoned but perfected Id. van den Daele 1987: 414). Since the mechanism of man's dealings with nature does not provide any barrier for a more perfect domination of nature, such a barrier-if one wants to have one-must be established by humans. The ecologists do establish such a barrier in re­ moralizing nature and science, thus challenging the famous claim of Bacon who once formulated that it is an error to believe that 'the inquisition of nature is in any part interdicted or forbidden' IBacon 1986: 20)Y In his view nature is 'a granary and storehouse of matters, not meant to be pleasant to stay or j I Thus a m�mber of the German Green Party, Maren-Griesebach, wrote: 'Ecology as baSIS for action, for politiCS. Since it is a scientific basis and can be proven with certainty . . . no one can avoid it' ( 1 98 1 : 32, my trans.). 11 Cf. also Kant in the preface to the 2nd edition of Kritik delreinen Vernunft: 'Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose' (Kant 1952a: 6). Phenomena 27 live in, but only to be entered as oeeasion requires, when anything is wanted for the work of the Interpreter . . . ' libid. 255, original emphasis). 13 1.3. Causes of ecological problems In section 1.2 I have sketched some essential human features in their relation to nature. From this we can infer the abstract possibility of ecological problems, for it is always possible that man acts upon nature in a way which causes changes in nature detrimental to his own life. In what follows I present several approaches which have been applied to investigate ecological problems or which can be used for this purpose. We may divide them into economic and soci­ ological ways of looking at the problem. The latter will be presented in sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, the former in sections 1.3.4-1.3.7. Generally we may distinguish between two com­ pletely different mechanisms which are at work, which 'cause' ecological problems, so to speak. The first conceives ecological problems as a result of purely intentional behaviour, whereas the second conceives them as essentially by-products of human action, as unintended in character. The first mechanism can be expressed in the economists' approach of 'externalities' which are the result of the strategy of an entrepreneur to externalize his costs as far as possible. The second mechanism has been studied above all by philosophers and has been taken up by social scientists.14 In determining what counts as 'intended' and 'unintended' the time horizon which is presupposed is crucial. Not by chance do the economists disregard long-term consequences of economic behaviour; they are transformed into 'social costs'. Likewise, although the producers and consumers of certain potentially damaging products may be aware of the inherent danger, they nevertheless decide to produce and use Iconsume) them. But at the same time they make their calculations about future U Marx shared this position, as we shall sec in ch. 2. To be sure, the two are ideal types which may not exist in this pure form. A firm which externalizes may not be aware of causing a specific type of ecological damage. 14 28 Phenomena developments. Some think that the consequences of their be­ haviour will not react upon them, or will occur only in a distant future; others think that they will not be alive to witness the catastrophic results (apres moi 1e diiluge); still others think that no catastrophes will take place in the future because of the beneficial technical innovations which reduce or abolish the dangerous potential of these products, or likewise reduce or abolish already manifest pathological symptoms. The unintended character of human action stresses the limits to human design. It is thus more pessimistic regarding the possibilities for abolishing ecological problems. Even if it were the case that entrepreneurs were not externalizing costs, but were ecologically aware, even if it were the case that no dangerous products are produced deliberately, there may be damages to the environment (if only in the long run). The two mechanisms are intertwined if we consider long time-spans and take human experience into account. Here the actors know that their actions may have detrimental effects on the environment, but they 'take the risk', the more so the more the consequences of that action will show up only in a distant future. Ecological problems are thus no 'information problems' in the first place. Even if people are well informed about the inherent dangers of some products/actions etc. they are not likely to stop. This mixed form of unintended/intended mechanism is thus present in sections 1 .3.3 - 1 .3.7. I start out with a discussion of technology which seems to be the decisive precondition for modem ecolo­ gical problems-but which should not be confused with a cause of them. 1 .3. 1 . Technology Above, I said that ecological problems arise from man's dealings with nature. In modern societies these dealings take place on an industrial level, and are carried out by technological means. We may generally distinguish two possible types of ecological problems: ( 1 ) ecological problems arising out of the 'normal' working of technol(jgy; (2) ecological problems arising out of accidents or catastrophes. Instances of ( 1 ) are, among many others, acid rain or toxic substances in food chains. Instances of (2) are accidents like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Seveso, or Phenomena 29 Bhopal. While I tum my attention to ( 1 ) throughout the remainder of this section, I shall consider (2) in section 1 .3.3. The report of the United Nations commission attributes a prominent place to technology. It says: 'Emerging technologies offer the promise of higher productivity, increased efficiency, and decreased pollution, but many bring risks of new toxic chemicals and wastes and of major accidents of a type and scale beyond present coping mechanisms' (United Nations 1987: 16). Commoner expressed a similar view: 'In modern industrial societies, the most important link between society and the ecosystem on which it depends is technology. There is consider­ able evidence that many of the new technologies which now dominate production in an advanced country such as the United States are in conflict with the ecosystem. They therefore degrade the environment' (Commoner 1 9 7 1 : 1 78-9). A simple consideration makes clear that technology stands at the heart of the matter. Mankind in its early stages, with primitive technology, could not affect its environment in the same way as mankind can today: the axe and fire could not, even lmder conditions of most careless use, cause dangers which were in the least comparable to present dangers which arise out of the use of nuclear or chemical technology. The difference, then, lies mainly in the greater scope and greater complexity of modem technology in comparison to old technology. Greater scope means that a Single malfunctioning of modem technology may affect regions and people far away from the event; it may affect a larger number of people and for a longer time span. Greater complexity means that modern technology is a composite of many parts which are embedded to a large degree in an institu­ tional framework; social institutions and technology permeate each other. Both are complex in their nature, thus 'increasing complexity, This leads to an ever-decreasing degree of transpar­ ency (see s. 5.5.), This makes it very difficult to determine more precisely 'causes' for ecological problems. It follows that the solution of ecological problems is equally difficult to achieve, If a chemical factory puts hazardous waste on a field, wc can identify the cause and its solution immediately. As Luhmann ( 1989c) pointed out, in such cases an adapted police law would suffice. But in most cases things are not so easy. As Passmore has put it, 'the 30 Phenomena solution of an eeological problem will normally depend on the . . . solution of a sub-set of problems-scientific, technological, economic, moral, political, administrative-each with its own style of solution' (Passmore 1974: 46). Thus interdisciplinary research is required to render possible a scientific understanding of ecological problems. There has been a considerable boom in the last few years in ecologieal literature which does consider itself 'interdisciplinary'. Even the term 'super-seience' has been coined for ecology, but a big part of it must be characterized as dilettante. IS This is because the subject-matter is so complex that no existing single discipline of science (let alone a single person) can make competent analyses.I6 The emerging 'ecosystems research' and the institu­ tionalizing of 'technological assessment' (see McBrierty 1988; Smits and Leyten 1988; Tuiniga 1988) are steps in the direction of a truer interdisciplinary dimension. 1 .3.2. Unintended consequences Suppose now that scientific research has yielded results and we are able to understand the working of a particular ecological problem. What comes next is (at least in many cases) the development of a new technology, a technology which reduces or eradicates the undesired outcome of the old technologyP Paradoxically, here we may enter a vicious circle, because the production or operation of the new technology may also produce ecological problems. As Passmore said: 'Any technological in­ novation . . . involves an element of ecological risk; it is impossible to calculate all its consequences in every possible circumstance' (Passmore 1974: 49) .'8 IS As Enzensberger observed, 'today everyone counts as expert in ecological matters' (Enzcnsberger 1973: 2, my trans.). 16 To be sure, many biologists have tried to develop solutions for the social, political, economic, or legal sphere, but they did not seem to be very appealing to their addressees. 17 I do not consider here such simple cases as the 'adapted police law' or any other 'simple new law' which is able to abolish any existing ecological problem in one blow. IN Cf. also Perrow: 'It is particularly important to evaluate technological fixes in the systems that we cannot or will not do without. Fixes, including safety devices, sometimes create new accidents, and quite often merely allow those in charge to run the system faster, or in worse weather, or with bigger explosives. Some technical fixes are excuses for poor organisation or an attempt to compen­ sate for poor system design' (Perrow 1984: 1 1 ). Phenomena 31 Modern technology thus exhibits a feature of social life in gen­ eral: human actions and intentions are crossed, mixed, and anni­ hilated by unintended consequences. Merton distinguishes be­ tween unintended consequences and unanticipated consequences and makes clear that 'undesired effects are not always undesirable effects' (Merton 1937: 895). From this it follows that undesired unanticipated consequences can be equated with unintended consequences (in the sense I use the term). Note that Merton in his later 'Manifest and Latent Functions' defines three types of unintended consequences (see Merton 1968: l OS): functional, dysfunctional, and irrelevant consequences. Ecological problems resulting from unintended consequences are thus clearly dys­ functional in character; but, as we must ask, dysfunctional in regard to what? Dysfunctional consequences may appear for parts of the economic system (for example: rise in prices for raw materials), the health system (increase in diseases), the political system (overburdening with legitimation). Additionally, the political system cannot regulate the problems by law in a simple way, but may instead trigger off a vicious circle by its very intervention. While I shall come back to this point in Chapter 2, let me briefly summarize Merton's view. He first limits a correct anticipation of consequences of action to an existing state of knowledge. Especially in situations which demand immediate action of some sort, the probability is high that we do not act on the basis of scientific knowledge but on opinion and estimate. As Merton himself put it: Moreover, even when immediate action is not exacted, there is the economic problem of distributing our fundamental resources, time and energy. Time and energy are scarce means and economic behavior is concerned with the rational allocation of these means among alternative wants, only one of which is the anticipation of consequences of action. In our present economic order, it is manifestly uneconomic behavior to concern ourselves with attempts to obtain knowledge for predicting the outcomes of action to such an extent that we have practically no time or energy for other pursuits. (Merton 1937: 900) The second factor is error. This means that actors often assume that 'actions which have in the past led to the desired outcome will continue to do so' (ibid. 901). The third factor is what has been called 'imperious immediacy of interest' and refers to 32 Phenomena instances 'where the actor's paramount concern with the fore­ seen immediate consequences excludes the consideration of further or other consequences of the same act' IMerton 1937: 901). Merton further explains that the action may be rational 'in the sense that it is an action which may be expected to lead to the attainment of the specific goal; irrational, in the sense that it may defeat the pursuit or attainment of other values which are not, at the moment, paramount but which nonetheless form an integral part of the individual's scale of values' libid. 902). This, however, is not only a question of conflicting values, but of short-term and long-term rationalities. Ecological problems seen in this way would suggest an identification of the paramount interest with the immediate economic benefits; other values Ifor example, environment) are suppressed and become a long­ term Concern. A similar but distinct factor concerns the basic values involved in the course of human action: 'activities oriented toward certain values release processes which so react as to change the very scale of values which precipitated them' libid. 903). Instances of this are self-defeating processes like the rise of the Protestant ethic which in the end brought about wealth and abundance. Vicwing ecological and economic values in this perspective, one may say that the result of the dominating economic value in Western societies has been to contribute to the emergence of its 'antagonist': the Ifundamentalist) defenders of ecological values who express their paramount concern with immediate ecological goals, no matter what the result for the economy. The fourth and last factor Merton mentions is the intriguing fact that successful social prediction and planning are often hampercd by public predictions of future social developments 'precisely because the prediction has become a new element in the concrete situation, thus tending to change the initial course of developments' libid. 903-4). Applying this last model again to ecological problems, we may for once receive a more optimistic picture: we might expect that the apocalyptic tone of the first world reports on environment have already changed the course of development, leading to a decline in pollution and a slower depletion of resources. But if we consider Merton's third factor, where a basic value becomes self-defeating, then we may get a much more pessimistic picture: then, the reduction in ecological Phenomena 33 damage results in the decline of ecological awareness thus allowing a new Ivicious) cycle. As we have seen, the feature of unintended consequences makes social planning difficult. 19 This is basically due to the fact that we cannot predict the character of these consequences: they may be inherently beneficial or harmful Ito all of mankind or to parts of it; in respect of short-term or long-term considera­ tions). Broadly speaking, we can summarize Merton's typology into two classes: unintended consequences as resulting from imperfect knowledge I'error' being part of it) or as resulting from the actor's paramount concern with immediate results. In section 1.3.3 the knowledge aspect plays a crucial role but is also mixed with the second aspect, whereas in sections 1.3.6 and 1.3.8 the 'imperious immediacy of interest' will be centrally important. 1.S.S. Industrial accidents I now come to the second possibility labove): industrial accidents. Up to now we have arrived at the possibility that some industries, during their 'normal' working, pollute, that is, produce toxic or otherwise dangerous waste. Now I shall consider the possibility that some industries lirrespective of whether working 'cleanly' or not) are likely to produce accidents which set free toxic or otherwise dangerous substances. Charles Perrow has studied high-risk technologies and their institutional setting, combining the study of organizations with the study of technology. His analysis thus contains two elements: technology Isee s. 1.3.1) and unintended consequences Isee s. 1.3.2). As Perrow pointed out, some characteristics of high­ risk technologies 'suggest that no matter how effective conven­ tional safety devices are, there is a form of accident that is inevitable' IPerrow 1984: 3). This alarming conclusion is derived from the specific features of modern technology: '!M!ost high­ risk systems have some special characteristics, beyond their toxic or explosive or genetic dangers, that make accidents in them inevitable, even "normal". This has to do with the way !<) As Passmore said: 'this is not a very encouraging line of reasoning . . . !blut it is at least realistic, firmly based on human history . . . that the unintended consequences of mcn's actions arc more important, for the most part, than the consequences they intend' (Passmore 1974: 83-4). 34 Phenomena failures can . interact and the way the system is tied together' (Perrow 1984: 4). This sort of system is characterized by 'inter­ active complexity' and 'tight coupling'. Perrow employs two vari­ ables in his analysis: linear/complex systems and loose/tight coupling. Linear processes and loose coupling are less prone to sys­ tem accidents. But note that even 'the most linear of all systems will have at least one source of complex interactions, the environ­ ment, since it impinges upon many parts or units in the system' (ibid. 75). 'Loosely coupled systems, whether for good or ill, can incorporate shocks and failures and pressures for change without destabilisation. Tightly coupled systems will respond more quickly to these perturbations, but the response may be disast­ rous. Both types of systems have their virtues and their vices' (ibid. 92). If the above two variables taken together inevitably produce an accident, this would be the case for a normal or systems accident in Perrow's definition. As he makes clear, 'we have such accidents because we have built an industrial society that has some parts, like industrial plants or military adventures, that have highly interactive and tightly coupled units. Unfortu­ nately, some of these have high potential for catastrophic acci­ dents' (ibid. 8). A well-known and widespread view blames the operators for causing accidents. Perrow, however, shows that 'the operator is confronted by unexpected and usually mysterious interactions among failures'. Saying 'that he or she should have zigged instead of zagged is possible only after the fact. Before the accident no one could know what was going on and what should have been done' (ibid. 9). It is complexity and tight coup­ ling which has to be seen as cause for a 'normal accident'. These two features make it possible that small and trivial beginnings often cause great events. 'Where chemical reactions, high temperature and pressure, or air, vapor, or water turbulence is involved, we cannot see what is going on or even, at times, understand the prinCiples. In many transformation systems we know what works, but sometimes do not know why. These systems are particularly vulnerable to small failures that "prop­ agate" unexpectedly, because of complexity and tight coupling' (ibid. 10). Perrow's approach must not be confused with the so-called 'Murphy's Law' (i.e. that everything that can go wrong will go Phenomena 35 wrong). As Perrow himself put it: 'The legendary Murphy was wrong. His law, that if anything can go wrong it will, is disproved by almost all post-accident investigations of large disasters. These investigations repeatedly point out that "it was lucky it , wasn't worse" (ibid. I l l ). Not all systems, however, display the characteristics outlined above. Systems which are not very complex, and are not coupled tightly, can still have accidents, as all systems can. 'But they arc more likely to stem from major failures whose dynamics are obvious, rather than the trivial ones that are hidden from understanding' (ibid. 10). It is worth noting that on the basis of Perrow's analysis the process of specialization alone does not lead to a loss of control over technology Or to detrimental effects of technology on the natural environment or on human well-being. But such is exactly Tiezzi's claim: 'It is said that technologies must to a large degree be scientific since one of the fundamental parameters in the pro­ ductive system today is complexity. But this leads to an increase in specialization and consequently to a loss of control and of knowledge of (complex) reality, no matter whether on the part of the people or on the part of specialists. The more specialization we have, the less we are able to foresee the effects of technology upon Hature' (Tiezzi 1984: 35, my translation). This is a some­ what exaggerated view since the problem is not whether tech­ nologies can (or should) be controlled by everybody. In this respect every specialization erects a barrier to such 'egalitarian' claims. The problem is rather that complex technologies may not even be controllable by specialists (ef. also Shrader-Frechette 1984: 1 14). In conclUSion, wc might say, then, that there exists something which is likely to produce catastrophic accidents: the high-risk systems. Perrow investigated the follOWing technologies: nuclear energy, petrochemical plants, shipping, air traffic, genetic engin­ eering, space missions, dams, mining, and weapon systems. The result is that the most catastrophic potential resides in nuclear weapons and nuclear power; hence they should be abandoned. Marine transport and DNA recombination have only little less catastrophic potential, hence they should be restricted. The last category is chemical, mining, airways, space, and darns which, according to Perrow, should be tolerated and improved (see Perrow 1984: ch. 9). Perrow summarizes the implications of his f 36 Phenomena analysis in the following way: 'On the whole, we have complex systems because we don't know how to produce the output through linear systems. If these complex systems also have catastrophic potential then we had better consider alternative ways of getting the product, or abandoning the product entirely' (Perrow 1984: 89). Summarizing sections 1 .3 . 1 to 1 .3.3 we may state that modern industry's potential for causing ecological problcms is consider­ able. To forestall another point of this chapter it must be said that few of the outlined characteristics of high-risk systems can be deduced from the institution of private property. 1 .3.4. Economic growth A further candidate for causing ecological problems is industrial growth. The explanation is straightforward. Low levels of indus­ trial production produce low levels of output hence low degrees of waste and possible pollutants. High levels of industrial pro­ duction produce high levels of output hence high levels of waste and possible pollutants 20 Regarding the input side, we Can establish a similar link: low levels of industrial growth require low amounts of natural resources, high levels of production require high amounts of resources (regarding both energy supply and raw materials). It is commonly agreed that the period since the Second World War has been a period of exceptionally rapid economic growth which has caused a considerable amount of hitherto unknown ecological problems. But even if we had declining or low levels of industrial production, ccological prob­ lems would be likely to survive, given thc characteristics of modern technology. As Barry Commoner put it: ' ''Economic growth" is a popular whipping boy in certain ecological circles. As indicated earlier, there are good theoretical grounds why economIc growth Can lead to pollution . . . However, this theoretical relationship does not mean that any increase in economic activity automatically means more pollution. What happens to the environment depends on how the growth is achieved' (Commoner 1 9 7 1 : 141). He emphasizes the impact of new technologies which have been used in the US economy - Sorne fundamenta 1· '0 lSt ecologists, such as the German Carl Amery, thus , demanded that production should stop where possible (ef. Amery 1978: 167). Phenomena 37 since the Second World War, insisting on the point that 'the post-war technological transformation of the United States economy has produced not only the much-heralded 126 per cent rise in GNP, but also, at a rate about ten times faster than the growth of GNP, the rising levels of environmental pollution' (ibid. 146). Beckerman, in a straightforward way, defended economic growth in the following terms: 'For even if there were no growth, and even if national product were declining, there would still be a danger, in the absence of appropriate poliCies, that pollution would be excessive and that insufficient resources would be devoted to the preservation of the environment' (Beckerman 1974: lOS). This is so because pollution reflects a failure of the · market rather than being a result of economic growth (d. ibid.). Thus, if people 'think that growth must be stopped or slowed down on account of excessive pollution' (ibid. 1 8 ), they are completely mistaken. Pollution has nothing to do with growth but is a question of misallocation of resources (d. ibid. 35, 104). In the following discussion I concentrate on approaches which all in one way or another have to do with economic rationality, market behaviour, or 'Western' rationality as such. I start with the sort of economic behaviour which is characterized by bur­ densome costs to the public ('externalities') and consider then a game-theoretic formaliza lion. The difficult question then arises as to whether this economic behaviour is typical for market economies (such as capitalism) Or if it is a more general pattern which would also apply to post-capitalist societies. Since we find empirical evidence for the latter assumption, we must try to exp lain it. 1 .3.5. Market, externalities, and the tragedy of the commOns Pigou, over fifty years ago, drew attention to the following feature of economic behaviour: 'ISlmoke in large towns inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community, in injury to buildings and vegetables, expenses for washing clothes and cleaning rooms, expenses for the provision of extra artificial light, and in many other ways' (Pigou 1932: 184). This leads to the tendency of private capital to externalize costs. As Passmore points out, the owner of a factory calculates 'that he will only have to meet 38 Phenomena such costs as directly arise from his particular enterprise, such costs as raw materials, labour, machinery, depreciation, taxation, insurance. He does not expect to meet the cost of replacing Mrs Jones' curtains, even if it is the smoke from his factory that causes them to rot' (Passmore 1974: 65). Neo-classical economics would argue that the market principle leads to beneficial outcomes in this respect provided that a system of property rights is established which includes natural resources like air or water. 21 Saleable rights would provide the mechanism for this system. Against this, some authors have argued that the introduction of market principles into economy was a decisive factor for the depletion of resources. Before the advent of the market, traditional mcchanisms occupied its place. Often these were based on tribal or kinship relations and were nature-conserving IVictor 1980: 205). As Victor, draWing on Polanyi 1 1 944), maintains, the market principle in fact intro­ duced a damaging tendency. Under market conditions the earth is no longer the property of the people who live on it, but an exchangeable good. Under market conditions a company lor any other) may buy a piece of land and extract resources in order to use them up by producing a specific good or simply to sell them. When the job is done, the company moves away and leaves the place. It leavcs it to Isometimes) anonymous future inhabitants. The difference between a society in which the inhabitants of a certain area are the common owners of the earth, taking the best care of it, and a society in which land has become a commodity, then, is that the former seems to be more apt to avoid ecological problems than the latter. It is assumed that people who own a certain thing commonly Iland in our case) will take the best care of it. This could also be interpreted as an example of a successful assurance game Is. 1 .3.6). But here neo-classical economists would argue that it is quite the contrary. They have it that the trouble begins with common property:" Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because 21 Beckerman ( 1 974) concedes that the market principle fails to prevent pollution since nobody has property rights in natural resources like air or water. 22 Actually, Hardin is a biologist but the logic of his argument is comparable to what neo-classical economists would hold. Phenomena 39 tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying eapacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. (Hardin 1980: 104) This is so because as a rational being the herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Since he is to get the full amount of increment if he adds one animal to his herd and he is only to share a part of the negative effects of overgrazing he concludes that the best thing he can do is add another animal to his herd. Hardin comments: 'But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in the commons brings ruin to all' libid. 104). Note that in one case the market is praised for preventing ecological problems whereas in the other it is accused of causing ecological problems. How can one explain these opposing judge­ ments of collective ownership? An answer to this would certainly focus on the important role which cultural values play in cases where common property exists. If there are cultural patterns which prevent the common owners from overfishing, over­ grazing, etc. there need not arise a tragedy of the commons. Only in cases where such patterns do not lor no longer) exist can the neo-classical argument come in. This has been rightly identified as a strategic point for bringing in a sort of 'environ­ mentalist ethics'. Thus Hardin writes: IT)he logic of the commons has been understood for a long time, perhaps since the discovery of agriculture or the invention of private property in real estate , . . . . but the inexorable succession of generations requires that the basis for this knowledge be constantly refreshed. (ibid. 105, 104) , The logic of the commons is understood mostly only 'in special cases which are not sufficiently generalized . . . the oceans of the world continue to suffer from the philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth 40 Phenomena of the "freedom of seas". Professing to believe in the "inexhaust­ ible reSources of the oceans", they bring species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction' (Hardin 1980: 105). And Victor claims: 'These examples from history indicate that the expansion of the market system created the tragedy of the commons by weakening the traditional forms of social relations which had hitherto prevailed. It is the reconstruction of social structures such as these, combined with the propagation of an environmental ethic, that environmentalists argue is an essential ingredient in an effective environmental policy' (Victor 1980: 206) However, if such an environmental ethics is not in sight, the problem must be posed in different terms. Rousseau addressed a similar set of questions in his Discours sur l'origine de l'inegalite parmi les hommes, using a model of a natural state which roughly corresponds to our above example of the commons (ef. Boudon and Bourricaud 1989: 313). His solution is to invest a superior power to regulate affairs in order to achieve optimal solutions. An optimal solution is one which would be preferable to all but cannot be brought about by rational individual action alone. However, this solution also has its limits. The limits are that public power is often as short-sighted as individual actors. Since ecological problems are complex and interwoven with one another, the future outcome of an adopted course of action in this field is insecure. This has serious implications for socialist societies. As has been argued, countries with state ownership of the means of production and planning are less likely to produce ecological problems for two reasons. First, so the argument gocs, socialist enterprises do not introduce prematurely certain (dangerous) technologies which are introduccd prematurely in capitalism in order to gain extra profits. Second, because of central planning (and the absence of the profit principle) individual socialist enterprises cannot externalize their costs to the environment. While it may be true that dangerous technologies are introduced in capitalism prematurely (in order to make short-term profits), it is not necessarily true that socialism does better in this respect. In fact, the actual record of socialist countries elucidates and confirms this point." What can account for this? . 2.-1 See some recent reports in Rosenbladt 1986 and generally Ziegler 1987. Phenomena 4 1 My answer here cannot be exhaustive but 1 think the follOWing factors explain a lot. In addition to what has been said above with respect to common property, I would add the following. It is not true that only private enterprises (profit maximizers) cause ecological problems. The same holds true for state enter­ prises and private consumers in capitalism, and for enterprises and consumers in socialist countries. One reason, therefore, has been explained by Max Weber: it is the expansion of the 'ration­ ality principle' in the modern epoch. In capitalist enterprises economic calculation is carried out mainly by means of money, which is, according to Weber, the most rational way of orientating economic activities (ef. Weber 1978: 86). As Weber also makes clear, a planned economy which is based on the principle of need satisfaction and on calculations in kind 'would have to determine "value-indicators" of some kind for the individual capital goods which could take over the role of the "prices" used in book calculation in modem business accounting' (ibid. 103). No matter how this difficulty is resolved, whether by production quotas or in value, socialist countries also try to enhance economic effiCiency. But are socialist countries not in a better position in so far as they can anticipate ecological costs, if not ecological problems? My answer is that state planning is not sufficient to avoid ecological problems. Six reasons oppose such a hope: 1 . As already pointed out above, (at least) high-risk systems produce ecological problems. Hence, no matter what basic property relations in a certain society obtain (private ownership or state ownership), 'normal' or 'systems' accidents are likely to occur. Because of their scope and dangerous potential, these complex technologies can create ecological problems for a great number of people over a long period of time. 2. A second factor which makes central planning problematiC as a solution to ecological problems is the feature of unintended consequences (see s. 1 .3.2) which, if true, is a general threat to 'planning the future'. 3. Collective ownership (for example of means of production) may lead to the 'tragedy of the commons'. Also in this case we have the spectre of externalities (social costs) which we have already defined as one of the causcs of ecological problems. 42 Phenomena Given certain conditions (see s. l .3.6), the logic of public goods can be applied here. 4. As has been pointed out, the price system in countries like the Soviet Union does not allow for taking into account the scarcity of resources. This is so because the dominating ideology forbids establishing prices which are not thc result of labour time (dogma of the labour theory of value, d. Kupilik 1982: 16970).14 Moreover, the specific mechanisms of 'success indicators' (ibid. 1 7 1 ) and departmentalism (Ziegler 1987: 35) lead to a reward system which does not provide incentives for con­ cern for the environment. On thc contrary, 'environmental protection is clearly identified, both by the central leadership and by virtually all bureaucratic organizations, as low priority' (ibid. 1 6 1 ) . 5. Although the Soviet Union is a country with one of the most ambitious environmental legislations, existing law is not enforced (see Goldman 1972, as cited in Kupilik 1982). As Ziegler put it, 'the irony of Soviet enactments, which are superficially quite impressive, is their ineffectiveness in application. In form, Soviet law is a paradigm of environmentalism; in application, it often becomes a paradox of neglect' (Ziegler 1987: 8 1 ). Firms which are found guilty of polluting are punished only with (relatively) small fines. This leads in effect to the result that firms take into account the cost of the fines in their budget (Kupilik 1982: 1 7 1 ). 6. A further reason why effective concems about environmental protection are blocked is the widespread belief that the Soviet Union is so huge that it can afford the negligence. Soviet official culture and Soviet popular culture frequently make a fetish out of the sheer size of the Soviet Union. This is an attitude 'similar to the frontier mentality of the American pioneers who, in the nineteenth century, slaughtered millions of bison and passenger pigeons in the mistaken belief that their numbers were inex­ haustible' (Ziegler 1987: 25). Whereas ( 1 ), (2), and (3) apply to socialist societies in general, (4), (5), and (6) are historically specific traits of Soviet society. We may imagine a non-Soviet type of socialism which is not committed to the labour theory of value and which enforces its 24 See also Kramer 1973; Kelley et 01. 1976; Ziegler 1987: 167. Phenomena 43 environmental laws; but even in this case we would have ( I ) to (3) as candIdates for ecological problems. The outcome of this discussion, then, is, contrary to the intuitions of many, that pnvate property is a less probable factor in causing ecological problems and that a socialist society is in no structurally better posmon to avoId ecologIcal problems. As Zieglerrightly observed 'environmental disruption has plagued industrial nations irre : spective of economic or political structures' (Ziegler 1987: 3). This IS so because there are no mechanisms built into socialism which would avoid these problems. Of course there are ecological problems 111 capitalist societies which are connected only to short-term profit considerations but these do not explain the broader phenomena or their existence in socialist countries. 1 .3.6. Prisoners' dilemma No matter whether the market combines the private producers and consumers in a society or whetherforms of common property eXIst, we may try to apply the logic of public goods to ecological problems. Game theory has formalized this approach in models like 'isolation game' or 'prisoners' dilemma' (PD) (d. Luce and Raiffa 1957). They were introduced into the social sciences by Olson's ( 1 965) influential book. Sen presented the prisoners' dilemma in the following way: Two prisoners are known to be guilty of a very serious crime but there ' is not enough evidence to convict them. There is, however, sufficient evidence to convict them of a minor crime. The District Attorney-it is an American Story-separates the two and tells each that they wil'l be givcn the option to confess if they wish to. If .both of them confess they will be convicted of the major crime on each other's evidence bu� in view of the good behaviour shown in squealing, the District Atto�ey will ask for a penalty of 1 0 years each rather than the full penalty of 20 years. If neither confesses, each will be convicted only of the minor crime and get 2, years. If one confesses and the other does not, then the one who does confess will go free and the other will go to prison for 20 years. (Sen 1982: 62) The probable outcome is that ' each prisoner feels that no matter what the other does it is always better for him to confess. So both of them do confess guided by rational self-interest, and each goes to prison for ten years' (ibid. 63). 44 Phenomena We can take this 'game' as a two-person game and apply its logic to an n-person game. In an n-person game the following modi­ fication occurs, as LiFeldman observed: 'Unlike the Prisoners' Dilemma, where all parties must cooperate to achieve the solution, a free rider case [which is represented in the n-person game] allows for some defectors' (LiFeldman 1986: 25). Important is 'some' here, for if a considerable number of players defect, we would be in the logic of a two-person game again, where one part opposes the other: co-operation stands against non-co-operation. Rawls also referred to a free-rider case when he wrote: Where the public is large and includes many individuals, there is a temp­ tation for each person to try to avoid doing his share. This is because whatever one man does, his action will not significantly affect the amount produced. He regards the collective action of others as already given one way or the other. If the public good is produced, his enjoyment of it is not decreased by his not making a contribution. If it is not produced his action would not have changed the situation anyway. (Rawls 1972: 267) In order to apply the logic of public goods to ecological problems, two conditions must be fulfilled. The first is that ecological problems be manifest, the second that their removal create a 'public good'. The first condition is not always met because many ecological problems are invisible and accumulate unknown; for a long time they do not show up as a problem. Only if an ecological problem is obvious (if, for example, pollution is taking place before everyone's eyes) and its stopping would generate a public good, could collective action lead to the production of that public good. Consider the case of some towns which pollute a river or a sea. Here we have an n-person game which can be represented as follows. Since each actor has to decide his actions vis-a-vis all other actors, we may speak of 'me' as the actor in isolation from the 'others'. The expected outcome, then, is suboptimal as my preference will always be not to co-operate, since whatever the others do, that will put me in the best pOSition; not co-operating gives me a free ride if all others produce the public good and I am not worse off in case they do not; then I have not paid any costs (but the water stays dirty). Note that even a contractual solution needs enforcement, for 'even if a contract is arrived at, it will be in the interest of cach to break it' (Sen 1984: 136). Phenomena 45 All others Do not co-operate co-operate Do not co-operate dirty water (00 cost to me) clean water (no cost to me) co·operate dirty water (cost to me) clean water (cost to me) 2 1 Me 4 3 FIG. 1.1 However, there may be an optimal outcome, if we consider somewhat different preference patterns. As Sen put it, 'In the special case when everyone else [co-operates], the individual now prefers [to co-operate] himself ' (ibid. 137). In this 'assurance game' the isolation paradox can be resolved. Now an individual's dominant strategy is no longer non-co-operation. Provided that there is perfect information for the players, then they will all choose co-operating 'in the safe expectation that others will too, since it will be in everyone's interest to do so' (Shaw 1984: 26). In cases where the game is repeated and the number of the players is small, the preference ranking in Fig. 1 . 1 would be modified: 2 and 3 are changing places. Apart from enforcing rules, then, there exists the possibility that 'selective incentives' induce actors to co-operate. These are offers which one can hardly refuse. Examples include cases where an incentive exists to do x and the threat of punishment when not doing x. Hillel Steiner ( 1 974: 36 fl.) coined the term 'throffer' for such combina­ tions. But not all ecological problems do dissolve so easily. One reason for this is that not all ecological problems arise out of their public goods character. I shall return in chapter 2 to this problem, discussing some problems connected to regulatory policy. 46 Phenomena 1.4. Summary Summarizing the causes for ecological problems, I should make clear that there can be no monocausal explanation. All of the factors may be causing an ecological problem under certain conditions. These 'certain conditions' are partly contained in the other factors such that the combination of two or more factors is sufficient to cause an ecological problem. The only exceptions are high-risk systems which represent a sufficient factor on their own. Take technology, for example. It is damaging only if (in the case of pollution) 'ecological costs' can be external­ ized and no agreement with other concerned parties is reached. It is damaging (in the case of resources) only if market prices make it profitable to exploit these resources and if no laws restrict the exploitation; the 'tragedy of commons' is only damaging if neither cultural values nor superior powers prevent the damage. To conclude, the salient points of this chapter are the following. ( I ) I have distinguished the anthropocentric from the ecocentric approach showing the former's superiority. (2) In so doing, it is possible to derive the criteria for evaluation (they are dependent on man's interests, needs, pleasures, and desires). (3) I have defined what counts as an 'ecological problem' and that it results (as an abstract possibility) from man's dealings with nature. (4) I have then looked at the causes for the actual emergence of ecological problems, using approaches from game theory and social and economic theory. The result is that technological and institutional complexity constitute a severe barrier for conscious human design, hence for a world without ecological problems. (5) Private property cannot count as a prime cause of ecological problems; neither can any other single factor (except high-risk systems). (6) The market and systems of common property may be equally beneficial or detrimental to the environment, depending on the concrete historical and . cultural conditions. 2 Ecology, the Social Sciences, and Marxism Prometheus, der den Mcnschen den Blitz ausgeliefert abcr sic nicht gelehrt hatte, ihn gegen die Gotter zu gebrau�hen, wurde wegen seiner Tat, beziehungsweise wegen seiner Unterlassung, im Auftrag der Gotter, von Hephaistos dem Schmied an den Kaukasus befestigt. IHeiner Miiller, Zement) Environmental reports in the 1960s and early 1970s disturbed the world public with their alarming tone. They presented scen­ arios which predicted ecological collapse within a few decades. According to these studies, main ecological problems were population growth, depletion of resources, and pollution. Since then, ecological topics have proved to be a forceful challenge to the Marxist left. One only needs to recall the debate which was sparked off by the first report of the 'Club of Rome' published in 1972. Consider, for example, the comment of a shrewd writer like Enzensberger who in a typical way expressed a widespread leftist standpoint: The ecological movement has only come into being since the districts which the bourgeoisie inhabit and their living conditions have been e�posed to those environmental burdens that industrialization brings . with it. What fills their prophets with terror is not so much ecological declmc, whIch has been present since time immemorial, as its univer� salization. IEnzensberger 1974: 10) However, this defence of the class-struggle orientation did not make Enzensberger blind to the importance of ecological prob­ lems as such. As he put it: IAJn ideological critique is only useful when it remains conscious of its own limitations: it is in no position to handle the object of its researches Pror:neth�us, who delivered the lightning flash to men but did not teach them to use � t agall1st the gods, was, in consequence of his act-or rather in consequence of hIS default-fastened to the Caucasus on behalf of the gods by Hcphaistos the blacksmith. 48 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism by itself. As such it remains merely the interpretation of an interpretation of real conditions, and is therefore unable to reach the heart of the problem. Its characteristic gesture of lunmasking' can turn into a sm�g ritual if attention remains fixed on the mask instead of on what 15 revealed beneath it. The fact that we name the interests which lie behind current demographic theories will not conjure the needs of a rapidly growing population out of existence. An examin�tion of the advertising campaigns of the enterprises involved does not Increase �hc energy reserves of the earth by a single ton. And the amount of foreIgn matter in the air is not in any way reduced if we draw attentIOn to the earlier history of pollution in the working�class quarters of Victori�n England. A critique of ideology which is tempted to go beyond ItS effective limits itself becomes an ideology. IEnzensbcrger 1974: 19) The two statements by Enzensberger typically express a sort of leftist schizophrenia. On the one hand the evils of modern societies, such as ecological problems, are linked closely to the existence of capitalism and its class structure; on the other hand the existence of these problems as such is recognized, that is, the challenge to every type of modem society based on industrial technology is perceived. Among contemporary Marxists lor authors who are close to the Marxist body of thought or influenced by it in the wider sense) there seem to be two broad spontaneous reactions to the ecological challenge. II shall consider first these more general attitudes and then turn to a specific variant.) The first IS the orthodox reaction which claims that ecological problems are the result of the workings of the profit principle and of the institutions of private property. The second reaction claims that Marxism has concentrated too much on the exploitation of man and the domination over man, thereby neglecting the aspect of exploiting and dominating nature. I shall start my discussion with the second type of reaction. I haVe already quoted Anthony Giddens (see Introduction) who charged Marx with a 'Promethean attitude' which he thinks to be indefensible in the twentieth century. Noberto Bobbio, in a similar way, writes that: (a)fter two thousand years the Promethean myth of humanity as having dominion over nature has reached a crisis: nature is rebelling agamst Its subjugation just as the slave of other ages lof all ages). The central theme of Marxism was the exploitation of man by man. But now Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 49 everyone must face up to the issue of how human beings as a species have exploited nature. It has been widely accepted in the past that it is inadmissible, at least morally, for a human being to be treated as an object, but now nature too can claim the right not to be treated any longer as an object. IBobbio 1987: 1 76) I leave aside for a moment the aspect of whether nature has or should have rights. What I am interested in here is above all the conclusion which Bobbio draws. He asks the following rhetorical questions: 'But is it still possible today to ignore the potentially catastrophic consequences of the unconditional submission of nature to the reign of the human species? Is it possible to persist in being blind to the fact that a humanistic ethic whose basic precept could be formulated in terms of "treat all human beings as persons, i.e. as an end in themselves, but nature as an object, i.e. as a means" taken to extremes, could eventually cause nature to wreak vengeance on humanity? ' libid.). Both Giddens and Bobbio see the evil in the 'expansion of productive forces' or in the 'domination of nature'. But in my view Giddens confuses expansion of productive forces 'as such' with productive forces which are detrimental to the natural environment. Similarly, Bobbio sees in the very fact of domination the possible cause of things going wrong. As I said, this may be a mere verbal quarrel. However, Bobbio's application of the Kantian categorical imperative to nature would leave modern industrial societies without any concrete guidance for action. If, for the sake of the argument, we accept Bobbio's suggestion, we should proceed in the same way as in the social realm, that is, we have to reckon that a liberal society which follows Kant'S demand has to institutionalize further rules and regulations to enable a legal system to be effective. Likewise, we would need criteria for action in the realm of transforming nature. It is my contention that criteria which are based on anthropocentric premisses are performing this task best. Let me now turn to the second type of response which I mentioned in the beginning, Marxist orthodoxy. This response has it that with the emergence of ecological problems capitalism has once more shown its incapacity to provide material wealth and security. The cause of ecological problems is clearly seen in the fact of capitalist relations of production. As Ernest Mandel put it: 'The evil is private property and competition, that is, the 50 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism market economy and capitalism. All catastrophes, including the irrational and inhuman roads that technology is led down, derive from this social base and from it alone' (Mandel 1975: 16). In a similar vein, albeit more carefully, Cohen writes that 'what­ ever the size of the problem would otherwise be, it is certain that capitalism aggravates it' (Cohen 1978: 322). Now these formulae seem to imply that the reverse is true as well: that the abolition of private property will lead to a society without (or with fewer) ecological problems. However, many orthodox Marxists have felt the inadequacy of such a claim. Therefore, they turned the challenge of ecology into a challenge for capitalism: ecological problems are here interpreted as yet another mechanism causing capitalist crises and, eventually, the breakdown of capitalism. If we recall for a moment some of the classic themes of orthodox Marxism, we would certainly include the following: • • • • the labour theory of value; the theory of capital accumulation; the theory of class; the theory of revolution. Along the lines of these different theoretical elements, not only orthodox Marxists, but many leftists as well, have been seduced to restate an ecological critique of capitalism which tends to replace the so-called historical subject (working class) with nature. Nature is then seen as producing all values and all wealth, it is seen as exploited, and it has to be liberated. This approach seemed to offer the leftist a theoretical tool which would no longer commit him to a response typical of the orthodox Marxist'S. The natural response from a (Marxist)leftist to ecological problems was to deny the central claim of the greens that ecological problems were global in character and a product of industrial societies, whether socialist or capitalist. The left response tried to point out that ecological problems were above all produced by the profit mechanism of capitalism, or that they were a class question, or that they were simply invented by the ruling classes to prevent the workers from perceiving their 'real' class interests . . . and so on. Now, on the basis of this new image, every instance of an ecological crisis could be seen as leading to capitalism's final Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 51 crisis. This theoretical schema (and its 'green' interpretation) explains quite well the fact that many leftists changed their former class-struggle orientation to a green orientation, in the hope that capitalism would collapse. What changed was the reasoning behind that hope. The 'old' left view saw it collapsing for economic reasons, the 'green left' for ecological reaSOns. In this sense the orthodox Marxist orientation and the green funda­ mentalist position have quite a few affinities. Orthodox Marxism was little prepared for the ecological challenge. Everything it had to offer was either out of step with reality or was to be taken over by a 'green logic'. However, the opposition which was created thereby is a false opposition. Orthodox Marxists are plainly wrong in belieVing that capitalism is the main Cause of ecological problems and the green Marxists or leftists (in the above sense) are wrong in believing that capitalism will fall because it suffers ecological crises. Yet, what is more, the latter have taken over a piece from the baggage of ecological fundamentalism, that is, the ecocentric world-view. I now briefly address a more specific Marxist argument. This is expressed by authors like Walker ( 1 979) and Benton ( 1 989) who think that historical materialism has to be revised because in its traditional form it did not sufficiently consider the problem of scarcity of resources. However, this point stresses only one of the two main ecological problems, almost completely neglecting the other: pollution. But apart from this reduction of the prob­ lematic the proposal seems of little help in the project of a green reconstruction of historical materialism. The charge against Marx that he saw nature as something 'socially constructed' does not convince. True, there are natural limits to everything, including society. But the point is, rather, that societies have found ways to overcome these limits and are also trying to do so in the light of present ecological problems (see too the argument based on the second law of thermodynamics: entropy; see Georgescu-Roegen 1 9 7 1 ). However, it is characteristic for societies to behave in a 'negentropic' way, as pointed out, for example, by Luhmann ( 1989c). Two questions arise in this context: first, to what extent are societies capable of doing so and, second, is this right or wrong? Benton seems to address only the second question, assuming that it is wrong. On the basis of this evaluation he infers the claim that Marx 'overestimated' Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 52 the transformative possibilities of modern technology. But this seems to confuse the factual question whether such transform­ ative potentials exist with the evaluative question whether we like them to be set free. As regards the factual question, I believe that Marx's view of technological dynamism corresponds more closely to reality than Benton'S. Imagine only electronic and biochemical technologies. The evaluative question again has two sides: we may imagine beneficial and detrimental effects of such an unleashing of technology. My suspicion is that Benton arrives at his conclusion only by impliCitly assuming that an unleashing of technology leads to undesirable effects. In other words: he confuses the undesirable with the unfeasible. If this sketch of Marxist reactions is correct, it becomes understandable why orthodox Marxism has almost completely vanished and why leftists, in so far as they were relying on standard Marxist assumptions, got confused. Orthodox Marxism has vanished from the scene, leftism has turned green, I and Marxists have become ecologists. However, there seems to be an unchanged world-view standing beyond the switch in ori­ entation, in so far as radical leftists have turned into ecological fundamentalists. Both reject the capitalist system, be it for economic reasons (exploitation, crises) or ecological reasons. But this switch is not reflected properly by their adherents. The fact that orthodox Marxism failed in tackling the ecological problematic does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that Marx's thought is equally impotent in this respect. Such a conclusion could only be drawn if it could be shown that Marx's basic premiss, i.e. the Promethean model, was fatally flawed. My contention is that this is not the case and that the potential of Marxism therefore has not been exhausted. The big point for debate can be defined around the terms 'domination of nature' and 'anthropocentric world-view'. To explain this in greater detail, I distinguish between an eco­ centric and an anthropocentric world-view. 1'he former believes that ecological problems are basically the result of our modern attitude towards nature-an attitude which tries to manipulate nature as if it were an object. The latter has it that nothing is wrong with such an instrumental view of nature; that ecological I Among other things. It has also turned feminist, ethniC, and so on. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 53 problems do not necessarily follow from such an attitude; and, what is even more, that only the anthropocentric world­ view allows us to develop criteria on which we can base our alteration of the present state of affairs (d. Norton 1987: 1 2 and see below). Lukes ( 1 985) has argued that whenever Marx engages in arguments of a moral or normative sort, his discourse is one concemed with emancipation, not with Recht. I broadly agree with this general statement. However, I do not see that this theoretical decision (no matter if conSCiously taken by Marx) was a fatal error. True enough, the Marxist tradition, following Marx, ran into all kinds of difficulties by condemning any discourse of Recht as abstract, formalistiC, and bourgeois. But this tradition of dogmatic Marxism was never committed to the other part of the distinction, for it did not take seriously the discourse of emancipation. No matter what its own self-description is, in my view, Marx's theory employs two levels of analysis, first, a level which we can call descriptive, explanatory, or historical; and second, a level of criticism. Both levels are bound together in the following poetic statement: '(T]hese petrified relations must be forced to dance by singing their own tune to them!' (eW iii. 1 78). It was not by accident that Marx used the term 'critique' in the title of many of his major writings, above all his life-long project of the 'Critique of Political Economy'. Raymond Geuss makes a similar distinction, a distinction between 'scientific' and 'critical' theories. As he put the difference: A critical theory is structurally different from a scientific theory in that it is (reflective' and not 'objectifying', that is, it is not just a theory about some objects different from itself, it is also a theory about social theories, how they arise, how they can be applied, and the conditions under which they are acceptable. (Geuss 1981: 79) What is, then, for Marx the standard of critique? How does he evaluate what social theories had to offer at his time? To this question there have been among Marxist scholars, broadly speaking, two responses. The first is a natUralistic answer which says that capitalist societies will lead to their own destruction and supersession as a result of the working of the laws of motion of capitalism itself. The proletariat is the social 54 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism class which fulfils the historical role as grave-digger for capitalism and as a foundation stone for the new, communist society. In this version, critique is a process which exists, on a quasi­ ontological level, out there in reality. It is the task of the communist to become its 'mouthpiece'. This is the interpretation of Marxism to which above all Althusser and his followers have given great publicity; it is Marxism as a science. . cntena. . . The second response commits itself to some nonnatlve Marx engages in such an enterprise when he compares capitalism with earlier modes of production and states that people in earlier epochs were freer and happier. Here Marx obviously employs a notion of the good life which is linked to his philo­ sophical anthropology. The theory of human nature which we encounter in Marx is a theory which states several basic traits of human beings: that they are natural and social, where social embraces the meaning both of 'co-operative' and of 'civilized'. It also includes that they are creative and possess a projective consciousness. They transform nature in co-operation with others, and they appropriate culture in the same way. This stress on creative activities is of the greatest importance if one is to understand Marx's critical approach properly. What matters for Marx is human self-development, man's 'working-out of all his creative powers' I Grundrisse). This is the objective trend which Marx discerns in the history of mankind, and it is at the same time a normative claim about the good life, as seen by Marx. Therefore, I interpret Marx's statement that the productive forces develop throughout history and that they must be unfettered if social relations impinge upon them, in the wide sense which I explained a moment ago as a process of unfolding human self-realization. Orthodox Marxism has always interpreted this statement from the 1859 Preface in a narrow economic sense. Accordingly, capitalism was criticized for not developing enough economic efficiency. Whereas the weakness of this interpretation becomes obvious, not least by experiences in post-war Europe, the broader interpretation still has something important to say about the development of modern societies and about its evaluation as well. According to Marx, the creative drive of humans can be thwarted from many directions. Marx distinguishes between 'heavenly' and 'earthly' powers. The first are magical or religious Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 55 powers, the second are powers which grow out of social relations and oppress the 'Promethean' project of man. Interestingly, both powers are, according to Marx, themselves creations of men; they are, therefore, liable to be dissolved and replaced by a rational order. The method behind this type of reasoning strongly resembles Kant's, who defined Enlightenment as the 'exit of mankind out of its minoritylimmaturity which was brought about by its own fault'. We can trace this line of thought through the whole work of Marx. In his early writings he discusses this theme under the label of 'alienation', in Capital he discusses it under the label of 'fetishism'. Right in the first chapter of Capital, we find a section entitled 'The fetish character of commodities and its secret'. Here Marx explicitly uses the analogy between religious visions and religious powers on the one hand and capitalist mystification on the other. It was from Feuerbach that he took over the motto that all criticism has to start with the criticism of religion. Marx summarizes the analogy between religious and bourgeois illusions in the following way: 'As, in religion, man is governed by the products of his brain, so in capitalist production, he is governed by the products of his own hand' I Capital i. 582). However, this is a state of affairs which is, according to Marx, unworthy of human nature. It must, therefore, be abolished and replaced by social relations which are the conscious product of human enterprise. Note that I am going beyond the point where Marx stopped his analysis. For him, the institutions of class society represented in the first place the instances for the frustra­ tion of human self-creativity. However, I believe that even supposing that class oppression had vanished, modern societies would still not be able to control their fate, humans would still suffer from the workings of 'alien powers' which they them­ selves brought into existence and for which ecological problems give a good illustration. Therefore, I propose to adopt a double concept of alienation, one which focuses not only on the social relations like capital, abstract labour, and commodity character of goods but also on their material aspects, like pro­ ductive forces, use-values, and concrete labour. This approach takes seriously Marx's discovery that the double character of commodities Ibeing the unity of use-value and exchange-value) corresponds to the double character of labour I which is the unity 56 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism of concrete, transformative, and abstract, surplus-producing, labour). The ecological debate only recently became a topic for social theory. There have been many works which were directed, instead, against some dominant paradigms in economic and social theory, like those of Mishan 1 1967), Meadows et a1. 1 1 972), Schumacher 1 1974), Gorz 1 1977, 1980, 1983). There have been 'ecological' analyses from economists like Georgescu­ Roegen 1 1971 ), Daly 1 1 980); works from moral philosophers like Feinberg 1 1980), Passmore 1 1 974), Regan 1 1 982), Jonas 1 1 984); works from philosophers of technology like Mumford 1 1977), Rapp 1 1978)-but no outstanding contribution from sociology. There are exceptions in works on a meta-theoretical level, inspired by the sociology of knowledge, like Kitschelt 1 1984), van den Daele 1 1 987), or Oechsle 1 1988). There are also works from organizational sociology, most notably Perrow 1 1984). The works of Buh1 1 1 98 1 ) and Luhmann 1 1 989c) also have an organ­ izations and systems theoretical background. This seems to be due to the fact that sociology, having its object of inquiry in society and not in nature or in the relation between nature and society, must be blind to ecological questions. This situation was reflected in Chapter 1 where, apart from considering Merton's and Perrow's analysis, ! focused mainly on approaches which developed in philosophy and economics. Now it has often been noted that the economists' and the environ­ mentalists' views are inevitably at odds with each other. The first attribute no intrinsic value to nature as such and think in short-term economic outcomes, as affected by actors' preferences. The latter, by contrast, pursue a 'deontological' argument and think that nature has an intrinsic value which should be respected and preserved. Hence their concern about nature is profound and the time horizon is rather wide, stretching also to future generations. The actors' preferences of the economists are criti­ cized as a distorted version of 'real human needs'. In this chapter, I try to propound a position which avoids the pitfalls of both approaches. Odd though it may seem, I take sides with the economists in denying that any intrisic value in nature exists. This instrumentalist view of nature, however, does not squeeze out ecological concerns-on the contrary, it does so only if the economists' interpretation of 'value' is accepted. However, in Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 57 my view, the economists' approach to ecological problems is far too narrow. In continuation of my argument in Chapter 1, I propose to enlarge the instrumentalist view of nature Iby adding sCientific, aesthetic, and ethical elements to it) and subsequently to arrive at a position from which it is possible to evaluate ecological problems and possible solutions from a human stand­ point, taking human needs and interests Is. 2.5) as a starting­ point, rather than narrow, short-sighted economic preferences. In so doing, I take sides With the ecologists' concern about our natural environment. It seems commonly accepted that the economists' denial of any intrinsic value in nature and the environmentalists' affirmation of precisely this value are the only possible lextreme) ways to conceive of the problem. From this, it is concluded that we face a dilemma which we cannot avoid. The only thing we could and must do is to make a choice between these opposing claims: either we choose 'nature', and 'life', or we choose 'wealth', and 'efficiency'. When I claim that we have a third possibility, I try to espouse the environmentalists' concern about the natural environment without committing myself to the metaphysical notion that nature has an intrinsic value for itself. In this chapter, I want to show how Marx's theory concords with such an approach, thus proving its value for investigating ecological problems. Especially important is Marx's distinction between 'wealth' and 'value'. The present chapter proceeds as follows. I first try to relate the findings of Chapter 1 to Marx's theory in a direct way Is. 2. 1 ) and then reconstruct some of Marx's arguments from within his body of thought as laid out in section 2.3. In section 2.4 I will discuss the concept of nature in Marx, and in section 2.5 Marx's philosophical anthropology. 2.1. How can we relate Marx to ecological problems? Recall the discussion of section 1 . 2 where I considered several claims with respect to ecological problems. How is it possible to relate elements of Marx's theory to them? As will be demon­ strated in this section, Marx shared an anthropocentric approach and had something to say on population growth, future genera­ tions, and unintended consequences of human action. 58 Ecology, the Social SCiences, Marxism 2. 1 . 1 . Marx's anthropocentrism I think it is plain that Marx had an anthropocentric world-view and did not set up moral barriers to the investigation of nature. He was clearly a follower of Enlightenment thinkers like Bacon and Descartes. However, both have become the main scapegoats in ecological literature. Both are accused of having helped to establish a world-view which is in favour of dominating nature. But the modern approach towards nature does not amount to a 'violation' of nature. As Bodei has made clear, it was the ancient view of nature which saw in the use of mechanics a violation of nature: In the ancient world the machine was often conceptualized as an alteration 'against nature' within the balance between man and naturc. Apart from this, the notion mechane originally means 'cunning', loutwitting', 'trick'. Only much later does it denote the machine in general . . . Thus the machine is considered by Aristotle and by a part of the tradition as a sort of knowledge and a technique against nature tpara physinJ, since it violates the laws of nature. Conversely, medicine, for examplc, is according to nature (kata physinj, as far as it promotes it. (Bodei 1983: 1 7- 1 8, my translation; cf. Spaemann 1980: 191) A corollary of the ancient view of nature was the fear that nature might take her revenge if manl<ind tried to harness her: 'How­ ever, the outwitted nature which has been caught by surprise by sophisticated human beings is able to take her revenge and punish those who dared to challenge her, who tried to break her eternal laws' (Bodei 1983: 1 7, my translation). We find this thought even in a famous passage of Engels's Dialectic of Nature, and in more drastic forms from a religious strand of the ecological movement: here, nuclear power is simply the work of the devil. Modernity sees nature as an object of utility which fulfils human needs and desires. In paving the way for a modern outlook, apart from Dante, Pico della Mirandola's De hominis dignitate is of crucial importance. Pico criticized the ancient view sharply. According to him, God did not attribute a fixed point to human beings in the 'hierarchy of Being'. Instead, he attributed to humans the power to change their place on this scale, so that they could sink down and become animals, or they Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 59 could rise up and become God-like. Such heresy was not to be embraced until the advent of technological breakthroughs based on scientific discoveries. Even before Pico, Dante saw in human nature the potential for a transformation of the world, albeit primarily in an aesthetic sense. When Dante says that we have to praise human nature which produces so much beauty2 this refers to aesthetic standards, but, nevertheless, the reference point is clearly human. What the human essence is can be deciphered from art. This tradition, which includes writers like Vico, Rousseau, Schiller, Humboldt, and Herder, was also to be inherited by Marx. While there is little evidence that Marx was familiar with the work of Pico, he was a great admirer of Dante and took up Italian Renaissance thought via Giambattista Vico.3 However, as we shall see, Marx extends the argument of the artistic realization of human essence to technology and industry. If nature is harnessed, it is not by violating her laws, but by obeying them. Marx takes this point from Bacon and distinguishes between two general forms of mankind's relationship with nature. The first is the form where nature was merely 'appropri­ ated', i.e. in societies of hunters and gatherers. In the second form, nature is not only appropriated, but also transformed. In the Grundrisse, he imagines a state in which agricultural com­ munities appropriate 'ready objects prepared by nature itself for consumption . . . without any instruments whatever' I Grundrisse 4921. A state of nature may be imagined in which the free gifts of nature Iwerel abundant' I Grundrisse 6 1 2) and hence there was no need to develop technologies. However, Marx calls this appropriation of nature production and not consumption, since hunters and gatherers also have to develop certain capacities and abilities. But this is not the normal state, not even a normal original state, as he assures us in the same text Isee Grundrisse 492). In Capital, Marx states more explicitly that man can ptoduce nothing without technology Isee Capital i. 352; in the Paris Manuscripts he had already spoken of industry as the open book of man's essential powers, the perceptibly existing human 2 Cf. ch. 1 u. 6. " For the influence of Dante on Feuerbach, see Wartofsky 1977: 1 19; on Hegel, see Dobbins and Fuss 1982. 60 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism psychology, CW iii. 302) and the dcvelopmcnt of productive forces as largely dependcnt on geographical factors: Where nature is too lavish, she 'keeps him in hand, like a child in leading reins', She does not impose upon him any necessity to develop himself. It is not the tropics with their luxuriant vegetation, but the temperate zone, that is the mother-country of capitaL It is . . . the differen­ tiation of the soil, the variety of its natural products, the changes of the seasons, which form the physical basis for the social division of labour, and which, by changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on to the multiplication of his wants, his capabilities} his means and modes of labour. It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of society, of economizing, of appropriating or subduing it on a large scale by the work of man's hand, that first plays the decisive part in the history of industry. ( Capital i. 481, amended translation) This presupposes that the producers have some ends which transcend the 'normal' end of providing food and shelter. In this means-ends relationship, human beings try to get something from nature which is not immediately there, or to manipulate and control natural processes to a certain degree. This higher form of Stoffwechsel presupposes the use of speCific technologies. To denote this specific trait of humans, that is, that of being natural beings which are able to 'steer' some parts of the rest of nature, Marx used the term 'domination of nature'. True, the notion of domination is value-laden, as is the notion of exploit­ ation. However, both offer us a possible description of man's relationship to nature; in the first case, where natural gifts are abundant, man can be conceived of as exploiting (in the sense of 'usufructing') nature; in the second case, where nature is actively transformed, it is harnessed or dominated. I said above that the concept of 'domination' is always linked to a concept of the agents' interests. King Midas, by turning everything he touched into gold, can hardly be said to have 'dominated' his citizens, or even his own private life. His power was self-defeating since he was no longer able to feed himself. As the poet put it, Therefore, thou gaudy gold, Hard food for Midas, I will none of thee (Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, III. iii) 61 Marx in one passage of the Grundrisse seems to reject the very idea of the domination of nature, since it would imply the breaking of a free will: 'Basically the appropriation of animals, land etc. carulot take place in a master-servant relation, although the animal provides service. The presupposition of the master­ servant relation is the appropriation of an alien will' (Gnmdrisse 500, my emphasis) 4 But the condition of breaking an alien will is a limiting case which is not of very much interest: it does not matter if domination is achieved by breaking or by respecting (or by transforming, influencing, manipulating, etc.) an alien will; it is only important that the outcome of domination serves the interests of the dominator. The question of whether nature possesses a will (or a soul) of its own, therefore, is primarily a question of religious interest. If we speak of taming wild animals such questions may arise. However, they do not arise if we speak of 'taming' a river, or, to take another example, of mastering an instrument. Imagine a musician who plays her instrument with virtuosity. We can her playing 'masterly', she masters her instrument. It is in this sense that we have to understand the domination of nature. It does not mean that one behaves in a reckless way towards it, in the Same way as we do not suggest that a masterly player dominates his instrument (say a violin) when he works upon it with a hammer. As we saw in Chapter 1, contemporary debates on ecology seem to conceive society's relation to nature either as one of harmony or as one of conflict. Often the former is seen as the desideratum, whereas the latter is seen as the current dreadful state of affairs. For Marx such an opposition makes no sense at all. In the German Ideology he emphasizes that mankind is always in unity and in struggle with nature: (The) unity of man with nature has always existed in industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or greater development of industry, and so has the Istruggle' of man with nature, right up to the development of his productive forces on a corresponding basis. (CW v. 40) 4 From this it follows that another version of this model {which is usually endorsed by environmentalists) is as problematic: the notion of co-operation with nature-one cannot co-operate with a stone or a -cat. 62 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Nature, in Marx, is not anthropomorphous. Nature has no end in itself, it is man who imposes his ends on it.5 In order to do so, however, he has to respect the laws of nature. Domination does not imply violation: as Bacon put it in the Novum organon, 'nature to be commanded must be obeyed . . . man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so mueh and so much only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature; beyond this he neither knows anything nor can he do anything' (Bacon 1986: 47). This is to say that man imposes his ends on nature, but he cannot harness or manipulate nature in an arbitrary way; he eannot make flour out of green wheat. 'All that man can do is to put together or to put asunder natural bodies. The rest is done by nature working within' (ibid. 47). An ecologist might argue that there exists a natutal cycle or natural potential for a flower (in our ease) to become a fruit and that men are bound to respect these cycles 6 But nothing in nature forbids us (to take another example) to not eat the ripe apple, to leave it on the tree and let it rot. On the other hand, if the apple is picked too early, this is not detrimental to nature, but to human nature: an unripe apple causes stomach-ache. Natural cycles have no teleological structure, i.e. no immanent purpose, no stage which is naturally the highest. It is rather just by chance (as a product of 'blind evolution') that apples in a ripe state are beneficial to men. But even if we accept the teleological argument for a moment, its absurdity can be shown when we extend its scope and look at other cases. Take the case of rats, insects, or bacteria which reproduce quickly and are contrary to man's well-being: here man intervenes if he has the required technology to do so. Man's ends are thus intimately related to his 'human nature', a concept which is, as we shall see, crucial to Marx's analysis. But Marx's rejection of a teleological struc­ turc to nature does not make him blind with respect to ecological problems. An ecological concern is contained in his general position which views nature as man's inorganic body. This body must flourish if man is to flourish. As Marx writes in the Paris .5 Recall Hegel's famous phrase that the cork tree does not grow in order to deliver taps for wine bottles; or Voltaire'S that the melon was not designed to be eaten by a family. (, On the question whether nature operates in cycles, cf. Reiche 1984; Maurer 1973. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 63 Manuscripts: 'Man lives on nature-Ithis] means that nature is his body with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die' (CW iii. 276). Any careless use of resources, any pollution of earth, water, and air which exceeds a certain degree may turn out to be detrimental to the well-being of human beings. The disruption of man's environment makes survival for the human species difficult, if not impossible. Marx considers the following possibilities for such a disturbance: Capitalist production, by collecting the production in great centres, and causing an ever-increasing preponderance of town population, on the one hand concentrates the historical motive power of societYi on the other hand, it disturbs the circulation of matter IStoffwechsel J between man and the soil, i.e, prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the soil. (Capital i. 474) Marx is aware of the fact that man and soil are essential for a successful Stoffwechsel; they are the two basic elements of every labour process in every society: If we look at the labour process in the abstract, one can say that basically only two factors come into play: man and nature (labour and the material substratum of labour) . . . Conceived in this way, the soil and labour are the original factors of production. Products determined fodabour, I.e. produced work material, means of production, means for subsistence, are only derived factors. (MEGA II. iii. ! . 87) ' With regard to the material aspect, i.e. the production of use�value, the production process of capital is a labour process. As such, it exhibits all the characteristics which this process assumes under the social forms of production in their diversity. In other words, these characteristics are determined by the nature of labour as labour. (MEGA II. iii. 1 . 82) There are two main sources of all wealth, the soil, and labour power. If man wants to prosper, these two also have to prosper. But capitalist production hampers this condition, it 'develops technology . . . only by sapping the original sources of all wealth-the soil and the labourer' ( Capital i. 475) . 7 All quotations from the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe have been translated by myself. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 64 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 2.1.2. Population growth Sometimes a Malthusian theme recurs in the ecological discourse, it is the contention that an increasing number of inhabitants of the earth will be left without the means of subsistence andlor that this will lead to an ever-greater degree of pollution. The first part of the contention is classical Malthusian whereas the second part could be called 'Neo-Malthusian', it was expressed in the first reports of the Club of Rome, for example (el. Meadows et aJ. 1972). Marx, throughout his work, never stopped criticizing Malthus's ideas. Consider the following passage from the Grundrisse: Malthus's theory . . . is significant in two respects: ( 1 ) because he gives brutal expression to the brutal viewpoint of capital, [2) because he asserted the fact of overpopulation in all forms of society. Proved it he has not, for there is nothing more uncritical than his motley compila­ tions from historians and travellers' descriptions. His conception is altogether false and childish [ I ) because he regards overpopulation as being of the same kind in all the different historic phases of economic development; does not understand their specific difference, and hence stupidly reduces these very complicated and varying relations to a single relation, two equations, in which the natural reproduction of humanity appears on the one side, and the natural reproduction of edible plants (or means of subsistence) on the other, as two natural series, the former geometric and the latter arithmetic in progression. In this way he transforms the historically distinct relations into an abstract numerical relation, which he has fished purely out of thin aiI, and which rests neither on natural nor on historical laws. (Grundrisse 605-6) Marx disagreed with Malthus over the alleged different growth rates of natural and human population growth. But he could have agreed that there might arise such limits, since he said that we have ro deal with 'very complicated and varying relations'. True, there is a certain hesitation on the part of many Marxists (and on the side of liberals, too) in acknowledging population growth as problematical since this seems to open the door for dictatorial measures of population control or for imperialist treatment of the 'irresponsibility' of third-world populations. However, this anxiety seems to me unfounded. If it were true that population growth presents severe problems for the pros­ pering of mankind one can imagine that there might be non- 65 compulsory solutions which are feasible as well. But not even the results of demographical research seem to suggest that the planet will suffer in the near future from overpopulation. After all, this is a relative concept which depends on technologies and possibilities of providing the means for life. Up till now, mankind has succeeded in providing these means for an increasing num­ ber, that many people still die from starvation is primarily a result of the present mode of distribution of food. Consider now the Neo-Malthusian argument. In so far as an increasing popula­ tion leads to ecological problems like littering or pollution, the phenomenon can be analysed with the logic of public goods (s. 1 .3.6). To repeat: population growth is a relative notion. Consider a stagnating world population but a simultaneous concentration of population in certain areas. In this case we would not speak of overpopulation of the globe, but of problems of a large community which has to find a solution for the production of its public goods. 2. 1.3. Future generations The reference to future generations is a comparatively new issue in political philosophy. Bacon, writing in the late sixteenth century, was still of the old opinion that 'men must pursue things which are just in Ithe] present . . . and leave the future to the divine Providence' (The Advancement of Learning, cited in Passmore 1 974: 80). As Passmore pointed out, it was in Kant's philosophy that the idea of a duty to posterity assumes, perhaps for the first time, a central place. But although he exhorted Izuratenl men to sacrifice themselves for a posterity which would enjoy the fruits of their toil . . . Kant had too little confidence in man to suggest that the future is entirely his making. Providence, working through the laws of progress, is still for Kant the principal historical agent. [ibid.) World-views of the twentieth century, and especially the ecolo­ gically inspired ones, are often committed to the position that only enormous sacrifices could prevent mankind from perishing in a nuclear disaster or in an ecological breakdown, thus making sacrifices for posterity inevitable. But if we ask for the arguments which would persuade us to make sacrifices for posterity, what can we supply? 66 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Passmore has dedicated some attention to this problem. It seems that there are three possible types of argument. The first is religious, the second perfectionist, the third utilitarian. Leaving aside the first, I deal with the perfectionist and utilitarian approaches. The perfectionist view was endorsed by Kant and Fichte who thought that man will always strive towards a better world, towards the fulfilment of an ideal society. The utilitarian approach is presented in the Bentham, and Sidgwick, version." Bentham, and Sidgwick after him, were fully prepared to admit that we ought to take into account both the probability of the effects of our actions and also their remotenesSi in general, we should place the greater emphasis on effects which are near at hand. Although the hereafter as such has the same moral importance as the now, this is not true when account is taken of its uncertainty. [Passmore 1974: 84) Thus the utilitarian view [at least in this version) is not strong enough to ensure a concern for posterity, mainly because we are not able to calculate the probabilities of eventually detrimental actions to future generations. As Passmore concludes: 'So even if we accept the principle of impartiality and the utilitarian framework in which it is embedded, even if we accept the view that we ought not so to act as certainly to harm posterity, this does not appear to be a principle strong enough to justify the kinds of sacrifice some conservationists now call upon us to make' (ibid.). Beckerman, a straightforward defender of economic growth and economic rationality, expresses the myopie view of many eeonomists whieh has come under attack from the environ­ mentalists when he says: [IJf it can be said that there is a conflict between growth and the environment, it is equally true that there is a conflict between growth and food consumption or clothing consumpt.ioll, or any other ingredient of current standards of living. In other words, one does not choose between consumption tomorrow and environment todaYi the choice is between consumption tomorrow and consumption today, irrespective of how consumption today or tomorrow is distributed between the environment and other uses of output. [Beckerman 1974: 29) This quote makes suffiCiently clear how economists, on the basis of their utilitarian approach, coneeive of ecological probS Passmore erroneously calls Rawls a utilitarian, see Passmore 1974: 86-7. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 67 lems. If something eannot be expressed in terms of monetary value then it is not likely to be taken into consideration for the calculation of utility or welfare. As Thomas Schelling noted, 'economic theory evaluates actions by their consequenees and by the way the consequences are valued by the people who benefit or suffer' ISchelling 1983: 3). Usually, such evaluations are carried out by means of a cost-benefit analysis. When applied to questions of species preservation, the cost-benefit approach assesses the value of an individual species and, if several species are involved, sums the relevant assessments. As Norton pointed out, on the basis of sueh an approach 'no initial presumption in favour of species preservation is built into the analysis' INorton 1987: 30). Beckerman exemplifies such an approach. He asks: 'How should society choose between consumption today and consumption tomorrow? ' (Beckerman 1974: 27). The answer is: 'If a sacrifice of consumption today of £100 for purposes of investing in the environment can only yield an extra £90-worth of future welfare from the environment then it should not be undertaken' libid. 29). But this rules out the possibility that there might be environmental values which are appreciated 'as such', even if on balance there would in fact be such a trade-off as described. The problem with Beckerman's account is not, as he sees it, that the different preferences might be difficult to measure, but simply that he neglects the fact that people might not want the extinction of an animal species even if its actual financial value were negligible. His view, therefore, presents in a nutshell what is wrong with the economists' approach: their framework does not ine1ude human needs which cannot be rendered in economic terms ('preferences' which lead to a market price). To repeat the lucid statement of Norton, who eaptured the point very well: The usefulness of a species may wait upon changes in human tastes and preferences, changes in income levels, developments of knowledge and technologies for using species, and changes in public policies. But if the species is extinguished before it is examined for usefulness or before such changes can take place, the resulting losses will never be known. [Norton 1987: 37) The topic of future generations is an extremely difficult and complex subject which I cannot address in detail here. Therefore, I 68 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism limited the argument to questions of species preservation and the possiblc role of economic mechanisms in that process. Joan Robinson in her Economic Philosophy put her own scepticism about a concern for fmure generations in this way: This problem cannot be resolved by any kind of calculation based on 'discounting the future', for the individuals concerned in the loss arc different . . . The benefit from their sacrifices will come later and they may not survive to see it. The choice must be taken somehow or other, but the principles of Welfare Economics do not help to settle it. (Robinson 1962: 1 15 ) But what about a theory of justice which i s designed to tackle exactly such problems? Consider,for example, the approach of Rawls, who is not concerned with maximization of welfare, utility, or happiness, but wants to define the conditions for a just society. The question of future generations can also be ana­ lysed by this approach. Rawls argues that the principle of impar­ tiality between present and future generations is too demanding; there is no reasonable argument for demanding from the present generation that it share the available resources with the whole of posterity. But it is quite reasonable to hand on to our immediate posterity a better situation than we have ourselves inherited. Rawls writes: Each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established} but it must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation. (Rawls 1972: 285) The language of economics ('capital accumulation') is a bit technical here but what is meant is simple: each generation has to hand on to the following one technology, investments in science and education, agriculture, etc. Note, however, that the extraction of, say, minerals from the earth is an irreversible act, both as regards the 'loss' of the mineral (in its natural form) and also as regards an eventually aesthetic damage (as would be the case in the dcstruction of a mountain or a village). In this case all that the present gencration can do is hand on a compensation for this loss; this compensation may take the form of improved technology which in turn leads to an increase in productivity which finally leads to higher incomes and/or to a decrease of the Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 69 average working day. (By the way, this is how irreversible destruction of natural resources in this century has been legit­ imated.) However, I think that Rawls's suggestion is misleading, because it overlooks the fact that the interests of the immediate and all future generations may not coincide, as a simple example can show: there may be a technical solution to storing nuclear waste for the next generation (or even the next two or three generations) but this way of storing may become dangerous for the tenth or hundredth generation. Furthermore, Rawls's reasoning does not give criteria to judge the problem of preser­ vation of species. But how does Marx relate to these approaches? At first sight, none of the outlined approaches contains Marx's position. Marx did not think that any hitherto existing society had, or should have, made sacrifices for posterity. He thought that capitalism anticipated the future in the dreadful way that it wastes human resources: It is, in fact} only at the greatest waste of individual development that the development of general men is secured in those epochs of history which prelude to a socialist constitution of mankind. (MEGA JI. iii. ! . 327, English in original) Communist society on the contrary, so he thought, would leave the planet to future generations in a better state simply as a result of its pure modus operandi. This is not only a matter of prediction and of 'historical laws'; Marx himself expounds it as a duty to unborn generations when he speaks about the duty of the world's inhabitants to hand it down to future generations.in a better condition:9 From the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, private ownership of the globe by single individuals will appcar quite as absurd as private ownership of one man by another. Even a whole society, a nation} or even all simultaneously existing societies together, arc not the owners of the globe. They are only its possessors, its usufructuaries, and, like bani patres familias, they must hand it down to succeeding generations in an improved condition. (Capita) iii. 776) Hence the passage from Capital iii does contain a statement about facts (and historical prophecy) and an ethical principle. 9 It is thus no ethical argument regarding nature, but an ethical argument regarding human beings {unborn generations}, 70 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism It is difficult to speculate exactly about what his position amounted to, but a probable answer, taking Passmore's scheme for granted, is that he was committed to both a utilitarian and perfectionist view. Since Marx says 'future generations', a Rawlsian interpretation seems to be excluded. However, we must keep in mind that Marx did not treat this question in a systematic manner, so he probably did not care too much about the formulation. But Marx also clearly endorsed a perfectionist view. Together with Fichte and Kant, he shared the belief that mankind would always strive towards greater self-realization, towards the ideal society. With the industrialists of his time he shared the belief that the world is imperfect but can be improved. The good society for Marx is a society which enables the release of all human powers, most notably their communal and creative powers Id. s. 2.5). Since these cannot be defined in advance and once and for all, Marx avoids a static definition of what human needs are or what the communist society would exactly look like; but this much seems clear: communism should be that social form which liberates the human content. This is an open process which finds in a perfectionist view its natural expression. In contrast to Fichte and Kant, Marx offered an account which­ so he thought-would explain why mankind moves toward that ideal society. This account is contained in his historical materi­ a
ism to which I shall turn in Chapter 4. On the basis of his ' materialist conception of history, Marx avoided the ethical tone of Kant and Fichte who could only conceive of a duty, a duty to strive for a better future. Marx's imperative in the above passage where he conceives of a duty of existing generations to leave the planet in an improved situation is rather an exception to his general line of thought. True, in his early writings Marx accepted the categorical imper­ ative to 'overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being' lew iii. 182) but this general principle does not stretch to future generations, once a communist society has been established; it would be sufficient to leave the planet in the same condition and to take care that mankind will not regress to a state in which man again becomes a forsaken and despicable being. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 71 2.1.4. Unintended consequences and the 'tragedy of the commons' As regards unintended consequences, Marx was one of the first social scientists who systematically treated this mechanism. He employed this kind of analysis himself when he demonstrated both on the political and economic level how individual ration­ ality can bring about collectively undesirable outcomes. As Elster put it: The general idea that unintended consequences arise when agents entertain beliefs about each other that exemplify the fallacy of com­ position is an extremely powerful onc. In my opinion, it "is Marx's central contribution to the methodology of social sciencc. IElster 1985: 481 Economists are usually interested in positive feedback loops which give rise to their beloved 'invisible hand mechanisms'. But Marx immediately sees the two possibilities contained in this mechanism: The real point is not that each individual!s pursuit of his private interest promotes the totality of private interests, the general interest. One could just as well deduce from this abstract phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interest, so that instead of a general affirmation, this war of all against all produces a general negation. (Grundrisse 1561 As Elster rightly observed, for Marx} counterfinality-the negative externalities of the capitalist mode of production-was a more interesting phenomenon. He believed that capitalism systematically tends to aggravate spontaneously arising crises, since each entrepreneur reacts to them by behaviour that, even if individually rational, is disastrous in the aggregate. The main instance of this mechanism Marx found in the process that according to him tends to generate a fall in the rate of profit. (Elster 1985: 25-6) Marx employs the same structure of argument with respect to the phenomenon that behind the backs of capitalists a process is at work which, through increasing productivity, reduces socially necessary labour which turns out to lower effective demand. Marx also uses this argument in summarizing the whole capit­ alist business cycle, i.e. on a meta-level. Here the specific 72 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism capitalist means of increasing productivity lead to economic crises. This is one major reason why Marx condemned capitalism: he condemned it as a socially antagonistic form of wealth production. Certainly, capitalism develops the productive forces (this is, according to Marx, its historical legitimation), but it does so by wasting social wealth. Tremendous amounts of value are depreciated in periods of economic crisis, and labourers and soil are exploited and degraded during capitalism's 'business as usual'. Another example of the presence of this mechanism in Marx's work is the 'tragedy of the commons' which I referred to in section 1 .3. Marx comes close to recognizing this mechanism when, in a letter to Engels, he praises the German agriculturalist Fraas for proving that climate and flora changed in historic times . . . He maintains that as a result of cultivation-in proportion to its degree-the 'dampness' so very much beloved by the peasants is lost (hence plants, too, emigrate from South to North) and eventually the formation of steppes begins. The first effect of cultivation is useful but is eventually devasta­ ting on account of deforestation etc. . . The sum total is that cultivation-when it progresses naturally and is not consciously cou­ trolled (as a bourgeois, of course, he docs not arrive at this)-Ieaves deserts behind itl Persia, Mesopotamia, etc. Greece. (Letter to Engels, 2S Mar. 1868) Now this is clearly a different explanation from the one which blames market mechanisms (or capitalism) for ecological prob­ lems. 2.2. Marx's motivation for his critique Fortunately, Marx's approach is far richer in scope than is reflected in the all too well-known standard interpretation which blames only capitalist relations for all evil. Taking Marx in a broader sense seems to me supported by at least two facts. Firstly, Marx's critique of capitalism was no end in itself, but was to serve the establishment of a 'true, human society' (see ch. 5). Marx criticized capitalism mainly because of its 'enslaving effects' on human beings. Enslaving effects can express them­ selves in many ways; they may take the form of overt or covert Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 73 oppression and they may also take the form of alienation which Marx thought was the prevailing form in the capitalist system. Alienation, for Marx, presupposes a 'true human' essence which will come into being once the conditions of alienation are removed; thus communism is the realization of the true human essence, of true human society. If we take this line of thought as a guiding thread, we have a far richer approach for our subject than a simple 'capital-criticism' would offer us. Marx criticized the social form of capitalism because it alienated men: the products of their work appear to them as if they were alien powers. In the German Ideology he writes thus: This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now. The social power . . . which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these. (German Ideology 47-8) As Fetscher summarized Marx's concern: Domination of man over Isocial nature' should do away with the quasi­ natural forces generated by the capitalist system of production. Thus the (free association of producers' is at the same time the prolongation and the accomplishment of human history as the humanization of nature and of the appropriation of truly humanized nature by man. (Fetscher 1973: 460) But it is not only capitalism which brings about alienation; there are other social forms which display this feature; and it seems doubtful to many that alienation can ever be overcome. This is in part due to the character of our complex world of technology and social institutions. If this is so, might not Marx's own approaches give us illuminating insights into this field? If so, much of my task would be fulfilled, namely showing how useful Marx can be in analysing ecological problems. Marx 74 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism treats technology as a constituent part of mankind in prominent places throughout his work (see ch. 3). He thus offers an analytical tool for investigating ecological problems.lO The other tool consists in his social theory which investigates the features of social institutions. As we shall see, Marx focused on this subject as well in the most prominent places throughout his work and, what is more, he combined both aspects in a theoretical frame­ work which has been called 'historical materialism' (see ch. 4). Now it would be beside the point to blame a writer for having written on problems which were pressing at his time. But, unfortunately, it seems that sometimes contemporary Marxists are unable to acknowledge the changed reality in a profound way (of course, even the most orthodox Marxist will pay lip­ service to the fact that reality has changed . . . ) and to build their theory on these changed 'real' preconditions. Moreover, they have blinded us to an approach which is able to deal with contemporary problems (such as ecology) in an illuminating way. Thus I plead for a reinterpretation of Marx in this respect which acknowledges frankly Marx's own predominant approach (i.e. blaming capitalism's social form) but does not accept it as the main tool in analysing contemporary ecological problems. In order to do so, we have to exploit some resources in Marx's thought which have not yet been acknowledged to the extent they deserve. Moreover, as my analysis will show, Marx himself in his preparatory writings for Capital analysed machine tech­ nology in a way which focused on its inherent characteristics, regardless of the capitalist context in which it was placed. Orthodox Marxism has blinded us to such theoretical possibilities by stressing the paramount role of capitalist exploitation and class rule as causing all major problems in the modern world. Such a narrow and, confronted with the facts, unrealistic inter­ pretation of Marx's thought may have the advantage of being in line with the argument in Capital. But in neglecting other most interesting parts of his theory, and overlooking ecological prob10 It is not surprising that he did not consider inherently dangerous technology or high-risk systems. For one rcason, he wrote over 100 years ago and could not witness the problems of modern tCGhnological systems. For another reason, he seemed to have been quite confident regarding the possibilities of overcoming technical problems which have detrimental effects on human beings. Instead, he insisted that it was the capitalist use of technology which makes life unpleasant and risky. 75 lems in socialist countries, the orthodox Marxists have done a disservice to Marx's thought, convincing many of their opinion that his theory has little to offer in respect to contemporary problems. 2.3. Three Marxist approaches In section 2.1 I tried to relate some of Marx's statements to contemporary debates on ecological problems. In what follows, I shall present three approaches which are to be found in Marx's writings, all of which could be related to ecological problems. The first approach blames capitalist production (s. 2.3 . 1 ), and the second alienation, for ecological problems (s. 2.3.2). The third approach is more general in that it investigates natural and social factors without focusing immediately on the capitalist form (s. 2.3.3). I shall claim that this is the most promising approach and I use it as the basis for my own argument. 2.3. 1 . First approach : capitalist production as a cause of ecological problems In its concentration upon capitalist profit-maximizers, Marx's approach is fairly close to the 'externalities approach' (see s. 1.3.6) with one difference: Marx's main focus is on capitalists as externalizers. As we have seen in Chapter 1, however, the scope of the phenomenon is much wider: state enterprises and private consumers, too, externalize their costs, following general stand­ ards of rationality. The potential of public enterprises for causing ecological problems is as great as that of private enterprises, if they employ high-risk technology. The same holds true for state enterprises in socialist countries. Let us determine, then, the potential of private consumers for damaging the natural envir­ onment. Imagine the following possibilities: littering, private cars, and burning. In the case of littering, most civilized countries employ public services to remove refuse. The responsibility lies thus with the state (public organs) which has to provide a solution to the problem (burning waste etc.). Individual citizens pay a fee for obtaining this service. Marx saw the possibility of private pollution but tried to tie it to the capitalist economy, that is, he saw it as being caused by irrational social principles: 76 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Excretions of consumption arc of the greatest importance for agriculture. So far as their utilisation is concerned, there is an enormous waste of them in the capitalist economy. In London, for instance, they find no better use for the excretion of four and a half million human beings than to contaminate the Thames with it at heavy expense. (Capital iii. !OI, my emphasisl Marx assumes that a rational society would find a solution for using excrement as a fertilizer for agriculture. Up to now, however, there is no solution available in this respect. Human excrement is simply not appropriate for fertilizing agricultural land. A widespread view of environmentalists is that private con­ sumers ought not to buy potentially damaging goods, such as batteries, plastics, cars, etc., in order to abolish this kind of refuse and to allocate the productive capacitics of society to other, less damaging, production. This argument forgets the structural aspect of the problem: it forgets the 'embeddedness' of virtually every consumer in a network of social obligations, technological and economic constraints and possibilities, which by and large rcproduces the present structure of consumer goods. To be surc, the market mechanism would allow for the replacement of presumably dangerous materials with less dan­ gerous material, if the new material could be produced at competitive prices. But this depends on technological possibil­ ities which are economically profitable. The environmentalist, confronted with such an argument, would probably confess his readiness to pay much more for a certain good, if this would protect the environment. This solution, however, again raises the spectre of the prisoners' dilemma. We can regard it as a solution only under two premisses: I I I that the real income allows for such chOices; 121 that the vast majority of people would become what Pizzorno has called 'identifiers'. I I But note, this 'solution' only reformulates our problem: for people to adhere to a 'logic of identity' rather than to a 'logic of utility', they would have to accept some sort of 'green' ideology and enter a 'circle of recognition' which is constituted by other 1 1 Starting from Hirschmann'S notions 'exit, voice and loyalty', Pizzorno introduces a fourth notion: identification. This is supposed to explain behaviour which otherwise could not be explained. See Hirschmann 1970 and Pizzorno 1986. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 77 committed environmentalists. Even opponents of the anthropo­ centric view partly recognize this embeddedness. Paul Taylor, for example, writes: We arc part of a civilization that can only exist by controlling nature and using its resources. Even those who go out to a natural area to enjoy the 'wilderness experience' are recipients of the benefits of advanced technology. IWhat marvels of modern chemistry went into the creation of plastics and synthetic fabrics in their backpacks, tents, sleeping bags, and food containers!) None of us can evade the responsibility that comes with our high standard of living; we all take advantage of the amenities of civilized life in pursuing our individual values and interests. ITaylor 1986: 1 9 1 1 I n the case of private cars, at least some countries have intro­ dnced technical standards which limit the quantity of toxic gas in car exhaust. In countries where no such legislation exists, the potential for private pollution is considerable. Take now the problem of private burning. Especially in winter time the big cities of many countries are covered by an unbreathable air. A change in this situation is not very likely since every individual consumer seems to prefer breathing bad air to freezing. Even given the existence of a new, clean, heating technology, this attitude of the 'rational consumer' will not change unless special incentives are created which 'force' people to change their heating systems. But in many towns, heating is provided by public services Icentral heating plants), hence shifting the re­ sponsibility again from the individual to the social level. To sum up, then, two things can be said. Firstly, the situation of private consumers is sometimes characterized by the fact that their environmental responsibilities are taken over by public administration. Secondly, the impact of private consumers on the environment is of much less importance Iwith the possible exception of private cars) than the impact of the other mechan­ ismsJisted in section 1.3. This is so because the scope of private pollution is much more restricted, because the technology at hand is much less powerful. It seems plain that Marx under­ estimated the externalizing potential of public enterprises land, to a lesser extent, of private consumers). Marxists after him have been mistaken in underestimating the externalizing potential of socialist enterprises. 78 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 79 In the early On the Jewish Question Marx connects the degradation of nature to the dominion of money: conversely for their preservation and restoration appears infinitesimal. [Capital ii. 248) Money is the jealous God of Israel in face of which no other god may exist. Money is the universal self-established value of all things. It has therefore robbed the whole world-both the world of men and nature­ of its specific value . . . The view of nature attained under the dominion of private property and money is a real contempt for and practical debasement of nature. (CW iii. 1 72) However, as we saw in Chapter 1, the absence of the profit prinCiple, and the absence of market competition, does not ensure a careful use of natural resources. Marx often seemed to take into account this possibility incidentally, without elabora­ ting on it. Rather, it came to him via the reading of Fraas. As Fetscher has observed, Marx was deeply inspired by Fraas, whose book Klima und Pflanzenwelt in der Zeit: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte beider he 'discovered' in 1868 and about which he commented to Engels enthusiastically, as we have seen above (Fetscher 1985a: 124). He appreciated the work of Liebig in the follOWing way: 'To have developed from the point of view of natural science, the negative, i.e. destructive side of modern agriculture, is one of Liebig's immortal merits' (Capital i. 475). Therefore, both the problems of fertility and forestry illustrate the mechanism of unintended consequences and the 'tragedy of the commons', rather than capitalist methods. Consider, first, the forestry example. Marx's claim is that forests have been destroyed throughout history, under no matter which form of property. This is to say that not only the market mechanism or capitalist methods of production lead to destruction of forests but also collective forms of growing timber. Consider, now, the fertility example. Here Marx juxtaposes a short-term rationality ('increasing the fertility for a given time') to a long-term irra­ tionality ('ruining the lasting resources of that fertility') where the latter is explained by the former. This interpretation is further supported by Marx's general assertion that 'the develop­ ment of culture and industry in general' (Letter of 25 Mar. 1 868) has led to such an energetic destruction of forests. But let us turn again to the general destruction of soil and labour as a result of the capitalist mode of production. Marx identifies large-scale industry and agriculture as main causes of ecological problems: As we saw above, Marx blames capitalist production for the inter­ ruption of the man-nature metabolism: 'on the other hand, Icapit­ alist agriculture] disturbs the circulation of matter IStoffwechsel] between man and the soil i.e. prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the soil' ( Capital i. 474). In the following passages Marx demonstrates how he applies the working of the principles of capitalism to its own life-conditions, the soil and the labourer. Here his explanation is clearly one which rests on the 'unintended consequences mechanism', although Marx himself tries to limit it to the capitalist epoch. [A[II progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility. The more a country starts its develop­ ment au the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for example, the more rapid is the process of destruction. Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology, and the combining together of various processes into a social whole, only by sapping the original sources of all wealth-the soil and the labourer. (Capital i. 474-5, my emphasis) In Capital ii Marx dedicates some attention to the problem of timber-growing: The long production-time (which comprises a relatively small period of working time), and the great length of the periods of turnover entailed, make forestry an industry of little attraction to private, and therefore capitalist, enterprise, the latter being essentially private even if the associated capitalist takes the place of the individual capitalist. The development of culture and of industry in general has ever evinced itself in such energetic destruction of forests that everything done by it Large-scale industry and large-scale mechanised agriculture work to­ gether. If originally distinguished by the fact that the former lays waste and destroys principally labour power, hence the natural force of human beings, whereas the latter more directly exhausts the natural validity of the soil, they join hands in the further course of development 80 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism in that the industrial system in the country-side also enervates the labourers, and industry and commerce, for their part, supply agriculture with the means of exhausting the soil. (Capital iii. 813, amended translation) With regard to the destruction of labour Marx points to the faet that individual rational behaviour of capitalists leads to disastrous outcomes on the aggregate level: 'ApIeS moi Ie deluge! is the watchword of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Hence capital is reckless of the health or length of life of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society. To the outcry as to the physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, it answers: ought these to trouble us since they increase our profits? ( Capital i. 257) In illustrating what the consequences of capitalist production amount to for the worker, he claims that the introduction of machinery worsens the working conditions for the workers: At the same time that factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost, it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual activity. The lightening of the labour, even, becomes a sort of torture, since the machine does not free the worker from work, but deprives the work of all interest. ( Capital i. 398) Three things spring immediately to mind: ( I ) Marx partly blames capitalist relations, partly modem industry for the undesirable results; (2) he concentrates far more on the waste of labour than on the waste of the natural environment; 13) the waste of the natural environment in Marx's view is largely limited to the waste of soil as a result of capitalist agriculture. Since I discuss ( I ) extensively in Chapter 3, only the last two points will be further commented on here. Marx is fairly optimistic regarding the possibilities of recycling. In Capital iii he stresses the fact that capital has an interest in consuming the elements of production in an economic way: The general requirements for the re-employment of these excretions are: large quantities of such waste, such as are available only in large­ scale production; improved machinery whereby materials, formerly useless in their prevailing form, are put into a state fit for new productionj scientific progress, particularly of chemistry, which reveals the useful properties of such wastc. ( Capital iii. 1 0 1 ) Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 81 Regarding the chemical industry Marx is completely optimistic. According to him, it utilizes not only its own waste, for which it finds new uses, but also that of many other industries (Capital iii. 102). The general result of Marx's analysis with regard to 'undermining the fountains of wealth' is formulated in the following pointed manner: 'Capitalist production . . . is very economical with the materialized labour incorporated in commodities. Yet, more than any other mode of pro­ duction, it squanders human lives, or living labour, and not only blood and flesh, but also nerve and brain' (Capital iii. 88). In the Manuscripts 1861-3 he phrases it this way: 'The capitalistic production is . . . most economical of realized labour, labour realized in commodities. It is a greater spendthrift than any other mode of production of man, of living labour, spend­ thrift not only of flesh and blood and muscles, but of brains and nerves' (MEGA II. iii. 1 . 326-7, original in English, emphasis added). As we saw above, Marx distinguished between two sources of wealth: soil and labour. That Marx's main interest was in the waste of human beings is not due solely to his humanist stand­ point and his political outlook. Undoubtedly it reflects the historical situation of his time where the far !'nore pressing problem was the direct waste of human beings in the production process. Nowadays, human beings are endangered perhaps less within the industrial production process than outside it. Marx was preoccupied with the life-conditions of the working class resulting from overwork and bad working conditions. There was a remedy at hand which in fact improved the working conditions and the lives of the working class and which Marx supported: the labour legislation which led to the shortening of the working day which introduced, inter alia, standards of job security. What if we apply this by analogy to the destruction of the natural environment? Imagine two clear-cut eases. The first is a production process in which human beings are wasted, but which, ecologically, does little damage. The second is a produc­ tion process in which labourers enjoy safe and decent working conditions, a short working time, but which harms the natural environment. If we take these two cases as ideal cases and suppose-for the sake of the argument-that the first obtained during Marx's time, whereas the second obtains today, we 82 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism might benefit from an explicit application of Marx's approach to the natural environment. Excursus on law Before proceeding any further, we must ask: how exactly does Marx conceive of the exhaustion of labour power? In the opening paragraph of section 5, chapter x, of Capital i, he writes: Wbat is a working-day? What is the length of time duringwhich capital may consume the labour power whose daily value it buys? How far may the working day be extended beyond the working-time necessary for the reproduction of labour power itself? It has been seen that to these questions capital replies: the working-day contains the full 24 hours, with the deduction of the few hours of repose without which labour­ power absolutely refuses its services again. (Capital i. 252) Capital does not respect the time necessary for human education, intellectual development, fulfilment of social functions, social intercourse, the free play of physical and psychical life powers. It does not even respect the holy Sabbath Ie!. ibid.l· Following its blind instincts, capital overruns not only the moral, but also the physical, limits of the working day: all the worker's 'disposable time is by nature and law labour time' libid., my emphasis). If we apply this argument to man's dealing with nature, we would get the following argument: nature belongs to man 'by nature and law' in its entirety; man overruns the 'moral and physical limits' of nature; man often does not permit nature to recover. In fact, Marx himself says that 'a greedy farmer snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility' libid. 253, my emphasis). As we have seen, Marx invokes moral and physical limits when speaking about the working day and its limits. Does it make sense to do the same with respect to nature? As regards the moral dimension, I think that Marx would have refused. He time and again ridiculed all forms of nature worship and senti­ mentalism. This becomes clear when we look at his appraisal of capitalism, in so far as it 'creates the bourgeois society, and the universal appropriation of nature' IGrundrisse 409). 1 2 12 In a polemic against the 'true socialists' and the nature-cult of Mr D.mmer, Marx makes fun of a view which sees essentially harmony in nature, see CWv. 471 -3; CW x. 244-5. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 83 In Chapter I I discussed several versions of the argument that nature prescribes how society should live I 'nature knows best'l. Interestingly, Marx polemicizes against such a view which was already being put forward by the true socialists: The true socialist proceeds from the thought that the dichotomy of life and happiness must cease. To prove this thesis he summons the aid of nature presupposing that this dichotomy does not exist in nature and from this he deduces that since man, too, is a natural body and has the properties which bodies generally possess, this dichotomy ought not to exist for him either. ICW v. 473) We can think of nature as having either instrumental or intrinsic value. As Passmore put it: 'On the first view, wilderness and species ought to be preserved only if, and in so far as, they are useful to man. On the second view, they ought to be preserved even if their continued existence were demonstrably harmful to human interests' I Passmore 1974: 1011. He rightly says that 'usefulness need not be narrowly interpreted: wilderness and species, it might be argued, are valuable not only as economic resources, actual and potential, but as providing opportunities for the pursuit of science, for recreation and retreat, as sources of moral and aesthetic delight' libid. 102; cf. Norton 1987: 1 2 f.1. 1t thus seems a promising project to develop arguments against the destruction of the natural environment on the basis of its instrumental rather than its intrinsic values; the more so, since Marx's position connects the aspect of domination of nature to human interests. Marx, draWing an analogy between exhausted working power and exhausted soil, used an instrumentalist argument in the example of the greedy farmer. Yet another observation can be made about this example. He did not say that the exhaustion of soil was due only to capitalist methods, but that it was due also to the greedy behaviour of the farmer. Of course, as we have seen above I Capital i. 474-5; Capital iii. 8 13), Marx thinks that capitalist methods accomplish the destruction of soil in the most systematic and 'efficient' way. But his reference to the 'greediness' of the farmer suggests that it is a fundamental · problem that must be faced by every social form. In similar fashion, Marx analyses the labour process in its material content I'as such') before he dedicates his attention to the specific social Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 84 forms labove all, the capitalist one; d. MEGA I!. iii. l . 82, as quoted above). With such an approach one does not say that capitalism exhausts nature just like it exhausts labour power, but that the labour process Isometimes) exhausts nature just like the capitalist exhausts labour power. In both cases the exploiter has to face negative consequences if he is too ruthless. During Marx's time capitalists resolved the problem of a perishing labour force by importing new labour until labour legislation put an end to this. In the case of man's exploitation of nature we can distinguish two cases, recalling the distinction between the 'prisoners ' dilemma' and the 'assurance game' in Chapter l . The point of the PD is the following: If the assurance mechanism does not work, optimal outcomes are only obtained by superior force, that is, when all actors are 'forced' to contribute to the public good either in a direct way (penal law) or in an indirect way Iselective incentives). Before considering this possibility, let us look briefly at the possibilities for co-operation. As has been pointed out, the number of actors must be limited and the game must be repeated. Taking a limited number of actors for granted, the repetition of the game does not necessarily give an incentive to contribute to the public good: if an actor is better off by polluting and can off-load the costs on to 'the public', then he will not co-operate. In this case, the future is likely to become the 'junkyard of the present' IMiiJIhalde der Gegenwart) as Preuss 1 1 9 8 1 ) aptly remarked. If, however, the future 'retroacts' even now, and if it can be anticipated in some way, actors may have an incentive to co-operate. But note that it is only in the case of this feedback loop, where detrimental consequences become felt, that a further discounting of the future is likely to be avoided. 13 Basing the argument on such considerations, then, it seems that there is no mechanism which automatically secures an optimal outcome. Let us therefore discuss an alternative: law coerces actors to co-operate. Can law provide the key to the solution of ecological problems? The existence of an environ13 As C. Perrow pointed OUt to me, it is essentially human to act within short time-spans and to consider only short-term consequences of that action. But the present time with its immense and fast information and communication systems may contribute to a change of this state of affairs. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 85 merttal law does not in principle alter anything with respect to the behaviour of rational actors; the problem would be restated in the form that it might be rational for the actors to break the law. But let us simply assume that negative incentives Ithreat of sanctions) are at work which prevent actors from doing so. For the purpose of exposition we may take Dworkin's 1 1978: 1 7 1 ) distinction between three approaches of modem law: rights­ based theories, duty-based theories, 14 and goal-based theories. The first and second are mainly concerned with individual interests; the third concerns the community as a whole Id. also Waldron 1984: 12-14). In elaboraring the first approach, there have been contemporary efforts to extend the concept of rights to animals, 15 to material objects in nature, 16 to artistic creations, and to foetusesP It seems pretty clear that Marx would have scorned rights­ based theories. From what we know, he was already opposed even to the rather limited concept of rights in his own time Isee his On the Jewish Question; see also Campbell 1983 and Lukes 1985 for an evaluation). However, in the case of labour legislation he was in favour of using law as an instrument against capital's assault on workers, which might presuppose the attribution of rights to them. With respect to a duty-based theory, Marx, at least in his early Hegel critique, inspired by Kant's categorical imperative Iwhich is taken as a basis in many contemporary duty-based theories), formulated his own categorical imperative: 'The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being . . . ' leW iii. 1 82; d. ibid. 187). As we shall see in the next section on Marx's philosophical anthropo­ logy, Marx did in fact endorse some ethical values which he thought to be universally human and which an ideal form of society should put into practice. The problem for him was thus not to attribute rights but to establish the conditions under which man's species power could be released. In Lukes's 1 4 Hart (1968: 9) claimed that the duty-based approaches often turn out to be Utilitarian, i.e. goal-based. 15 Regan and Singer 1976; the first attempt was formulated in 1892 by Salt (d. Passmore 1974: 1 15). 6 Stone 1974. 1 J7 Feinberg 1980. 86 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism formulation: Marx opposed the morals of Recht, but endorsed the morals of emancipa tion. But what about the third possibility of a 'goal-based theory'? This approach, which dates back to Bentham, is essentially based on utilitarian premisses. Since we know how much Marx ridiculed Bentham ('Genie in der biirgerlichen Dummheit') and his 'utility-principle' ('freedom, equality, property and Bentham! ') it seems unlikely that he would have allowed his own theory to be characterized in goal-based terms. And yet, there is something there which comes very close to a utilitarian approach. I made the distinction above between nature's instrumental and intrinsic values of nature. Marx adhered to the instrumental view of nature. But what label other than utilitarian (if only in the broadest sense of its meaning) could be given to this approach? 1 8 Let me return ro the question of law. In the previous paragraphs I have dealt with a possible Marxist position regarding law's capacity to deal with ecological problems. The result was not very clear. It seems that Marx could have endorsed all three approaches. ConSider, again, his advocacy of labour legislation. At face value his argument is purely goal-based (the working class is the universal class which leads mankind into communism). But since Marx thinks that letting people work to death is simply inhuman, he also endorsed a duty-based theory. And since defending workers' interests seems to presuppose the attribution of rights, he nolens volens has to embrace also rights of workers. In what follows I shall concentrate upon the feasibility of the goal-based approach. For this purpose, I should like to distinguish between law as a medium for regulation and law as a guarantee to secure some minimal standards. Marx, when analysing labour legislation, strongly supported the legal fixation of the limits of the working day. This is an instance where law operates as a guarantee, as a purely defensive mechanism which protects some interests from being overridden. This should be quite uncontroversial among Marxists and liberals (though not among libertarians). However, law as a means for regulation poses some intriguing questions. Recent research suggests that the complexity of many problems makes it extremely difficult for law to achieve 11< See Lukes 1985 for some similarities between Marx's and utilitarian approaches. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 87 the intended results. This is because law can rarely anticipate the development of science and technology, which would be necessary for it to intervene successfully. Moreover, legal inter­ ventions may produce unintended consequences which also harm nature. As Teubner and Willke have pointed out, traditional law was apt to regulate simple, bipolar conflicts (sce Teubner and Willke 1984). These conflicts presupposed a world of simple connections. In a stratified society, this condition did in fact obtain (at least to a much greater degree than under modem conditions). Following Luhmann, Teubner and Willke assume that the structural principle of modem societies is no longer stratification or class, but functional differentiation. Modem societies have a high degree of internal complexity which changes the conditions for social development and the possibilities of social regulation in decisive ways (see Teubner and Willke 1984: 9). Law is confronted with a functionally differentiated, complex society; society has no top nor does it have a centre. It follows that it cannot intervene in the traditional way; it cannot 'plan' society. This is not pOSSible, because the social subsystems have gained an autonomy and degree of differentiation which make it impossible for law to bring about only intended COnse­ quences. There is the ever-present danger that interventions in one subsystem may have detrimental effects on other subsystems. Hence the slogan 'more law!' may backfire. But neither does the opposite possibility seem feasible, because the mere autonomy of subsystems produces ecological risks and damage. 19 Recently, Teubner has listed four reasons which inhibit regulatory politics. These are ( 1 ) Change of goals. Original goals of conditional programmes are changed into a judicial question of 'who loses? who wins?' (2) Statics of legal positions. The means-ends relation­ ship of condi tional programmes is transformed into thinking in legal terms. The question now is: Who can .trump with rights? (3) Change of reality construction. The reality construction of regulatory programmes, based on certain causal connections, is transformed into a legal reality construction based on a twol\.l In ch. I, we encountered Merton's statement that there arc three main types of unintended consequences: functional, dysfunctional, and irrelevant. Teubner's 'regulatory trilemma' has it that law as a social system may ( I ) Cause dysfunctional effects in other social systems, \2) remain irrelevant, and (3) cause detrimental effects for itself (see Teubner 1985: 3 1 1). 88 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism party perspective of plaintiff and defendant. (4) Dogmatism. Instruments of regulation are transformed into elements of sheer normative orders and dogmatics (see Teubner 1988c). Given these difficulties of regulatory policies based on law, the (neo-)liberal comes up with a comparatively simple solution: he assumes that the market leads to beneficial results for nature as wel! as for society. Marx flirted with such a solution in his analysis of the waste of resources and a possible recycling (see above), and many still regard it as a mechanism which is genetal!Y valid 20 One could even say that the waste of resources is not the most urgent problem for modern societies, and this might indeed be due to the working of the market. But Marx was well aware that the working of the market offers no beneficial solution in some eases like agriculture and human labour power. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 1, we can conclude that every naive reliance on the market is completely fallacious. 2 l Summarizing the discussion of goal-based theories in law, we can say that this approach is linked to the problem of 'steering society' (with all its inherent difficulties). Since a successfully planned society was Marx's final aim, I shall return to this question in Chapter 5 . 2.3.2. Second approach : alienation In section 2.3.1 I concentrated on detrimental effects stemming from capitalist production, especially from its profit principle. I dismissed that prinCiple as too narrow to be able to account fot ecological problems. Next, I evaluated the question of private consumers as 'externalizers', that is, as responsible for ecological problems, and arrived at a similar result. Another prominent feature of capitalism which Marx holds responsible for many pathological phenomena of modern society is alienation. Might it not be that under conditions of alienation a careless use of technology and resources takes place which leads to ecological problems? Marx does not elaborate upon this line of thought in a systematic way. However, in Capital iii, in the chapter entitled 'Economy in the Use of Constant Capital', he states: ::1.0 See Hayek ( 1973-9) as the most prominent defender of this position. Note that the dogmatic Marxist and the neo-liberal views are symmetrical, but equally mistaken: the one blames the market as one cause 6f ecological problems, the other praises the market for being the most efficient remedy. 21 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 89 Finally, we have seen earlier thatl in fact, the labourer looks at the social nature of his labour, at its combination with the labour of others for a common purpose, as he would at an alien powerj the condition of realizing this combination is alien property, whose dissipation would be totally indifferent to him if he were not compelled to economise with it. The situation is quite different in factories owned by the labourers themselves, as in Rochdale, for instance. (Capital iii. 85, my emphasis) With the idea of being 'compelled', Marx has in mind the institution of piece-work (Stiicklohn) as the following passage makes clear: The capitalist's fanatical insistence on economy in means of production is therefore quite understandable. That nothing is lost or wasted and the means of production are consumed only in the manner required by production itself, depends partly on the skill and intelligence of the labourers and partly on the discipline emorced by the capitalist for the combined labour. This discipline will become superfluous under a social system in which the labourers work for their own account, as it has already become practically superfluous in piece-work. leapita1 iii. 83) Note that communist society and capitalist piece-work arc supposed, here, to be similar in their results: both tend to economize on resources. In both cases, the worker has no interest in wasting resources. The prinCiple of piece-work is said to bring about this result because the worker gets paid for the fruits of his labour according to their quantity and quality. Thus it lies in the worker's interest to produce a maximum output in a certain time period. Capitalists' supervision can therefore be minimized. But here Marx seems to overlook a crucial fact. Since the worker gets paid for the final product, he has no incentive to use resources sparingly. If he squanders resources this need not have negative consequences for his wage. His wage could, however, be related to his use of resources in the following two ways: either the worker has to pay for wasted raw material, semi-products, or damage to the machine (as can easily be done in the case of house work), .or supervision and control are maintained. A communist society, therefore, is not free from this problem either (see s. 1 .3.5). The possibility of alienation arises as soon as we admit that Singular interests are not identical 90 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism to general interests, 22 a possibility which Marx excluded. I return to this problem in Chapter 5. 2.3.3. Third approach: man-nature metabolism In section 2.3.1, I introduced industry and technology as decisive factors with respect to ecological problems. 'Production' thus seems to be the central category for the analysis of our problem. We are confirmed in this view by a statement from a radical ecologist who said: 'For the sake of nature, no production would be the best production' (Amery 1 9 78 : 167, my translation). This position, however, leads to absurdity. Human beings would no longer exist if they stopped producing their life-conditions within nature 23 Marx's approach is far from such absurdity. He recog­ nizes that human beings are part of nature, the most developed species of animals. They are thus dependent on nature, and have to organize their 'interchange' (Stoffwechsel) with nature in order to survive. Furthermore, they employ tools, instruments, knowledge, and skills during their interaction with nature. Let us call this 'technology' for short. He locates technology in the middle between man and nature: it is the necessary condition for man's Stoffwechsel with nature; man transforms nature only by using means, tools, technology. According to Marx, 'techno­ logy discloses man's mode of dealing with nature' ( Capital i. 352). The embeddedness of human beings within nature is expressed by Marx through an analogy to organism. He says: 'But just as man requires lungs to breathe with, so he requires something that is work of man's hand, in order to consume physical forces productively' (Capital i. 365). Man -----�) Technology ------;.) Nature t FI G. 2 1 . 22 A further cause of ecological problems can be called 'technological alienation' and will be discussed in ch. 3. 2.> And yet, even on this level, the argument has been put forward that, if mankind inevitably damages nature in securing its means for life, it would be better that it perish (see Birch 1982: 48-9). Ecology, the Soeial Sciences, Marxism 9 1 Technology is the mediating instance without which man could not secure his interchange with nature. Marx's approach is essentially based on Hegel: As soon as he has to produce, man possesses the resolve to use a part of the available natural objects directly as means of labour, and, as Hegel correctly said it, subsumes them under his activity without further process of mediation. I Grundrisse 734; d. ibid. 706)24 There are several questions then which need examination before we can address Marx's position in its full scope. The first is the question of nature, to which I turn in the next section (s. 2.4); the second is the question of human nature (s. 2.5). Finally, the question of technology will be addressed in Chapter 3 . After this discussion, we will be in a better position to examine Marx's thought with respect to ecological problems; I shall then take up again the threads of nature, technology, and society and discuss them as they are brought together in Marx's historical material­ ism (ch. 4). 2.4. The concept of natllre In this section I claim that Marx's concept of nature belongs to a discourse which dates back to Pico, Bacon, Descartes, and which includes such thinkers as Hegel and Nietzsche.25 It is this modern view of nature which has structured philosophical reasoning and which has recently come under attack. As we 24 Cf. Hegel: 'Man ought to be proud of his tools since reason is expressed in them. The tOol is the medius terminus which mediates human activity with outer nature. This is the spirit of rcason, in that man preserves himself in turning not himself but something else against nature which is then rubbed off' (Hegel 1983a: 159, my trans.). 25 From Bacon ('nature is a storehouse of matter'), Hegel ('nature has no immanent purpose'I, Marx ('nature ceases to be recognized as a power for itself') there is a direct line to Nietzsche ('will to power'). For an exposition of this discourse and its historical emergence, sec Leiss 1972. Cf. also Dostoevsky: 'Men will unite to take from life all it can give, but only for joy and happiness in the present world. Man will be lifted up with a spirit of divine Titanic pride and man-god will appear. From hour to hour extending his conquest of nature infinitely by his will and his science, man will feel such lofty joy from hour to hour in doing it that it will make up for all his old dreams of the joys of heaven' (Dostoevsky 1952: 345). But Marx is also different from these writers who propound that man should make an impact on the world: for Marx this goal is related to the goal of controlling all natural and social processes. 92 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism shall see, Marx did not merely follow Bacon or Hegel, but developed a quite unique position, however much the 'modern' concept of nature is at its basis, Therefore, in discussing Marx's approach, the whole modern concept of nature is involved 26 A position such as the fundamentalist ecological one which refutes the Marxian position is thus challenging the whole modern discourse of nature, One can regard Marx's position as a test Case for the feasibility of the modern discourse on nature, This is all the more interesting since Marx, in my view, has given the concept 'domination of nature' the most compelling formulation, Two things need mentioning here which I take up again later: 1 , The concept of domination makes sense for Marx only with respect to interests and needs, Recall the example of King Midas who had the power to turn everything hc touched into gold, Now this is clearly a self-defeating power which we would hardly include in a reasonable concept of domination, Likewise, a society which does not take into account the repercussions of its transformation of nature can hardly be said to dominate nature at aIL In this version the usual meaning of 'domination of nature' is reversed, In the usual meaning, ecological crises are seen as a result of this very domination of nature, But here they are seen as the absence of it, 2, Marx links the concept of domination of nature to his cOm­ munist project: for him communism is a state of affairs in which human beings are capable Ifor the first time) of full self-realization, All naturally evolved natural and social conditions are the products of their common conscious control. Communism, 26 Cf. Heidegger 1 96 1 : 'That period we call modern . . . is defined by the fact that man becomes the center and measure of all beings. Man is the subjectum, that which lies at the bottom of all beings, that is, in modern terms, at the bottom of all objectification and representation' (cited in Habermas 1987a: 133). It is also Heidegger who challenges the modem concept of nature as a 'storehouse of matter and energy' (see Heideggcr 1978: 296-9). Modern science, like modern technology, entraps and frames nature. The alternative is to hope that another form of pOiesis will 'bring forth and reveal': art. Heidcgger's vision lies in 'this other possibility: that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everyvvhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth. Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflcction upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the onc hand, akin to the essence of technology, and on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art' jHeidegger 1978: 316-17). Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 93 therefore, is the culmination of a process of increasing mastery over nature. Alfred Schmidt 1 1 97 1 : 29) maintains that Marx employed a double concept ofnature, On the one hand nature was for Marx the totality of all existing 'reality' IGes4mtwirldichkeit), comprising human beings and 'external' nature, i,e, the universe, On the other hand, nature is only there for human beings if they enter into a practical relationship with it; they are in relation with nature only when transforming it. Marx puts it in the extreme formula: 'But nature too, taken abstractly, for itself-nature fixed in isolation from man-is nothing for man' ICW iii. 345), This passage from the Paris Manuscripts indicates that there is no discrepancy between an 'ecologist' yOl1ng Marx and an 'economist' later Marx. But, on the other hand, Marx is aware that man can produce nothing without the help of nature ICWiii. 273), In the Critique of the Gotha Programme he stresses that labour alone does not create wealth, Here he insists that nature too produces use­ values which are the material precondition for all production, However, the Grundrisse view that only labour can create value I Gnzndrisse 366) is not revoked, Against the physiocrats, Marx holds that it is important to analyse the social forms in which value is produced; value-in contrast to wealth-is not imme­ diately given or transhistorical, it is the economic form which material wealth takes under specific conditions Imost typically under capitalism), In other words, the above quote from the Grundrisse neither expresses nor implies that Marx disregarded nature in the sense that he undervalued natural preconditions for human production, Quite the contrary is true, However, there is a certain disregard for nature, albeit in a completely different sense, This apparent paradox can be solved by looking at Hegel's distinction between first and second nature, As he put it in the Philosophy of Right, para, 4: The basis of right is, in general, mind; its precise place and point of origin is the wilL The will is free, so that freedom is both the substance of right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom "7 27 Compare Marx, Capital iii. 820, where he refers to the 'realm of freedom'; see also ch. 5. 94 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature. (Hegel 1952, my emphasis)28 Marx takes this outline as a model for a society in which human beings are no longer dominated by alien powers 29 However, Marx disagreed with Hegel on the point of whether existing society, law, and state were manifestations of 'reason'. Marx objected to this Hegelian view for two reasons. Firstly, he maintained that under given circumstances human beings still experience their own creations as alien powers. In this sense history is still to be characterized as pre-history ( 1 859 Preface). It follows that second nature is still first nature in the sense that it imposes its blind forces on man in a natural way ('blind wirkende Naturgesetze'). It is intriguing to extricate this line of thought from Marx. As Marx indicated in a footnote in Capital i, he agreed with Vico that man can understand the world which is his own product much better than the world of nature (which is, according to Vico, the product of God).'o Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of all social organization, deserve equal attention? And would not such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the former, but not the latter' (Capital i. 352) Let us call the nature before man's transformation 'nature,', and the transformed nature 'nature,'. The latter comprises all prod­ ucts of the human will, all objectifications. We can conceive of culture, history, and society as second nature. Now, Marx thought that the more man transforms nature, the more he understands its principles and laws. In this process nature, 211 In the German original: 'Der Boden des Rechts ist uberhaupt das Geistige und seine niihere Stelle und Ausgangspunkt der Wille, welcher frei ist, sodaB die Freiheit seine Substanz und Bestimmung ausmacht und das Rechtssystem das Reich der verwirklichten Freiheit, die Welt des Geistcs aus ihm selbst hervor* gebracht ais eine zweite Natur'ist.' 29 Fetscher is right when he emphasizes that Marx's point 'is that men should be able to consciously control their own form of association (division and combination of labour etc.) instead of being dominated by autonomous struc­ tural forces. What the free association of producers has to achieve is the completion of the process of humanization that started with the first conscious transformation of nature by men' {Fetscher 1973: 459). .�o As we shall see in ch. 5, Vieo's argument needs to be reconsidered. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 95 becomes nature2 . Marx saw the natural sciences as haVing made great progress in this respect whereas the social realm was still awaiting its revolution. 'Revolution' here is to be taken literally, for Marx thought that a social revolution was necessary to establish nature2 properly. After the social revolution, therefore, no soeial science will be needed anymore (seess. 5.5 and 5.6). To repeat: Hegel maintained that the existing forms of nature2 (law, state, society) were the manifestation of reason; Marx, on the contrary, maintained that, since nature2 acts upon man in a 'natural' way, in a way which is not understood ('blind wirkende Naturgesetze'), it cannot be the manifestation of man's reason, but only a distorted version of it. This leads me to Marx's second objection to Hegel. Marx substituted the notion of 'reason' for the notion of man as a 'real human being' who has needs, desires, and consciousness. He derived this line of thought from Feuerbach's critique of Hegel, as the Paris Manuscripts show (see s. 2.5). But what is most important here is the implication of this theoretical shift for man's relationship with nature. When I said above that Marx adopts from Hegel his disregard of nature" this is not to say that his position is condemned as blind to ecological problems. The introduction of the Feuerbachian 'real sensuous being', ' as a human living organism, reveals the distinction here. Marx conceives of human beings primarily as 'real bodily entities' (which, of course, also have a brain and 'reason') which relate to the rest of nature as their extended body. Marx in his early Paris Manuscripts praises Hegel for having conceived of man as producing himself through labour. As he put it, 'the outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phanomenologie and of its final outcome . . . is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation, thus grasping the essence of labour and comprehending objective man-true, because real man-as the outcome of man's own labour' (CW iii. 332-3, amended translation). This 'greatness' of Hegel, however, did not blind Marx to the fact that this Hegelian being was still an essentially spiritual being, a limitation which Marx exposed. But whether we see labour as 'spiritual' or 'practical', it is not the only source of wealth. In 1875, attacking the Programme of the German Social Democratic Party which 96 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism declared exactly that 'labour is the SOurce of all wealth and of all civilization', Marx wrote: Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values land it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature human labour power. The above phrase is to be found in all childrcn'� primers and is correct in so far as it is implied that labour is performed with the appurtenant subjects and instruments. But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that alone give them meaning. 15W iii. 17) In Capital i Marx affirms the same: 'We see, then, that labour is not the only source of material wealth, of use-values produced by labour' (Capital i. 50). To conclude, then, Marx's perspective was that only com­ munist society would merge nature, and nature2, humanizing nature ;md naturalizing man (to paraphrase a passage from the Paris Manuscripts). Thus he writes in the Grundrisse: 'Univer­ sally developed individuals . . . are no product of nature, but of history' (Grundrisse 162). In this transformation process two main factors participate: man and nature. Both have physical properties and limits which must be respected if the transforma­ tion process is to be continued. So far, the ecologists' attack on Marx is in vain. But they might now argue that Marxism does not take into consideration these parts of nature which are not needed for material production. As I shall show, this claim is not true either. It would be true if consistent ecological politics required a deontological 'respect for nature' as a starting-point, if the attribution of intrinsic value to nature were the sine qua non for ecological .concerns. As we have seen, Marx did not attribute an intrinsic, but an instrumental, value to nature. However, it is possible to derive an ecological awareness from such a premiss if we understand the instrumental value as including other elements (such as aesthetic and recreational).3l And, what is more, this premiss is more likely to help construct criteria for an ecological position which starts from premisses of ,1J It may also include a cultural and moral element, as the case of cruelty to animals makes clear. But, as I have argued in ch. I, this moral standard is derived from human needs and purposes. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 9 7 modern reality and tries to develop an ecological critique on the basis of scientific findings.32 Still, one might insist that Marx, in privileging second nature, pays too little attention to first nature. Jon Elster called his concept of nature 'extreme and exaggerated' ( 1985: 56), and 'exaggerated and pointless' (ibid. 57). I agree with him when he claims that Marx's concept of nature does not hold true for 'the millions of solar systems outside the reach of man' (ibid.). But I think Elster himself underestimates the degree to which nature has been transformed by man. Two important points must be made. The first is that we usually underestimate this. Many landscapes, apart from their geomorphological and topographical elements, also contain a cultural element in that they have been created by man-they arc 'landscaped'. The most important factor in this process has been the development of agriculture. With agriculture, natural landscapes develop into 'cultivated' ones. Biitzing ( 1 984) has shown how this process transformed the Alps. As Passmore put it: 'IT]he landscapes we now so greatly admire-the landscapes of Tuscany or of England or of Kyushu-are largely the creation of human enterprise, of human struggles' ( Passmore 1974: 1 79).33 The second point is that this is not only a question of degree, of 'how much' nature has been transformed, rather, it is a cognitive point. And here may arise serious problems for Marx. Elster seems not to be aware of the crucial importance of this matter for Marx's whole project; it is not sufficient to call his view extreme and pointless. If Marx is wrong in his exaggerated view, that whole project fails, because this view is one of the corner-stones of a true, human society: from this view derives Marx's optimism, together with the :{� Inter.estit.1g1y, much of t�e current. ecological criticism was suggested by efltlcal sCl�ntlsts. Th� em�rgmg ecologlcal movement took it up but gave it a (partly) antl-modern duecHon. One important reason for this seems to be that many environmentalists do not trust the present systems to be able to resolve these problems. On the contrary, they seem to believe that further research and further development of technologies would rather worSen the situation than im�rove it. Howev�r, ecologi�al policy-making also needs �oncrete technologies whIch are economIcally feaSIble. Ecosystems research is of the utmost impor­ tance here . .B See also Marx on Feuerbach: 'jTJhc nature that preceded human history is not by any �eans the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer eXIstS <lllywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands of recent origin)' (eW v. 40). 98 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism belief that a rational society Ihuman society, communist society) presupposes the human understanding of the processes at work lin nature and society). Significantly, Elster himself associates this Marxian viewpoint to Marx's theory of the good society Isee Elster 1985: 57), without paying more attention to its cognitive implications. The more human beings have transformed nature, into nature2-so goes Marx's claim-the more they are able to understand the world, the more they are able to avoid 'enslaving effects' which stem from natural or social processes. His concern was to abolish man's lunfounded) beliefs in natural or mystical powers. Taken in this sense, even solar systems lat least those within the reach of telescopes) have been 'transformed' by man without his putting a hand on them; their movements are understood. It was no accident that the phrase 'Copernican revolution' was coined for the new conception of man's position in the cosmos. Similarly, it could be argued that we now know what oxygen is, that is, we know its 'secrets'. In this sense it is transformed, since it represents something other to man than it did before. 2.5. Philosophical anthropology As Schmidt 1 1 9 7 1 ) has shown, Marx, analysing the man-nature relation, followed a methodological approach which was sub­ stantially the same throughout his writings. Its first element is, as we have seen, the double characterization of man as both natural and social being, a definition in which we can detect Feuerbach's influence Iman is both 'Natur·Mensch' and 'Menschen-Mensch'). 34 2. 5.1. Man as both a natural and social being The 'natural' and social dimension are intertwined. When Marx uses the metaphor of nature as man's inorganic body, and refers to this relation as Stoffwechsel, the natural dimension is obvious: man as part of nature acts upon nature, just as any other natural element may have an impact on another. In this respect, man is a biological being with physical needs; a being who, like all .,4 See Feuerbach 1959, 1960, 1973. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 99 other living beings, can only exist within a natural environment. Marx expressed this view in his early Paris Manuscripts with the metaphor of nature being man's 'inorganic body'; in Capital he used the language of 'metabolism', or 'intcrchange with nature' las the German Stoffwechsel is rendered in English). But this Stoffwechsel takes place in community with others. Thus human beings are also social beings. As Marx states in the introduction to the Grundrisse: The human being is in the most literal sense, a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society-a rarc exception which may well occur when a civilised person in whom the social forces arc already dynamically present, is cast by accident into the wilderness-is as much an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other. (Grundrisse 84) Marx stresses this double relation of man to his fellow-men and to nature throughout his work. We shall see in Chapters 3 and 4 that Marx continues this argument and repeats the distinction on the level of society. Here he differentiates between relations of production and productive forces where the former correspond to the relation between 'man and fellow-men', the latter to the relation 'man to nature'. As a result of both their natural lbrain) and social character (common goals, tradition of know-how, skiIls) human beings are able to harness nature, to make it work for them. As Marx remarks in the Grundrisse: Nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as the tuse to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or a means of production. (Grundrisse 410, amended translation) And in Capital i: An instrument of labour is a thing, or a complex of things, which the labourer interposes between himself and the subject of his labour, and which serves as the conductor of his activity. He makes use of the mechanical, physical, and chemical properties of some substances in order to make other substances subservient to his aims. (Capital i. 174-5) 100 Ecology, thc Social Sciences, Marxism Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism !O1 In a footnote to this passage Marx refers to Hegel, whom he cites approvingly: 2.5.2. Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principally in her mediating activity, which, by causing objects to act and re�act on each other in accordance with their own nature, in this way, without any interference in the process, carries out reason's intentions. ICitcd in Capital i; German original in Hcgel l970a: 365)35 A decisive feature of man is that he produces and develops his productive capacities. But where does this drive come from? Marx's answer is simple: from human needs. We can derive two sorts of human needs according to my distinction between natural and social characteristics of human beings. As Elster put it: The main feature of men is thus not so much that they are tool­ making but that they are 'intelligent' in that they can anticipate outcomes of their action upon nature. Human beings are able to project outcomes of natural processes and outcomes of their own work. To illustrate this, Marx eompared human activity with that of a spider and a bee: A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. ICapital i. 1 74) This projective consciousness is the decisive difference between human beings and animals. Human beings can decide how to build their houses. They do not have a 'natural' place in the eco­ system but they are able to adapt to many environments. Again, as distinct from animals, men do not change their species character in this process of adaptation, but, on the contrary, they exercise it. Human beings have been described as 'Miinge!wesen' (Gehlen), beings of shortcomings and deficiencies. 'But', as Fetscher rightly comments, 'man's biological disadvantage is at the same time the basis for his superiority over animals' (Fetscher 1973: 444). Hence Marx's definition fits well with the definition in section 1 .2 where the relation between man and nature was defined as: man being ( 1 ) in and (2) against (dominating) nature. ,15 In his Naturphilosophie Hegel makes a more elaborate statement: 'The practical relation to nature is determined by the desire which is egoistic. This desire aims at using nature to our benefit, to rub it off, to cancel it out, in short: to annihilate it . . . The need and the cunning of man has invented many ways of using and mastering nature . . He takes the means from nature and uses them against her. The cunning of his rcason makes sure that he thereby pits natural powers against other natural powers. The former arc then attacked and man confirms and preserves himself behind them' {Hegel 197Gb: 13 £., my trans.). Human needs The concept of human needs is fundamental in Marx's theory of human nature. The good society, for Marx, is one in which people are rich in needs and rich in need satisfaction. Conversely, capitalism is defective both because people have few needs and because the needs they do have are not satisfied. IElster 1985: 68) The concept of needs is important also in another sense. We saw that the notion of domination (in general, and in respect to nature) is meaningful only if linked to a notion of interests (for matters of simplicity, I take needs and interests synonymously). Now, how can we establish this link? Elster, drawing on Heller 1 9 76, constructed the following typology of needs in Marx. It includes 1 . Physieal needs which are needs for physical or biological necessities; 2. Necessary needs which correspond to the conventional and accepted standards of living of a particular group of people at a particular time and place; 3. Luxury needs which are needs which exceed (2); 4. Social needs which are needs which (a) are social in origin, (b) are social in content, or (c) can be satisfied only com­ munally (see Elster 1985: 69). ObViously, each point in this typology can be related to the ecological problematic in one way or another. To be more specific, I shall qualify the relations in the following way. ( 1 ) Physical needs: it is immediately clear that a debased envir­ onment may not permit of need satisfaction. This is the case for inhabitants of an extremely polluted area who can no longer have these needs (like food) satisfied in that area. (2) Necessary needs: standard goods of consumption (like water), which have such a low price (if any) that it can be neglected when calculating standard of living, may increase in their prices because it becomes 102 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism more and more costly to keep water, for example, clean. As a result, the historical and moral elements which enter this category will change. 13) Luxury goods: it is a cultural and political question to define the distinguishing line between 12) and 13). Some orthodox Marxists and some committed 'workerists' have contended that the perception of environmental problems, as it occurred in the early 1970s, was an expression of the privileged status of the middle and upper classes. Workers, on the contrary Iso went the claim), have always faced these prob­ lems at their workplaces and tried to improve their situation. In some extreme versions of this 'workerism', it is claimed that workers should not bother about these problems but instead pursue their 'real' class interests. 14) Social needs: Elster gave an example of a social need which can be satisfied only communally: the need for education. Education can be seen as a public good which is usually provided by the state. By analogy, we can apply the logic of collective goods to many ecological problems. Clean air and clean water may serve as examples here. All environ­ mental problems are social in origin in that they are produced socially; to overcome them is both a social concern and a social need. 2.5.8. Human nature essential to Marx To define human beings as communal and creative36 justifies coining the term theory of human nature. Man as a 'tool­ making animal' can be seen as part of the creative dimension. As Norman Geras, in a most detailed and convincing study, has shown, throughout his writings Marx adhered to something we could describe as 'human nature'. The evidence that Marx held a specific view of human nature seems clear and abundant. And yet, one interpretation of Marx, namely that of Althusser and his followers, has denied precisely this. What is taken as evidence that there was no 'humanistic' element in Marx is the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, the second and third sentences of which read as follows: 'But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations' lew v. 4). As regards the exegetical level, M, For obvious reasons, I take 'creative' here to mean both constructive and destructive. In any case, what counts as constructive or destructive is observer� dependent. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 103 Geras shows that the sixth thesis can by no means be taken as support for the 'anti-humanist' interpretation of Marx (see Geras 1983a: 27-87). With regard to the substantial level, I would like to add the following. When Marx speaks of human nature, and in the sixth thesis apparently denies such human essence, this should be explained in the following way. What the human essence is can only be grasped from its emanations, from its objectifications. This combines the Hegelian idea Ithat the real is the rational) with the 'positivist' idea that only real, observable entities form the object of scientific investigation. Marx, most explicitly in the German Ideology, conceives of human charac­ teristics such as creativity and communality as empirically given facts which can be observed and analysed. Modern industry is a product of this 'inner essence', a thought which had already appeared in the Paris Manuscripts. There might be many other human traits which have manifested or which will manifest themselves; what Marx is interested in is the significance of these traits. How does he define what is significant and what is not? According to him, it is the (self-)production of the conditions of human life which leads him to attribute to the development of the productive forces, and the relations of production, a prominent place. Certainly, Marx is equally aware of the im­ portance of language or power but he attributes only a secondary role to them. This is because he takes pains to avoid what we may call 'Don Quixotism', that is, the attempt to bring about something for which the preconditions are missing. Such attempts sometimes look funny, sometimes dreadful, and Marx scorned many of his contemporaries for this reason Imost notably the Utopian SOcialists). Consider how Marx relates class struggle (power) to the development of the productive forces. According to him, class struggle can only play the role of a midwife, a metaphor which Marx used several times. The analogy is obvious: as in biology, in social life, the objective preconditions must be given in order that a midwife can take up her job. This takes me to another set of arguments. Up to now we have listed a number of statements on human nature which are explanatory in character. Additionally, Marx employs the concept in a normative sense. He not only holds that there exists something like a human nature, but, moreover, he qualifies this. The substantial part of his concept of human 104 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism nature is contained in his notion of labour as free, creative activity. In the Paris Manuscripts he distinguishes men from animals by defining their species character: Free conscious activity is man's species character , . . The animal is immediately identical with its life-activity . . . Man makes his life­ activity itself the object of his will and consciousness . . . Conscious life�activity directly distinguishes man from animal lifc-activity . . Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwell­ ings . . . But man in the working up of the objective world . . . duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world he has created. lew iii. 275-7) But human beings are not only creative, but also communal, even in eases where they are not directly co-operating, in actions like composing, writing, thinking. 'The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life-even if they may not appear in the direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in association with others-are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life' lew iii. 299). This 'expressivist' notion of labour ITaylor 1 9 75) is present in all stages of Marx's theoretical development. Just as German Idealism saw the formation of spirit as self-consciousness, Marx as a materialist 'praxis-philosopher' sees the formation of human species as self­ creation: externalization, objectification, and appropriation are the three aspects of this circle.37 In this context, we have the human labour on one side and the objectified, dead labour on the other. The latter is the crystallized result of man's interchange with nature. 'Dead labour', therefore, is many things: technology, buildings, but also culture, institutions; it is man's second nature. I now address some questions which arise from Marx's philo­ sophical anthropology. One can relate this theoretical outline to the contemporary debate on liberalism and its communitarian criticis" and ask: Where does Marx stand? Obviously, there can ,17 Habermas 1987a: 7S If. There are a number of scholars who interpret Marx as transposing Hegel's model to his anthropocentric approach, replacing 'Spirit' with 'mankind'. Cf. Kolakowski 1978, Habermas 1987a, Thcunissen 1978, Benhabib 1986. They all point Out that Marx also inherits the fundamental difficulties of that theoretical model. ;J8 Cf. the discussion on Rawls's ( 1972) book, especially the contributions by Sandel { 1 9821 and MacIntyre {19841. Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism 105 be no clear answer to this. On the one hand, it seems as if Marx would align readily with the communitarian critique of liberalism since he saw individuals as socially constituted and aiming at a specific conception of the good. However, I want to draw some attention to the fact that Marx, despite all his criticism of liberalism, is no defender of Neo-Aristotelianism, since he does not envisage an institutionalization of the good life in a good society which is based on virtues. Therefore, the Greek model of polis was not an option for communist society as perceived by him. The 'good life' for him is something dynamic which cannot be expressed in citizens' basic virtues. This is so because his idea of human self-realization is a process which has baSically no end. The ideal society, therefore, marks no endpOint in history but is a society which is forever superseding itself. Self-realization, then, does not allow for an end-state called 'communism'. For these reasons Marx tries to avoid giving concrete models of communist society. And when he does, he tries to keep open all the possibilities of human self-realization. However, the model of self-realization contains a tautology and a paradox ."9 The tautology is that human essence Iwith its potentiality for self-realization) is what it is Ifor example: limit­ less). The paradox is that human essence is what it is not since it is everything Ibecause limitless). But if it is everything, it is void, it is nothing. It is a contradiction in terms to define something without drawing the border around the defined object. Likewise, absolute freedom is a contradiction in terms. One can be free only with regard to something or from something. The process of self-realization is a historical process which up till now has gone through certain stages, and has opened up new possibilities. Marx seems to have been aware of all this. He modifies his pOSition after the completion of the Paris Manuscripts. In the Theses on Feuerbach and the German Ideology he affirms that what for him is important is not an abstract 'human essence' but concrete, real, existing individuals and their realized essence, as we find it in existing culture, i.e. industry, science, art, literature, ,l<) See Luhmann 1988d for the distinction and its application to social thought and social reality. In a similar way, Ricoeur (l986: 309-10) distinguishes between ideology and Utopia; ideology justifies existing relations whereas Utopia contains fictional power. 106 Ecology, the Social Sciences, Marxism etc. He thus ( 1 ) analyses concrete objectifications of human essence and (2) measures them by an abstract human potentiality. The first operation is based on tautology, the second on paradox. This shows that the model of self-realization as a basis for criticism does not vanish. It may be appropriate to describe Marx's move as a move which de-paradoxified the abstract philosophical thesis of self-realization. He introduces a distinction between historical analysis and critical evaluation-a move which allows him to overcome the void and sterile 'man is everything' and its tautological or paradoxical implications. The distinction separates the analysis of concrete objectifications of human essence (e.g. as realized in productive forces) from the evaluation of these. Historical analysis and critical judgement are thus two distinct operations. To be sure, Marx uses criteria which derive from self-realization when criticizing existing productIve forces and social institutions. However, they are 'reintroduced' only after the crucial distinction is made and only after the historical analysis is carried out. The motive of his criticism is the concern for human dignity. For a better understanding of the following I briefly recall the structure of the argument. According to the Stoffwechse1 model man transforms nature by means of labour and technology. In Chapter 3 following (and in ch. 4) I therefore focus on the analysis of technology and society, postponing the notion of labour and its implications to Chapter 5. 3 Technology It is not the articles made, but how they arc made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs. (Karl Marx, Capital) So far I have discussed the concept of nature and human nature in Marx and some implications for the ecological problematic. Now I turn to the topic of technology. Apart from the importance this subject has for my discussion of Marx, it additionally provides the opportunity to investigate a subject which has been largely neglected by political and social theory as well as by philosophy. For the sake of conceptual clarity, the following remarks are in order. The English notion 'technology' is equivalent to the German 'Technik' which derives from Greek 'techne' and means intentional, goal-directed change of things. The Inter­ n ational Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences gives a useful definition: lIn] its broad meaning it connotes the practical arts. These arts range from hunting, fishing, gathering, agriculture, animal husbandry, and mining through manufacturing, construction, transportation, provision of food, power, heat, light, etc.t to means of communication, medicine and military technology. Technologies are bodies of skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, using, and doing useful things. (Merrill 1968: 576) In order to identify these 'useful things' more preCisely, Merrill adds that the concept of technology 'centers on processes that are primarily biological and physical rather than on psychological or social processes' (ibid. 577). Note that with this narrow definition not just any means-ends relationship counts as tech­ nology; rather, it stresses means-ends relationships which take place on a 'material' level. It is easy to see how the narrow 108 Technology Technology definition of technology corresponds to Marx's concept, which also stresses the material aspect.l In section 3 . 1 I shall discuss Marx's approach to modern industry '> Here, I am especially interested in his definition of machinery and his evolutionary view of technology. Several contemporary attempts at conceiving tcchnology in an evolu­ tionary way will be discussed in section 3.2. Closely connected to this problem is the problem of distinguishing between science and technology. I then discuss two theoretical possibilities which are contained in Marx's general position. The first is technological determinism, which I address in section 3.3; the second is technological alienation, which I address in section 3.5. Closely connected to the question of technological deter­ minism and to an evolutionary view of technology is the question whether technology can be conceived as having an 'inner logic' or 'autonomy'. I shall address this problem in sections 3.2 and 3.4, discussing some contemporary approaches. Section 3.5 will discuss the concept of division of labour in Marx. It has been claimed by several authors that Marx employs a theoretical model which conceives the results of human action as becoming independent from their producers (a process called objectification) but eventually reappropriated. In cases where this reappropriation is not possible but where the objectifications are retroacting upon the producers in a detrimental way, we have a state of alienation.3 If such a 'lack of control' can be discerned in the working of technology, if modern technology operates behind the backs of the individuals, then we would have an exact parallel on the technological level to what Marx analysed regarding economics 4 Moreover, as can be shown, I For two usages of a wide notion of technology, see Weber 1978: 32f. and Heidegger, who stresses that techne is not only the name 'for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts and for the fine arts' !Heidcggcr 1978: 294). 2. The German Groile Industrie has been translated as 'modern industry' as well as 'large-scale industrY'. l shall use the former since the text which was at my disposal adopted this translation. The decisive differences between the epoch of Gro/3e InduslJie and other epochs (such as manufacture) arc the important thing. 3 See Plemenatz 1975 and Elster 1985 for a distinction between spiritual and . social alienation. 4 Schelsky spoke of a 'new self-estrangement of man which came into the world with the new scientific civilization. The danger that the creator is losing 109 Marx himself sometimes suggested such a parallel but did not subsequently develop it. That he could not adhere to such a position will be made clear as well: if there was something in the human condition (technology) which escaped successful social control, his project of liberating society from 'alien powers' would have failed. 3.1. Marx as a student of technology As Rosenberg ( 1982a) emphasized, Marx was a careful student of technology. He argues that quite independently of whether Marx was right or wrong in his charac� terization of the future course of technological change and its social and economic ramifications/ his formulation of the problem still deserves to be a starting-pointior any serious investigation of technology and its ramifications. (Rosenberg 1982a: 34)5 According to Rosenberg, Marx 'devoted much time and effort to explicating the distinctive characteristics of technologies, and to attempting to unravel and examine the innerlogic of individual technologies' (Rosenberg 1982a: 34). Furthermore, 'he insisted that technologies constitute an interesting subject, not only to technologists but to students of society and social pathology as well, and he was very explicit in the introduction of technological variables into his arguments' (ibid.). But why was Marx so obsessed by the feature of technology to the extent that he focused on it in all his major theoretical works? I think that any answer has to consider at least two elements. First, Marx sees technology as part of the human condition, as the means by which man exercises and regulates his Stoffwechsel with nature. Second, Marx was aware of the importance of the productive forces for the development of a mode of production, for the evolution of relations of production, himself in his work, the constructor losing himself in his construction, is now the metaphysical temptation of man. Man shrinks back from transferring himself without remainder into self-produced objectivity, into a constructed being, and yet works unceasingly at the continuation of the process of scientific­ . technical self-objectification' (Schclsky 1961, as quoted lU Habermas 1976b: 126). ;'i The history of technology is indeed a very young discipline. See Hughes 1979 for an overview of emerging themes in this discipline. 1 1 0 Technology Technology 111 and, specifically, he was interested in the role of machines and machinery for the emergence of capitalism; likewise, he was interested in the technological basis of communist society. In what follows, I shall turn to each of the two topics. Marx assumed an 'inner logic' of technology, simultaneously rejected any technological determinism in his thought. This section will focus on the problem. When Marx explicates the concept of Stoffwechsel, he remarks: 3. 1 . 1 . Technology as part of the human condition It was Marx's firm conviction that modern industry reveals man's active relationship with nature. To be sure, there has been an original state in which 'the free gifts ·of nature [were] abundant' (Grundrisse 6 1 2) and hence there was no need to develop technologies. This state is, according to Marx, a pre­ historical one. But as soon as human beings develop technolog;es they begin to have a history. Thus we are able to reconstruct main characteristics of earlier societies by examining the different ways in which production took place. As Marx states: Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them. (Capital i. 352) But just as man requires lungs to breathe with, so he requires something that is work of man's hand, in order to consume physical forces productively. (Capital i. 365) Relics of bygone instruments of labourpossess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economical forms of society as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economical epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on. (Capital i. 175-6) In the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx bases his judgement on the works of Babbage and Ure who analysed technology and, par­ ticularly, machinery. The definition which he adopts is the following: The machine is a uniting of the instruments of labour, and by no means a combination of different operations for the worker himself . . . Simple tools; accumulation of tools; composite tools; setting in motion of a composite tool by a single hand engine, by mani setting in motion of these instruments by natural forces; machines; system of machines having one motor; system of machines having an automatic motor­ this is the progress of machinery. ICW vi. 186-7) In this definition an interesting evolutionary logic is suggested. Are these evolutionary stages of technology to be explained from within their own development or are they determined by outside factors? Rosenberg 1 1 982a: 34), while suggesting that In historical development all three factors involved in this Stoffwechsel process are changing: human beings, technology, and nature. Marx aims at an identification of a 'driving force', a mechanism which sets the change in motion. My claim is that Marx approaches this problem in two different ways. One way is to examine history and to draw conclusions. This is essentially an explanatory task. The other way is to evaluate the develop­ ment of the three factors; this is essentially a normative enter­ prise. In order to distinguish these two aspects, I use the terms 'historical' and 'critical'. Taking the historical approach to the problem we can conclude that Marx conceived in prinCiple all three factors as 'driving force': I. nature: geographical determinism;" 2. technology: autonomous development, inner logic, evolu­ tion; 3. human beings: their needs, developing technolOgies, trans­ forming nature ? Thus the circle can be started from all three points " (, We find an instance of geographical determinism in a passage (crossed out by Marx) from the German Ideology: 'These conditions [geological, oro· hydrographical, climatic] determine not only the original, spontaneous organisa­ tion of men, especially racial differences, but also the entire further develop­ ment, or lack of development, of men up to the present time' (CWv. 3 1 ). See also Manuscripts 1861-3 where he states that geographical and climatic factors determine the differences in the natural tools ('in den naturlich vorgefundenen Arbeitsinstrumenten'J which in turn divide the branches of existence of different tribes [d. MEGA lI. iii. J . 266-7). 7 Boserup ( 1 9 8 1 ) argues that population and technology stimulate each other through history. Since the ratio man-land is a decreasing one, human beings 1 1 2 Technology Turning to the critical dimension, Marx's theoretical human­ ism immediately springs to mind. Because the good society for Marx is a society in which no alien powers exercise any 'enslaving effects' on the individuals, but, quite the contrary, in which individuals are fully developed and autonomous, an autonomy of ( 1 ) or (2) could cause difficulties for his theory. In his view, a society cannot be called free as long as enslaving effects are exercised, no matter whether they come from nature or technology. If technologies are detrimental to human well­ being, they must not enjoy autonomy in his theoretical frame­ work With respect to nature Marx in the German Ideology clearly states that a society which lives in an untransformed nature can only be called narrow-minded or ignorant (borniert): 'Here, as everywhere, the identity of nature and man also appears in such a way that the restricted attitude of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted attitude to one another determines men's re­ stricted relation to nature, exactly because nature has not yet been historically modified' (CW v. 44; emphasized part missing from the English edition, d. MEW iii. 3 1 ). With respect to technology Marx makes clear that labour must reappropriate the objectified productive forces 'not only to achieve self-activity, but . . . to safeguard their very existence': [TJhe productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite inde­ pendent of and divorced from the individuals, alongside the individuals; the rcason for this is that the individuals, whose forces they arc, exist split up and in opposition to one another, whilst, on the other hand, these forces are only real forces in the intercourse and association of these individuals. Thus . , . we have a totality of productive forces, which have, as it were, taken on a material form and arc for the individuals themselves no longer the forces of the individuals but of private property, and hence of the individuals only in so far as they are develop more productive technologies in order to maintain (or improve) their situation. Note that Marx also sees the possibility that population growth can be a productive force, sec Grundrisse 400, 528-9, 749. il The determining role of nature may be limited to an original state where production and society start 'from scratch' (see last footnote). For industrially developed societies we could thus neglect the point. Ironically, however, it comes in again through the back door, when 'careless' use of technology and natural resOurces has led to a debasement of the natural environment, which in turn affects human well· being and requires measures (often new technologies) to improve the situation. Technology U3 owners of private property. Never, in any earlier period, have the productive forces taken on a form so indifferent to the intercourse of individuals as individuals, because their intercourse itself was still a r�stricted one. lew v. 86-7) The only instance which legitimately enjoys autonomy is the fully developed individual. True, Marx always acknowledges the eternal condition of mankind to produce and reproduce itself within natural limits ('realm of necessity'). Exactly because such limits do exist, so he concludes, the realm of necessity will never vanish completely (cf. Capital iii. 820). But he thinks that alienation, also in the field of necessity (i.e. transformation of nature), can be superseded." Here I want to stress that the German Ideology can be read in exactly the same way. Marx conceives of the reappropriation of the productive forces as synonymous with the development of individual capacities. Since the productive forces have developed to a totality, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the productive forces and the intercourse. The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. lew v. 87) The discussion in this chapter, and in the following section 3 . 1 .2, concentrates on Marx's discussion of technological evolu­ tion, which seems a challenging enterprise, for it seems that a tension in his theory arises exactly here: a tension between his historical and critical analysis. As I shall show, this tension takes the form of an opposition between a technological evolution and his humanist claims. As Rottleuthner, in another context, puts it: The concepts of organism and development arc linked by their ambi­ valent and therefore broad political applicability. Development can . easily be linked with dynamism and progress, with directions and goals of development, which recall the ideals of perfectibility of the 18th century. But 'development' was also linked . . with the aspect of objectivity, a context which was remotc from the deliberatc, goal� \I This foreshadows my discussion in ch. 5 where I give an interpretation of the famous passage from Capital iii which diverges from the standard interpretation. 1 14 Technology directed action of men. The forces or regularities of development act inevitably. History cannot be made. (Rottleuthner 1988: 1 10- 1 1 ) In the present chapter, I limit the analysis to the question whether technology evolves; in the next chapter, I embark on the question whether technology is autonomous. 3.1 .2. Evolution and technological evolution The major source in studying this subject is the recently published manuscript 2m Kritik der Politischen 6konomie: Manuskript 1 861-63 lManuscripts 1861-3 for short)1D where Marx presents, over hundreds of pages, major contributions on technology. Already a superficial glance into the table of contents shows the importance which Marx attributed to this subject. In part II, volume iii. I , we find under the heading 'Der relative Mehrwert' excerpts and discussions on co-operation, division of labour, and machinery. In volume iii. 6, Marx returns to the same questions. Just to show how closely Marx did study matters of technology, I shall draw to a great extent on passages from this work lapart from more common sources) which has only recently been published lin German). Marx conceives the development of the productive forces, and of relations of production, in an evolutionary perspective. He refuses a viewpoint which would treat the individual inventor as the focus of attention. Indeed, in the beginning of the chapter on 'Machinery and Modern Industry' in the first volume of Capital, Marx writes: A critical history of technology would show how little any of the inventions of the 18th century are the work of a single individual. Hitherto there is no such book. Darwin has interested us in the history of Natures technologYI Le. in the formations of the organs of the plants and animals! which organs serve as instruments of production for sustaining life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of all social organization, deserve equal attention? ( Capital i. 352 n.) 10 In fact, parts of these manuscripts had been published 1905-10 under the title Theorien iiber den Mehrwert, ed. Karl Kautsky, and 1954-61 by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the CPSU. These editions consisted mainly of notebooks v-xv and XX-XXIII; the new edition of the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe contains all the notebooks. Technology 115 A hundred years later this question has still not received the attention it deserves. As Rosenberg rightly observes, this passage from Capital, 'amazingly fresh over a century later, reads like a prolegomenon to a history of technology that still remains to be written' IRosenberg 1982a: 40). The reference to Darwin comes out even more clearly in the Manuscripts 1 861-3. Marx explicitly refers to On the Origin of Species where Darwin distinguishes between the lower and higher forms of organization of living beings. The criterion for drawing this distinction is the differentiation of organs. Since Marx gives a summary of the passage in German, let me reproduce the English original here. Darwin writes: I presume that lowness in this case means that the several parts of the organization have been but little specialised for particular functions; and as long as the same part has to perform diversified work, we can perhaps see why it should remain variable, that is, why natural selection should have preserved or rejected each little deviation of form less carefully than when the part has to serve for one special purpose alone. In the same way that a knife which has to cut all sorts of things may be of almost any shape; whilst a tool for some particular object had better be of some particular shape. Natural selection, it should never be forgotten, can act on each part of each being, solely through and for the advantage of each being. (Darwin 1 9 7 1 : 1 4 1 j I l Marx is inspired directly by Darwin and uses an analogy between biology and technology. l 2 He transposes this distinction to technology in thc broad sense lincluding division of labour, tools, machinery, etc.). The differentiation, specialization and Simplification of tools in manu­ facture, which is based on the division of labour-their exclusive adaptation to very simple operations-is one of the technological, material preconditions for the development of machinery as an element !I It should be mentioned that Darwin rejected the common equation of evolution with progrcss (Gould 1973: 36). !2 It is most interesting that Darwin intuitively conceived of the develop­ ment of tools and of organs in the same evolutionary way. The Marx/Darwin relation has been a controversial topic. This seems to be due to Marx's ambi­ valent attitude towards Darwin, sec Groh 1981, Avincri 1968, Gerratana 1973, Ball 1979. Marx fiercely rejects the formula 'struggle for life' which is a basic theme of Malthus. In a letter to Kugelmann, Marx stresses that this formula is a mere Phrase which is as void (and false) as Malthus's law of (over-Jpopulation. See Marx to Kugelmann, 27 June 1870. In a letter to Lassalle, he praises Darwin for haVing destroyed teleology in the natural sciences (see letter of 16 Jan. 1861). 1 1 6 Technology which revolutionizes the mode and relations of production. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1914) Marx was convinced that the historical development of techno­ logy which is man's organic nature (see s. 3 . 1 . 1 ) cannot be explained by individual behaviour (inventions). Rather, it needs to be explained by an approach which conceives the development of technology from an observer's standpoint, i.e. as evolution. 13 As Weick put it: What occurs is simply that an obseIVer watches events happen, imposes on these happenings some preconception about order, and this pre­ conception then allows the observer to watch the changing instances, compare them, and see whether there is a progression toward orderliness in those portions being observed. If there is, evolution has occurred. (Weick 1979: 1 19) In the above passage Marx alludes to the mechanism of 'adapta­ tion' which makes us ask: does it make sense to suggest sim­ ilarities between the adaptation of a biological species to an environment and a technology which adapts to 'very simple operations'? Are we not led astray by Marx's application of Darwin's criteria to technology? Darwin suggests that evolution is a process of natural selection which operates by means of variation. The 'goal' of evolution, however, is not variation (nor is it selection or inheritance). These are only the means to secure the survival of the species and to reach an increase in reproductive capacity of the species. 14 This is not to say that the suggested similarities are devoid of heuristic value. Weick pointed out that 'a surprisingly rich introduction to theories of evolution can be obtained with a simple deck of playing cards. If the deck is shuffled repeatedly, it is clear that there is continual change as the cards become rearranged, but does the deck evolve? It all depends. Some people are willing to accept any rearrangement of parts as evolution, whereas others would say that some order must occur out of chaos before it can be said that evolution is occurring' (Weick 1979: 1 1 9). Technology and the deck of cards U I A critical history of technology would show how little any of the inven­ tions of the 18th century are the work of a single individual' (Capital i. 352 n.). 14 According to Gould, we may distinguish between two main strategies for enhancing reproductive capacity: r- and [(-strategies. The former are directly maximizing reproduction, the latter are adapting ('fine-tuning') to the environ­ ment. See Gould 1973: 94. Technology 117 are similar in that they do nothing by themselves: technology needs to be designed and produced, a deck of cards needs to be shuffled. There are two main objections to an evolutionary approach within social theory. The first contends that the natural and the social world are different in that the social world is characterized by intentional human action. The second rejects the use of biological models in the social sciences in a more principled way. I comment on both objections in turn. 1 . It is true that evolution in the biological and evolution in the socio-cultural (including technological) sphere are distinct. The most important difference is that the latter does not depend on the selection of mutations, since the possibility of new combinations is given in each generation (d. Luhmann 1984a: 589). This leads to an enormous acceleration of evolution. As Enzo Tiezzi wrote in his instructive Tempi storiei, tempi biologici: With biological time we measure biological evolution. Its unit of measure lies in the order of millions of years: thousands of millions of years separate us from the origin of the earth, hundreds of millions of years from the appearance of algae, bacteria, trilobites, Arthropoda, fish; three million years from the appearance of human beings. However, with biological time we also have to measure the future and it is here that the rupture of biological balances induces variations on a planetary level in time-spans so short as to accelerate the geological clock. Transformations which in former times occurred in millions of years can now occur . . . in some decades and the subsequent variations for human and social balances correspond to an acceleration of millions of years of history. (Tiezzi 1984: 62, my translation) Biological and socio-cultural evolution are thus taking place at different speeds and different rhythms which may lead to ecolo­ gical problems. It may occur that the fast evolution of society does not permit for an adaptation of some biological species (either of the K- or r- type). To the extent that social evolution depends on these species, it in turn will be endangered. Unlike Elster, and others, I do not see the decisive difference between biological and sodal evolution as resting on the iatter being characterized by intentional human action. The decisive difference is that the social realm evolves at a much faster rate than the biological realm. Also, Terence Ball juxtaposes natural and social evolution: 'The opening chapter of his Origin 1 1 8 Technology notwithstanding, Darwin fails to see that conscious human selec­ tion is, when weighted on the scales of human history, vastly more significant a factor in evolution than IS natural selectIOn through chance and accident. Because of human attempts to transform nature, "natural history" is fast becoming "human history". Human purpose and praxis are replacing chance and accident as the motive force of evolution' (Ball 1979: 473). But Ball is doubly mistaken. First he neglects the fact thador Marx capitalist societies cannot be called human sOCieties smce they still belong to what he called 'natural history' (see 1859 Preface). 's Second, following directly from the first point, he does not interpret the decisive difference between natural and social evolution as in the first place a difference m relative speeds of evolution, but a difference marked by intentional actIOn which, according to him, replace chance and accident. To repeat: at least for Marx such a state of affairs could be estabhshed only in communism (the truly human society), and not in pre­ communist societies. Ball concludes that the 'Marx-Darwin-myth' was completely unfounded. However, there is something which does not fit into Ball's account and which makes understandable a claim hke Feuer's, namely that Marxism rests on Darwinian evolution (cited in Ball 1979: 479-80): Marx, while clearly seemg the differences between natural and social evolution and 1musmg himself about Darwin's identification of nature with the free­ market categories of capitalism, nevertheless tries to develop his own theory of social evolution. In this respect Engels's speech at Marx'S graveside (where he called him the Darwm of the social world) was not without justificatIOn. As Luhmann rightly pointed out: Darwin's theory of evolution represents a radical break with all earlier traditions of thinking about development and perfection, of history and order. It is no longer an intelligent cause, no longer God's design, hut simply a difference that makes the difference. All 'grand theory' of the 15 Karl Karsch ( 1 967) rightly emphasized that the crucial point for Marx was the overcoming of the naturwUchsige traits of society. This word can.no� be translated adequately into English with only one ",,:ord. �arx uses it 1� a pejorative sense here; it means that people are confrontmg SOCIety as ,som,ethmg they do not understand or can do nothing about. I shall translate It wlth the English word 'natural'. Technology 1 19 19th century uses this scheme of thought. So did Hegel, and, of course, Marx. ILuhmann 1984c: 6 1 ) There are various thinkers who have tried to adapt an evolution­ ary model to the social sciences, among them Donald Campbell. He tried to summarize the main mechanisms of evolution in the following way: For an evolutionary process to take place there need to be variations (as by mutation, trial, etc.), stable aspects of the environment differentially selecting among such variations and a retention-propagation system rigidly holding on to the selected variations. The variation and the retention aspects are inherently at odds. Every new mutation represents a failure of reproduction of a prior selected form. Too high a mutation rate jeopardizes the preservation of already achieved adaptations. There arise in evolutionary systems, therefore, mechanisms for curbing the variation rate. The more elaborate the achieved adaptation, the more likely are mutations to be deleterious, and therefore the stronger the inhibitions on mutation. For this reason we may expect to find great strength in the preservation and propagation systems, which will lead to a perpetuation of once-adaptive traits long after environmental shifts have removed their adaptedness. I Campbell 1965: 306-7) Several authors have transposed this model to socio-cultural evolution. As Luhmann pointed out, 'Despite all these differences between organic and socio-cultural evolution . . . the latter is also evolution in the strict sense, that is, an unplanned arrange­ ment of a highly improbable complexity' (Luhmann 1984a: 590, my translation). Note that Luhmann defines evolution (both in the biological and in the socio-cultural sense) as leading to an increase in complexity (see also Ballmer and von Weizsacker 1974). This complexity is the result of selections of individual ('improbable') variations (mutations) and thus an improbable event. Evolutionary theory, then, would have the task of ex­ plaining how it came about that (both in the natural and social world) highly improbable constellations were selected and sta­ bilized.16 Habermas also tried out possible uses which can be ! (> See also Gould's stress on the importan t role played by increasing com­ plexity: 'Either plants or animals. Our basic conception of life's diversity is based upon this division. Yet it represents little more than a prejudice spawned by our status as large, terrestrial animals' (Gould 1973: 1 13). Gould then adopts the five-kingdom typology of Whittaker 'because it tells a sensible story about organic diversity. It arranges life in three levels of increasing complexi ty . 120 Technology made of evolutionary models in the social sciences. Although it is very tentative, his article is worth mentioning here. He asks what sense it makes to transfer such categories as 'variation' and 'increase in complexity' to society. As to the latter he rightly comments that 'increase in complexity' is no sufficient criterion for establishing an evolutionary hierarchy if we do not know the inner logic of the organisms IHabermas 1976a: 190). Habermas sees the increasing 'learning potential' of societies more as the driving force of development. However, as Gould has convincingly pointed out, we can derive these criteria by looking at how organisms succeed in handling the balance between size and shape Isee Gould 1973). By analogy, if we dissect society in social subsystems, we can formulate the criterion that each subsystem must be able to secure its own maintenance, given its level of complexity and its operating codes. The 'goal', so to speak, of its operations thus lies, similarly to natural processes, in securing the continuation of its own operations. 1 7 2. One might wish to reject the use of biological analogies in a more rigorous way. Indeed, it is common in the social sciences to be highly sceptical of models of theories which are imported from biology. IS Biological analogies and metaphors are to be found also in Marx.'9 I shall thus make a general remark about analogies as such and about biological analogies in Marx and my own study. IE]volutionary transition from any level to the next occurs more than oncei the advantages of increased complexity arc so great that many independent lines converge upon the few possible solutions. The members of each kingdom are united by common structure, not by common descent' (Gould 1973: 1 1 7). 17 At the time Habermas wrote his article, Luhmann had not yet taken his 'autopoietic turn'. But Habermas already objected to 'hopeless circles of self­ referential definitions' in Luhmann's and Dunn's efforts in establishing criteria analogous to the survival criterion in biology. HI Needless to say, I share this scepticism regarding sociobiology and social Darwinism. For a critique, see Gould 1973 and Hofstadter 1944. 19 See the afterword to the 2nd edn. of Das Kapital, where Marx cites with approval a Russian reviewer of his book who pointed out that it was Marx's method to examine the evolution of social and economic forms, 'in a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution" in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis . . . shows that social organisms differ among them­ selves as fundamentally as plants or animals' (Capital i. 28). Marx comments that this generous review portrays nothing other than his dialectical method. Technology 121 Gregory Bateson once remarked that it is a feature of the human brain to think with the help of what he called 'abductions'. This is to say that our perception is guided by specific experiences and concepts. If we encounter something new, we try to explain It with common or known I'old') categories, models, or theories. This lateral extension of abstract components of description is called abduction . . . Every abduction may be seen as a double or multiple descnptIOn of some object or event or sequence . . . In each case, it is assumed that certain formal characteristics of one component will be mirrored in the other. IBateson 1979: ch. 5) As to the second point, it has been noted by several authors that Marx deliberately tried to develop his theory with analogy to the natural sciences. Alfred Schmidt has already pointed out that in Marx we find 'peculiarly biological metaphors' in describing man's relationship to nature ISchmidt 1 9 7 1 : 80). Schmidt cites Moleschott and Liebig who both employed the term Stoffwechsel whIch Marx acquired from them. Moleschott wrote that the soul of the world consists in a circulation of matter (ef. Schmidt 1 97 1 : 86-7). The German philosopher Schelling also used this notion to develop parts of his natural philosophy. Indeed, the title of one of his writings is 'Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der hiiheren Physik zur Erklarung des allgemeinen Organismus' (Schelling 1927) 20 The curious thing with Moleschott and Liebig is that they coin the term Stoffwechsel with analogy to SOCIal concepts: Moleschott makes reference to commerce Liebig to politics. We have thus to take into account that at leas� some categories in the natural sciences were coined by explicit or ImpliCIt reference to social phenomena. This reciprocal process has also been noted by Schmidt: Since classical times, and right up to Machiavelli and even Pareto alteratio?s in the configuration of society have been understood as par� ?f a cychcal movement proceeding according to natural laws. We find, Just as early, attempts to interpret the changes and mutual interactions of natural objects by means of social categories. ISchmidt 1971 : 92) As we just have seen, Darwin can also be added to this list· he also tried to make plausible the use of a concept (differentiation) 20 It is worth noting that Sc helling'sphilosophy has also been interpreted as a . forerunner of the new paradIgms of self-organization self-reproduction and ' autopoicsis-see Heuser-KeEler 1986: 52. , 122 Technology by means of an analogy, in this case to the technical world (see his knife example). Furthermore, Darwin also transposed a mechanism from the social world to the natural world, namely Malthus's 'struggle for existence' (see Rottleuthner 1988: 109)­ a procedure which amused Marx. 2 1 Wolf Lepenies has shown that the concept of division of labour went back and forth between sociology and biology: 'Spencer spoke of reciprocity ( Wechselwirkung) as he showed that biology borrowed the concept of division of labour from sociology in order to return it in an enriched form. Reciptocity signifies the transfer of a concept from one scientific discipline to another and then back into the original discipline' ( Lepenies 1976: 1 72, cited in Rottleuthner 1988: 1 0 1 ) . To come to my own use of such analogies: as will become clear in the following discussion, evolutionary concepts in social theory indeed borrow much from biology (see Weick 1979). There are several authors who believe that central notions of evolutionary theory can be put to use in the explanation of social phenomena and social change. In Chapter 4, I shall test the potential of such an approach in comparison to the standard Marxist approach (as expressed in the 1859 Preface). S. l.S. Marx's machine definition Now look at Marx's definition of what a machine is. He rejects several definitions, among them the following: The explanation that a machine is a complicated tool and a tool a simple machine explains nothing. The explanation that we have a machine where the tool is not moved by human power and that we have a tool where the human being is the prime mover . . . mistakes a dog's cart . . . for a machine and the mechanical spinning wheel . . . for a tool. It contains nothing which cOl1ld explain historical change. (MEGA II. iii . 6. 1951, my emphasis) 21 See the letter to Engels of 1 8 June 1 862: 'It is remarkable how Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his English society with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, inventions and the Malthusian "struggle for existence", His [nature I is Hobbes' bellum omnium contra omnes and one is reminded of Hegel's Phenomenology, where civil society is described as a IIspiritual animal kingdom ", while in Darwin the animal kingdom figures as civil society,' Technology 123 In a letter to Engels he explains several attempts to define a machine: You may or you may not know) for of itself the thing1s quite immaterial, that there is considerable controversy as to what distinguishes a machine from a tool " if we take a look at the machine in its elementary form, there can be no doubt that the industrial revolution originates, not from motive power, but from that part of machinery called the WORKING MACHINE by the English, i.e. not from, say, the usc of water or steam in the place of the foot to move the spinning wheel, but from the transformation of the actual spinning process itself, and the elimination of that part of human labour that was not mere EXERTION OF POWER (as in treadling a wheel), but was concerned with processing, working directly on the material to be processed, (Letter to Engels, 28 Jan. 1863) Marx aims to identify a technological element which is able to produce social change. The point for Marx is not to have a good definition for its own sake but to have a definition which is able to capture the advent of the industrial revolution. It is precisely here that the definitions of the Englishmen and the Germans fail. Marx emphasizes his speCial interest when he admits that 'Itlo those who are merely mathematicians, these questions are of no great moment, but they assume great importance when it comes to establishing a connection between human social relations and the development of these material modes of production' (letter to Engels of 28 jan. 1863, my emphasis). According to Marx, then, the important difference is the existence of a mechanism, which can be found in the models of the clock and the mill. According to him, 'Itlhe clock was the first auto­ matic device to be used for practical purposes, and from it the whole theory of the production of regular motion evolved' (ibid.). Marx is aware that machines (which conform to this definition) have been employed for a long time. But with their use on a broader level a specific dynamics occurs which leads to the industrial revolution: The industrial revolution began as soon as mechanical means were employed in fields where, from time immemorial, the final result had called for human labour and not therefore-as in the case of the above-mentioned tools­ where the actual material to be processed had never, within living memory, been directly connected with the human hand; where, by the nature of things and from the outset, man has not 1 2.4 Technology functioned purely as POWER ' Iletter to Engels of 2.8 Jan. 1863). He thus rejects both the definition of the English technologists who 'call a tool a simple machine and a machine a complicated tool' and the definition of the 'German jackasses, who are great on little matters like this' and call a plough a machine because it is not moved by human power 22 Instead, he agrees with Babbage who defines the maehine in the following way: When each process has been reduced to the use of some simple tool, the union of all these tools, actuated by one moving power, constitutes a machine. In contriving tools and simplifying processes, the operative workmen are, perhaps, most successful; but it requires for other habits to combine into one machine these scattered arts. (Babbage 1971: 1 74)23 Marx comments: 'What we stress here is not only the reduction "de chaque operation particuliere a l'emploi d'un instrument simple" [of each process to the use of some simple tool], but what is involved in it, i.e. creation of these "instruments simples" on the basis of the division ol labour' IMEGA II . iii. 6. 19 14). It is not important what the motor is. It may be the human hand and foot, animal powers, elementary powers, or an automaton Imech­ anical powers) Id. MEGA II. iii. 6. 1914). The only important thing is that virtuosity and skill get transposed from the worker to the mechanism: 'However, those operations which formerly needed the virtuoso who played on the instrument are now produced by the transformation of the most simple movements Icaused by human beings, like turning a handle, treading a wheel) into the refined movements of the machine' IMEGA II. iii. 6. 1 9 1 7).24 22 In a letter to Engels he admits-to being 'in considerable doubt about the section in my book that deals with machinery. I have never been quite able to sec in what way SELF-ACTORS changed spinning, or rather, since steam power was already in use before then, how it was that the spinner, despite steam power; had to intervene with his motive power' {letter of 24 Jan. 1863). And, in the letter of 28 Jan. of the same year: 'For me, mechanics presents much the s.amc problem as language. I understand the matheinatical laws, but the simplest technical reality that calls for ocular knowledge is more difficult for me than most complicated combinations.' For this reason, Marx was attending a practical course for working men in the Institute of Geology (cf. CW xli. 446, 449). 2J Cf. also The Poverty 0/ Philosophy, CW vi. 186, as cited above. 24 See also the following passage from the Gnmdrisse: 'lIlt is the machinery which possesses skill and strength, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it . . . The workers' activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of machinery and not the opposite' (Gntndrisse 693). Technology 12.5 Machinery rests upon simple co-operation and division of labour, but changes them at the same time: 25 As soon as machinery is employed in a capitalist way . . . it presupposes simple co-operation. This appears in this context . . . as a much more important moment than it was when manufacture rested on the division of labour . . . which repeats itself inside the mechanical atelier, albeit on a lower scale; and, as we shall see later, the mechanical atelier overthrows the main principles of manufacture, based on the division of labour. Finally, the use of machinery increases the division of labour within society, the multiplication of special trades and autonomous branches. Their basic principle is to be found in the replacement of skilled labour by simple labour. (MEGA II. iii. 1. 294, my emphasis) Marx distinguishes historically two stages of transition to ma­ chine work. The first is the development of machines which have their origin in primitive tools and which eventually led to the production of machines by means of machines. There are two classical examples of machinery which emerge in this way: on the one hand spinning and weaving machines which develop out of the oldest tools . . . On the other hand construction of machinery by means of machinery . . . Historically, the revolution in industry starts with the first. It is in the very nature of things that only after the production of commodities by machinery has reached a certain size does the need become felt to produce machinery by machinery. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1915) In the case of the spinning machine, the worker was reduced to merely driving the wheel. The mass of the product was no longer in direct proportion to the physical expense of power. The decisive feature of machinery is that a mechanism performs operations which earlier were performed by a virtuoso who played an instrument: From the moment that direct human participation in production consisted only in supplying simple power, the principle of work done by machinery was given. Thc mechanism had become available whereby the human factor could be replaced later by water, steam, etc. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1 9 1 7) The second stage is characterized by the employment of the steam engine: 'After this first big industrial revolution, the use of the 2;; See s. 3.6 for a discussion of his concept' of 'division of labour'. 126 Technology Technology steam engine as providing the motive power was the second' IMEGA II. iii. 6. 1 9 1 7). The historical turning-point, however, is expressed in the first stage Itransfer of skill), for the simple reason that mankind always had living automata I =animals) which served as a power source. The important difference has to be seen in the instrument. The plough contained no element which could lead to the industrial revolution: all movements of men and animals were essentially those of free will, the move­ ment was irregular; man had to direct the animals. The mechan­ ical act was hidden behind the movement of man and animal: they themselves were not forced into a strict geometry. The mill, however, can be regarded as the forerunner of machinery; it is the first 'Arbeitswerkzeug' Isee MEGA II. iii. 6. 1 9 19). 'This aspect of machinery has also been developed from the mill, i.e. that work which was previously separated from grinding in the strict sense is now done by the same motive power and therefore is mechanically combined with the work of grinding' IMEGA II. iii. 6. 1 920-1 ). It is most important to keep in mind the differentia specijica of the machine as defined by Marx. It is the transfer of technical skill from the worker to the instrument. Recall, also, Marx's definition from the Grundrisse where he said that the machine is the virtuoso which possesses a soul of its own Isee Grundrisse 529, 693). In Capital, Marx shifts the attention from the technological to the social level Isee s. 3.5.). But let us return to the consequences of Marx's machine definition. The effects on the character of the labour performed under these conditions are summarized as follows: On the one hand, we have the changed form of labour, its apparent ease which transfers all muscular effort to machinery-but also all virtuosity. The lengthening of the working day therefore does not immediately reach physical limits. On the other hand, the opposition of the worker breaks down since his virtuosity . . . is broken. This impedes the ability of the worker to resist and it allows capital to replace skilled workers with unskilled workers who more readily submit to control. lMEGA II. iii. I. 303) This new reality, which is in the first instance a technological one, has tremendous social consequences, and negative ones for the workers. Marx says that a new class of workers, i.e. women and children, is entering the production process, a class which is 127 completely obedient to the despotism of capital. Furthermore, capitalist use of machinery lengthens the working day instead of shortening it: 'Once the working day has been forcibly pro­ longed, it takes ages las in England) for the workers to reduce it back to its previous level' IMEGA II. iii. 1 . 303). 3. 1 . 4. The machinery question The machinery question in early nineteenth�century Britain was the question of the sources of tcchnical progress and the impact of the introduction of the new technology of the period on the total economy and society. The question was central to everyday relations between master and workman but it was also of major theoretical and ideological interest. The very technology at the basis of economy and society was a platform of challenge and struggle. IBerg 1982: 9). BaSically, there were two attitudes towards machinery: one which welcomed it and saw it as an instance of progress; another which condemned it, stressing its dehumanizing effects. The follOWing quote from John Stuart Mill may serve as an example of the first attitude: 'The more visible fruits of scientific progress . . . the mechanical improvements, the steam engine, the railroads, carry the feeling of admiration for the modern, and disrespect for ancient times, even down to the wholly uneducated classes' IMill 1 865: 148; see also Marx 1964: ch. 4). The counter­ position was expressed by writers like Thomas Carlyle or Charles Dickens. Carlyle's cultural critique comes out clearly when he compares 'the living artisan' with the inanimate one: 'The huge demon of Mechanism smokes and thunders, panting at his great task, in all sections of English land; changing his shape like a very Proteus; and, infallibly, at every change of shape, oversetting whole multitudes of workmen, as if with the waving of his shadow from afar, hurling them asunder, this way and that, in their crowded march and curse of work or traffic' ICarlyle 1980: xxiii. 24). Marx was caught between these attitudes. He saw both the progressive character of machinery and also its debasing effects.26 He tried to combine both positions, pointing to a higher form of 26 The latter are sharply expressed in the early Paris Manuscripts, but also in Capital. The difference is that Capital conceives the debaSing effects as due only to the capitalist use of machinery. 128 Technology industrial society where the negative features would have van­ ished. Carlyle depicted machinery as a 'huge, dead, immeasurable steam engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference' (Carlyle 1885';'8, cited in Berg 1982: 12). Marx, in Capital, describes a 'mechanical monster whose body fills whole factories, and whose demon power, at first veiled under the slow and measured motions of his giant limbs, at length breaks out into the fast and furious whirl of his countless working organs' (Capital i. 381-2). This expresses an anxiety felt by many contemporaries of Marx and still felt by many people today 27 When Dickens complained that in modern society everything was quantified, mechanized, calculated as 'so many hundred hands in this mill; so many hundreds horse steampower',28 Marx would stress the potential for liberating mankind on the basis of this scientific method. In Capital he praises modern industry in the following way: Modern Industry rent the veil that concealed from men their own social process of production and that turned the various, spontaneously divided branches of production into so many riddles} not only to outsiders, but even to the initiated. The principle which is pursued, of resolving each process into its constituent movements, without any regard to their possible execution by the hand of man, created the new modern science of technology_ The varied, apparently unconnected, and petrified forms of the industrial process now resolved themselves into so many conscious and systematic applications of natural science to the attainment of given useful effects. ICapital i. 456-7) From this quote at least we may conjecture that Marx ultimately gave more emphasi&to the progressive aspect of machinery than to the 'spiritual' consequences 29 This has to do with the eman­ cipatory role he attributed to science, as we shall now see. 3.1 .5. Technology 129 more generally, how the relation between the two has to be conceptualized. In a recent debate, Fores denied the scientific character of technology (modern or otherwise). He maintains that there is nothing identifiable which could be called technology; it is only Technik which is worth talking about. According to himJ 'it makes no more sense to ask an engineer to be J'scientific" than to ask a lawyer to "be seamanly" or a sailor to "act like , good cook" (Fores 1988: 7 1 ). In his view, engineering science is a 'myth'. However, this view is contrary to a long tradition of conceptualizing modern technology which I cannot represent adequately here for reasons of time and space. Suffice it to say that, from Ure, Babbage, and Marx onwards, technology's main characteristic was seen in the growing application of scientific findings. This does not mean that technology has to await some 'ordered' scientific results, or that technology is 'applied science'; rather it means that modern technology as such incorporates skills, knowledge, and experience, and thereby some-at least minimal-scientific knowledge .'o However, Fores is right to insist on the distinction between science and technology. In order to pursue this issue further, I now explore Marx's thought on this matter, confronting it with some contemporary analyses. Marx conceives the relationship between science and techno­ logy under capitalism in the following way: In machinery, the appropriation of living labour by capital achieves a direct reality in this respect as well: it is, firstly, the analysis and application of mechanical and chemical laws, ariSing directly out of science, which enables the machine to perform the same labour as that previously performed by the worker. IGrundrisse 703-4) In the follOWing statement in the Manuscripts 1861-3 he exag­ gerates the influence of science upon technology to some extent Science and technology It is a commonplace that the main facet of modern technology is the growing influence of science. Little agreement exists on whether science or technology has a prius over the other, or, 27 Charles Babbage also expressed such an anxiety-see Berg 1982: 1 1-12. 2H Dickens 1969, as cited in Berg 1982: 13. 29 To be sure, this is also the way in which mainstream Marxism presented its answer to the question of 'technical progress'. .10 Scheler ( 1 980), in an illuminating study, has claimed that it is logic, mathematics, and the practice of observing and measuring that form the driving forc;e for technical development (basic to both science and technology is the Mach£gedani<e, the will to power). Scheler thinks that Technik does not in the first place consist in constructing 'economically efficient' machines, but, follow­ ing its own logic, 'The basic value which guides the new technologies aims at constructing . . . all possible machines. First, this is carried out in thought and as a plan' (Scheler 1980: 125, my trans.). Only after that are two further selections made: one by the engineer, the other by the entrepreneur lcf. ibid. 127); see also Rapp 1978: 70. I come back to 'Scheler in s. 3.3. 130 Technology when he says that every scientific discovery serves as a base for a new technological invention: Every discovery becomes a basis for further invention or for new and better methods of production. Only the capitalist mode of production puts science at the service of the immediate process of production! while, on the other hand, the development of production provides the means for the theoretical subjugation of nature . . . Capital does not create science but exploits it, adapts it to the production process. Hand in hand with this goes the separation of science (science applied to production) from immediate labour. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2060) Marx's very concept of the machine would not work without the role of science. As he propounded at length in Capital, it was only with the emergence of machinery that science could be applied to the production process in an unprecedented way. Rosenberg observed: 'By breaking down the productive process into objectively identifiable component parts, it creates a struc­ ture of activities which is really amenable for rigorous analysis' IRosenberg 1976b: 133). Marx himself put it this way: The principle, carried out in the factory system, of analysing the process of production into its constituent parts, and of solving the problems thus proposed by the application of mechanics, of chemistry, and of the whole range of the natural sciences, becomes the determin­ ing principle everywhere. (Capital i. 434) This is a quite recent phenomenon. To be sure, science and capital have existed for centuries without giving rise to the above-described process of analYSing the production process and applying scientific knowledge to it. 'It is only at a very recent point in history, Marx argues, that the marriage of science and industry occurs. Moreover, this marriage does not coincide with the historical emergence of capitalism' IRosenberg 1976a: 130). In modern industry, technology is for the first time not designed in accordance with the physical endowments of the workers 'but in accordance with a completely different logic, a logic which explicitly incorporates principles of science and engin­ eering' libid. 132). But the mere growth of science is not a sufficient condition for the growth of productivity. Neither is it justified to think of technology as application of scientific knowledge. As Rosenberg put it, 'this perspective obscures a very elemental point: techno- Technology 131 logy i s itself a body of knowledge about certain classes of events and activities. It is not merely the application of knowledge brought from another sphere . . . It is . . . not a fundamental kind of knowledge, but rather a form of knowledge that has generated a certain rate of economic progress for thousands of years' IRosenberg 1982b: 143). Thus technology may develop on its own, without the guiding function of science. Marx was also aware of this when stressing the 'eigendynamics' of technology: Invention then becomes a bUSiness} and the application of science to direct production itself becomes a prospect which determines and solicits it. But this is not the road along which machinery, by and large, arose, and even less the road on which it progresses in detail. The road is rather dissection IAnalyseJ-through the division of labour, which gradually transforms the workers' operations into morc and more mechanical ones, so that at a certain point a mechanism can step into their places. IGrundr;sse 704, my emphasis)3 l It is doubtful if Marx would have agreed with attributing the following characteristics to a communist society: ITJhe normal situation in the past and to a considerable degree also in the present, is that technological knowledge has preceded scientific knowledge . . . Thus, it is to be expected that feasible technological knowledge is likely to be attained before the deeper level of scientific understanding. At least this is so if sufficiently powerful economic incentives are at work. IRosenberg 1982b: 144) Perrow, analysing high-risk systems, points out that poorly designed or poorly understood technological systems are likely to lead to accidents: Transformation processes exist in recombinant DNA teclmology, chem­ ical plants, nuclear power production, nuclear weapons, and some aspects of space missions. Most of these are quite new, but it is .�J See Hegel: 'In a case where factory work has been made so perfect and simple, a machine can work instead of a human being and this is the normal transition which now takes place inside the factories' (Hegel 1983b: 127, my trans.). Avineri comments: 'We thus have herel in one of the most speculative documents of German idealist philosophy, one of the most acute insights into the working of modern, industrial society: from a priori philosophical anthro­ pologYI Hegel moves on to incorporate the results of political economy into a philosophical system-an attempt almost identical in its systematic structure with Marx's program forty years later' (Avineri 1972: 94). 132 Technology significant that chemical processing is not. While experience has helped reduce accidents, accidents continue to plague transformation processes that are fifty years old . These are processes that can be described but not really understood. They were often discovered through trial and errOI, and what passes for understanding is really only a description of something that works. IPerrow 1984: 85) Marx, on the other hand, doubtless assumed an ever more explanatory and projective force of science when he wrote: But to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose 'powerful effectiveness' , . . depends rather on the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the application of this science to production . . . Agriculture, e.g., becomes merely the application of the science of material metabolism, its regulation for the greatest advantage of the entire body of society. IGnmdrisse 704-5) Equally optimistic was his trust in technological possibilities: 'Mirabeau's "Impossible I Ne me dites jamais ce hete de mot!" is particularly applicable to modern technology' (Capital i. 448). He speaks of an ever-increasing productivity of labour together 'with the uninterrupted advance of science and technology' (Capital i. 567). At this point in his theory, Marx seems to enlarge his theoretical scheme according to which man trans­ forms nature with the help of technology. Now the role of science becomes crucial. Here an intriguing question arises: how can we reconcile Marx's statement that technology develops relatively autonom­ ously, i.e. independently of science, on the one hand, with his statement, on the other hand, that science will to an ever greater extent determine the course of technology? Marx's theory offers two possibilities for such a synthesis. First, we can again apply the distinction between a historical and a critical approach, which in Marx's case is represented in the difference between an analysis which is 'backward-looking' and one which is 'forward-looking'. The second possibility is contained in his claim that human labour will be able to reappro­ priate all sorts of objectifications, including modem technology. It is true that a rural idyll is the reference point in the famous Technology 133 passage from the German Ideology (fishing and hunting); but in the same text, Marx also says that the highly developed productive forces of capitalism will be appropriated by the producers, which is the very precondition for the full development of the individuals (d. CWv 86-7 as cited in s. 3 . 1 . 1 ) . It is important to note that Marx's basic idea remains the same in this respect, what varies is only the stress he gives to different factors. For example, in the 'Speech at the Anniversary of the People's Paper' ( 1 856), he invokes new-fangled men who would masterthe new­ fangled machinery; in the Grundrisse he envisages a fully auto­ mated production process with man as mere guardian (see the passage cited below); in Capital he stresses that there will be varied work also under communism, which makes necessary an all-round development of individuals. But the basic idea of the rural model reappears: it is the explicit claim that any fixation of persons to one exclusive task has to be avoided; the all-round development of human capacities and needs is Marx's goal. Regarding the possibilities for the realization of that goal, Marx's argument is quite optimistic; according to him, it is based on real relations which exist in modern industry. Therefore, fully developed individuality is both the aim of communism and necessitated by capitalist technology. The rural idyll is replaced by a model where indiViduals, as it were, switch from one activity to another, but they do this on the basis of a scientific and artistic education (which will also generate new needs in them). This model is no Utopia but, according to Marx, inevitable, since modern technology requires it. A functional requirement of modern societies, therefore, leads to the birth of communist man, which is quite an extraordinary claim. To turn to the scientific dimension, it should be said that Marx analyses technology mainly in its historical development, including its rapid growth under capitalism. He describes this process as an evolutionary process. But it is one thing to state with hindsight a blind evolutionary process, another to state it for the future. And here, I suppose, not only could Marx not allow for such a possibility, no humanist position could. This is why Marx distinguished sharply between pre-history and history proper (d. 1859 Preface): the first is governed by blind evolution whereas the second is controlled and planned by human purposes. And this is the place where science becomes most important for . 134 Technology Marx. Science provides the means for a planned technology, for a planned Stoffwechsel between man and nature; and, what is more, science for Marx was not only a desideratum, but a real, unfolding I'before our eyes') force. Under the regime of science, the gap between explanation and evaluation, between blind evolution and conscious human control, between pre-history and history could be bridged .'2 For Marx it is an empirical fact that modern industry Icapitalism) already leads mankind to the threshold of history proper. Look at his bold outline in the Grundrisse where he sketches some breathtaking scenarios for a technologically advanced, communist society: Labour nO longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself . . . No longer does the worker insert a modified natural thing INaturgegenstandj as middle link between the object and himself; rather he inserts the process of nature/ transformed into an industrial process} as a means between himself and inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor thc time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature, and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body-it is, in a word, the develop� ment of the social individual which appe.rs as thc great faundatian­ stone of production and of wealth. (Grundrisse 705 J Marx's optimism with regard to the transparence of technological processes must be subjected to critical examination. It seems that it does not concord with the reality of modern technology, Perrow emphasized four dimensions of technological systems: linear/complex and loose/tight coupled. The point is that Marx excludes the complex dimension from his analysis when stressing that the production process gets 'dissected' into its component parts.· This suggests that every instrument in the production process serves only one purpose: the production process takes place step by step. However, examples from the chemical and .'S2 This general outline seems still to apply to present-day problems of industrial accidents. As Perrow has pointed out, it is due to the poor scientific understanding of existing technological systems that their working is some­ times dangerous. This view can be contrasted with the standard explanation which assumes perfect functioning of technology and simply blames the oper­ ators in case of an accident. Technology 135 electrical industries indicate that there is also a reverse tendency to observe: parts or components of technical systems are designed so as to fulfil more than one function (d. Perrow 1984). To return to the problem of science and technology in Marx. Above, I suggested that we can reconcile the autonomous devel­ opment of technology and the increasing influence of science in Marx's model with the distinction between historical and critical analysis. But apart from the exegetical task, we are still left with the crucial question: how do we distinguish science from tech­ nology and what does their relation look like? Rosenberg holds that science and technology are essentially two different things which have things in common, but are, in the first place, distinct from each other. The difference lies in the specific character of knowledge which is employed. In the case of science we have rules, laws, and procedures which can be written down and discussed by the academic profession. In the case of technology, the knowledge which is sometimes employed cannot be explained; technical solutions are found which demand scientific explanation. From this it follows that technology cannot simply be conceived as applied science. According to Rosenberg, the main bulk of inventions and technical-practical solutions were found long before a scientific explanation could account for them. 'It is still far from unusual for engineers in many industries to develop a successful solution to a problem for which there is no scientific explanation and for the engineering solution to generate the subsequent scientific research that eventually provides the explanation' (Rosenberg 1982b: 144; see also Marx: science depends on the development of trade and industry, d. CW v. 40).33 Price, in a similar vein, says that 'the naive picture of techno­ logy as applied science simply will not fit all the facts. Inventions do not hang like fruits on a scientific tree' (Price 1982: 169). ,B Heidegger made the same point when he wrote: 'It is said that modern technology is something incomparably different from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern physics as an exact science. Meanwhile we have come to understand more clearly that the reverse holds true as well: modern phYSiCS, as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus and upon progress in the bUilding of apparatus' (Heideggcr 1978: 295-6). One strand in the sociology of science takes up exactly this point in stressing the hermeneutic character of the natural sciences, see Bloor 1976; Barnes 1977; Mulkay 1979; Knorr-Cetina 1985. For a criticism, see Archer 1987. 136 Technology Instead, so he argues, 'most technological advances derive im­ mediately from those that precede them . . . old technology breeds new in just the same way as the scientific process' (Price 1982: 1 70). Such a characterization would presuppose that tech­ nology, like science, could be conceived as a social system (for further discussion see s. 3.3). Price bypasses this difficulty in assuming that old technology breeds new, just as old knowledge breeds new,34 and in endorsing an actor model in explaining the transfer of knowledge from science to technology. He sees the relationship between the two as an 'interaction' (which takes place between persons) since we know of many cases in which science has passed into technology and technology has made possible new science (ef. ibid. 1 7 1 ). But the prius is science since he notes a time-lag between scientific and technological advance. Price takes an image from Toynbee in order to illustrate the relation between the two. The image is of two dancers, dancing to the same music: it is 'impossible to tell who is leading, and who following' (ibid. 1 70). But, 'IrJather than supposing that an outsideforce affects both dancers, it seems more reasonable to think that their action · upon each other keeps them in step' (i bid. 1 7 1 ). Since the influence is reciprocal, we must assume a complete interaction (ibid.). However, there is a time-lag between scientific and technological advance which 'would seem to indicate that the dancers hold each other at arm's length instead of dancing cheek to cheek. To use the more precise language of the physicist, the relation between science and technology seems to be a weak rather than a strong interaction' (ibid. ). To explain the interaction, Price employs an actor model and stresses the important role of socialization of the respective actors (i.e. scientists and engineers): 'ITJhe medium of transmis­ sion is the person and the method is the fact of the formal or informal education' (ibid.). By this mechanism, Price explains the time-lag between the two disciplines: it is simply that both scientists and technologists, during their education, are subjected to some training in the ambient state of the respective other discipline. 'It follows then that men on the research fronts of 34 Cf. also: 'One can, I suppose, create technology to order, just by wishing it. But ordinarily one is severely constrained by the old technology's having or not having the capacity to breed a particular desired thing' (:price 1982: 170). r r r t Il r I f t I i I I 1 i ! K 1 , I I I I I I J , Technology 137 science and technology will be able to use each other's ambient knowledge. It seems too that this will generally be the ambient knowledge that is on the average about one generation of students old-perhaps ten years' (ibid.) ."5 How hard it is for science and technology to communicate has been convincingly stated by Price in the following way: In any case, what communication difficulty there is seems due to the fact that though the scientists want to write and the technologists want to read, the scientists arc writing for their colleagues in science, or sometimes for their imaginary archive; they are simply not writing the sort of material that the technologists want to read. This frustrates the technologists and makes them believe that somewhere in this pile of material, if only they could find it, there is the very valuable material they are looking for to make new products. (ibid. 173)3(> In summary, then, there seem to exist few if any channels of communication between science and technology.3? Rosenberg is aware of this, stressing the distinct character and development of the two. To stick to the picture, the dancers are still dancing together, but to different kinds of music. He emphasizes the central role which technology has always played in the history of mankind, thus clearly referring to Marx's concept of Stoff­ wechsel (ef. Rosenberg 1982a: 41). He concludes that technology as such can proceed without the guidance or assistance of science. 'Indeed, if the human race had been confined to tech­ nologies that were understood in a scientific sense, it would have passed from the scene long ago' ( Rosenberg 1982b: 143).38 Technology sets the agenda for scientific research, provides the empirical data without which the latter cannot start. Rosenberg straightforwardly reverses the common view that science is prior to technology: it is technology which 'influences scientific 35 Note that this explanation does not depend on an actor model; the same could be said for a systems approach: each system uses information from its environment, i.c. from other systems too. 36 Marx provides an example from hydraulics in the 18th century: 'Hydraulics and hydrotechnology have been enriched by the many discoveries of the 1 8th century with beneficial consequences for the miller's art which, however, followed theoretical progress only slowly (especially in Germany) . . . The theory of water wheels was difficult, therefore it was denigrated as an empty theory, the builders of the mills hardly considered it' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1924). 37 See Stichweh 1987: 473, for another example. .38 Cf. also his statement that science and technology represent two different forms of knowledge. See Rosenberg 1982a: 143, as cited above. 138 Technology activity in numerous and pervasive ways' IRosenberg 1982b: 142). In tills conception, technology provides empirical data for science just as nature does. To be sure, both science and technology have to do with man's Stoffwechsel with nature; whereas technology is practical-empirical transformation of physical objects, I shall define science as one form of social communication about this process.39 Science uses the empirical data provided by nature and technology as information on which it builds its own system Isee s. 3.3. for further elaboration). How can we relate Marx's findings about modern industry to this distinction? Marx emphasizes the important role of science in the modern capitalist production process. Machinery is for him the bodily expression of the abstract principles of science. This is not to say, however, that machinery is the mere applica­ tion of scientific knowledge nor to say that science comes before technology. What Marx stresses is the fact that in modern industry scientific know ledge could be applied for the first time in a systematic way and on a large level, and that modern industry gave rise to the expansion and importance of scientific research. Yet, what is more, Marx's stress on the important role played by science is crucial for his communist perspective. Recall the distinction of naturej and nature2 from Chapter 2. It is only under the condition of transforming naturej into nature2 and understanding this transformation that mankind liberates itself from alien powers. We must thus regard Marx's position as a position which privileges the scientific over the technological dimension, for only a second nature which is understood provides the basis for communist society. It is quite obvious that techno­ logies which are just technical installations and happen to work cannot provide the technological basis for communist society. They cannot provide this baSiS, especially under modern con­ ditions where technologies may affect large parts of the globe and its populations in a detrimental way over a long period of time. In summary, then, we might say that science and technology are different fields of human activity which are quite distinct as regards their basic characteristics. But they also influence each other, constituting a relationship which is vital for modern .1',' Also Marx in the Gnmdrisse distinguishes a material and a mental dimen­ sion of the Stoffwechsel, see Grundrisse 1 6 1 . Technology 139 industry Isee s.3.3 for other interrelations). To be sure, technology is not 'applied science', but it is true that some scientific findings get embodied in technical apparatus. 3.1.6. Wha t is wrong with machinery! Machinery represents a form of constant capital and therefore a social relation but it also represents an embodiment of human control over nature, that is, it is also a material means to provide society with the possibility of transforming nature. The well­ known part of Marx's theory, and the one which became histor­ ically relevant, has it that technology as such is a neutral means by the help of which mankind progresses towards communism. The specific social form of technology in capitalism li.e. as fixed capital) is the barrier to a full liberation of technology'S potential. It is the peel which has to be stripped off by proletarian revolution. This model is defective for all the reasons we know today and Marx would no longer deserve any attention if he had no more to offer. In effect, he has more to offer, and this leads us to some very interesting ambiguities in his theoretical framework. In this section I briefly point out that the distinction between technology as social form and technology as material artefact was known by Marx and that he, in the years when he was preparing Das Kapital for publication, was not clear how to treat it. In the writings from these years we witness how he analyses machine technology not only in terms of social form but also in terms of material artefact. He discovers that: 1 . machinery not ony dispossesses the worker of the surplus­ value produced by him but also deprives him of his skill and virtuosity. This is a worrying discovery for an author who also holds the following two important views: 2. an ideal of human self-realization which calls for the full development of man's species powers; and 3 . an evolutionary view of historical and technological devel­ opment, with the important claim that every existing form emerges out of a pre-existing form by way of differentiation. If we take these two views together with the discovery that machine technology is deskilling and dehumanizing, Marx is 140 Technology Technology left with the uncomfortable result that machinery as such is alienating. The project of communism must then rely upon the contingent occurrence of a new, liberating technology. Since this standpoint was clearly unacceptable to Marx, he took another way out of the dilemma. He put all guilt on the capitalist social form and not on the material substratum of machinery. . Therefore, I la) only capitalist machinery is alienating and depriving workers. This solution does not come as a surprise from an author who, writing in the nineteenth century, saw all evils of society rooted in capitalism. The political aim was the overthrow of the bourgeoiSie, an event which should pave the way to a socicty without domination, exploitation, and alienation. Experience of both 'real socialism' and global ecological problems tells us that Marx's solution to the dilemma is defective. The re-evaluation of this question can lead to quite dramatic consequences, not only for true Marxist believers but also for anyone whose interest is linked to human emancipation. Roughly speaking, the consequences would amount to the following: 4. Given that technology has the traits described by Marx, alienation has to be considered part of the modern human condition. Emancipation depends on the incidental emer­ gence of new, liberating technologies; 5. Given that technology not only cripples and deprives the workers but also degrades the natural environment, ecolo­ gical problems do not follow from the capitalist use but from the inner logic of technology as such. Contemporary theorists either drop premiss 12) and claim that mankind has to survive and forget about Enlightenment ideals, or they proclaim 15) and conclude that industrial production has to be abolished where possible. However, these solutions have as littlc foundation as Marx's own. Therefore, let us explore the possibility of consistently holding together views 1 1 ), 12), 13), avoiding conclusions I l a), 14), and 15). This solution would be easy if one could point to real existing technologies which promote human self-realization and do not disrupt the environment. Since this is hardly the usual case, in general the solution depends upon the possibility that modern complex 141 societies can direct technological development. If they could do so, they would come closer to the ideal of communist society, namely being able to control their fate consciously. The political focus thus switches from the objective of proletarian revolution to the problems of 'intersystemic planning' Isee s.4.2 for further development and literature) . 3. 1 . 7. Progress? One could distinguish several criteria for measuring progress. There are economic criteria, regarding productivity or per capita income. Productivity is usually defined as the relation between costs and benefits, between investments and pay-offs. Higher productivity thus means to achieve the same output with less investment, or, which is the same, to achieve more output with the same amount of investment.4o Another criterion would be one which is purely immanent to technology and which judges technological features like reliability, speed, longevity, energy input, etc. Still another criterion would be spiritual in that it asks if people are freer or happier in comparison to former states in history. The latter two criteria seem to cause difficulties. For how can we distinguish different levels or stages of evolution in the technological or ethical realm? And, more penetratingly, is progress involved in this development? With Weick we could say again: all depends on which criteria we want to use. There are no absolute standards regarding technical criteria: they are all dependent on a social-cultural-economic context. A technology which comes later in time need not be 'superior' to a previous technology Isee Rammert 1988). Let us, therefore, look for a moment at spiritual criteria in judging progress. In a very stimulating book on Goethe'S Faust, Binswanger 11985) pointed out that along with modern economic growth, mankind witnessed two major losses: beauty and Itech­ nical and economic) security.4l If we now contrast the purely 40 Marx is not precise when he writes that 'the growth of the productive forces of labour means merely that less direct labour is required in order to make a larger product' {Grundrisse 831, see also MEGA II. iii. 6. 2 1 44, as cited below}, since it is sufficient that the same product is produced with less labour. 4 1 Binswanger distinguishes the latter again into 'risk' and 'worry' (Sorge), see Binswanger 1985: 65-70. 142 Technology economic and technical criteria with the spiritual criteria, we can conclude that the overall development need not establish an unequivocal progress. Marx's criteria, in fact, were not only economic and te.chnical, but also spirituaL42 For Marx, real wealth is not only, or primarily, expressed in value or material goods, but in total individuals. Neither does Marx neglect the physical aspect of material production. Again, unlike the eco­ nomists, he does take into account qualitative criteria (as when he praises the ancient world for caring most about the quality of the products), he does stress the need to transform nature with respect to the well-being of individuals. Both points make clear that the charge against standard economics of neglecting the natural environment cannot be made against Marx. It is common in interpretation to neglect the latter element in Marx. Thus, the following critique by Luhmann is misconceived. He 'charges Marx (and Durkheim) with employing an 'evolu­ tionist' position, since they used the notion of 'division of labour': 'This theoretical approach [division of labour] makes a conception of historical progress (including Marx and Durkheim) inevitable' (Luhmann 1984b: 320, my translation). Ironically, Luhmann's charge backfires: with the same legitimation we could charge him with being committed to a strong notion of progress because he employs the concepts of 'functional differ­ entiation' and 'increase in complexity'. Similarly, one could charge him with claiming that the more complexity we have in society, the more progress exists. As Luhmann himself says, evolutionary processes are developments which display some succession of order to an observer. This means that it is the observer's criteria of order which are crucial here. The evaluation of this process is equally observer-dependent. If, for example, an observer labels an evolutionary process as 'progress', he has to show the criteria for doing so. Darwinian theory is not usually 42 Cohen, for example, stresses only the economic criteria when he writes: 'The United States can produce, much more abundantly per head, everything the medievals could produce, and more besides, with the exception of certain products perhaps wholly beyond its reach, such as, say, stained glass of the kind found all Notre Dame Cathedral . . . The concept of need is not easy to handle, but it would be hard to maintain that the unavailability of JUSt that kind of stained glass generates an overwhelming frustration' (Cohen 1978: 60). But these are issues at stake when we discuss the ,question of progress-in this case, a loss of beauty. Technology 143 committed to any notion of progress whereas Marxist social theory definitely is. However, Marx did present his normative assumptions. In the Manuscripts 1861 �3, Marx takes sides with Ricardo against Sismondi, defending the former's appraisal of 'production for the sake of production': Ricardo conceives, rightly for his time, of the capitalist mode of production as the most advantageous for the production of wealth. He wants production for the sake of production and this is right. Were one to claim} as sentimental opponents of Ricardo havc done} that production as such is not the purpose, one forgets that production for the sake of production means nothing morc than development of human productive capacities} i.e. development of the wealth of human nature as an end in itself. (MEGA II. iii. 3. 768) Marx praises Ricardo's scientific honesty; nevertheless, Marx distinguishes himself also in this respeet from Ricardo. Consider the following quote from the same page of the MEGA: Ricardo's disregard was not only scientifically honest but a scientific imperative for his viewpoint. For this reason he is completely indifferent to the question of whether the development of the productive forces kills landed property or workers. If this progress depreciates capital of the industrial bourgeoisie} he also welcomes it . . . Who cares} says Ricardo: The productivity of human labour has been doubled. (MEGA 4 II. iii. 3. 768) 3 But Marx does not say 'who cares?' when workers are crushed in the factories. Rather, his analyses were 'fired by outrage and indignation and the burning desire for a better world' (Lukes 1985: 3). Neither does Marx content himself with an increase in material wealth since this wealth assumes antagonistic forms vis-a-vis the producers. Material wealth here leads to a domina­ tion of things over persons, since the creation of use-values in capitalism is achieved at the expense of the individuals. Special­ ization and dehumanization are the main means of achieving it (cf. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2164-51. 4 " But d. Marx's judgement of Malthus on the preceeding page, MEGA I I . iii. 3. 767. 144 Technology 3.2. Evolutionary approaches to technology in economic theory A recent strand in cconomic theory, cspecially Neo-Schum­ peterian economics, conceives technology in an evolutionary way. In the following section, I shall therefore discuss an evolu­ tionary approach to technology and, only after that, several objections to it. The criticisms can be divided into three main strands. The first criticism sees the danger of technological determinism when endorsing an evolutionary approach to tech­ nology. The second criticism doubts whether the analogy to Darwinism is legitimate or even feasible. The third criticism doubts whether the distinction between systcm and environ­ ment can be made and asks how the system itself has to be conceptualized. The remainder of this section, and sections 3.3 and 3.4, deal with these problems. 3.2. 1 . The behavioural theory of the firm Criticizing neo-c1assical economics, Nelson et al. claimed that existing technologies were not chosen because they were indic­ ated by markct signals or followed from the rational decision of a firm in order to maximize its profits. On the contrary, so they argued, the technology of a firm is the outcome of a routine; firms do not choose technologies, but have them. In their words: Our principal break with neoclassical tradition lies in our 'behavioral' treatment of the question: why is the firm at any time using the technique it is using? A neoclassical answer would be that the firm has chosen its technique on the basis of profitability calculations comparing the elements of a large choice set (production function). A behavioralist's answer, and the one employed in our model, is of a very different form. The production technique used by a firm at any time is regarded as a complex pattern of routinized behavior, of which the input-output coefficients arc a quantifiable aspect. The firm is not seen, at any time, 'choosing' its technique from a large choice set, but rather as 'having' its technique. (Nelson et a!. 1976: 94) The point Nelson et 01. are making here is that they reject the idea that technologies are simply chosen because of their profit­ ability. Rather, firms are developing rules and meta-rules for the Technology 145 development and selection of technologies. This 'evolutionary' approach to technology has been a very influential one in the recent debate among economists, economic historians, and also among sociologists. The approach contains, however, several points which proved to be problematic for scholars working on the basis of it. They focused mainly on the question whether technology has 'inner logic' or 'trajectory'. This set of questions is closely related to the methodological question of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Dosi, building upon the evolutionary approach of Nelson et al., made the explicit analogy to Darwinian theory. Although he does not develop a full analogy to Darwinian theory, we can conclude that Dosi equates speCific technologies with 'species', and the environment with economy and society (see Dosi 1984: 20). Now, Dosi holds that the environment does not only select among mutations, but is also selecting the direction of mutations. (Tlhe economic and social environment affects technological develop­ ment in two ways, first selecting the 'direction of mutation' (i.e. selecting the technological paradigm) and then selecting among muta­ tions, in a more Darwinian fashion (i.e. the ex-post selection among Schumpeterian trials and errors). libid.) But what exactly does the environment constitute? Dosi stresses three factors: the economy, politics, and institutions. Since there are many possible technologies which could be chosen, it is 'hardly possible to compare and rank them ex ante' (ibid. 18). This is witnessed by the 'role often played in the establishment of a particular technological trajectory by public ("political") forces' libid.). As examples, Dosi mentions the military and space programmes in the US and the synthetic chemistry in Germany which emerged in the post-Bismarck period out of that country's drive towards self-sufficiency 44 'Bridging insti­ tutions' between 'pure' science and applied R & D are also of great importance here. But these three environmental factors do 44 Cf. Dosi 1984: 18. Comparing the role of poliCies with respect to auto­ motive and aircraft technology, another author states: 'In one important respect the development of commercial aircraft and aircraft engines was different from the development of automotive technology. In the case of the automobile the government played no significant role. But government support for the develop­ ment of military aircraft and aircraft engines generated technology applicable to commercial aircraft' (Klein 1977: 109). 146 Technology Technology not shape a technological trajectory: technology is still under­ determined. As Dosi observes, 'competition does not only occur between the "new" technology and the "old" ones which it tends to substitute, but also among alternative "new" technological approaches' IDosi 1984: 1 9 ). As I shall propose later, the envir­ onmental factors economy, politics, and science can be viewed . as systems themselves. Technology in this conception is seen as an emergent phenomenon which arises out of the interacting of these three systems. Dosi comes close to a similar statement when he writes that the 'emergence of radically new techno­ logical paradigms . . . stems from the complex interplay . . . between advances in science, institutional factors and economic mechanisms' libid. 292). These remarks, however, indicate that technology cannot be shown to have a real autonomy, to be a real unity which evolves. Rather, it has to be conceptualized as having an apparent autonomy but essentially dependent on social factors. Dosi uses not only the analogy to biology in explaining technological trajectories but also an analogy to the philosophy of science, especially to Kuhn's concept of 'paradigms'. This was already hinted at with Nelson et a1. 's approach when they alluded to Kuhn's aper9u 'You can't beat something with nothing', which means that a new scientific paradigm must be able to replace the old one: it is not sufficient to prove the flaws of an established paradigm, if there is no conception which could take its place. Dosi applies this line of thought to technology itself. In broad analogy with the Kuhnian definition of a 'scientific paradigm', we shall define a 'technological paradigm' as a 'model l and a 'pattern' of solution of selected technological problems, based on selected principlcs derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies . . . We will define a technological trajectory as the pattern of 'normal' problem-solving activity li.e. of 'progress') on the grounds of a techno­ logical paradigm. libid. 14-15) Dosi offers us a criterion of progress which is immanent to technology itself: problem-solving activities arise within a given technological paradigm and around 'focusing devices'. If they , succeed, this could be an instance of 'progress 45 But what if we 45 However, the difference between progress and problem-solving activities should be kept in mind. If problem-solving activities succeed, there may be 147 compare different technological trajectories? In this case, the answer seems not very clear at all; not even evolutionary theory has a ready-made solution to it:" As we shall see, Marx distin­ guishes in a more general manner between different I'epochal') technologies I'technological trajectories'). According to him, there are three big historical forms: ( 1 ) artisan, 12) manufacture, and 13) machines. Each one stands for a specific historical epoch, it is the material base for every social organization Id. Capital i. 352 n.). For Marx, the transition from I I ) to (2) and from (2) to 13) was paralleled by an increase in productivity, and, to a certain degree, by 'progress'. His notion of progress, however, is neither purely economic nor purely technological; it also contains an ethical eomponent.47 3.3. Technology as a social system? At this point it may be useful to state again my own position with respect to technology. In my view, technology is a social­ material entity which can be conceived in an evolutionary manner. However, it should not be conceptualized as a social system. Consider, first, two important distinctions which we encountered above. One is the distinction between science and technology, the other is the distinction between system and environment. I shall claim that science:" but not tech­ nology, can be conceived as a social system. The difference can be described as follows: the first is a homogeneous, well­ defined field in which actions or communications are the basic units and in which meaning is transmitted; the second is a progress in the short run or on the micro-level; from an observer's viewpoint, and/or from the historian's viewpoint, this need not be true. Moreover, it is not said that this 'progress' is a linear, directional process. It could also be a development on a circular, or any other, line. ct. Rimbaud ( 1 970: 12): 'Science, the new nobility! Progress. The world walks on! Why doesn't it turn around?' {my tr�ns.). 46 See again Darwin's refusal to equate evolution with progress, Gould 1973: 36. 47 Cf. Marx's judgement of Ricardo, above. Sec ch. 4 for further discussion. 41> And not only science, as we shall see later. J 48 Technology Technology 149 heterogeneous field which has to do primarily with the physical reordering of the world 49 Renate Mayntz emphasized the difference between social systems and socio-technical systems. According to her, techno­ logical systems cannot be analysed as functional subsystems of society because the components of technological systems are not (only) social.so Instead, goes her claim, in analysing socio­ technical systems, one should leave the ground of the theory of social differentiation and conceive technological systems (such as large infrastructural technologies) as socio-technical systems (Mayntz 1988: 236). This approach rightly proposes that techno­ logy cannot be conceived as a social system. However, the conclusion which is drawn does not accommodate the abstract level on which my discussion is here located. Mayntz aims at a theoretical framework which illuminates empirical studies of specific technological infrastructure systems; my analysis tries to investigate relations between technological and social factors per se. Several authors have emphasized the similarities between science and technology. One similarity is that both employ a method of decomposing (analysing) and recombining (see Price 1982). While this is obViously true, there is also a big difference. Consider the cases of a scientist and an engineer. The engineer will apply the scientific knowledge which he has learnt (his 'ambient knowledge' in the language of Price); but when it comes to the point where he has to solve a practical problem, he does not proceed in an essentially scientific way. It is not that intuition plays a greater role here than in science; rather, it is the fact that engineers can rest content with solutions they find without asking for the exact scientific explanation. Both sci­ entific and technological activities are problem-solving, decom­ posing and recombining, but the engineer is concerned with a practical, workable solution whereas the scientist is looking for explanations on the level of his academic discipline. In the words of Price, science produces papers, technology machines, drugs, products of any sort (see Price 1982: 1 70). Consider now the distinction between system and environ­ ment. Technology stands in a close relationship not only to science, but also to economy and politics Sl Technology should be seen as part of the material world which has already been trans­ formed by social labour into tools, instruments, machines s2 Technology contains a material and a social element, matter and mind. In Marx's formulation: 'Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electrie telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified' (Grundrisse 706). Scheler stressed that in modern societies science and economy are both autonomous social spheres: capitalist economy is driven towards limitless 'process of acquisition versus gaining and keeping of property' (Scheler 1980: 129; my translation). like­ wise, science is expanding in a similar unlimited way: 'Modern science neither administrates a given and stable asset of truth nor researches only to solve specifically defined tasks, but it is primarily a will to "methods" from which . . . emerges in a limit­ less way and unlimited process ever new substantive knowledge . . . almost automatically' (ibid., my translation). For my subject, a third social subsystem is relevant. This is politics. There have been some doubts whether politics deserves a special treatment within the social sciences. John Stuart Mill argued that there can be no such special science, since '[tlhose phenomena . . . with which the influences of the ethological state of the people are mixed up at every step (so that the connexion of effects and causes cannot be even rudely marked out without taking those influences into conSideration) could not with any advantage . . . be treated independently of political 49 To avoid a possible misunderstanding: in denying the status of a social system to technology, one docs not deny the decisive role of technology in modern societies. 50 Or, in Habermas's earlier definition: '[Wle shall understand "technology" to mean Scientifically rationalized control of objectified processes. It refers to the system in which research and technology arc coupled with feedback from the economy and administration' (Habermas 1971b: 57). 51 See Scheler 1980 for a model of a triple selection made by the scientist, the engineer, and the entrepreneur to which I want to add the political clement. The scientist wants to construct all possible machines, the engineer all workable machines, the entrepreneur all profitable machines, and the politician all machines which enhance power and legitimation. 52 Marx presupposes Nawrstoff which is transformed with the help of tech­ nology which is already transformed Naturstoff, see MEW iii. 45. 150 Technology ethology' (Mill 1 9 74: 906). This argument that polities cannot be studied separately since it is mixed up with the national character at every step is not very convincing, because the argument is not particular to politics-the same can apply to economics, too, for example: there are undoubtedly certain nationalities who can be said to have a greater business spirit than others. In contrast to Mill, Max Weber holds that modern politics in fact forms a separate field of human action which can be studied accordingly. In 'Politik als Beruf', Weber, similarly to Scheler, starts from an analogy to the economy as studied by Karl Marx. Both emphasize the analogy, but also that the respec­ tive fields are following unique laws of their own.53 Above, we saw how Scheler defined the specific function of science in modern societies. Now, how does Weber define politics? Accord­ ing to him, 'engage in polities' means nothing else than 'seek to influence the distribution of power within and between political structures' (Weber 1948: 83). How is this political realm defined? Weber describes it in similar terms to the functioning of a capitalist enterprise: [T]he modern state controls the total means of political organization, which actually come together under a single head. No single official personally owns the money he pays out, or the buildings} stores, tools, and war machines he controls. In the contemporary 'state' -and this is essential for the concept state-the 'separation' of the administrative staff, of the administrative officials, and of the workers from the material means of administrative organization is completed. libido 82) Although sketched very roughly, these systemic distinctions are the ground on which later versions of social theory could find a point of departure for their functional and systemic approaches. In what follows, I shall take Luhmann'S theory as a major reference point when discussing the differentiation of society into subsystems, and the interrelations between them. In his theory, polities is that funetional subsystem of modern society in which collectively binding deeisions are taken (see Luhmann 1988d: 29-30). -",{ "".'eber says: 'The direction of capitalist enterprises, despite far-reaching . , dlfferent analogies, follows quite laws than those of political administration' (Weber 1948: 821. Technology 151 As w e shall see in a moment, the most convincing solution to the problem of distinguishing system and environment is to attribute everything which is not part of the system to the environment. Thus each of these systems conceives all other systems and the environment (such as technology and natural resources) as its environment. Note that economy, politics, or science have to take into consideration the characteristics of existing technology. This may influence the systemic behaviour in many ways. Consider: politics is eonfronted with dangerous technologies as a problem of legitimation; economy is keen on certain most profitable technologies; scientific research is de­ pendent on technological apparatus and research funds. Usually the production of technology itself is conceived of as an economic activity, that is, firms are concerned with the construction of new technologies. Economic activity is seen as including technological activities, or, to put it the other way round, technology is a speeial case of economic activity. 54 Although this is a rather crude and narrow version of the social dimension of technology, it may serve the purpose. of illustrating a 'technological trajectory'. A reason for such a 'technological trajectory' is the role of fixed capital. As Hughes put it, The durability of artifacts and of knowledge in a system suggests the notion of trajectory, a physical metaphor similar to momentum. Modern capital-intensive systems possess a multitude of durable phys' ical artifacts. Laying off workers in labour�intensive systems reduces momentum, but capital-intensive systems cannot lay off capital and interest payments on machinery and processes. Durable physical arti­ facts project into the future the socially constructed characteristics acquired in the past when they were designed. IHughes 1987: 77) Consider now the enlarged view: here we have scientific, eco­ nomic, and political factors shaping technology. Additionally, a new technology must be a technology which fulfils certain standards of engineering. A new technology thus has to be in accordance with politics, science, economics, and engineering. Apart from the fact that technology is durable, the development of new technologies takes time; we therefore have a certain inertia of technological development. It is unlikely that all the 54 As Max Adler ( 1 964: 32, my trans.) PUt it: 'Economy and technology are by no means two distinguished factors which could act upon each other. They are but two sides of one process, and this is the social life- and working-process . I p 152 Technology time technologically revolutionary 'shocks' occur. Quite on the contrary, it is likely that a process of diffusion and saturation occurs,55 Piore and Sabel try to explain both technological trajectories and historical turning-points. Their 'possible worlds approach,56 may be seen as akin to the 'social construction of technology' approach when they stress that there is no 'absolute best tech­ nology': 'Thus although the winning design had to meet some minimum performance standard, the sweep of its success was not a proof of unrivaled technical superiority, nor of the existence of a narrow track of progress : other variants could have served as well. Power in the market, not efficiency lin the sense of a uniquely appropriate application of technology) decided the contest' (Piore and Sabel 1984: 40). Once a breakthrough has been made, many competitors choose to follow a proven approach 'rather than risk failing to find one more suited to their needs' (ibid.). From this the authors conclude that 'in the world of possible worlds, relatively short periods of technological diver­ sification punctuate longer periods of uniformity. The technical knowledge that is accumulated during the interludes of diversity creates the possibility of divergent breakthroughs: branching points. At these technological diVides, the different political circumstances in diffcrent regional or national economies move technology down correspondingly different paths' (ibid. 39). Thus they suggest the metaphor of a branching tree instead of classical Political Economy's 'narrOw track' when considering the history of technology. If we now confront Marx with the results of this section, two things require comment. I . At first sight it seems that Marx was a follower of classical Political Economy's 'narrow track' rather than a proponent of the possible worlds theory, as when he presents the development up to the machine as a logical development, one which follows an inner logic. This is c1earl y expressed in the passage from the Poverty of Philosophy where he sketches the various stages of 55 Economists call this 'absorbing Markov processes', I shall return in ch. 4 to the problem of 'stasis', 56 This approach has been developed by Stalnaker and Lewis (and before them, o� co�rse} by Leibniz). For a good discussion of the theory with respect to economlC hIstory, sec Elster 1978. See also the critical remarks by Lukes ( 1 980). Technology 153 development from tools to the machine. (See CW vi. 186-7; quoted above, p. 1 10). But at the same time Marx is aware that the history of technology has not yet got the attention it deserves. In Capital, he suggests a historical investigation into technology which would proceed by analogy to Darwin's investigation of natural history (see Capital i. 352). However, an evolutionary view of technology, especially if based on Darwin's method, will leave no room for any teleological explanations S? Now what about the 'inner logic' of specific technologies? I think that such an 'inner logic' and an evolutionary view of technology may be compatible. With respect to biological evolution one can say that although it is a non-teleologieal process, it can never­ theless be interpreted as if it were a teleological process (ef. Habermas 1976a: 1 8 7; one could call it 'teleonomic'j. If we apply this argument to technology, we might say the same: although the development of technology is a non-teleological process, we can look at it with hindsight and try to find the mechanisms which stabilized such improbable constellations. Looking at the history of technology, we as observers impose some preconceptions about order, 'and this preconception then allows the observer to watch the changing instances, compare them, and see whether there is a progression toward orderliness in those portions being observed. If there is, evolution has occurred' (Weick 1979: 1 19). 2. It seems clear that Marx is aware of both economy and science as interacting factors. However, he overestimated the SCience-technology interaction, in comparison to political influ­ ences upon technology. The latter seem to have only an indirect influence, via laws which are the result of class conflicts. 58 With respect to communist society, he stressed the important role of science and economy, too. The necessity of scientific under­ standing has already been indicated; the importance of economic criteria is expressed clearly in Capital iii: IAlfter thc abolition of the capitalist mode of production, but still retaining social production, the determination of value continues to prevail in the' sense that the regulation of labour-time and the distribution of social labour among the various production groups, ultimately the :;7 Marx is aware of this, see the already cited letterto Lassallc, 1 6 Jan. 1861. He stressed that the law which shortened the working day enhanced the development of technology. See Capital L $ 1> 1 54 Technology book-keeping encompassing all this, become more essential than ever. (Capital iii. 85 1 ; see also Capital ii. 137_8)59 Here science is in a close relationship with cconomy, but at the same time has a certain autonomy. The economy tries to utilize, and evcn direct, scientific knowledge; but sciencc is not merely demand-induced. Science must have developed before, and independently from, captialism I Capital i. 434, 567; see also Rosenberg 1976b: 135-6). 3.3. 1 . Criticisms: system and environment In contrast to the above-mentioned model of a 'technological trajectory', several authors have developed a different approach. Pinch and Bijker 1 1987) speak of a 'multidirectional development of technology'; Calion 1 1987) assumes an 'actor-network' which contains animate and non-animate components; Law 1 1 98 7), in a similar vein, coins the notion of 'heterogeneous engineering'; van den Belt and Rip 1 1 987) assume a 'nexus' between techno­ logical trajectory and the selection environment Iwhich they see embodied in patent law in an exemplary way). All these concepts try to avoid what the authors think to be an inherent difficulty of evolutionary theory: the distinction between system and environment 60 As Calion rightly states: 'The systems concept presupposes that a distinction can be made between the system itself and its environment' ICallon 1987: 100).61 But 'how do we define the limits of a system and explain concretely the influence of the environment?' libid.). The main difference from Darwinian systems is seen in the fact that in the case of technology the selecting criteria are not just given, but socially shaped. Van den Belt and Rip make this point following Elster 1 1984: 6): 'In biological evolution, although mutations are random, the selection process is deterministic; that is there are "well 59 60 Recall Weber 1978: 103 as cited in s. 1.3. From this basic assumption follow the different attempts to resolve the problem: whether 'nexus', 'actor-network', or 'heterogeneous engineering', all try to dissolve the boundaries between system and environment. 61 The theoretical problems which the authors pose themselves thus arise from a misconception of technology: only if one tries to define technology as a social system does the difficulty of distinguishing system and environment arise. Yet another consequence follows from some of their approaches: those who think that technology cannot be regarded as a social system seem to reject systems theory tout court (Mayntz is an exception in this respect). Technology ISS defined criteria for accepting or rejecting any given mutation." IElster). In societal evolution involving technological develop­ ment, even the selection process is far from deterministic: Intentions and expectations play a role' Ivan den Belt and Rip 1987: 140- 1 ) . In other words: actors try to change the actions of others and thereby change their environments. 'Thus the assumption of a selection environment that is truly independent of a particular technological trajectory is hard to justify' (ibid.). Against this argument three points cau be made:62 First, if we take into account unintended consequences of human action, we cannot assume strategic action to be always successful Isee Douglas 1986). In this case we again get blind events, which can be studied from an observer's standpoint with the help of evolutionary models. Second, there are inherently technical factors which determine a special course of development in some cases. We can illustrate this point again with an example from biology. As Gould has pointed out, 'Galileo argued that the bone of a large animal must thicken disproportionally to provide the same relative strength as the slender bone of a small creature . . . This simple principle of differential scaling with increasing size may well be the most important determinant of organic shape. J. B. S. Haldane once wrote that "comparative anatomy is largely the story of the struggle to increase surface in proportion to volume". Yet its generality extends beyond life, for the geometry of space contains ships, buildings, and machines, as well as animals' IGould 1973: 1 73-5). Gould then presents medieval churches as a testing ground for the effects of size and shape. There are inherent barriers for the size of a church, because the area of outer walls and windows would increase as length cubed. In other words, the area of the windows would increase far more slowly than the volume that requires illumination . . . Large organisms, like 62 As I pointed out in s. 3 . 1 .2, there is an important difference between biological evolution on the one hand and social and technological evolution on the other. This difference lies in the different speed of development and the higher capacity of the social field to recombine its elements in innumerable ways. Evolution of biological species is a relatively slow process which leads to specialization of natural characteristics. Evolution of social forms and of tech­ nologies is a relatively fast process of differentiation and recombination of elements. The last aspect thus deserves our special attention (see Luhmann 1984a: 569; Tiezzi 1984; and see ch. 5). 156 Technology large churches, have very few options open to them. Above a certain size, large terrestrial animals look basically alike-they have thick legs and relatively short, stout bodies. Large medieval churches are relatively long and have abundant outpunchings, The 'invention' of internal organs allowed animals to retain the highly succcssful shape of a simple exterior enclosing a large internal volumcj the invention of intcrnal lighting and structural steel has permitted modern architects to design large buildings of essentially cubic form. The limits are expanded, but the laws still operate. (Gould 1973: 175-7)63 This may be an illuminating illustration when discussing the question of technological autonomy or technological trajectories. A small car probably cannot be a large car writ small; neither can the opposite obtain. In ignoring this, the Ford motor company had to suffer an unpleasant experience: The troubles that the Ford Motor Car Company had in the 1930s producing a compact car suggest that some of their problems resulted from the fact that they presumed small cars are made the same way as large cars: take a big car and shrink it. Since Ford knew how to make large cars, they thought there was no problem. (Weick 1979: 6) But even if technology develops in accordance with the laws of size and shape, it eventually arrives at a halting point. To advance technology, new technological solutions must be avail­ able. On such a reading, one can derive a dynamic model of technical change in which periods of simple extension alternate with periods of technical revolution. The first phase is charac­ terized by extending existing technical principles Isuch as: bigger, smaller, faster, slower, lighter, heavier, more silent, more powerful, etc., see Rammert 1988). The second phase is characterized by a technical invention which helps to overcome a restriction, an obstacle to further development. There are several theoretical formulations of this problem, such as Hughes's 'reverse salients', or Rosenberg's 'bottlenecks'. Furthermore, there seems to exist an equivalent on the economic level in the law of diminishing returns I Grenznutzen) or in absorbing Markov processes: in these cases a point of saturation is reached, beyond which no further investment is optimal. 6,� As a schoolboy, I was always struck by the example that there are limits in length for a rope which is hanging freely. At a certain length it will ineVitably break, because it cannot bear its own weight. Technology 157 Third, all the approaches discussed above have one basic flaw in common: it is their anthropomorphic model of social action and evolution. Only by placing human action I'individuals') in the centre of analysis do they arrive at their conclusions. MacKenzie most clearly expresses this Imistaken) view when he writes: '[Alctars create and maintain systems, and if they fail to do so, the systems in question cease to exist' IMacKenzie 1987: 197). And Hughes, on whom MacKenzie builds his argu­ ment, takes the same view in stressing the actor-dependent characteristics of technological systems: 'Because they are in­ vented and developed by system builders and their associates, the components of technological systems are socially constructed artifacts' IHughes 1987: 52). For this reason, 'the convention of designating social factors as the environment, or context, of a technological system should be avoided' libid.). But what if we reverse the two? Could we not imagine technology as part of the environment of social systems? I think this is the solution to the problem which, however, the authors under discussion here cannot allow for. Instead of treating technology as the environ­ ment of social systems, the heroic actions of individual 'system builders' must fulfil the theoretical blank in the analysis of technology. Before going into greater detail on the question of evolution and systems theory Ich. 41, I shall keep attention for the remainder of this chapter on Marx's own analysis. Next I shall discuss Marx's alleged technological determinism Is. 3.41, the question of technological alienation Is. 3.5), and the division of labour Is. 3.6). 3.4. Marx: a teehnological determinist? Discussing the question of technological determinism in Marx, we should first of all devote some attention to the problem of determinism in Marx per se. Marx is often interpreted as an economic determinist. This interpretation holds that Marx's 'iron laws of history' rest on the paramount role of economic motives for social development. From the German Ideology where he sets up his research pro­ gramme of investigating the 'life-process of the real individuals' r 158 Technology (CW v. 35) to his later Critique of Political Economy he is obsessed with the important role economic factors play in social life. A very clear expression of this view is the all-too-famous 'base-superstructure' metaphor. Aceording to this model, it is clear that the economie base is far more important than the political, juridical, or cultural superstructure: In the social production of their life, men entcr into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis, on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in generaL It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. ICW xxix. 263, emphasis added) Nevertheless,64 Marx was also a soeial determinist, for he believed that social institutions played a big part in explaining historical change. Thus, he did not coneentrate on individual behaviour nor on economic relations 'as such'. Rather, his approach consisted in a speeifie conception of the social sphere which has its own dynamics. In this sense, Marx was a follower of Hegel; there was nothing strange in Marx suggesting that social institutions develop aceording to their own logic and their own goals: they are forms of objective spirit. It has been, and, perhaps, still is, fashionable to deride such an approach and to assimilate it to another Hegelian concept, namely the march of the Weltgeist through history. But if a rigorous attempt to explain decisive historical developments in terms of individ­ uals' aetions fails (and I think it does), then some kind of 'social determinism' will be needed, as developed by sociological theories, be they structural, systems, or funetional approaches. In Chapter 2, I have analysed Marx's philosophieal anthropology; we may label his intentions there as 'ethical individualistic' 64 I need not conceal that in my view this metaphor is not very illuminating; on the contrary, it often obfuscates illuminating insights {see also Lukes 1983 for a critique). But it should also be said that Marx thereby formulated a problem which served as a starting point for sociological research. See only Weber 1930 and Mannheim 1936. Technology 159 ones. But this normative dimension has to retreat when describ­ ing or explaining soeial reality. Marx was aware of this, as he made clear in the foreword to Capital i : I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are the personifica­ tions of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.65 Marx's soeial determinism is most clearly expressed in Capital. In respect of teehnology, his position is the following: machinery ean, be employed in completely different ways. Capitalism em­ ploys it to the detriment of the producers; communism will employ it to the benefit of the producers. Thus it is good per se, but bad under capitalist use. This offers him the theoretical possibility of achieving a social form which produces in a non­ alienated way. Note that on the basis of a technological deter­ minism sueh a perspective might be difficult. It would be difficult if the structure of technology were to impinge on a full development of human needs and capaeities. The following passage from Capital iii can be read as confirmation for both the economic and social determinism: The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element . . . It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers­ a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the devel­ opment of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity­ which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it . . . the corresponding specific form of the state. (Capital iii. 791 ) 65 Many advocates of methodological individualism seem to confuse ethical and methodological indiVidualism, to use a distinction of Lukes ( 1973). Or, as Teubner put it, they confuse moral-political options with theory constructions (Teubner 1989b). Many theorists seem to incur the fallacy of embracing an individualistic approach because they consider themselves humanists. 160 Technology As I shall claim, Marx's ccntral notions sometimes do not pcrmit of precise differentiation between legal, political, and economic factors. The concepts 'relations of production' and 'productive forces' overlap; they cannot be defined independently of one another. In Chapter 4, I shall return to this issue, this time seen from the viewpoint of Cohen's claim that the productive forces have primacy over the relations of production, which is a technological determinist interpretation. Turning now to Marx's technological determinism, we should first have a clear definition of technological determinism. If we define it in the strongest possible sense, it means that technology determines other social spheres Ilogical determinism) and that it is the driving force for social change lhistorical determinism).66 On the first I 'logical') level, we can distinguish between a strong and a weak notion. The strong notion would probably claim that to one specific technology, one social form which is determined by this technology exactly corresponds. The weak notion would probably claim that to a specific technology a variety of social forms may correspond, which consequcntly are thus not deter­ mined by technology; rather, they are 'allowed by' or 'compatible with' that technology. Marx sometimes invokes the weak, sometimes the strong notion. The weak version is present when he says that artisan technology was the technology of slavery and feudalism; the strong version is present when he says that capitalism is only capitalism when it is machine-based. However, the technological basis of capitalism Itogether with the co­ operative character of the labour process) will also serve com­ munist society, which again would suggest the weak version of the argument. It seems that an evolutionary approach requires the weak version, because all elements of a new social form must be already present at the prior stage and are always common to both social forms. I think that the strong notion cannot be supported in a consistent way. The evolutionary approach advises us to subscribe to the weak notion. The weak notion does not allow for any combination, it only rules out specific combina- 66 MacKenzie thus refers to both meanings when he writes: 'To be a tech­ nological determinist is obviously to believe that in some sense technical change causes social change, indeed that it is the most important cause of social change. But to give full weight to the first term in expressions such as "prime mover" and " independent variable", it would also have to be believed that technical change is itself uncaused' (MacKenzie 1984: 474). Technology 161 tions. We should thus take into consideration the possibility of functional equivalents Isee Luhmann 1970). Marx, on some occasions, seems to forget his evolutionary approach because he cannot withstand the temptation to cstablish a rigid connection between technology and social form. Turning to the historical dimension, we must note that Marx does not favour the technological argument. He says that both forces of production and relations of production are caught in an evolutionary development. There are examples of the Importance of technological factors6l as well as examples of the importance of social and political factors.68 MacKenzie 1 1984) is also dealing with the question whether Marx can be called a technological determinist. Commenting on the 1 859 Preface 'as the definitive statement of historical materialism', he writes: Anything approaching a careful reading of it quickly reveals two things. First, to make it into a statement that machines make hi� tory, the 'forces of production' would have to be interpreted as cqUlval�n� to teclUlology. Second, to make it into a strong technological determml�m in the sense outlined above, the development of the forces of produCtlon would have to be taken as autonomous, or at least independent of the relations of production. (MacKenzie 1984: 476) In my view, the first point causes no problems, since technology can be conceived as containing skills, knowledge, and expen­ ence 69 More intriguing is the second question. G. A. Cohen has tried to make the second point in the strongest possible way, claiming that 'Ia) The productive forces tend to develop through­ out history (the Development thesis). Ib) The nature of the production relations of a society is explained by the level of development of its productive forces Ithe Primacy Thesis proper)' ICohen 1978: 134). Furthermore, Cohen's intention is 'to use la) as 67 As when he holds that capitalism and communism cannot be based on artisan technology. . (;8 As when he holds that only with the abolition of the gUlld laws and the consequent establishment of a l�bour market, only with the disc�ver� of new . grow continents and the import of precIOUS metals (CWVl. 185) could capItalIsm up. . 69 Habermas overemphasizes these non-material elements af prodUCtlVC w­ kn (2) power; labour ) 1 ( of consisting as afte � Produ1<tivi<r defines He forces. ledge which can be translated into productive techniques; (3) knowledge which organizes, mobilizes, and qualifies labour power. See Habermas 1976(/: 152-3. 162 Technology part ol the argument for Ib)' ICohen 1978: 153). In other words, if technology can be shown to be the unmoved prime mover, MacKenzie's conditions would be fulfilled. I postpone the dis­ cussion of this point to Chapter 4, but nevertheless will make a judgement at this point: Marx did not employ technological determinism in a consistent way/o rather, he was tempted several times to use it as an additional argument for his theory. 3.5. Technological alienation My suspicion in section 3 . 1 . 1 was that Marx runs into a theoret­ ical difficulty when Simultaneously endorsing an evolutionary approach towards technology and a normative humanist stand­ point. Above, the two elemcnts were made compatible by an interpretation which sees technological evolution as paralleled by an increase in human capacities. The total individuals were the result of an objective unfolding historical process, of 'blind' evolution. But what if this diagnosis is not plausible? The tension between the two elements tums into a contradiction if the historical and the critical level cannot be reconciled. If there was to be no technology which permitted the realization of Marx's humanist programme, he would have remained pessim­ istic. In fact, as we shall see, underlying his theory was optimism. 3. 5.1. Technological alienation in the Manuscripts 186 1-3 The aforementioned problem gives me a strong reason for locating technological alienation in Marx's discourse of the Manuscripts 1 861-3. It is the character of the machine itself land not its employment by capital) which expropriates his abilities from the worker, which transfers his skill to the machine. Before going into greater detail, I first discuss briefly the notions of alienation, reification, and fetishism. 7 j The concept of fetishism derives from the Portugoese 'feitico' ILatin factitius) and means 'artificial', 'false', and 'magic'. It was first employed 70 See Heilbronner 1967 for a statement that Marx was an explicit techno­ l09ica1 determinist . J �he term 'Verdinglichung' was first used in a systematic way by Lukacs, who, m his early formulation, suggested an identity of 'Vcrdinglichung' and 'Entfremdung'. See his later self-criticism in the 1967 preface to Geschichte und Klassenbewufltsein. See also Petrovic 1983 and Gems 1983b for definitions. Technology 163 in ethnology, but also in philosophy ISchelling, Hegel, Kant), sociology IComte), physics, and psychoanalysis. It denotes the phenomenon of objects produced by people being invested with apparent power lef. Seidel 1972). Objects do not have that power inherently, but the attribution of power to them by their produ­ cers generates their own power which is a real phenomenon. The fetish character of commodities arises because their social character is established only after the production, that is, after the use-values have experienced exchange and proved their exchange-value. According to Marx, if all labour were perfortned as social labour from the outset, there could be no fetishism. He refers above all to commodity, money, and capital fetishism; the first two he explains at the beginning of volume i of Capital; he retums to the third at several places throughout Capital, culminating in the 'Trinitarian formula' Ivolumc iii). In a passage in the Gnzndrisse, Marx links the concept of alienation quite tightly to the concept of fetishism. There he compares the function of money with the function of 'lists of current prices'. Hc says: 'Money . . . serves as such only because of its social lsymbolic) property; and it can have a social property only because individuals have alienated their own social relation­ ship hom themselves so that it takes the form of a thing' I Grundrisse 160). Lists of current prices provide information about the activities of all others on the world market and are 'the best proof of the way in which their own exchange and their own production confront individuals as an objective relation which is independent of them' IGrundrisse 1 6 1 ) . The three concepts reification, fetishism, and alienation can be seen here as forming the structure of a situation 'unworthy of human nature': 1 1 ) a social relation takes the shape of a thing; 12) this thing is invested with a power of its own; 13) this power reacts upon the individuals as an independent force. 1 1 ) stands for reification, 12) for fetishism, 13) for alienation. Marx here compares money and lists of prices with the result that 12) docs apply to money but not to the lists of prices. From this Marx seems to conclude that the 'Aufhebung' of alienation is easier in the latter case. He writes: 'In the case of the world market, the connection of the individual with all, but at the same time also the independence of this connection from the individual, have developed to such a high level that the formation of the world 164 Technology market already at the same time eontains the conditions for ' going beyond it' ( Gnzndrisse 1 6 1 ) 72 Consider, now, an application of this triad to technology. Obviously, ( I ) is not relevant here, since man's relationship to nature is nearly always mediated by things. The relation to nature is no social relation which then assumes the form of a thing, nay, it is already in the first place a 'dinghaft' relation, it is lU Its very nature characterized by the use of things. However, (2) and (3) are relevant, as we can see in every treatment of the matter by Marx. According to Ricoeur, Marx in his l)aris Manuscripts employed a Hegelian model when he analysed 'the inversion of human labour into an alien, foreign, seemingly transcendent entity. Therefore, the transformation by which the subjective essence of labour . . . is abolished and lost in a power that seems to rule human existence becomes the paradigm for all similar processes. Something human is inverted into something which seems to be exterior, external, superior, more powerful, and sometimes supernatural' (Ricoeur 1986: 35). Ricoeur rightly insists that-in contrast to the dogmatic Marxists-there is no fundamental economic alienation from which all other forms of alienation are derived; rather, these other alienations are analogical to the Feuerbachian construction (see ibid. 36). Consider, for example, Marx's description of money-fetishism: Tbeir power lof gold and silver) appears as a kind of fate and the consciousness of men, especially in social orders declining be�ause of a deeper development of exchange-value relations, rebels against the pov:cr which a physical matteI, a thing, acquires with respect to men, agamst the domination of the accursed metal Ivelfluchtes Metallj which appears as sheer insanity. (eW xxix. 487) If Marx's enterprise is characterized by a strong anthropocentric and critical approach, this must ineVitably be in opposition to . 72 Cf. Keynes's drastic statement which may serve here to make the distinc­ tIOn between two different uses of money clearer. Writing about a future society, he says: 'We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of money as a possession-as distinguished from the love of money �s a. means to the enjoyments and realities of life-will be recognised for what It lSI a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal semi­ pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the spe�ialists in mental disease' (Keynes 1972: 329). Technology 165 the 'machino-centric' description of capitalist reality of produc­ tion ?3 Marx, however, does not care to show how an Aufhebung of this contradiction is possible, how a new, socialist 'machine' can be imagined. Following the 'materialist' advice of Marx, this new 'machine' would still have to emerge under the old con­ ditions, i.e. in capitalism. Yet, he himself does not show this and he gives us no touchstone at all to indicate that it should occur. We can only presume that he aims at a similar thing when he writes: Capitalist production is generally characterized by the fact that the means of production oppose the hving labourer in an independent way, as if they were personified. The worker does not employ the means of production, but vice versa. By this reversal the workers become capital and the commodity owner who employs them becomes capitalist. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2014) According to this outline, a post-capitalist society would be a society in which the workers employ the means of production ('im Accusativ anwenden', as Marx says-instead of vice versa, as in capitalism). The creation of a new social form I= abolishing of capital) is accompanied by a new technological form (=abolishing of enslaving work). Marx aims at overcoming these 'contradict­ ory forms' of social production: 'As soon as this contradictory form falls away it follows that they possess this means of production socially, not as private individuals' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2144). Since technology in capitalism assumes the form of fixed capital, two things exert domination over the worker: capital 7.� Hcidegger's position can be interpreted as a straightforward �ositio� of technological alienation. The 'essence' of modern tec�nology, accordmg to �lm, can be understood neither in terms of instrumentahty {means-ends re1atlon­ shipL nor in terms of human activity_ The essence of modern technology is rather that it is concealing instead of revealing. '[MJodern technology, docs not unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordernl, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such' (Heideggcr 1978: 296). Nature becomes an object of ordering, a 'standing reserve'. Even man is involved in this process, although he is never 'transformed into mere standing reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing" (ibid. 300). This is not the place to deal with the exact structure of Hcidegger's argument; suffice it to say that, for him, '\mlodern technology, as a revealing which orders, is thus no mere human dOing' libid.). 166 Technology and technology. Capital and machinery in their evolution and in their functioning are acting in pairs, reinforcing each other, conditioning each other. The one is not possible without the other. It takes only a small step for Marx to assume that the Aufhebung of the capital-labour relation would also lead to an Aufhebung of deskilling machinery. But Marx does not devote any discussion to this special problem. He only states in a very general way that workers in post-capitalist society will possess the means of production socially, not as private individuals Icf. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2 1 44). In the Manuscripts 1861-3, Marx is a technological determinist when backward-looking and a social determinist when forward­ looking. In Capital, Marx tries to get out of these theoretical difficulties and gives the following solution: his argument builds exactly on the 'social character of labour'. He claims that in capitalist modern industry the character of labour is immediately social and co-operative; all that needs to be done is the expropri­ ation of capital. The advantage of this solution readily springs to mind: it is consistent with his evolutionary approach I'new productive forces do not drop from the sky', Grundrisse 278 j, and at the same time fits his normative criteria. Only in this way could he bring together the historical and critical strands of his project. We may thus say that although his approach in Capital is far more 'social determinism', he nevertheless allows for a technological argument, too. This occurs when he claims that the social institutions have to adapt to the 'technical necessity' I Capital i. 365) of the labour process. 3.5.2. How Marx changed his view: Manuscripts 1861-3 v. Capital The degree to which Marx maintained this definition of the ma­ chine and its corollaries in his final version of Capital is most in­ teresting. One could show in great detail how he used the material from the Manuscripts 1861-3 for the formulation of chapter 1 3 1 1 5 in the English version) of Capital. But a t first sight there seems to be a slight difference in the definition of the machine. In Capital, he defines it as follows: 'The machine . . . supersedes the workman, who handles a single tool, by a mechanism operating with a number of similar tools, and set in motion by a Technology 167 single motive power, whatever the form of that power may be' I Capital i. 355). Marx also repeats that the skill of the worker is transferred to machinery: 'Along with the tool, the skill of the workman in handling it passes over to the machine' I Capital i. 396). But the 'slight difference' turns out to be a radical cut between a machinery 'as such' and the really existing one lof capitalism). He cites Ure for the two different aspects of the automatic factory I'automatische Fabrik' as Marx calls the 'atelier' now). The first is ' "[C)ooperation of many orders of workpeople . . . in tending with assiduous skill, a system of productive machines, continuously impelled by a central power" Ithe prime mover)' I Capital i. 394-5). The second is 'a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in uninter­ rupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being subordinate to a self-regulated moving force' I Capital i . 395). Now look at Marx's comment: 'The first description is applic­ able to every possible employment of machinery on a large scale, the second is characteristic of its use by capital, and therefore of the modern factory system' I Capital i. 396). But this distinction is completely artifiCial, having no real basis in the text of Ure. Marx has nowhere shown what 'every possible employment of machinery on a large scale' could mean. Addi­ tionally, the first passage of Ure in support of a 'neutral' use of machinery is self-defeating. Here it is clearly expressed that the workers only oversee I iiberwachen) a system of productive machinery. No virtuosity is inherent in the workers, as Marx himself asserts on the next page. He says: 'Hence, in the place of the hierarchy of specialised workmen that characterises manu­ facture, there steps, in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalise and reduce to one and the same level every kind of work that has to be done by the minders of the machines' I Capital i. 396). Marx could not rest content with such a perspective. Communism would have to abolish the reduction of workers into mere 'appendages' to machinery. Marx, however, is a materi­ alist. He could neither be content in proclaiming such a goal for communist society nor advocate a return to the medieval 'masterpiece' Isee his polemic against Proudhon, CW vi. 190). He must show a real possibility for abolishing enslavement 168 Technology in the production process which stems from technological factors. It may be that Marx became aware, after the Manuscripts 1 861 -3, that he was trapped in the pitfalls of his own theory, for he had to provide a new technological 'elementary form' for post-capitalist society which must be already visible under presentconditions. Since he could not provide this, he constructed it in a somewhat obscure way from Ure's text. Marx has two possible ways with which to defend his materialist programme: 1 . he can claim that machines can be used in other than capitalist ways; 2. he can claim that under communism another technology will be used in the process of material production. His strategy combines both points. He follows ( I ) in that he takes great pains to show how the liberating potential of ma­ chinery is not (and cannot be) set free under capitalism.74 He develops (2) above all with respect to the character of the labour process (see s. 3.6). The introduced distinction, however, has important conse­ quences for Marx's further analysis in Capital; we can say that it changes the character of his discourse completely. It becomes the guiding thread for the remainder of the fifteenth chapter. We find a dozen passages like the following: 'Here as every­ where else, we must distinguish between increased productive­ ness due to the development of the social process of production, and that due to the capitalist exploitation of that process' ( Capital i. 398). Marx's strategy in chapter IS is simple: he attributes all negative features of machinery (essentially those which oppose his theory of human nature) to the capitalist use; , the positive features he attributes to 'Maschinerie an sich 75 Marx provides examples like intensification of work, child and woman labour, lengthening of the working day, etc. to prove the capitalist use. He stresses these features more than the 74 The main point is the increased productivity which allows the producing of more output with a given portion of labour power. This means that the working day can be reduced drastically; and free time, we know with Marx, is important and left for the development of the indiVidual, cf. MEGA II. iii. 1 . 275; MEGA II. iii. 6. 1909-10, 2088-9. 75 His evolutionary scheme thus anticipates a 'mutation' only of the relations, and the mode of, production, not of technology, Technology 169 transfer of skil1. It is no exaggeration to say that he actually substitutes the one for the othcr. The two, however, are of a different theoretical status. The first is historical (and thus contingent), the seconq analytical. Thc only analytical instance (in Capital) is the (spurious) 'Ure-distinction', the others are historica1.?6 Now Marx seems to overemphasize the difference between the use of machinery by capital and the character of machinery as such. The expropriation of skill is no longer central, as it was in the Manuscripts 1861-3. To make it plain: if capitalists would refrain from using women and children in the production process, from lengthening the working day past its natural limits, etc. their use of machinery would nevertheless be capitalist (and not 'neutral' application of machinery 'as such'). Another instance of Marx's adherence to strategy ( I ) is the fact that machinery is used by capital as a tool for warfare against the workers. As Berg pointed out, 'Ure's automatic factory was the image of war' (Berg 1982: 201 ) . Indeed, Marx himself was to use this paralle1. He writes: But machinery not only acts as a competitor who gets the better of the workman, and is constantly on the point of making him superfluous. It is also a power inimical to him, and as such capital proclaims it from the roof tops and as such makes use of it. It is the most powerful weapon for repressing strikes, those periodical revolts of the working-class against the autocracy of capital . . . It would be possible to write quite a history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sale pnrpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working­ class. leapita! i. 4 1 0- 1 1 ) 77 76 Needless to say, the Manuscripts 1861-3 abound with analytical ex­ amples: 'This is the big difference: whether the existing means of production confront the workers as capital and can be appropriated by them only in so far as they increase the surplus-value and surplus-product for their employers, that is, whether these means of production employ them or whether they, as subjects, employ the means of production in the accusative, in order to produce wealth for themselves' (MEGA II. iii. 3 . 1 195). 77 See also the following passage from the Manuscripts 1861-3: 'All the more, here we have alienation in which the objective conditions of work (i.e. past labour) assume, vis-a-vis living labour, a direct opposition in that past labour, including the general social forces of labour, natural forces, and science, appear directly as weapons, partly to make workers redundant . . . partly to break their special qualifications and the claims which arise from them, partly to subjugate them to the factory despotism and military discipline of capital. In this form, therefore, the social conditions of work . . . appear not only as claims to the worker but as directly hostile and overwhelming powers which are employed in the interest of capital' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2057-8). 1 70 Technology This warfare, according to him, is no technological feature; rather, it is a social feature of class struggle, where capitalists use machinery as a weapon to become independent of special workers' skills. To repeat: this is the approach Marx adopts in Capital. In the Manuscripts 1861 -3, however, he additionally defines the conflict as one between the 'iron man' and the man 'of flesh and blood': Also here, past labour-as automaton and the machinery moved by it-appears as independent of labour and self-acting, instead of being subjected to it, is subjecting. It is the iron man which opposes the man of flesh and blood. This subjugation of his labour under capital . . . which is given with capitalist production appears here as a technological fact. The corner*stone is in place. Dead labour is endowed with movc* ment and living labour is only one of its conscious organs. (MEGA 11. iii. 6. 2057-8, my emphasis) This passage echoes again a formulation of Ure, who wrote in 1835: 'Thus the Iron Man, as the operatives fitly call it, sprang out of the hands of our modern Prometheus at the bidding of Minerva-a creation destined to restore order among the indus­ trious classes, and to confirm to Great Britain the empire of art' (Ure 1967: 367, cited in Berg 1982: 201). Though Ure says that '[tlhe news of this Herculean prodigy spread dismay through the union, and even long before it left its cradle, so to speak, it strangled the Hydra of misrule' (ibid.), this does not to stand up to closer scrutiny. As Lazonick ( 1979) has shown, the shop-floor organization continued even after the introduction of the self-acting mule. This is affirmed by the following account of Piore and Sable: In 1830 . . . the Manchester engineering firm of Sharp, Roberts & Company introduced the self-acting mule, and promised its customers that the new equipment would allow the substitution of unskilled machine operators for skilled cotton spinners-thus putting an end to the spinners' union in the mills. Ure, a political economist and industrial consultant} popularized this claim as a statement of facti Marx lwho called Ure the Pindar of the factory) accepted this account and, as we saw} made it a starting point for his reflections on the decisive role of special-purpose machinery in modem industry. Yet the cotton spinner}s role in production-part supervisor} part recruiter of labor-was far more complex} and management's grip on the shop-floor activity far more limited} than the machine maker, the consultant, and the theorist Technology 171 imagined. The spinners' (now called minders') union not only survived but gained extensive control over the use of the new technology. (Piore and Sabel 1984: 45) However, the above quote from the Manuscripts 1861-3 also reveals that Marx discerned alienation on the technological level alone. This comes out when he uses the term Frontstein (keystone, comer-stone), which brings to mind architecture. The picture is of an arch which is completed by a keystone. This keystone prevents the construction from collapsing and provides its stability. The worker gets expropriated of his skills and of his product; it is capital which accumulates both and represents itself as the living subject: dead labour which is able to move on its own; living labour which serves only as an appendage to it. The increase in productivity which stems from the division of labour . . . is not only a productive force of capital instead of the worker. The social form of these combined activities is the existence of capital against the worker. This combination confronts the worker as an overpowering force to which he succumbs since his labour has been reduced to a wholly one-sided function which counts for nothing in separation from the whole mechanism. The worker himself has become a mere detail. iMEGA II. iii. I . 254) 'In machinery . . . the domination of past labour over living labour gains not only social . . . but also technological truth' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2059). This passage contains in a nutshell both technological determinism and an analysis of technology in terms of fetishism-a position which Marx in Capital is going to blur. 3.6. Alienation and the division of labour The concept of 'division of labour' has had a long career from ancient Greek philosophy to the Political Economy of Marx's time. It is essentially a concept which lacks precision since every author and every epoch uses it in a different way. Authors who, like Marx, try to use the concept to cover many phenomena are thus easily confused in their argument. In fact, the concept 'division of labour' is a rather complex subject in Marx too; it is used in different ways, which some­ times leaves the reader confused. Marx himself was aware of 1 72 Technology this danger whcn he criticized Proudhon for using the concept 'division of labour' in such a vague way. Marx's point was that the concept covers too many different things which do not have much in common and thus can hardly be understood by the term 'divide' Id. C W vi. 180). But why, thcn, am I interestcd at all in the concept and especially its connection with technology? Both technology and the division of labour are essential for Marx's discussion of the 'good society', i.e. for his communist perspective. Both techno­ logy and division of labour in communist society must be of a kind that exerts minimal 'enslaving effects' on individuals. But both are, on the other hand, main 'agents' in the dcvelopment of the preconditions for a communist society. They develop possibilities of transport and communication Iworld market), reduce the socially necessary labour, lcad to an increase in productivity: in short, they contribute to thc crcation of real wealth. But they do not bring about this rcal wealth completely, all they do under capitalist relations is produce material wealth I'sachlicher Reichtum'), and this only in antagonistic forms Iclass domination, poverty, economic crises, etc.). Marx's concept of division of labour has-like his concept of technology­ a historical and critical dimension Ifor a comprehensive dis­ cussion, see Grundmann 1988). As Fetscher notcd, Marx in his maturc works 'no longer pretends that the division of labour will altogether disappear. Certainly there will be different social functions and people to fill them.' And, Fetscher continues, 'the very nature of modern industrial production and the rapid change of its technology will demand many more many-sided individuals' IFetschcr 1973: 46 1). Marx thought that the development of modern industry and the development of human needs and capacities would go together. This connection is established in the following way: 'IP]rivate property can be abolished only on condition of an all­ round development of individuals, precisely because the existing form of intercourse and their existing productive forces are all­ embracing and only individuals that are developing in an all­ round fashion can appropriate them i.e. can turn them into free manifestations of their lives' I C W v. 439, see also CWv. 86 ff.). In Capital i, Marx Similarly points out that 'modern industry through its catastrophcs imposes the necessity of recognizing, Technology 1 73 as a fundamental law of production, variation of work, con­ sequently fitness of the labourer for varied work, consequently the greatest possible development of his varied aptitudcs' I Capital i. 458). Here Marx explains in a functional fashion that human abilities have to adapt to productive necessities. This argu­ ment, however, presupposes a gap between the development of productive forces and individual abilities. Thus, Marx tacitly assumes that mankind's collective objectifications Isuch as technology) evolve in a different manncr, at a different speed, or at a different rhythm from individual capacities. Since both are tied together by functional requirements, they co-evolve. This leads Marx to the enigmatic statement that mankind sets itself only tasks which it is able to fulfil 1 1 859 Preface). It seems plain that Marx would allow for a certain social division of labour, as far as it is the product of the associatcd individuals.'8 Heller summarized Marx's intention very well: 'Marx attacks those theoreticians who tie the specialisation which arises from centralisation to capitalist relations of pro­ duction, "as if the division of labour were not likewise possible if its conditions belonged to the associated workers, and were regarded by the latter as their own activity, which they are by their very nature'" IHeller 1976: 108, Marx quotation from Theories of Surplus Value, cf. MEGA II. iii. 4. 1405). Heller contends that the bourgeois economists want to achieve by this identification a justification for the capitalist mode of production. As Marx put it, they seek 'a technological justification for the specific social form, i.e. capitalist form, in which the relationship of labour to thc conditions of labour is turned upside down, so that it is not the worker who makes use of the conditions of labour, but the conditions of labour which make use of the worker' Icited in Heller 1976: 108; d. MEGA II. iii. 4. 1409).'9 Marx was ambiguous in evaluating the division of labour in modern industry. He regards it in both positive and negative terms. It is positive, since it contributes to the increasc in pro­ ductivity and thus contributes to the matcrial preconditionS for 7H Selucky in his (otherWise illuminating) treatment of the division of labour is thus mistaken when he says: 'Be that as it may, Marx and Engels wanted to abolish the division of labour' {Se1ucky 1979: 10). 79 Cf. also Habermas's claim that technology in late capitalism takes the form of ideology, since 'Sachzwangc' are blamed imitead of obsolete power relations. See Habermas 1971b: 59. 1 74 Technology communist society. It is negative since it contributes to enslaving effects, that is, individuals get subsumed under a life-long task which hinders their development into 'total' individuals."O Now, it would be naive to think that communism could do away with the division of labour because the necessary levels of material wealth would then exist. The reproduction of wealth requires a certain social organization of labour, which may be called 'division of labour'. From this it follows that communist society also must develop a social form of division of labour, but one which exercises no enslaving effects."' Unfortunately, Marx dedicated little attention to the topic of division of labour in society. It seems that he would see an inverse relationship between the division of labour inside the factory and the division of labour in society: the less division of labour inside the factory, the more division: of labour in society ."2 My conjecture is thathe does see the trend towards a functionally differentiated society, which, however, will be reversed at a certain stage of historical development. As Elster rightly pointed out, 'like Weber and Durkheim, Marx . . . saw the progress of history up to the present as one of constant differentiation. Unlike them, he did not see this as an irreversible process, but predicted that there would occur a final stage of integration, or loss of differentiation' (Elster 1985: 1 13). If Marx's main interest was to reduce the fragmentary effects of the division of labour, a prerequisite thereto was the exploration of the possibility. From the Grundrisse onwards, Marx assumes !lO In Capital L 343 Marx cites Urquardt with approval: 'To subdivide a man is to execute him, if he deserves the sentence, to assassinate him if he does not . . . The subdivision of labour is the assassination of a people,' 81 Both in the early German Ideology and in the Critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875 Marx explicitly assumes separate 'social functions' to ' exist in a communist society. See GW v. 47; SWiiL 19, 26; see also Crundrisse 158. 11 2 Actually, the place where this quote occurs deals with manufacture .but I think it fits the stage of machinery as well: 'The division of labour in the workshop implies concentration of the means of production in the hands of one capitalistj the division of labour in society implies their dispersion among many independent producers of commodities . . . [Iln a society with capitalist produc­ tion, anarchy in the ' social division of labour and despotism in that of the workshop are mutual conditions the one of the other' (Capit.al i. 336-7). Capitalist society is only able to organize its tasks with the help of despotism and anarchy which to Marx must have appeared a very undesirable state of affairs. Technology 1 75 a natural division of labour which is based on personal endow­ ments and geographical and climatic factors (MEGA u. iii. 1 . 266-7) and an occupational, professional division of labour which found its most adequate expression in the system of manufacture. Modern industry destroys this division of labour and leads to a form of co-operation.83 Marx's political perspective is to regulate this co-operation socially84 and to allow for an all­ round education and training of the whole working population ( Capital i. 458). He refuses to return to the idea of the craftsman, as Ricoeur pointed out: For Marx, we must push the industrial system to its last consequences in order to achieve a solution at the level of the illness. The nostalgia of romantics for an earlier labour situation is thus misplaced. The craft worker who made a complete work still did not control the market; the value of the work was determined by someone else. (Ricoeur 1986: 53) Marx strongly opposed a life-long subordination of individuals to specialized tasks in all of his works; in other words, he opposed a fusion of occupational and technical division of labour. The division of labour within society is, however, a broader concept than the division of tasks: the occupational division of labour is only one part of the social division of labour. Marx's ambiguity in evaluating the division of labour is resolved by means of a change in opinion on these matters. In the preparatory writings to Capital, he depicts the difference between manufacture and modern industry in the way that the period of manufacture leaves the virtuosity and skill with the worker, whereas in modern industry the worker gets deprived of his virtuosity and skill. Whereas the division of labour in manufac­ ture was a real division of labour, a division between different sorts of labour (MEGA II. iii. ! . 269-701,"5 in modern industry 8:� According to Marx the concept of co-operation is the universal form of which the division of labour is only a special case: see MEGA II. iii. ! . 229-31 . IN Cf. Capit.al i. 400: 'The factory code . . . is but the capitalist caricature of that social regulation of the labour-process which becomes requisite in coopera­ tion on a great scale, and the employment in common, of instruments of labour and especially of machinery.' 85 It is concentration instead of dispersion of the elements of the production process which is characteristic of manufacture. Marx therefore calls manufac­ ture the mode of production specifically corresponding to the division of labour (see MEGA II. iii. 6. 2701. 1 76 Technology Technology 177 there exists a division of machines, under which living labour is subjected IMEGA II. iii. 6. 2016). Simple co-operation and division of labour get totally trans­ formed once machinery becomes the main way of producing: division of labour in manufacture] increases the social produc­ tive power of labour, not only for the benefit of the capitalist instead of that of the labourer, but it does this by crippling the individual labourers' I Capital i. 344). Now we come to the mechanical atelier which is based on a system of machinery. To be sure, here we also have a division of labour . . . It has its material basis in the different, specific machines . In this mechanical atelier the body of the whole mechanism consists of the differentiated machines themselves . . . Here it is not a specifically developed labour power which uses particular instruments like a virtuoso does, but it is the self-acting instrument which needs specific­ ally and constantly attached servants. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 2020) In manufacture, as well as in simple co-operation, the collective working organism is a form of existence of capital . . . manufacture proper not only subjects the previously independent workman to the discipline and command of capital, but, in addition, creates a hierarchiC gradation of the workmen themselves. While simple co-operation leaves the mode of working by the individual for the most unchanged, manufacture thoroughly revolutionizes it, and seizes labour-power by its very roots. It converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity, by forcing his detail dexterity at the expense of a world of productive capabilities and instincts; just as in the States of La Plata they butcher a whole beast for the sake of his hide or his tallow. ICapital i. 340, my emphasis) In the system of manufacture, the tasks are distributed according to a hierarchy of skills and powers. SpeCific physical and mental abilities of individuals are seized upon and developed in their one-sidedness in order to produce a common, general mechanism Id. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2020). By contrast, in modern industry86 there no longer exists a hierarchy of abilities. What we have is a general nivellement of services with the consequence that the workers can work at different machines with little prior training time Id. Capital i. 396). Under manufacture, the construction of new instruments had to be done with respect to human abilities and characteristics IMEGA II. iii. 1 . 274). Modern industry, on the contrary, is characterized by the principle that machines get constructed under the sole influence of scientific analysis and natural laws. Marx echoes here a central theme from the work of Andrew Ure who stressed that machinery is preferable for factory-owners because it is not dependent on the skills of craft workers. Another point is that Marx repeats Ure's judgement that modern industry has eliminated the division of labour Isee Berg 1982: 197-8). Consider, now, the discussion in Capital. Marx repeats the general line of argument, but changes his evaluation completely: now he sharply criticizes the division of labour under the system of manufacture, drawing on Ferguson and Smith: 'IThe H6 In the Manuscripts 1 861-3, Marx often uses the term 'mechanical atelier' to denote the new technological character of the post"manufacture age. In Capital he calls it automatic factory, or, more generally, 'modern industry'. Modern industry, on the other hand, is conceived positively: it is more productive than manufacture, since it is not dependent on a certain number of skilled craftsmen and their skills. Instead, an objective productive organism, a 'skeleton', takes their place. The 'subjective principle' of adapting the instruments to personal abilities falls away. The production process gets analysed in its constituent parts. In manufacture, it is the workmen who, with their manual implements, must, either singly or in groups, carry on each particular detail process. If, on the one hand, the workman becomes adapted to the process, on the other, the process was previously made suitable to the workman. This subjective principle of the division of labour no longer exists in production by machinery. Here, the process as a whole is examined objectively, in itself, that is to say, without regard to the question of its execution by human hands, it is analysed into its constituent phases; and the problem, how to execute each detail process, and bind them all into a whole, is solved by the aid of machines, chemistry. ICapital i. 359 )" ' The reversal of judgement thus seems to rely on a more positive view of the possibilities for human self-development offered by machinery. To illustrate the different character of the means of production, Marx uses the metaphor of 'dwarf-instruments' H7 Cf. also Capital i. 456-7, 434, 567. 1 78 Technology I Capital i. 361 I, as being characteristic of manufacture, whereas 'cyclopic machines', or even 'cyclopic monsters' I Capital i. 360, 3641, are characteristic of modern industry. This indicates that, although monsters may be more horrible than dwarfs, neither is immediately preferable: dwarfs and monsters are both weird figures for humans. Even more important is Marx's juxtaposition of the social character of labour in these two technological epochs. In manu­ facture the worker is expropriated of his skill which becomes in turn embodied in the Cesamtarbeiter: Intelligence in production expands in one direction, because it vanishes in many others. What is lost by the dctail labourers, is concentrated in the capital that employs them . , . In manufacture, in order to make the collective labourer, and through him capital} rich in social productive power, each labourer must be made poor in individual productive powers. I Capital i. 341) We are wrong if we think that maehinery also displays this feature since '[m]achinery . . . operates only by means of associated labour, or labour in common. Hence the co-operative character of the labour process is, in the latter one, a technieal neeessity dictated by the instrument of labour itself' I Capital i. 364_5 ) 88 This is the complete reversal of the argument in the Manuscripts 1 861-3 89 The deeisi ve difference between the Manuscripts and Capital is the faet that according to the Manuscripts the worker under the system of manufacture is in full possession of his knowledge and skill, that it is he, the h uman being, who commands the instrument; modern industry, on the contrary, is $$ The English translation does not render the following interesting connota­ tion: the German original says machinery 'funktioniert nur in der Hand un­ mittelbar vergcsellschafteter oder gemeinsamer Arbeit' (Das Kapital i. 407). Now, this is the same formula that Marx employs when describing a decisive feature of communist society, namely that labour would be social from the outset ('unmittclbar vergesellschaftet'J, whereas in capitalism the social charac� ter of production proves itself only post !estum, after the exchange of private products. It is no accident that Marx assimilates the character of work under modern industry to a feature of communist society. 89 To avoid misunderstanding: in the Manuscripts 1 861-3 Marx also empha­ sizes the point that machine production leads to higher productivity, and that the labour process becomes sociaL Large'scale production seems irreconcilable with single ownership of the means of production (cf. MEGA II. iiL 6. 2144). The fact that the workers are still fragmented, and developed only in narrow specialities, he considers to be an inheritance of manufacture, which is, how­ ever, enhanced by capitalist use of machinery (see Capital i. 398). Technology 1 79 the most perverted form of capitalist technology li.e. negative in comparison to manufacture). Marx reverses his judgement in Capital. He now conceives manufacture, as we have seen, as the technological regime whieh expropriates the workers from their skills, cripples their individualities, etc. Likewise, he conceives modern industry as a turning-point, as a mode of production in which the character of labour is already unmittelbar geselI­ schaftlich, 'co-operative'. The virtuosity, knowledge, and skills are embodied in the Cesamtarbeiter, albeit belonging to capital. On the basis of this construction it is sufficient to expropriate capital in order to return the lost capacities to the Cesamtarbeiter. An additional point is of interest here. Marx said that the co­ operative character of the labour process is a 'technical necessity' Isee Capital i. 365). This suggests that he clings to a sort of 'technological primacy'. First develop technologies, then soeial institutions. This standpoint makes it easy to present the trend towards communism as 'inevitable', or 'lawlike'. Technological determinism was a very appealing concept for Marx because it offered him the chance to prove the inevitability of communism. Every time he analyses the role of technology in history, he is tempted to endorse a determinist view, no matter whether we take the The Poverty of Philosophy, the Manuscripts 1 861-3, or Capital. However, in the Manuscripts, Marx is left with the most discomforting theoretical problems when analysing the central role of machinery and its dehumanizing effects. Therefore, he makes little reference to the technologieal base of communism, which, after all, seems the most interesting question, given his evolutionary approach to teehnology and social institutions. In Capital, he solves this problem by stressing the co-operative character of the labour process as the decisive feature of modern industry, thus suggesting a 'genetic link' with communist society. This solution has the great advantage of presenting capitalism's technological base and organization of labour as being similar to those of communism. Using a distinc­ tion of Agnes Heller, we may say that Marx did not rely on the 'subjective will' to bring about a higher form of society; he was not content until he could find some 'natural laws' providing the possibility for transition. Historical Materialism 4 Historical Materialism All earlier modes of production were essentially conserva­ tive. IKarl Marx, Capital) My discussion so far has shown that Marx's main critical concern was to investigate the conditions for realizing the 'good life'. To this end, he was interested in the liberating potential of technologies and social forms. Regarding technology, Chapter 3 explained that Marx was able to conceive of the problems which stem from man's dealings with nature. From this he did not conclude that it is the fault of technology as such or of a specific, dominating attitude towards nature. I think he was right to reject such a conclusion. Regarding social forms, he assumed that the negative aspects of technology only stem from its capitalist employment: in so doing I think he was wrong. He did not conceive of the possibility that specific forms of technology could cause ecological problems for every social form, not only for capitalism. This chapter will focus on the following questions. Starting from the premisses of historical materialism, its 'standard model', as laid out in the J 859 Preface and elsewhere, I try to reconstruct the basic underlying thought. As several discussions have shown, a reconstruction is needed since the original model is inadequate.l The underlying thought which should be kept is that society and technology can be analysed in evolutionary terms. Coevolution of social and technological forms is a process in which the individual has little explanatory power. My recon­ struction thus tries to retain these Marxian analytical premisses, while simultaneously trying to overcome some of the basic flaws of the standard model. When one speaks of coevolution, functional links between evolving units are required. This necessitates a brief consideration ! See the, debate on G. A. Cohen'S book ( 1 978), especially the contributions by Elster 1 1980, 1982), Lukes 1 1983), joshua Cohen 1 1 982), Levine and Wtight 1 1 980). -f J81 of functional analyses in the social sciences. In section 4 . J I argue that social enquiry cannot do without functional analysis, that it is sound, and that it is, in some respects (depending on the questions one is asking), superior to causal-intentional explana­ tion. In section 4.2 I try to apply findings of the emergent paradigm of autopoiesis to the problem of coevolution of society and technology. Section 4.3 tries to apply some findings of neo­ Darwinian theory to the same problem. Section 4.4 summarizes Marx's presentation of how feudalism as a social form, based on a speCific technology, was overcome by capitalism which was based on another technology. Section 4.5 confronts the basic claims of Marx's historical materialism with the ecological problematic, showing that its conclusion (the stripping away of private property relations) may be of little help when facing ecological problems, but that the potential of Marx's historical maferialism is far greater than is expressed in the standard model. Marx's interest in technology stems from his materialist approach to studying society. As he stated in Capital: 'Tech­ nology discloses man's mode of dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow from them' (Capital i. 352). In this statement, a relationship between three elements is expressed: ( 1 ) the transformation of nature; (2) forms of social relations; and (3) mental conceptions '> These three elements have been evident in Marx's work since the early German Ideology. In the canonical i 859 Preface, Marx states the following relationship between these elements: In the social production of their life, men cntcr into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their matehal productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the econotnic structure of society, the real basis, on which 2 J:.5 Douglass North put it: JMafx's over�ll an�lysis, set i? the contex� of . economic history, explores human interrelatiOnShIps as a vehIcle for study�n? the increasing mastery of humans over nature. The growth of the productlve forces of human beings was an ongoing process in the subordination of nature to mario As humans learned how to produce and use intermediate goods, it became necessary to define the relationship amongst human beings with respect to the production and use of these tools' (North 1986: 58). 182 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism to which correspond rises a legal and political superstructure, and of production of mode definite forms of social consciousness. The al life process lectu intel and ical polit material life conditions the social, mines their deter that men of ness cious in general. It is not the cons s their mine deter that being, but, on the contrary, their social being rial mate the nt, opme devel consciousness. At a certain stage of their ons relati ing exist the with ict confl in productive forces of society come ssion for the same thing­ of production} or-what is but a legal expre they have been at work with the property relations within which productive forces, these the hitherto. From forms of development of h of social revolution. epoc an s begin relations tum into theirfetters. Then I CW xxix. 263) model only. Let me concentrate on two aspeets of this levels in bourgeois e thre 1 . Marx conceives of the following society: productive forces, corresponding • relations of production and l, over which emerges a base to each other (economic which, in turn, corresponds cture • political and legal superstru to forms of social consciousness. as standing in a 2. Marx conceives of these three levels uctive forces deter­ relation of determination to each other: prod rmine political and mine relations of production, these dete a certain social con­ legal forms, which in turn give rise to various elements in sciousness. I shall propose to disconnect the an autonomous role. the above model and to assign to them all politicS, and culture This means that technology, economy, law, own, without com­ are developing according to a logic of their In other words, the pletely losing touch with each other.3 tion of the model proposal is a systems theoretical reformula e all aim at a precise contained in the Prefa ce which would abov i.e. technology, are understanding of how productive forces, stands at the heart of socially shaped. If it is technology which t chances there are of the matter it is important to know wha h are less harmful to bringing into existence technologies whic gs. Only if we have the natural environment and to human bein • ctive forces with technology, an " The reader will notice that I equate produ societies. It seems that size and list capita for true equation which is basically in pre-capitalist societies. With role alent density of population played an equiv risse 400, 529). Grund {see ology techn y clearl is it lism, capita 183 an answer to this question can we reassess the question of whether mankmd WIll be able consciously to control its own fate. 4.1 The spectre of functionalism Before embarking in closer detail on the proposed reformulation of the premIsses of historical materialism, I briefly discuss an Important methodological question. The systems approach which I propose and the evolutionary approach which I shall examine later have a common reference point in functionalism. And . functIOnalism also plays an important role in Marxism. As van den Berghe put it, functionalism and the dialectic share an evolutionary notion of social change. For both Hegel and Marx the dialectic process is an asccnsional . spIral towards progress. The functionalist concept of differentiation postulates �n �volutionary growth in structural complexity and func­ . tional speCIfiCIty analogous to biological evolution. Admittedly, these two evolutlOnary Views are different, and each presents serious diffi­ . cultle�. We are �ll aware of the pitfalls of organicism, the teleological , I:�npl�catl��s of progress , and the untenability of assuming that cvolu� tlon is umlmear �r has an endpoint , , , Nevertheless, the convergence of the two th�ones o� so�c form of evolutionism suggests that the c?nce�t of soclal evolutlOn 1m the minimal sense of change in discernible . d,rectIOns) may be Ineseapable. Ivan den Berghe 1963: 703) Jon Elster argued that it is almost impossible to find functional explanatIOns m the social sciences. According to him it is essentially a method which yields good results in biology, but obscures the Issues at hand in the social sciences (Elster 1980: 125-6).4 ThIs IS so for the following reason: a functional explana­ tIOn explams an event E as occurring because of its beneficial consequences for something else (X). Or, in his words: An institution or a behavioral pattern X is explained by its function Y for group Z if and only if: L Y is an effeet of X; 2. Y is benefieial for Z; 4 T�e target ?f Elster's criticism was G. A. Cohen's defence of historical . maten�hsm whlch employed a functional explanation. In order to avoid too exegetlcal an argument, I shall leave aside this debate here. 184 Historical Materialism 3. Y is unintended by thc actors producing X; 4. Y-or at least the causal relation between X and Y-is unrecognized by the actors in Zi 5. Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through Z. IElster 1983b: 571 Now Elster claims that having described the beneficial consequences and the occurrence of Y, we do not have an explanation at all, unless we can show the existence of a feedback mechanism which secures that Y will indeed occur. Elster affirms that no one has any quarrel with functional explanation where the mechanism is actually shown to be at work. However, 'the hard question is whether one can ever be justified in setting forward a functional explanation even in the absence of a specific mechanism. In biology this question is to be answered in the affirmative, because the general mechanism of natural selection creates a presumption that beneficial consequences explain their own causes' IElster 1980: 126). According to Elster, social scientists unfortunately and typically do not satisfy all five conditions of the above list; and, typically, what is missing is the last condition. Mary Douglas 1 1986) accepted Elster's demand, insisting at the same time that social sciences cannot do without functional explanations. In fact, she defends much of Durkheim's and Merton's programme, rejecting any naive I'arm-waving') func­ tionalism. C. A. Cohen took another line of defence when he claimed that there are always mechanisms at work, even when we are not able to show them Isee Cohen 1980: 133-4). This epistemological point, however, offers us little resistance against bad functionalist arguments of the type 'whenever an event y has beneficial consequences it will occur'. I thus take sides with Douglas and Cohen in insisting on the importance of functional analysis for the social sciences,s but also accept Elster'S demand that in order to have a proper explanation, we need to provide some sort of mechanism. Elster concludes that social scientists should be committed exclusively to causal and intentional ;:; And, especially, his insistence that game theory cannot replace t�e central assumptions of historical materialism. See also Berger and Offc: 'Loglcally, the game starts only after the actors have been constituted, and their order of preferences has been formed as a result of processes that cannot themselves be considered as part of the game' (Berger and Offe 1982: 525). Historical Materialism 1 85 explanations in order to avoid obscure or pre-scientific results. Elster would be prepared to accept a functional analysis if the mechanisms at work could be shown. Otherwise, for him, it would have the status of a metaphysical notion, it would be obscuring matters rather than illuminating them. From the structure of Elster's five conditions and his comments one can conclude that he regards functional explanation as a variety of causal explanation, since he ties cause and effect in a very tight manner.6 The only difference between a functional and a proper causal analysis would thus be the direction in which the causal chain is running ? But this premiss need not be accepted blindly. Another proponent of functional analysis clearly accepted the criticisms made by authors like Nagel and Hempel with respect to the 'strong functionalist' paradigm. In 1962, Niklas Luhmann stated that 'it is not immediately possible to explain Causes by their effects' ILuhmann 1970: 10, my translation). The function of an action, seen as effect, cannot be taken to explain the factual occurrence of that action. Functional analysis thus needs some additional arguments which qualify these effects and functions. 'The functional argument is not to conclude a specific need from an existing "service" [Leistung[ and thus to justify the existence of this service' libid. 15, my translation). So far, Elster and Luhmann could agree. But where Elster is sceptical that such 'microfoundations' can be found lif not on the basis of methodological individualism and causal explanation), Luhmann is sceptical that a causal model will be possible at all, assuming that an uncertainty relation obtains between cause and effect. According to him, it is not possible to determine cause and effect simultaneously, for variables in social research typically cannot be separated. For Luhmann, the interesting question is thus not: Does A always cause BI But: are (, Von Foerster ( 1984) coined the term 'trivial machines' to denote the determin­ istic connection between input and output, where input is understood as sufficient condition for a certain output. One can easily see how this applies to a deterministic cause-effect relationship. 7 Cohen explicitly holds that functional explanations or 'consequence explana" tions' (as he later calls them) are a variety of causal explanations-see Cohen (1980: 130). Luhmann holds exactly the opposite POSitiOll, as Berger and Offc rightly observed: 'Luhmann surpriSingly, but plausibly, suggests that we reverse the relationship of "functionality" and "causality", In his view, functional relations are no longer a special subcase of causal relations, but causal relations a subcase of functional ones' (Berger and Oifc 1982: 522). 186 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 1 8 7 A, C, 0, E functionally equivalent to produce B? This approach opens up a space for alternative possibilities and a gain in knowledge. Luhmann consequently characterizes the 'causal sciences' as metaphysics, since they try to fix action to invariant relations between determinant causes and determined effects Id. Luhmann 1970: 26). It seems that Luhmann's functional analysis does not claim the same explanatory power as, for cxample, Cohen's functionalist explanation lor any causal ex­ planation in gcneral); it is no accident that Luhmann avoids talking about 'explanations'. His concern is with functional equivalents which would give us more illuminating insights than strict causal connections Isee also Berger and Offe 1982). '. In his Soziale Systeme, Luhmann seems to come close to Cohen's insistence that functional analysis may be a useful tool even in the case where micro-mechanisms cannot be shown to be at work, when he writes that the increase in knowledge provided by the functional method is based on a comparison of causal connections which is possible even in cases where we have little knowledge of the causalities involved .' The functional method is a comparative method which serves as a means for broadening the viewpoint in order to see other possibilities. It tries to find relations between relations, it relates something to 9 · an aspect of a problem in order to compare it to other soIutlOns. Larmore 1 1 982) and others have objected to this view in that the relation between these functional equivalents is not clear and that arbitrary equivalents could be listed. However, as Luhmann asserts, this is not the case. It is decisive that the additional points are limited by the nature and aspects of the problem one is interested in. Therefore, not everything, but few points can be added. The real virtue and achievement of this approach lics in H 'Growth in knowledge as it were cuts across causalities. It resides in their comparison. One can achieve it even if causalities are understood at first hypothetically or without being adequately researched' (Luhmann 1984a: 84, my trans.). . <,) 'The functional method is ultimately a comparative onc. And itS mtroduc­ tion into reality serves to open up what exists there to other possibilities. Ultimately it ascertains relations among relations. It relates something to a perspective on a problem in order to be able to relate this to oth�rsolutions of the problem. Accordingly, "functional explanation" can be nothmg less than the ascertainment (in general) and exclusion (in particular) of functional equivalences' libid. 85, my trans.}. . . the construction of thc problem Id. Luhmann 1984a: 86) 1O However, Luhmann is not as vulnerable as Cohcn, since he does not accept the underlying claim regarding scientific research. According to him, mainstream science is fascinated by a parallel between the structure of theoretical statemcnts IAussagestruktur) and the structure of the object I Gegenstandsstruktur). l l In fact, Luhmann'S decisive turn has been the adaptation of a constructiv­ ist epistemology. Cohen, on the other hand, shares the premisses of mainstream science, which makes his position in the debate with Elster more vulnerable. One purpose of Elster's Making Sense of Marx was to show that whenever Marx engages in functional analYSiS, he goes astray, and whenever he engages in causal analysis, especially based on the premisscs of methodological indiVidualism, he arrives at good and valid results. It is beyond the scope of the present study to prove the exact oppositc. However, I shall draw some attention to this point. Marx alludes several times to the model of natural scienccs with which he tricd to bolster his analysis in Capital where we find many references to chemistry, biology, astronomy, physics, and mathematics. His ultimate aim was to discover and explain the law of motion of capitalist society. He understood this law in close analogy to Newton's discovery of the movements of the plancts. Once the movements and regularities are understood, we can determine the state of the universe at any point in time, in the past and in the future. We are able to predict eclipses of the sun and the moon or the 10 As Luhmann points out, functional analysis does not attempt to justify or legitimize its object of study, it is a technique of discovering pro�lems which have already been solved in reality with the help of system theoreucal assump­ tions (see Luhmann 1978: 6j. II For a criticism of the 'natural science model' sec also Charles Taylor, according to whom this rests on 'the view that the natural sciences can proVide us with paradigms for the methods and procedures of the social science. We think we understand the activity of exploring nature. Here, too, we arc certainly over�complacent. But we tell ourselves a tolerably clear story of what goes on in natural science, and the very success of our research seems to indicate that we have here the norm for science in general. The prestige of this norm then stops further enquiry' (Taylor 1985: 91-2). Without embarking on an exposition of the question whether there are different sorts of scientific knowledge, we can propose two general solutions to the problem stated by Taylor: either we look for explanations sui generis in the social realm, or we stick to a 'monist' view, rejecting, however, the realist epistemology which underpins the natural science model. In the latter case, both natural and social sciences construct their own object of knowledge. 188 Historical Materialism return of comets. Marx was convinced that he had found the equivalent for the social world. His supreme task was to show that capitalism will lead to its own supersession which is brought about by the laws of motion of capitalism itself. Only if we are aware of this line of thought are we able to understand Marx's obsession with cyclical economic crises, the law of the falling rate of profit, the general law of capitalist accumulation, etc. But today these models have less fascination. One important reason for this is that the natural sciences themselves are moving away from purely causal models. Authors like Prigogine, Hahn, Elgen, von Foerster, and many others doubt the validity of causal explanatIOn when analysing complex systems. To predict the future behaviour of such systems, the usual causal principle that the same causes lead to the same effects must be made in a stronger way. The causal principle must be that similar causes must lead to similar effects (d. Krohn and Klippers 1989: 78 1 smce the startmg conditions of systems are never equal but always have minimal variations. As soon as we have minimal deviations �f one system from the other, little causes can lead to big effects l 2 But il this is true, the strong version of causality loses Its plauslb,hty. The fascination of the traditional paradigm was based on the belief that behind all eomplexities one will find regularity and simplicity. This was plausible in a world in which classical mechanics served as a model for the whole of nature. The more this model is losing its paradigmatic eharaeter, the less the strong assumptions can convince. The universe is no watch, the planet is no machine, living beings are no automata (d. ibid. 791. It may be worth noting that Marx, although relying heavily on claSSIcal mechamcs and especially astronomy, nevertheless lends hImself to a more cautious reading. See, for example, the following passage from Capital: As the heavenly bodies, once thrown into a certain definite motion always repeat this, so is it with SOci�ll production as soon as it is onc� thrown into this movement of alternate expansion and contraction. Effects, in their turn, become causes, and the varying accidents of the 12 Krohn and Kuppcrs quote the example of E. N. Lorenz who in his studies on weather found out that insignificant variations in the date set-up led to com­ , pletely dlffcre nt developments. This was due to an exponential amplification of , , the small vanatlons. r F' t j r! Historical Materialism 189 whole process, which always reproduces its own conditions, take on the form of periodicity. (Capital i. 593) In thc first sentence he vindicates the model of classical mech­ anics and tries to apply it for his social scientific analysis. In the second sentence he moves partly away from it in claiming that effects turn into causes, that there are varying accidents in the whole process which give rise to new emerging orders (Eigen­ zlZstimde, to use a contemporary term). lt is interesting to introduce Weber's analysis of religion here. Weber used the notion of 'elective affinity' (Wahlverwandtschaftl to analyse specific social and cultural developments, such as the rise of Protestantism and capitalism. The term stems from chemistry and was taken up by Goethe who wrote a novel with that title.13 But it was also known in philosophy where Kant employed the term 'affinity'. The 'art of divorce' was his way of separating the rational from the empirical. In the final paragraph of Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kant suggested the 'moral sciences' proceed according to the methods of mechanics or chemistry: This example [i.e. mechanics] may suggest to us to enter on the same path in treating of the moral capacities of our nature, and may give us hope of a like good result. We have at hand the instances of the moral judgement of reason. By analysing these into their elementary concep­ tions, and in default of mathematics adopting a process similar to that of chemistry) the separation of the empirical from the rational elements that may be found in them, by repeated experiments on common sense, we may exhibit both pure, and learn with certainty what each part can accomplish of itself, so as to prevent on the one hand the errors of a still cnlde untrained judgement, and on the other hand . . . the extravagances of } genius, by which, as by the adepts of the philosopher s stone} without any methodological study or knowledge of nature} visionary treasures are promised and true are thrown away. (Kant 1952b: 361, my emphasis) Weber became familiar with Kant's philosophy via Kuno Fischer (see Howe 1978: 377). A logical or analytical affinity was a 'property of the concepts that they have certain features in common with other concepts', as the Encyc10piidische Worter­ buch der l<Iitischen Philosophie noted in 1 797 (see Howe 1978: 3761. The classical definition was that of Bergman: 1 3 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Die Wablverwandtschaften ( 1 809); see Howe 1978: 3 7 1 . Historical Materialism 190 Historical Materialism Suppose A to be a substance for which other heterogenous substances, a, b, C, &c./ have an attraction; suppose further A combined with c to saturation [this unit I shall call Ac), should, upon the addition of b, tend to unite with it to the exclusion of c, A is then said to attract b more strongly than c, or to have a stronger elective attraction for it; lastly, let the union of Ab, upon the addition of a, be broken, let b be rejected, and a chosen in its place, it will follow that a exceeds b in attractive power, and we shall have a series a, b, c in respect of efficacy. What I here call attraction, others denominate affinity. (Bergman 1970, cited in Howe 1978: 374-5)14 In the climate of the beginning of the twentieth century, with the influence of vulgar Marxists' economic determinism, Weber tried to escape such a narrow way of thinking using the metaphor of elective affinities. The vulgar Marxists' interpretation of social life and social evolution was based ( I ) on the base­ superstructure model which was (2) taken in a causal way (3) with the superstructure explained in purely economic terms. Engels protested against this interpretation15 but his intervention hardly settled the debate. Ever since then, orthodox Marxists have had enormous difficulties in handling the relations in the base-superstructure mode!. 16 Against this poor model, and the confusion which it caused, Weber suggested another analytical model, as, for example, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: In view of the tremendous confusion of interdependent influences between the material basis, the forms of social and political organization, and the ideas current in the time of the Reformation, we can only proceed by investigating whether and at what points certain correlations [Wahlverwandtschaftenl between forms of religious belief and practical ethics can be worked out. IWeber 1930: 9 1 ) " 14 'From chemistry and Bergman would come the basic paradigm of elective affinity; from literature and Goethe, its application to the portrayal of social relationships; from philosophy and Kant, the art of divorce of the empirical from the rational and the affinity of all things in their possibility' (Howe 1978: 382). IS See his letters to Joseph Bloch, 2 1-22 Sept. 1890, and to Conrad Schmidt, 27 Oct. 1890, both in MEW xxxvii; to Franz Mehring, 14 July 1893, and to W. Borgius, 25 Jan. 1894, both in MEW xxxix. 16 Thousands of scholars since then have been looking for the 'last instance' or 'relative autonomy'. 17 Unfortunately, Parsons translated Wahlverwandtschafl as correlation instead of elective affinity. Howe's translation reads as follows: 'in view of the immense confusion of reciprocal influences between the material bases, the 191 Certainly, there have been attempts to define the Marxist term of 'determination' exactly in this sensc of 'correspondence', , or 'correlation . 1 8 Cohen too suggests something similar when he says that an existing productive force is only compatible with a small range of social relations, 1 9 which means that a strict determination does not obtain. Weber's methodological pro­ gramme is thus a comparatively modest one, in the sense that it does not establish causal or lawful connections: 'When we construct a "stage of culture", then this thought construct, analysed into judgements, means only that the individual appear­ ances that we thereby assemble conceptually are " adequate" to one another, possess a certain measure of "inner affinity" iinnere Verwandtschaft] . . with one another, but never that they follow from one another with any kind of lawfulness' (Weber 1 930, as cited in Howe 1978: 378). Recall, now, Marx's analysis of capitalism and machinery. We can view it from the Cohen, Luhmann, or Weber standpOint. According to Cohen, we would get a functional relation between productive forces and social relations. According to Luhmann, there may be functional equivalents to actual solutions and we should avoid the mistake of regarding the actual as the 'necessary' and inescapable solution. Piore and Sable, for example, claim that handicraft production (combined with computer technology) , may well be a 'functional 20 alternative to industrial mass production (Piore and Sable 1984). According to Weber, there must obtain 'elective affinities' between the elements which form a unit. The question of whether machinery is compatible with communist society may serve as an example here. As we . forms of social and political organization, and the intellectual and spiritual contents of the cultural epochs of the Reformation, one can proceed only by first of all inquiring as to whether and in what points definite elective affinities between certain forms of its religious faith and its work ethic are discernible' [Howe 1978: 3681. See also Schluchter 198 1 : 142. I f! See Raymond Williams's suggestion that a determination sets only limits and does not determine {bestimmenj in the strong sense (Williams 1977: 83-9). But the problem is not just a semantic one of how to translate the German 'bestimmen', since Engels already had trouble explaining what 'bestimmend in letzter Instanz' meant (see above). [<) The undcrdetermination of the relations by the forces of production is deVeloped in Cohen 1978: 163-5. 20 1 put 'functional' in quotation marks because the authors themselves do not use the term. 192 Historical Materialism have seen in Chapter 3, Marx was ambiguous about this problem. In the Manuscripts 1861-3, he regarded machinery as inherently deskilling, leading to the enslaving and crippling of human beings. In Capital, he revised this position, stressing the co­ operative character of mass production and blaming only the social form, that is, capitalism which employs machinery. From the viewpoint of present-day Western societies we might add the effects of machinery on the natural environment. In the following sections I shall thus try to establish some possible relations between capitalism and machinery, postponing the question of communism to Chapter 5. 4.2 Capitalism and machinery as autopoietic systems? " The starting-point for my elaboration here is the curious way in which Marx links capitalism and machinery. He wants to stress that capital has found in machinery its adequate mode of pro­ duction IMEGA II. iii. 6. 2142-41, which is to say that before the use of machinery the mode of production could not be called capitalist: Modern Industry had therefore itself to take in hand the machine, its characteristic instrument of production, and to construct machines by machines. It was not till it did this, that it built up for itself a fitting technical foundation, and stood on its own feet. ICapital i. 363)22 With respect to the social form, he says that only from that point on, where capital exists in its 'pure' form Ii.e. essentially as capital-labour relation), does it stand on its own feet and is therefore capitalist in the real sense of the word. The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realize their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own feet, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale. ICapital i. 668, amended translation) This is a process which 'transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the 21 This section owes much to discussions I had with Gunther Teubner. Grundrisse 699; d. also MEGA II. iii. 6. 2059. It would be interesting to ask 12 if this is also true the other way round. In other words, can we assume that machinery has found in capital its adequate social expression? Historical Materialism 193 other, the immediate producers into wage-labourers' I Capital i. 668). The capitalist mode of production 'produces not merely the material products, but reproduces continually the production relations in which the former are produced, and thereby also the corresponding distribution relations' I Capital iii. 879). In both cases the 'crutches' of pre-capitalist modes of production could be thrown away. We are thus in both cases dealing with self-referential operations: production of capital by means of capital, production of machinery by means of machinery. It seems tempting to apply autopoietic systems theory to these two processes since Marx himself conceives the material and the social as self-referential processes 23 Autopoietic theory has been developed in biology IMaturana 1982; Varela 1979, 1981; Maturana and Varela 1980) and in social theory Ifor example, Luhmann 1984a; Hej1 1982; Willke 1983, 1986, 1987; Teubner 1988a, 1988b, 1988c, 1989a, 1989b).24 , This 'emerging paradigm 25 takes as its point of departure the concepts of 'self-reference', basic circularity, and operative closure of social systems. However, as has been emphasized by several authors ITeubner 1987, 1989a; Roth 1987; Buhl 1987; Zolo 1 99 1 ), one has to be careful not to mix up the concepts of self­ referentiality, self-reproduction, and autopoiesis. Autopoietic theory defines system and environment in a different way from 'General Systems Theory'; it combines systems theoretical elements with evolutionary theory and constructivist epistemology. In some versions, like Luhmann'S, it tries to overcome basic theoretical difficulties of older socio­ logical approaches, like Parsons's structural functionalism or General Systems Theory. How is an autopoietic system defined? Stichweh, following 23 Sztompka ( 1 974: 177) has claimed that 'Marx may be pronounced the forefather of the modern systems approach in social sciences'. In an illuminat­ ing article, Amburgery and McQuarie try to interpret Marx's categories in a systems theoretic way. In contrast to Cohen, who stresses the primacy of the productive forces, Amburgery and McQuarie emphasize the 'reciprocal linkages between the various subsystems of this model' (Amburgery and McQuarie 1977: 100). 24 For a critique which is not completely hostile to the concept of autOpoiesis as such, but doubts the validity of using it in broad analogy to biology as a new 'super-paradigm', see Buhl 1987. 25 Some authors call it a 'revolutionary paradigm', d. Krohn, Kiippcrs, and Paslack 1987. 194 Historical Materialism Luhmann, gives four criteria which must be fulfilled to call a social system autopoietic: 1 . operational closure: operations of the system relate only to operations of the same system; 2. definition of its own elements: the systemic process defines what will function as its elements; 3. production of its own elements: an autopoietic system is a network of processes which produce elements for this system; 4. self-definition of the system-boundary Isee Stichweh 1987: 448-9). Someone might propose to apply criteria 1 1 )-13) to technology and say that technology is operationally closed and has clearly defined elements. He would probably describe technology as a system of instrumental artefacts which produces instrumental artefacts.26 Taking this assumption for granted for the sake of the argument, we could therefore say that technology is opera­ tionally closed. Turning to the elements of the system, we might say that it does not matter which substances the elements of an autopoietic system consist of Ithey may be books, factory buildings, banks, or persons), because 'elements' of the system are not things or persons, but operations. However, as will become clear in a moment, such a proposition fails for two reasons: I I ) technology cannot be conceived as a social sub­ system of society; 12) the material aspect of technology has not to be neglected: technology is not only a 'meaning-based system'. According to Luhmann, a social system 'consists of meaningful communications-only of communications, and of all communications. It forms its elementary units from the synthesis of information, communication, comprehension . . .' ILuhmann 1988a: 18). To be sure, technology could be conceived as a specialized social communication which can be defined apart from political, religiOUS, economic, and scientific com26 It would be production of technology by means of technology (to allude to Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means 0/ Commodities). Taken in the above sense, technology would be a special case of commodity. A commodity is the unity of exchange-value and use-value. There seems to be no problem in regarding value production as a self-referential process. But what about use­ values and, speCifically, technology? Marx himself gave us a few hints to conceive technology in terms of basic circularity; sec e.g. Capital L 363; Grundrisse 699. As I shall argue, this line of argument cannot be maintained. Historical Materialism 195 munications. Technology could even be conceived of as a self­ referential and self-reproductive process: whenever engineers are constructing a new technology, they are likely to take machines and textbooks of colleagues as models Isee Rammert 1988). However, technology cannot be conceived as exclusively based on meaning, as other social systems can. It would be absurd to see the essential elements in a thus conceived techno­ logical social system as consisting of communicative events. What gives technology its specific role in social life is, on the contrary, that some of its basic elements are material in character. In addition to the above definition of a social system, Luhmann calls a social system an autopoietic system in so far as it is a recursively closed system} which can neither derive its operations from its environment nor pass them on to that environment. It cannot communicate with the environment but it can and must necessarily communicate about the environment . . . This is a very clear} very unequivocal state of affairs} which does not pose any fundamental difficulties in the concept of unity or in the demarcation of the system from the environment . . . [Tbe system) does not, for example, consist of physical events nor of isolated individual behaviouL ILuhmann 1988a: 18-19, emphasis added) According to Luhmann's position, 'An autopoietic system . . . constitutes the elements of which it consists through the elements of which it consists' libid. 14). Elements of a social system are events or communications. Events 'have no duration in which they can change, but disappear immediately on their emergence . . . Since the social system . . . consists of nothing but communications, it belongs to this type of system that consists of events' ILuhmann 1988b: 341-2). From this account it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive technology as a social system-it would only be possible if technology is defined in a broad way Isee ch. 3).17 Take first the aspect of 27 From Luhmann's quote it also becomes clear that Marx's thought and autopoietic theory are located on two different 'ontological' levels: the former assumes that societies are able to have direct contact with their environment, the latter denies exactly this and insists on the purely communicative dimen­ sion of society. For Marx, the possibility that society has a direct contact with nature was at the very heart of his theory. As we saw, he regarded the conscious transformation of nature as the precondition for history. For autopoietic theory, on the other hand, an environment 'out there' docs not exist; what exists is only system-internal constructions of reality. I return to this problem below. 196 Historical Materialism events. Since technology produces durable artefacts, it hardly falls under the category of an 'event'. Consider, next, the aspect of communication. Technology may be conceived of in com­ municative terms as well. This is the case when, for example, engineers discuss the design of a new machine, or when politicians confer on the problem of dangerous technologies. But the 'essence' of technology can hardly be grasped with the notion of commu­ nication alone. Technology typically produces 'a machine, a drug, or a process of Some kind' (Price 1982: 1 70). Luhmann additionally brings to bear a further criterion: every functional subsystem of society has its own 'binary code' which organizes its operations. For example, he defines money as the code of the economy, power as the code of the political system, truth as the code of the scientific system, etc. The point of Luhmann's argument is that the autonomy of the various social systems consists in their coding: it is the economy which decides what counts as payment and what does not; it is the political system which decides what counts as power and what does not; it is the scientific discipline which decides what counts as scientific knowledge (truth) and what does not. It follows as a corollary that politics cannot solve problems of science, the economy cannot solve problems of the political system, science cannot solve problems of the economy, etc. In this sense a technological system is neither a social nor an autopoietic system. It is the realm in which mankind organizes its Stoffwechsel with nature.'8 This is a process which proceeds partly by means of communication, partly by means of material transformation of the environment. From my definition and the discussion in section 3.3 it follows that the material dimension is crucial for the concept of technology. Luhmann's theory also draws attention to this material element as the 'eternal presup­ position' for social systems: All systems form in a presupposed materiality continuum, which Maturana calls medium. For example, they presuppose a structure of matter rooted in atoms, just as the formation of atoms obviously 2" Technology should thus be defined as '.allopoietic' because of its hetero­ geneous character (ef. Maturana 1982: 159). It is essentially instrumental, a pool of skills and knowledge which is linked to all other systems: science, economy, and politics. Historical Materialism 197 presupposes energy capable of being bound. In the formation of systems, then, there is never any kind of recreation of the world in each individual case. This materiality continuum which has in each case to be presupposed takes no heed of the system boundaries of the differen­ tiating systemj it is both inside and outside the system. It nevertheless limits the possibilities of system formation, since only such systems are possible that are compatible with the materiality continuum. The emergence of social systems based on meaning processing presupposes the existence of a multiplicity of such materiality continua and is thus rather improbable. (Luhmann 1988b: 338) Social systems rest on this material continuum but operate on the basis of social meaning. In so doing, they are constructing their own social reality. So far the use of the notion of material continuum is in accordance with Luhmann's use. However, I think we can make use of it in another respect as well. It fulfils the function of keeping together the different social systems 'from below'. It makes plausible the claim that politics, economy, and science not only are occasionally or punctually in contact but are coupled on the basis of this material continuum. This provides the 'material basis' for the linkage of the social systems. The potential financial reward of a technological invention links technology immediately to the economic system, perhaps without giving much importance to science. Science is part of the environment of the economy, that is, inventions depart from an available given standard of scientific knowledge. If for political reaSons research is directed towards certain goals, it is the political system which gives rise to that research. The financing involves the economic system too. The political system may also enhance technological development in a direct way by subsidizing innovative firms. At this point a basic objection could be made. As I discussed Marx's model of Stoffwechsel, it was clear that society (by virtue of its ArbeitsprozefJ) had the possibility of transforming the environment in a physical way. It is precisely this possibility that is denied by Luhmann. It is impossible for society to derive operations from its environment and to pass operations on to that environment. How can we, then, reconcile the proposed systems approach with Marx's analysis of technology? Are the two theories mutually exclusive since they presuppose different ontologies? 198 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism I shall not doubt that the theories are ontologically disparate. However, they are by no means incompatible. The solution draws on the notion of 'materiality continuum' which is presup­ posed by systemic operations and which is inside and outside social systems. In Marx, the labour process is a goal-orientated transformation of nature which takes place with tools (or processes) and is zweckrational, i.e. determined by means-ends relationships. From this goal-orientation it follows that technology stands in a close relationship to rational human action or to a systemic rationality: the goals are in most cases clearly defined by tech­ nical imperatives: produce product x!, solve problem Y!, adjust 2! whereas autopoietic systems do not have a final goal, end, or 'telos'. The product and goal of their working are they themselves. When Marx analysed the valorization process (capitalist eco­ nomy), he employed a method which imagines traits of 'basic circularity' and self-reference, even of autopoiesis.29 The capitalist economy is an auropoietic system par excellence (see also Breuer 1987). But, as we have seen, it is not possible to extend this analogy to the process of use-value production as such, to man's transformation of nature, in short, to technology. These considerations suggest that the possibilities of influ­ encing technology are not so small. It seems that pessimistic analyses which have it that technology has slipped out of control of human action (Ellul 1964; see also Winner 1977) tell only half the truth: it is true, indeed, that technology is evolving according to its own Sachgesetzlichkeit ('technical imperatives'), moves in the way of 'trajectories', and cannot be determined by individual action. Furthermore, it is true that attempts to change existing technologies in some desired direction must fit three different logics or 'systemic codes'. This narrows down the range of feasible possibilities. But it is not true that technology as such develops according to its own logic linner code), or even moves away from the human world. A pessimistic argument would have to show that all technologies have merged together into one autonomous technological trajectory which cannot be changed.3D But theoretical considerations and empirical evidence 29 See his definition of capital as essentially referring to itself, as automatisches Subjck,' (Das Kapi'aI i. 169 1 . JO See Adorno and Horkheimer 1981 as an illustration of such pessimism. t 199 can show that the social impact on technological development is considerable. Before explaining this, I shall briefly address the self-referentiality of technology. In a particularly useful essay, Hughes addresses the problem of identifying a technological system when he says that '[t[ech­ nological systems solve problems or fulfil goals using whatever means are available and appropriate; the problems have to do mostly with re-ordering the physical world in ways considered useful or desirable' (Hughes 1987: 53). However, his approach is not informed by autopoietic theory. Rather, so it seems, he remains with a model which conceives systems as open, input­ using, and output-producing. But then how do we distinguish a technological system from any other system? Or are all social systems varieties of one, ali-embracing technological system? In this case we could conceive of the technological system as a subsystem of every social system: politics, law, economy, and art use technologies.3l Hughes is also aware of the difficulty when endorsing the wide definition of technology. He thus tries to make the following qualification to the definition of techno­ logy: 'It is problem solving usually concerned with the re-order­ ing of the material world to make it more productive of goods and services' (ibid., my emphasis). However, the criterion of productivity is basically an economic one, that is, technology itself cannot measure its own 'productivity'. Engineers who work in the field of machines and power transformation usually use Leistungsgrad (performance) as an indicator for the efficiency of their products, but this physical criterion is quite different from efficiency in the economic or social sense. This leads to the paradoxical situation in which a distinction is applied to itself, for example, Is it legal that law distinguishes between the legal and illegal? (See, for example, Fletcher 1985; Luhmann 1988c.) In our case we could ask: is a new productive device productive or not? This is to say that technology stands in a relation of augmentation to itself. What counts as more productive is open to debate. A higher energy-balance need not be more efficient in the economic sense.32 This historical record of capitalism so far .11 See Weber 1978: 32, Ellul 1964. It may be noted that Hughes's solution resorts to actor models where an actor measures and defines progress. It sounds ironic, but to make his system approach work, he needs a systems builder, Le. a person who forges the n . 200 Historical Materialism shows that economic criteria played a crucial role in this evalua­ tion. The successful entrepreneur has most importantly to unite economic and engineering skills and knowledge." But today other factors are entering this evaluation. For example, effects on the natural environment which are recorded by scienti­ fic research, monitored by politics, and transformed into decisions which are based on some social acceptability of technologies ('technology assessment' and 'Sozial- und Umweltvertraglich­ keit'). Having rejected the notions of an 'autonomous' technology and of technological system, I now ask: How shall we conceive of the coevolution of technology and society? Is technology at any point in time SOCially determined and hence subjected to human design? Instead of determining life, is it not itself com­ pletely determined by social arrangements? I deal with this question in two steps. 1 . As far as the question juxtaposes social and technological determinism, it is paralleled by a similar ambivalence in Marx. As I suggested above (see s. 3.4), Marx believed in both techno­ logical determinism and social determinism because of a twofold theoretical interest. Its first element is historical: to find out which variable 'explains most'; the second element is critical: to estimate the technological and social possibilities and require­ ments for a communist society. From this follows Marx's reduc­ tionism and his determinisim of one sort or another. There is nothing wrong with reductionism and determinism if it is supported by certain theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence. My suspicion is, however, that Marx was led astray by this approach. He wavered between a social and a technological determinism depending on his prevailing theoretical interest. In a very rough way,"4 we can say that he was a technological determinist when he tried to explain historical development ( 'backwards'-orientated), but became a social determinist when heterogeneous elements together and takes care that new technology will be more productive. 33 As Schumpeter put it, '[ilt is therefore quite wrong . . . to say, as so many economists do, that capitalist enterprise was onc, and technological progress a second, distinct factor in the observed development of output; they were essentially one and the same thing' (Schumpetcr 1987: 1 10, see also 132). ,{4 For the necessary qualifications, see s. 3.4. Historical Materialism 201 he tried to evaluate the possibilities for a communist society ('forwards'-orientated).35 Recent studies in the history and sociology of technology are strongly opposed to technological determinism (Pinch and Bijker 1987; Hughes 1987; Law 1987; MacKenzie 1987) and arguefor a strong social determinism. Pinch and Bijker try to apply the 'strong programme' (developed in the sociology of science) to technology. The label they adopt therefore is 'Social construc­ tion of technology' (SCOT). The starting-point for their approach is the Kuhnian notion of scientific paradigm, especially as further developed by Mulkay and others. Whereas Kuhn restricted his analysis to the natural sciences, several attempts have been made to extend it to the social sciences. Pinch and Bijker now try to apply it to technology, thus claiming that technology, just like natural and social sciences, is a social construction which gets stabilized during a process of 'closure', that is, technologists come to agree on a specific technology as the solution to a specific problem. There is nothing 'inheren tly' superior in a technology which becomes dominant over competing tech­ nologies; it is simply a matter of convention. From this it follows that a history of technology has to dispense with the idea that dominant technologies are 'better' technologies in comparison to others. The point is to treat successful and unsuccessful technologies in the same way ('symmetry of ex­ planation') and to show how contingent factors led to a decision which selected this or that technology. In my view this approach is a good starting-point for any sociological analysis of technology. However there are two comments I should like to make. The first is th�t the notion of 'social shaping' is too vague. As I have shown above, the 'social' must be further decomposed into social subsystems (politicS, economics, and science) in order to trace the inner dynamics of technology. From this it follows that it is not sufficient that 'technological closure' takes place; the technology which is successful in the 'middle run' has to be compatible with economic and political factors as well. The second point is that Pinch and Bijker try to employ their argu­ ment as an argument .against an evolutionary view of technology. They assume that once they Gan show that a process of closure .�5 As we saw in 55. 3.5 and 3.6, the two approaches can be found in a nearly ideal�typ�cal way in the Manuscripts 1861-3 and in Capital. 202 Historical Materialism takes place in the technological field, this is evidence against an evolutionary view of technology. But this assumption is com­ pletely mistaken; the contrary follows from their argument. To disprove an evolutionary view it is not sufficient to show that intentional human actions and choices are at work. As the example of the deck of cards lef. Weick 1979) can show, an attribution of the label 'evolution' to any development of an entity over time depends in the first place on the criteria of order which an observer wants to apply Isee also s. 3 . 1 .2). Thomas P. Hughes admits that technological systems 'are both socially constructed and society shaping' IHughes 1987: 5 1 ). Viewing technology as system, he comes close to attributing an autonomous development to it. However, Hughes refuses to subscribe to such a notion. He coins the term 'momentum' for the phenomena that technological systems consolidate and grow. As he explicitly points out, '[mJomentum . . . remains a more useful concept than autonomy. Momentum does not contradict the doctrine of social construction of technology, and it does not support the erroneous belief in technological deter­ minism. The metaphor encompasses both structural facts and contingent events' libid. 80). I think this formulation makes the point very well: what is needed is a theory which is capable of combining structural and contingent events. Hughes, however, does not offer much of such a theory. Unfortunately, he limits himself to historical illustration and very weak theoretical generalizations. On the one hand, he doubts the autonomy of technology libid. 79), on the other he concedes that '[IJarge systems with high momentum tend to exert a soft determinism on other systems, groups, and individuals in society' libid. 54-5, my emphasis). But how can technology exert a determining force if it is not autonomous? This question leads to the second step of my discussion. 2. As far as the question juxtaposes autonomous and hetero­ nomous systems the following can be said. It seems that it is not possible to impress a specific shape on existing technology at any time in any direction. Such attempts are likely to fail in one of three senses: these attempts may be dysfunctional, irrelevant, or detrimental to the acting system it elf.'" As Piore and Sabel 36 Cf. Teubner's 'regulatory trilemma'; Teubner 1985. Historical Materialism 203 1 1 984) maintain, there exist specific 'branching points' in the development of technology which make 'human choice' possible. But apart from the strong notion of social construction of technology, we should consider another possibility which goes beyond the question of 'determination'. In this view technology is conceived of as having some 'eigendynamics' lin the sense that technical properties inhibit or enhance certain technological developments), but is at the same time shaped by social factors. Let me thus return again, this time in more detail, to evolutionary theory. 4.3. Evolution and Darwinian systems Since Marx's analysis explicitly attempts an evolutionary ex­ planation of productive forces and mode of production, we might look a little more closely at Darwinian systems. Eigen and Schuster 1 1977, 1978a, 1978b) have emphaSized the follow­ ing properties of Darwinian systems which they regard as their 'necessary prerequisites': The essential requirement for a system to be self�selective is that it has to stabilize certain structures at the expense of others . . . The criteria for evaluation must involve some feedback property, which ensures the identity of value and dynamic stability. An advantageous mutant, once produced as a consequence of some fluctuation, must be able to amplify itself in the presence of a large excess of less advantageous competitors. IEigen and Schuster 1977: 547) The 'advantageous mutant' in our case is, of course, the machine. But Marx's theory also contains an evolutionary scheme for the modes of production. The ' advantageous mutant' in this case is capitalist commodity production. Generally speaking, the new emerges as a result of recombinations of the already existing, as Loh emphasized: during development and change the new does not simply supplement the already existing but is constituted from the pre-existing by means of development of the form ILoh 1975: 261 ). Purely incremental change need not lead to evolu­ tionary change of forms. According to Schumpeter's striking phrase, you may 'add as many mail-coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby' ISchumpeter 1934: 54). We can conceive the evolution of technology Imachinery) and 204 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 205 mode of production Icommodity production) in isolation from each other and in coevolution with each other. The first would apply to machines which emerged long before eapitalism. It is the case of specialization and differentiation that Marx refers to. They were the precondition for the rise of machinery. The two model machines which the sixteenth century inherited from antiquity were the clock and the mill id. Marx's letter to Engels of 28 Jan. 1863. Note that neither machine is hasedon a deskilling of the handicraft worker.) Capital also existed before capitalism, above all in the form of money-capital. The interesting question, then, is how the two came into touch with each other, triggering off hitherto unknown technological dynamism. One of Marx's implicit theoretical tasks was to provide an explanation for the fact that out of a variety of technologies and modes of production the capitalist mode and machinery, com­ bined together, became the successful ones and drove out all , others lor pushed them into 'niches ).37 The mechanism of the self-organizing hypercycle is described by Eigen and Schuster in the following way: tion. Before the advent of capitalism, all these elements lalso the model machine mill) had existed in niches. As we shall see, Marx is never suffiCiently clear on whether technology is a 'self­ replicative unit' or a 'functional linkage' -'8 Eigen and Schuster list several properties of the so-called hypercycle, of which the seventh is of special interest here: 'Selection of a hypercycle is a "once-for-ever" decision. In any common Darwinian system mutants offering a selective advan­ tage can easily grow up and become established. Their growth properties are independent of the population size . . . a hypercycle, once established, can not easily be replaced by any newcomer, since new species always emerge as one copy lor a few)' IEigen and Schuster 1978a: 4 1 ). With these methodological tools, we may read the following passages from the Manuscripts 1 861-3 and gain new insight into the problems with which Marx was confronted in his enterprise. In the following passage, Marx stresses the gradual development of modes of production and technology using an analogy to geology: Functional integration of an ensemble consisting of several self­ replicative units requires the introduction of catalytic links among all partners. These linkages, superimposed on the individual replication cycles of the subunits, must form a closed loop, in order to stabilize the 'ensemble via mutual control of all population variables. Independent competitors, which under certain spatial conditions and for limited time spans may coexist in 'niches', as well as catalytic chains or branchcd networks are devoid of self-organizing propcrties, typical of hypercycles. Mere coexistence is not sufficient to yield coherent growth and evolution of all partners of an cnsemble. (Eigen and Schustcr 1978a: 40- 1 ) As, with the sequence of different geological formations, one should not believe in sudden and sharply distinguished periods, the same is true of the making of the different economic formations of society. In the womb of artisan production the beginnings of manufacture developed and here we already find a partial usage of machinery. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1972) Recall here Marx's description of capitalism where machines are built by machines, capital produced by capital, and, as a precondition, labourers are separated from all means of produc37 Ballmer and von Weizsacker criticized Eigen and Schuster's model of the hypercycle for not allowing for 'niches': 'Eigen leaves isolation out of the picture. However, this is a factor of equal importance with mutation and se�ecti?n' ( �alll11er and von Weizsacker 1974: 248, my trans.}. This neglect . the very emergence of evolution: 'Eigen's theory builds up its own mIght mhlba decisive barrier against an evolution beyond the stage of hypercycles: the strategy of extirpation of the successful hypercycle against all others which is laid Out in Eigen's quasi-physical criterion of fitness' (ibid.). Note that Marx, while speaking of 'economic modes of produc­ tion', gives examples of technologies in order to distinguish them: artisan production, manufacture, and machines. Evolutionary theory also stresses the gradual development, the emerging of one form out of another: 'Evolution is conservative and therefore appears to be an almost continuous process, apart from occasional drastic changes. Selection is in fact based on instabilities brought about by the appearance of advantageous mutants that cause formerly stable distribution to break down. The descendants, however, are usually so closely related to their immediate ancestors that changes emerge very gradually' IEigen lind Schuster 1978b: 367). I think it is revealing to confront this .,� See von Neumann 1966 for an exposition of how we may conceive of machines capable of self-replication. 206 Historical Materialism statement with the following three passages from Marx: 'The general law, however, which is constant, is that the material possibility of the later form is produced in the former, as regards both the technological conditions, and the corresponding eco­ nomic structure of the atelier' (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1973). Compare also the following illuminating passage from the Grundrisse: 'It must be kept in mind that the new forces of production and relations of production do not develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from the womb of the self­ positing Idea; but from within and in antithesis to the existing development of production and the inherited, traditional relations of property' (Grundrisse 278). And in the Manuscripts 1 861-3: Here we have to remark above all that we are not dealing with a precise technological divide but with a revolution in the employed means of production which transforms the mode of production and therefore the relations of production. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1915) Once the revolution of the productive forces has been achieved (which reveals itself technologicallYl} a revolution in the relations of production also occurs. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1973) It may be said that these quotes strongly support a technological­ determinist view of history, that is, the emergence of the machine caused the change in the relations of production: after the revolution in productive forces comes a revolution in the relations of production. Butthere need not be a causal relation. Marx only says that with technological revolution a social revolution also occurs. Technical and social revolution could thus be parallel processes, without causal links. This interpreta­ tion is further supported by Marx's affirmation that not only present technology but also the present mode of production must have forerunners in the previous evolutionary stage when he says that 'the later form is produced in the former, as regards both the technological conditions, and the corresponding eco­ nomic structure' (cf. above, quote from MEGA II. iii. 6. 1973). This allows two possibilities of conceiving the 'social' and the 'technical': a causal and a functional model of historical change. We may interpret the following passage in both ways: The differentiation} specialization, and simplification of tools in manufacture which is based on the division of labour-their exclusive Historical Materialism 207 adaptation to very simple operations-is one of the technological, material preconditions for the development of maci1inery as an element which revolutionizes the mode and relations ofproduction. (MEGA II. iii. 6. 1914, my emphasis) Consider first the causal interpretation. According to this the division of labour leads to ('causes') differentiation and special­ ization of the work instruments, which constitutes the material condition for the development of machinery. Machinery, in turn, is one of the elements which leads to a revolution of the mode and the relations of production. If we leave aside the division of labour for a moment, we get the sequence shown in Fig. 4. 1 . T, ) Sx 1 Tb ) Sy F I G . 4.1 Technology T" leads to social revolution and eventually to social form Sx' Within this social form Sx a new technology Tz, arises which brings about social form Sy. Note that we have both a technological and a social determinism here: T,,->Sx stands for the technological, Sx-> Tz, stands for the social determinism. There is a causal effect of technology on the social form before a revolution and a causal effect of the social form on technology after a revolution. The canonical source for a technological determinism is the 1859 Preface; support for social determinism is found in the following passages from Capital i: At a given stage in its development, the narrow technical basis on which manufacture rested, came into conflict with requirements of production that were created by manufacture itself. (Capital i. 347) Manufacture produced the machinery, by means of which Modern Industry abolished handicraft and manufacturing systems in those spheres of production that it first seized upon. The factory system was therefore raised, in the natural course of things, on an inadequate foundation. When the system attained to a certain degree of develop­ ment, it had to root up this ready�made foundation, which in the 208 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism 209 meantime had been elaborated on the old lines, and to build up for itself a basis that should correspond to its mcthods of production. (Capital i. 361) In both cases the 'requirements' or the 'methods of production' are the driving force which cause a change in technology. This is a clear illustration that the growth of the productive forces has to be explained in a social way. Consider now the second possibility (see Fig. 4.2): s, F I G . 4.2 In the language of Eigen and Schuster this is a case of 'functional integration'. Such a functional integration requircs 'catalytic links' between the self-replicative units. These linkages must form a closed loop in order to stabilize the ensemble (see Eigen and Schuster 1978a: 40- 1 ). Similarly, Marx wants to establish a kind of 'elective affinity' between machinery and capitalism. This elective affinity has the following traits. Capital as 'pro­ cessing value' does not know any limits. Likewise, machinery does not depend on craft skills of workers nor on an increased working population in order to produce more commodities: the sale limits are physical (raw materials) and technical in character. As a result, a worker who is employed by capitalist machinery becomes dispossessed in two ways: in the technological realm, he gets dispossessed of his skill, in the economic realm, of the product of his labour.39 Note that in the case of a functional integration we have a coevolution of social forms and techno­ logies. When Cohen says that 'slavery rules out computer tech­ nology, but also computer technology rules out slavery' (Cohen 1 9 78 : 153), I shall leave open for the moment the question whether capitalism with, say, craft technology as dominant technology is equally impossible (see ch. 5). 3 9 I leave aside here whether this expropriation i s 'just' o r 'unjust'-see the contributions in Cohen et ai. 1980 and Geras 1986 for a good discussion and a complete overview of the literature. 4.3.1 . A machino-capitalist hypercyc1e Using the definition of Eigen and Schuster as heuristic device, I shall now try to define the 'self-replicative units', the 'catalytic links', and the 'closed loop'. In a first tentative approach, the 'self-replicative units' might be listed as follows: 1 . capital; 2. labour power; 3. machines; 4. raw materials. In Marx's view, as laid out in the 1859 Preface and elsewhere, productive forces, relations of production, and the superstructure stabilize each other. Elements ( 1 )-(4) from the above list all existed before capitalism; the 'capitalist hypercycle', however, is structured by the recomposition of all elements.4o ( 1 )-(4) are commodities which can be bought on the market; they fuse together in the production process where ( 1 )-12) constitute a social relation, 12)-13) a technical relation, 12)-14) the elements of 1 1 ) lvalue) under the aspect of use-value.4l But if Marx links up machinery and capitalism in such a definite way, it is impossible to speak of 'Maschinerie an sich', independent of Ibad) capitalist use: machinery is capitalistic, capitalism is machinery. Conse­ quently, the historical perspective must change: a post-capitalist society must also be a post-machinery society. From the Poverty of Philosophy onwards, where he says 'The handmill gives you the feudal lord',42 Marx has a curious theoretical scheme in 40 In the Grundrisse Marx emphasizes that the separation of these elements was the outcome of a long historical process of dissolution of old forms of production. 'It is not the case that capital creates the objective conditions of labour' (Grundrisse, Berlin edn,: 406; my trans.). Capital is the product of an evolutionary process, as are the instruments of work. 'The merit of capital consists only in uniting hands and instruments !which it has already found) under its control' (ibid. 407; my trans.). 41 Marx additionally emphasizes that ( 1 ) and (3) dominate 12l; since 'domin" ation' has no place in Darwinian systems, I shall leave this aside here. 42 'Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing their way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitaHst' (eW vi. 166). The example of the handmill may be historically untenable (see Elster 1985), but here I want to emphasize that it was Marx's aim to find such correspondences. 210 Historical Materialism mind. It consists of the law-like connection of ( I ) forces of produc­ tion, (2) mode of production, and (3) relations of production. The most significant and famous expression of this is to be found in the 1859 Preface and is commonly called 'historical materialism'. My claim is that Marx attributes to each of these analytical units an elementary form:' as the folloWing scheme shows. I consider all cases in turn. In the case of ( I ) productive forces it is artisan-, manufacture-, and machine-production. In the case of (2) mode of production it is use-value and commodity produc­ tion ('The commodity is the elementary form of bourgeois wealth'). The crucial point around which Political Economy revolved, and which only Marx solved (so he claimed), was his discovery that in capitalism the product (i.e. the commodity) reflects the double character of labour which is embodied in it. In other words: the commodity unites use-value and exchange­ value just as labour unites use-value-orientated concrete labour and exchange-value-orientated, surplus-producing abstract labour. Marx explicitly credited himself with this discovery (see his letter to Engels of 8 Jan. 1 868). In his evolutionary model we get the sequence Ii) use-value, (ii) exchange-value (commodity), and again (iii) use-value produc­ tion. As in ancient Greece, the Middle Ages (i.e. its artisans) were producing essentially use-value, not primarily exchange­ value. This is the crucial point for Marx. But he cannot simply return to the Middle Ages or to antiquity since he wants to establish a use-value-orientated production on the basis of capitalist productivity (but without domination of exchange­ value). The high level of productivity is the valuable point in the case of capitalism. Marx's vision of communism seems to 4,> Maybe we arc now living in a post-machinery age which is characterized by electronic and cybernetic systems. Accordingly, we should expect a social form which corresponds to it. Much has been said about 'post-industrial' society and its characteristics. In my view, however, the central difference in contemporary modem societies is not their industrial or post�industrial character but the difference between stratified class societies and functionally differentiated societies. In Marx's model a class division occurs also on the technological level since the great majority of the working class is an 'appendage' to the machine. If we apply his model to present Western societies, we would expect a new technology which'is different in this respect. If machines were run by workers who are not reduced to appendages, we could speak of a new, liberating technology. See Kern and Schumann 1986 for some empirical examples. r • Historical Materialism 2 1 1 assume that all good things go together-d. Elster 1985 and Lukes 1985. On the level of (3) relations of production, we have slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and communism. (i) corresponds to anti­ quity, (ii) to capitalism, and (iii) to communism. Note that there corresponds an ethical evolutionary scheme (Grundrisse 158 and German Ideology ( eW v. 78-9)), where Marx says that individuals were freer before the advent of capitalism. Habermas seems to be more optimistic as regards the evolutionary potential of the 'ethical realm' when he says: Whereas Marx localized the learning process important for evolution in the dimension of objective thought-of technical and organizational knowledgeJ of instrumental and strategic action, in short, of productive forces-there are good reasons meanwhile for assuming that learning processes also take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge . . . learning processes that are deposited in more mature forms of social integration, in new productive relations, and that in turn first make possible the introduction of new productive forces. (Habermas 1979: 97-9) The Middle Ages already partly produced commodities. Antiquity and communism have a social character of production. The first is regulated by blind rules, the second by a conscious plan (and the application of science). In feudalism and, above all, in capitalism, the market co-ordinates the many independent private producers.44 If we represent these three evolutionary strands graphically, we can detect an empty field (see Fig 4.3).45 A return to use-value production in communist society takes place on a higher and broader level than the ancient one-on a higher level because mankind has more developed needs, and more capacities to fulfil them, on a broader level because the development of productive forces is enjoyed not only by a polis but by the whole of mankind 46 44 It has been claimed that there exist basically two forms of socialization: markets and hierarchies (see Williamson 1975). Another position holds tht there are three forms: market, organization, and solidarity (see Polanyi 1944). As we shall see, it can be claimed that communism would, or should, be marketal, hierarchical, or solidaric-or a mixture of them. 45 Lenin, in popularizing terms, defined communism as 'Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country' (see Lenin 1920: 515 and Ziegler 1987: 24). 4(, I have remained strictly within the framework provided by Marx and therefore do not discuss the (questionable) heuristic value of an approach which Historical Materialism 213 2 1 2 Historical Materialism . Madee! production Antiquity Feudalism Capitalism Main technology tools tools, manufacture manufacture, machine Form al product use-value use·valueJ exchange-value exchange-value Purpose o! production production for needs Formel socialization social production, regulated by blind rules production for needs political regulation; guilds and estates, partly markets Communism ??? use-value production for surplus production for needs independent producers. market regulation social production regulated by conscious plan F I G . 4.3 4.3.2. Structural coupling The elements in the model outlined above of a machino-capitalist hypercycle are partiy material-physical, partly social. Only capital is a social relation, as Marx never tires of reminding us. According to him, it would be completely fallacious to conceive capital exclUSively in a definite, palpable form such as money­ capital, machinery, buildings, etc. As already indicated, techno­ logy cannot be conceived of as a social system. It might be useful to approach the problem from another viewpoint; this time the focus is on the interplay or 'structural coupling' of social systems in their environment. 47 Recall the emphasizes the character of tools for distinguishing historical epochs; see WeIskopf 1974. 47 See Maturana: 'In the history of interactions of a composite unity in its medium, both unity and medium operate in each interaction as independent systems that, by triggering in each other a structural change, select in each other a structural change. If the organization of a composite unity remains invariant while it undergoes structural changes . . . its adaptation is conserved . . . In other words, if a composite unity is structurally plastic its conservation of adaptation results in its maintained structural coupling to the medium that selects its path of structural change' (Maturana 1980: p. xxi). Luhmann's theory also offers the possibility of a 'structural coupling' of different social systems. He discusses this in the chapter on 'Interpenetration' in his Soziale Systeme; see Luhmann 1984a. passage froni Max Scheler cited in section 3.3 lwith my adden­ dum regarding politicS) where the drive towards domination of nature was conceived as the outcome of the follOWing inter­ actions: the scientist wants to construct all possible machines; the engineer wants to construct all workable machines; the entrepreneur wants to construct all profitable machines; the politician wants to construct all machines which enhance legit­ imation. If we transform this model from the level of interaction between individuals to the systemic level, we see the inter­ action of three different social systems: economy, politics, and science. Technology is an emergent entity, a complex; it springs from the interplay of these social systems. Because of the durability of technical artefacts, technology is an enduring phenomenon. As part of second nature, it belongs to the environment of all societies; modern societies are additionally characterized by the fact that their social subsystems 'include' technology. The 'interaction' between technology and social subsystems is not symmetrical; it is not the case that all three subsystems pull and push technology with the same power, in the same direction, or with the same success (see again s. 3.3). From this model, a 'technological trajectory', but no techno­ logical determinism, can be derived. This is so for the following reasons. Every system operates according to its own rules and expectations about the operations of other systems. For example, the economy has to take into account that the legal context may change in the near future, that new scientific inventions will become available, or a technological solution. Politics may try to resist or enhance certain technologies, scientific work, or economic activities. Science observes that a specific discovery would elicit massive financial rewards so concentrates on a specific research path. Each systemic operation takes time. Meanwhile, the Stoffwechsel takes place with technologies which are available. Small improvements and changes occur during their daily application. This explains the existence of a 'technological trajectory'. A technological revolution may occur either as a result of cumulative changes within a technological trajectory, or as a result of scientific discoveries which become applicable to transformation processes. However, technologIcal determinism is excluded, since there are economic, political, 214 Historical Materialism Historical Materialism and scientific incentives at work, which lead to a change of technology. To summarize my criticism of the base-superstructure model: 1 . The concept of relations of production lacks precision. It encompasses economic, legal, and social meanings. In order to make it more precise, it should be decomposed into its constituent parts. 2. The concept of superstructure is· misleading since it uses a metaphor which suggests a picture of a building with more and less important floors. It suggests that the base (ground floor) could exist without the superstructure (first floor). 3. Cohen's interpretation tries to avoid some of the difficulties by proposing a functional relationship between the elements. Thus we have a primary layer of productive forces which explain the relatlOns of production which explain the superstructures. But superstructures stabilize relations of production which in tum stabilize productive forces. This functional analysis fails on the grounds of its Own premiss, that is, to explain productive forces in asocial terms 4S 4. My own position, in contrast, concurs with the approach that there are some functional links involved in Marx's model but it defines the units in a different way. The most important dIfference IS to rob technology of its autonomous status; in my VIew, only SOCIal systems enjoy such a position. Moreover, SOCIal systems can be defined independently from eaeh other which avoids problems of variable diseretion. Circularity i � Illvolved III their self-production (which is no defect of the theory! ), but is not involved in the relation between them. Yet, the question remains: which productive forces will be suitable for communism? Will they take the form of machinery which per de!1nitionem degrades human beings and natural environ­ ment? According ro evolutionary theory, a new, 'liberating' technology Cannot be brought about by intentional action alone rather, its hypothetical emergence would be the result of th� interplay of the economic, political, and SCientific system. Let me present a short scenario to illustrate this line of thought and its illuminating and critical potential. 4H See Lukes 1983 for a similar critique of the separation of the superstructure from the base. 215 Politics does not stand at the top of a (pyramidal) society nor in the centre of a (concentrical) society: it is one social subsystem among others. This is to say that politics cannot be expected to cure modem societies of the disease of ecological problems. This would presuppose at least the following: • • • it would have to be able to provide a self-description for society which is accepted by all; it would have to give an uncontested account of the reasons of ecological problems; it would have to put into practice the conclusions reached (d. Luhmann 1988d, 1989c). What politics does is to decide on public issues in a binding way. Where an ecological problem is the result of a logic of public goods, politics seems to have some power to resolve it. Examples are cases where ecological problems are manifest and where the obviation of them is feasible by a combined policy of threats and offers, for which Hillel Steiner coined the term 'throffer' (see Steiner 1974 and Taylor 1982; see also ch. 1 above). These decisions may also have effects on the economy or on science, but not in a direct way. We know of many cases where such attempts have proved to be dysfunctional. But there are also examples of sueeessful political interventions (see Rottleuthner 1989; Scharpf 1989). If politiCS takes a specific decision, this will be perceived by science and economy with their own specific logic (see von Foerster 1981, who defines cognition as computa­ tion of computation of . . . ). How can we, then, imagine the emergence of a 'virtuous circle' here? In an interesting study, Beck ( 1 988) reformulated the Marxian categories of relations of production and productive forces. He conceives of the late twentieth century's reality as characterized by a conflict between productive forces and relations of definition (De!1nitionsverhi:iltnisse) and suggested that a central issue in the ecological problematic is the threshold values (Grenzwerte) which are established for every substance which is considered toxic or otherwise dangerous. Such thresholds are defined by scientists and technical experts-politicians are laymen in this process. It is often said that the definition of thresholds is rather a political than a 'rational' decision. However, as I try to explain, there are no uncontested standards of rationality. Each system has 216 Historical Materialism its own. Thresholds often are just the establishing of a comfortable working hypothesis which serves certain industries and research departments and which has been adopted by politics. Politicians here either play the part of active accomplices or-in a case where they really want to change something-are simply incompetent. But imagine that critical scientists, engineers, parts of the public, and 'green politicians' succeed in keeping the thresholds considerably down. The result would be real 'political' thresholds being much lower than technological or scientific thresholds. The industries concerned might protest, but if the policy is successful, investments will flow into less damaging technologies and substances, thereby reducing or eliminating the production of dangerous substances. However, it should be noted that this process is recursive, since it is not realistic to expect feasible production processes which are completely free from dangerous substances. This would be possible only in an ecological Utopia, ultimately depending on the power of scientific knowledge. In the last instance, only a society which is in the possession of full knowledge could be expected to be a society without ecological problems. Returning to the problem of intersystemic communication, on the basis of this scenario the establishment of a threshold value would be a social communication which links up the economic, the political, and the scientific system. A communi­ cation on threshold values is at the same time an economic, political, and scientific communication. As Teubner has pointed out, structural coupling of different social subsystems is possible for three reasons. First, these subsystems are all based on meaning; second, they all use communications as basic elements for their systems building. And third, every special communication in one subsystem may at the same time be a general social com­ munication (ei. Teubner 1989a: 107). Teubner gives the institu­ tion of contract as an example where three types of social actions coincide when a contract is made: economic, legal, and life-world communications (see ibid. 133 £.). In the case of a communication on threshold values, the political, the scientific, and the economic system are involved, and the com­ munication is at the same time a general social communication in which the political public takes part. Historical Materialism 217 4.3.3. Summary On a Weberian account, as briefly pointed out in section 4.2.3, an elective affinity between capital, machinery, and science obtains which explains the fusion of these elements in capitalist society.49 On the basis of Eigen and Schuster's account, this process can be described as a hypercycle. Stripped to its essentials, manufacturing and machine technology, movable capital, pro­ pertyless workers, competition, and extension of intercourse would be the elements of the hypercycle. Capital is the self­ replicative unit, the others are 'catalytic links'. According to autopoietic theory, capitalism is a social system which reproduces itself (in Marx, the elements are values, in Luhmann, the ele­ ments are payments); it reproduces the system by the production of its elements and it produces its elements by its elements. Taking these three approaches together, we can say that an autonomy of technology exists in none of them. Additionally, one important conclusion is that a causal explanation is not attainable and that the success of functional analysis depends very much on the precise formulation of the problem and the basic units of analysis. 4.4. An empirical illustration: the transition from fendalism to capitalism In this section, I trace some of Marx's analysis with respect to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, thereby also showing that a causal analysis is not feasible. Marx never developed fully a historical account of the emerg­ ence of capitalism. He was mainly interested in the logical preconditions of capitalist production. Thus he restricted his historical sketch at the end of Capital i. to demonstrating how capital and labour power came into existence. However, there are some pages in the German Ideology (see CWv. 66-8 1 ) andin the Grundrisse which can be exploited for my purposes here (I shall rely mainly on the passage from the German Ideology). 49 This is, of course, not Weber's precise theSiS, which, as is known, analyses the relation between religions and economic forms. 218 Historical Materialism Marx gives the following picture of the dynamics of capitalist production under the regime of the guilds and other fcudal bonds. The premiss is an ever-greater division of labour which separates town and country, commercc and industry, and Branches of industry. The result is the extension of communicationsSO which are particularly important for the development of the productive forces. 'As long as there exists no intercourse tran­ scending the immediate neighborhood, every invention must be made separately in each locality . . . In primitive history every invention had to be made daily anew and in each locality independently' (eW v. 67). With the establishment of the world market and large-scale industry, 'the permanence of the acquired productive forces lis] assured' lew v. 67), Marx assumes.51 However, the empirical starting-point for the evolution of capitalism is the manufacture of weaving. This first and most important branch of manufacture uses machinery. The rising demand for clothing gave weaving a big stimulus. A new class of weaver came into existence in the towns. Because of its very nature weaving resisted the trammels of the guilds; it was carried on mostly in villages and market centres without guild organization. Merchant capital, and capital of manufacture, created a mass of movable capital. At the same time, peasants and vagabonds provided the army of the work­ people. The discovery of America and of the sea-route to India led to a new impetus for manufacture; the import of gold and other precious metals gave an additional stimulus to the creation of movable capital. Commerce and navigation led to the establish­ ment of the world market, albeit in a restricted form, because of its splitting up into separate parts, each of which was exploited by a particular nation. Real competition between nations was prevented. Marx distinguishes the above two forms of manufacture and commerce as two distinct historical periods. The third period, then, is large-scale industry. It had to respond to the ever­ increasing demand for manufactured products. According to Marx, several preconditions must be fulfilled for this mode of so The German 'Vcrkchr' is usually translated as 'intercourse'. Somewhat naIvely, we might add today, standing on the shoulders of Merton. As Douglas ( 1986) has pointed Ollt, multiple discoveries and institutional forgetting are complementary processes which also take place in modern times. 51 Historical Materialism 2 1 9 production: application of natural powers in industry, machinery, a huge division of labour, freedom of competition inside the nation, and the development of theoretical mechanics. We may interrupt Marx's outline at this point and ask ourselves: what sort of explanation, if any, is employed? Marx gives an account of how a new form of production drives out another form: 'Hence the decline of the guilds as soon as they come into contact with manufacture' lew v. 70). This seems to be an argument on the level of selection. Taking Elster'S five points from above, and equating IY) with the advent of manufacture, (X), with some needs of feudal society, IZ), we then have to ask how condition IS), i.e. the feedback loop by which Y maintains X through Z, can be fulfilled. At first sight, there seem to be many causal relations at work: needs giving a 'stimulus', discovery of America prOViding the 'impetus', etc. On the other hand, Marx speaks of preconditions for this development (freedom of competition, natural sciences, machinery, wage-labour). But these preconditions are themselves products of historical processes. Whatever these are, we are not able to identify a prime mover (or first cause) which sets into motion the whole process. Besides, the picture does not resemble a chain reaction, but, rather, a network in which all elements influence all the others. It seems as if increasing demand ('human needs') is the motive power behind the whole. But since demand is only effective as economic demand, there must be a prior income which can then show up as demand. It thus seems as if we are lost in vicious circles and infinite regresses: capitalism still does not get off the ground. Let us therefore change the text for a moment. In Capital i, Marx tells us that English feudal lords transformed their agri­ cultural land into pastures for sheep to graze which in turn was caused by the flourishing of Flemish wool manufacture, followed by a consequent rise in wool prices. In fact, the whole 'clearing of estates' created a propertyless class of free labourers. But apart from the economic motivation (i.e. Dutch competition), there is a political factor Ithe dissolution of feudalism) and a religious­ political factor Ithe dissolution of the property of the Church). These are all historically contingent events. On this baSis we still do not get a coherent explanation. Every string we catch dissolves into many threads; every line we 220 Historical Materialism follow reveals itself as a circle.52 The most reasonable approach would thus be to take the preconditions of capitalism as historic­ ally contingent and analyse only the self-enhancing processes which eventually created modern capitalism. 53 Since his theory tells him that the capital-labour relation is essential for under­ standing capitalism, Marx restricts historical analysis mainly to the point where the emergence of those two elements land their constitution as a social relation) takes place. And yet there seems to be a privileged element in Marx's acCOunt. This is technology. He starts the historical sketch in the German Ideology with a glance at the division of labour. He states that the biggest division between manual and mental labour is the division between town and country. In the country­ side, outside the control of the guilds, evolves the system of manufacture s4 Marx knows with Hegel and Adam Smith that manufacture with its division of labour isfar more efficient than the earlier system of craftsmanship. 55 But the guilds prevented manufacture from growing up. Here we have an example for Marx's claim that social institutions may 'fetter' productive forces. Historical evidence told him that the drive of the produc­ tive forces is stronger than the repression of social institutions. The guilds were simply bypassed and had to bow later before the rise of manufacture. This is the 'technological bias' in Marx's analysis. However, technology is always embedded in specific ;\2 Neo-Darwinian biology seems to have the same difficulty in explaining how the 'closure' of the hypercycle is brought about. 'The inevitable question which follows is how the hypcrcycle is closed off; how it emerges is described often in a not very precise way' (Ballmer and von Weizsacker 1974: 241, my trans.). 53 Marx would probably have insisted on a more law-like account. In the Gnmdrisse, and Capital, he establishes some evolutionary stages of the develop­ ment of social forms which emerge from each other 'out of necessity', But it is nOt clear whether this applies also to technical forms, i.c. whether production based on artisanship had to give way to manufacture and only to manufacture. 54 When he describes the emergence of movable capital, of wage-labour, of competition, and of the establishment of a 'cash nexus' (X for short) he always presents it in the form of 'With the advent of manufacture, X also occurred'. These are clearly concomitant processes which are not causcd by manufacture although it may seem that manufacture was the 'subject' of this process. In the GlUndrisse, he speaks of a process of dissolution which brought about the elements or preconditions for capitalism (see GlUndrisse 496 ff.). 55 See the famous pin-making example of Adam Smith as cited in Hegel's early fenaer Systementwiir{e, see Hegel 1975: 323. Historical Materialism 221 social relations, in this case within the capital-labour relation. I thus concludc that it was part of Marx's impliCit research programme to examine social relations and productive forces in their coevolution. A confirmation is the transition from manu­ facture to modern industry. As already noted, Marx here assigns a degree of importance to social factors Isee Capital i. 347, 361, and MEGA II iii. 6. 1973). But to come back to the functional analysis: what sort of relations of production were functional for the development of the productive forces? As we have seen, in manufacture land even more in large-scale industry) the capital-labour relation was the important, dynamic social relation. Relations of pro­ duction which are functional for this relation must thus secure: I I ) private property in the forms of free labour and free capital; 12) free-market competition; 13) an institution which secures both I I ) and 12), namely the modern state. 56 However, Marx does not stop with this account. Within the technical form of manufacture a new technology arises which will take the place of the old: this is large-scale industry based on machinery. Manufacture already used machines in its production process. Eventually, manufacture also produces machines which are able to produce machines. Onee this task is accomplished­ manufacture has performed its 'historical service'-it becomes superfluous. The new productive forces of modern industry no longer depend on crafts of any sort. This is certainly a suggestive picture which has not lost any of its power. But perhaps Marx was led astray by the implicit suggestion that machinery itself was self-reproductive. In the language of Eigen and Schuster, it would have evolved from a 'functional linkage' into a 'self­ replicative unit'. But there are severe theoretical difficulties in supporting such an assumption, not to speak of its lack of plausibility. Even a fully automated industry, which employs robots instead of human labour power, cannot be said to be only 56 On this analysis the democratic form of the modern State is a contingent event. To be functional for the productive forces, it is sufficient to secure private property and competition. To be sure, there are historical reasons which made the democratic form of the state necessary, e.g. the anti-feudal, anti-authoritarian, pro-science, and, in some countries, pro· Enlightenment conjuncture. Sec also Barrington Moore's an.llysis ( 1966), which stresses the importance of class­ constellations for the final shape of specific political forms of capitalism. 222 Historical Materialism produced by machines. This kind of technology is also linked to science, politics, and the economy." 4.5. Evolution of technology and social institutions under ecological constraints In the following discussion, I want to come back to the question of historical progress and the criteria for measuring it. First of all, I want to stress that under present conditions we are faced 'with a new kind of " contradiction between the development of the forces of production and existing social productive relations" which appears . . . in all industrial societies', as Schefold ( 1 977: 247, my emphasis) so aptly put it. If we accept the terminology of the 1859 Preface, we can no longer assume that modern socicties have to adapt their institu­ tional arrangements to the productive forces but that they have to attempt to shape the productive forces in a way which makes their detrimental effects upon the natural environment and upon human beings decrease. The social institutions and the productive forces have to become reflexive if the original claIm of development and progress is to be sustained. Traditional Marxist analyses assumed that the institutional change would be tantamount to the abolishing of private property relations. This solution is fatally flawed in the light of ecological problems. But not even a sophisticated author like G. A. Cohen allows these considerations sufficient room in his interpretation of historical materialism sR We would be ill advised if we adopted his outline for the discussion of ecological problems since it offers only the perspective that class struggle nught fight out the contradiction between productive forces and relations of production until new social relations have been established which are propitious for the productive forces. But it seems that in the case of ecological problems it is the very nature of some S7 It is a common theme in science fiction to assume the contrary, Le. technology completely beyond the control of social relations. This p�rsistent metaphor takes its force from a deep �nthropological 'fear' of the �achme. �he . . machine is something between the hvmg and the dead; d. Bahr s stlmulatlng book 1 1 983). S!! I say 'sufficient' because there is a degree of awareness of the problem (see below). Historical Materialism 223 productive forces which causes considerable ecological damage. Hence, if we would rely on their 'autonomous' development, we would be left witnessing even more disasters. Late capitalism is still characterized by a productivity which the green fundamentalist Bahro called 'frightening' (at a time when he was still a critical Marxist, see Bahro 1977: 9, 5 1 ). If we judge the performance of capitalism on the basis of economic or technical criteria (productivity), there is no reason to assume that a new social form would be required to 'unfetter' a develop­ ment of the productive forces. Marxism, interpreted in such a scheme of productive forces/relations of production, loses all of its critical impetus. However, in my opinion, there is still much justification for claiming exactly such a critical dimension for Marxism. In order to do so, another theoretical referencc point will be needed. As I have pointed out, it is crucial for such an approach to incorporate non-economic criteria into our stand�rds of measuring progress. Since Marx did so, we have the possIbIhty of endorsing this dimension in judging how successful a mode of production is in transforming nature. It is not the institution of private property which fetters the development of the productive forces; and, on the other hand, it is not the institution of state planning which has led to an unfettered development of the productive forces either in the wide Idomination of nature) or in the narrow leconomic) sense. Ironically, the history of the last seventy years has shown that It is still the capitalist arrangement whIch develops the productIve forces lat least in the narrow sense) best. And, even worse for thc performance of socialist planning, the socialist arrangement of the productive forces did not prevent the emergence of severe ecological problems. If socialist countries had a slower develop­ ment of productive forces, it was not because they adopted an ecological policy which consumed part of the resources necessary for the development of the productive forces. Marx employed ethical and physical arguments when judging historical forms of society. With respect to the first, he stated unequivocally that people were happier in previous modes of production: At first sight there is a certain ambiguity in the conditions und�r w�ich the capital relation originally appears lor which appear as histoncal preconditions of its becoming): on the one hand dissolution of lower 224 Historical Materialism forms of living labour, on the other dissolution of happier relations of the immediate producer. On the one hand dissolution of slavery and serfdom. On the other dissolution of that form in which the means of production are owned by the immediate producer in that his labour is , directed primarily either towards use-value (agnculture) or towards exchange-value ltown labour). Finally dissolution of the form of eom­ munity [Gemeinwesenl in which the worker as an organ of this natural community was simultaneously owner or possessor of his own means of production. IMEGA II. iii. 6. 2288)" With respect to the second problem, he held quite an optimistic view, as I argued in Chapter 2. Capitalism, he thought, displays the inherent tendency to recycle waste if it is cost-reducmg. On the other hand, things which have no priee are likely to be wasted under capitalism-examples are air, water, and, most importantly, human beings. It is their flesh, blood, and nerves which capitalism wastes in an unprecedented way if it is not prevented by law. Considering the present conditions of industrially developed countries, this account seems to be questionable; but I claim that the premiss on which it is built is still valid. The premiss is the following: out of a given set of costs, capitalists try to reduce each factor, be it labour or raw material. This premiss is as valid today as it was a hundred years ago. The difference lies in the different structure of costs Irelative prices). In Marx's time, labour was a relatively cheap factor which has now become much more expensive. Raw materials, on the other hand, have not become cheaper in general: some raw materials have become cheaper, some more expensive, some are free lor nearly free), as they were in Marx's time lair and water). Certainly, labour has become protected by law. It therefore cannot be wasted in the same way as it could a hundred years ago. On this different empirical basis, we obtain results different from Marx's. Today we witness the depletion of natural resources which are only .59 Cf. the early formulation in the Holy Family: 'In the modern world ea�h , person is at the same time a member of slave S?Clet y �nd of the public commonwcallthl. PreCisely the slavery of civil soclety IS lil appearance the . greatest freedom because it is in appearance the fully developed mdependence of the individual who considers as his own freedom the uocurbed movement, no longer bound by a common bond or by milO, of the estranged elem�nts of ?is life, . such as property, industry, religion, etc., whereas actually thIS IS hls fully developed slavery and inhumanity' (eW IV. 1 16). See also Rosdolsky 1968: 488 ff. Historical Materialism 225 partially recycled, apart from extinct animal species. It goes without saying that only the relatively expensive raw materials are recycled by capitalists.60 The cheap ones are wasted. It is completely rational for a capitalist las for a private consumer) to throw away what would require some labour time to restore its use-value if he can readily buy the material at a comparatively low price. If a capitalist has the alternative of buying one ton of a metal or of extracting it from a salt which comes out as waste from his production process, he will decide on the basis of relative prices. Similarly, the private consumer throws away his TV set when costs of repair exceed a certain percentage of the costs of a new TV set. At the same time, we observe another tendency in this process: the tendency to replace expensive raw materials with cheaper raw materials. The result of this is that man to an ever-greater extent mediates his Stoffwechsel with nature by a process which transforms nature I'raw material') into artefacts. Ecologists doubt that this success in transforming nature is a rational one. II one compares the efficiency of production as an economic process with its effiCiency as a technical process in so far as it involves energy, we may find that there is a discrepancy Isee Schefold 1977). Economic rationality may have to be replaced, or supplemented, by an energy-conscious rationality. Cohen, at the very end of his book, dedicates some attention to this problem. He admits that 'if resources are to be used more sparingly, recourse to them must to some extent be replaced by continued reliance on human labour power' ICohen 1978: 323). Is this a reason to be pessimistic about post-capitalist society, since the promise of increased leisure cannot be fulfilled? Not at all, replies Cohen. Such peSSimistic 'reflections depend on a crude concept of leisure . . . By "leisure" we have meant freedom from unwanted activity, not freedom from productive activity. That the two have gone together under capitalism does not mean that they are fated to coincide in the future' libid. 323). As we shall see in the next chapter, this distinction is an illuminating one, but one with which Marx was already familiar.6l Victor 1 1 980) also maintains that Marx's framework entails 6{) 61 I do not consider here public recycling of paper, glass, etc. It thus does not run 'against a deep current of thought in Marx', as Cohen supposes (see Cohen 1978: 323). 226 Historical Materialism the physical dimensions of economic processes. After criticizing neo-classical economics for its blindness with respect to eco­ logical problems, Victor holds that Marx's 'broadly conceived analytical framework is not open to the same criticism . . . that can be levelled at the neo-classical framework' IVictor 1980: 207). Nco-classical economics have had only one major contribn­ tion which recognized the problem; this was Kenneth Boulding's article 'The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth'. As Victor put it, Boulding 'pointed out that the economic activities of consumption, production, and trade involve a rearrangement of matter and not a creation of new material' libid. 198). But this approach is hardly new for someone familiar with Marx's theory: This new approach to economic activities is particularly insightful for analysing environmental issues. It may be surprising to discover, therefore, that in fact it is not really a new approach at alL Economists as distinct in their orientation as Alfred Marshall and Karl Marx devoted substantial passages in their respective treatises to a description of economic activity in precisely these terms. (ibid.) This leads me to the core of Marx's theory. I maintain that Marx throughout his work endorsed an ethical theory on which his analysis and scientific edifice rest. This ethical theory can be summed up in the following way. Marx's main concern regarding mankind as a whole, and individual human beings, was to search out the possibilities for an abolition of all 'enslaving effects' which would fetter the development of individuals in a universal way. For example, he writes in the Theories of Surplus Value that people under capitalist conditions are 'dominated by the pressure of an extra­ neous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a soeial duty' ITSV iii. 257). In the Gruudrisse, Marx defines 'real wealth' in terms of individual self-realization, a process which includes an increasing domination of nature and is at the same time an ongoing process, that is, a process which has no halting point. This passage synthesizes his philosophieal anthropology with perfectionism and his conception of eman­ cipation. [WJhen the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, Historical Materialism 227 productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so­ called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working�out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? (Grundrisse 488) Soeial division of labour in class societies is most likely to initiate extraneous purposes. Marx, writing on a future com­ munist society in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, asserts that 'in a higher stage of communist society . . . the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour [will have] vanished . . .' ISW iii. 191. As we have already seen, Marx thought that people were happier and freer in earlier modes of production. But pre-capitalist conditions where the worker owns his means of production typically exclude I I ) concentration of means of production; 12) co-operation; 131 divi­ sion of iabour within one production process; 14) social mastery and regulation of nature; and 151 free development of social productive forces Isee Capital i. 7141· Marx thought that it is possible, probable, and even inevitable that mankind will reach a non-enslaving mode of production in socialist society. Socialist society would syntheSize the moral level of ancient societies with the achievements of modernity; it would combine the concern for use-value production Iquality of products) of antique society with the general availability of commodities in modern capitalist society Iquantity).62 In the Grundrisse, he says that only under modern conditions does an interest arise in what sort of property yields maximum wealth; in ancient Greece, the interest was in which sort of property yields the best citizen Isee Grundrisse 487). The historical condition for the fusion of 'happiness' with 62. In the Manuscripts 1861-3 Marx examines ancient Greek thinkers like Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides, They were concerned with the quality of products {use-values!; therefore, it was assumed that each man should depicate himself only to one art or work 228 Historical Materialism 'material wealth for the greatest number' would be a sufficient level of productive forces which frees man from wrestling with nature to a large degree. Capitalism was the mode of production which served this purpose. Thus Marx praised capitalism for the development of the productive forces. But capitalism still does not bring about a full 'social mastery and regulation of nature'. People are still the pawns in a mechanism which they do not understand. As Marx emphasizes, there is a paradoxical tendency at work:. In our days, everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we bebold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature/ man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. (eW xiv. 655-6) This paradoxical tendency, this regress within progress, made Marx condemn capitalism. It is a social form which makes people suffer, which has an irrational performance leconomic crises), and reifies social relations. This condemnation is a moral condemnation, even if Marx refused to accept such a label. He often endorses an ironic attitude, as when he cites Goethe's poem 'An Suleika'. Marx refcrs several times to this poem. He attributes it to the propagators of capitalism and to the capitalists themselves when he exposes the misery produced by capitalism. Confronted with the number ofdead workers in mines, they would, according to Marx, respond with the poem . which reads as follows: Sollte diese Qual uns quiilcn, Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt, Hat nicht Myriaden Seden Timurs Hcrrschaft aufgezehrt? ('Should this torment worry us it increases our delight; did not the souls of myriads eat up Timur's might?') Historical Materialism 229 Marx, in turn, uses the same poem in the opposite sense, stressing above all the third and fourth verses which refer to the expectation of a socialist revolution. This use of thc' poem is a clear instance of Marx's view that history until the advent of socialist society is a natural process in which a certain number of souls have to be sacrificed in order to achieve the downfall of the tyrant. Of course, one can characterize this position as simply describing I'value-free') a mechanism; but only the underlying evaluation Isacrifice, tyrant) provides meaning Ifor the social scientist) and motivation Ifor the oppressed masses). It is thus a moral condemnation, because someone who is interested exclu­ sively in the level of productive forces has no reason to condemn the social form which is beneficial to that development, if this social form goes along with a development of the productive forces both on average and in the long run. If the setbacks are only temporary or so small that they cannot reverse the general direction of the development of the productive forces, there would be no reason to object to such a development. But Marx is not concerned about 'net gains' of the sum total of progress and regress. The point is that both notions have many dimensions which make it difficult to scale or quantify them. Marx does not share the criticisms of modernity which would like to abolish modern technology and modern conflicts. Against such backward-orientated positions, Marx says: 'On our part, we do not mistake the shape of the shrewd spirit that continues to mark all these contradictions. We know that to work well, the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men-and such are the working men. They are as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself' lew xiv. 656). Nietzsche'S Ubermensch comes to mind here, but also Marx's dictum that people only set themselves tasks which they are able to fulfil. The emergence of Marx's 'superman' is a process which can be determined technologically: since the productive forces of capitalism are universal ones, the producers who reappropriate them are becoming universal individuals. If one accepts this interpretation of Marx's theory, one under­ stands better the question of ecological problems and their relation to producti ve forces. If Marx's ultimate concern was the abolition of enslaVing effects and the bringing about of a social form which organizes its transformation of nature in a rational 230 Historical Materialism way, he would have had to take into account the possibility that man's very Stoffwechsel with nature entails the danger of 'en­ slaving effects'. Marx seems to overestimate the degree of a successful social mastery of nature under modern conditions. But, conversely, he is aware of severe ecological problems which arise under capitalist conditions. However, we may doubt whether Marx's own position offers a perspective here. As he states in Capital, a higher synthesis of agriculture and industry, i.e. the unification of town and country, would avoid disturbances in the process of Stoffwechsel (see Capital i. 474). In his view, it is modern industry which frustrates such a higher synthesis: 'The more a country starts its development on the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for example, the more rapid is this process of destruction' (Capital i. 475). This is another instance where Marx seems aware of the possibility that the very nature of a productive force might cause huge undesirable effects, that is, that it is not only the capitalist form which is responsible. But this would create insurmountable difficulties for his theory. He thus adds imme­ diately: 'Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology . . . only by sapping the original sources of all wealth-the soil and the labourer' ( Capital i. 475). With respect to the detrimental effects of modern industry on human labour power, Marx tried to make his analysis consistent in the final version, i.e. in Capital, as we have seen in section 3.6. With respect to detrimental effects of modern industry on the natural environment, Marx's analysis remains ambiguous: it allows for both possibilities, blaming the productive forces and social relations.63 According to Marx, a social mastery of nature can be achieved only in communism. As he states in Capital, a higher synthesis of agriculture and industry would avoid 'disturbances' in the Stoffwechsel between man and nature. The miserable state of the natural environment, the separation of the globe into agri­ cultural and industrial zones, the dangers arising from the present methods of transforming nature indicate clearly that (,,-\ Recall Marx's statement on the 'greedy farmer (who! snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility' (Capital L 253). Also, here, it is not a specific social relation (for example, capitalism) which exhausts the soil but a behaviour which may occur under several social relations, under relations which exacerbate a greedy attitude towards nature. Historical Materialism 231 mankind has not yet succeeded in mastering nature. We may thus regard the solution of ecological problems as a test case for communism, that is, only that social form which succeeds in incorporating reflexivity into its modus operandi will be worthy of being called 'communist'. Marx did not pay enough attention to the possibility that technological and scientific progress need not be paralleled by social progress. He partly followed the optimistic tradition of the Enlightenment (Bacon, Descartes) which ·assumed such a parallel (see Leiss 1972). But Marx was also deeply influenced by (German) romanticism. This tradition informed his theory of the moral evolution of mankind (from a non-alienated primordial state to personal dependence, to impersonal dependence, to total freedom).64 Since Marx tooldor granted that history would inevitably lead to a final reconciliation in communist society, he could formulate the relation between productive forces and social institutions as a law-like relation which will lead to communism. If we, basing ourselves on historical evidence, challenge this assumption, we can nevertheless derive the criteria for the superiority of communism from Marx's own framework: only a society which is able to calculate the results of its own work and function fulfils the condition of being a communist society. M See Grundrisse: 'Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective dependence is the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations, of all�round need and universal capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage' (Grundrisse IS8). Communism 233 5 Communism So wird das Problem eines zentral vermittelten Bezugs zur J:'atur das dringendste; die Tage des blo[\en Ausbeuters, des Uberhsters, des blo[\en Wahmehmers von Chancen sind auch teehnisch geziihlt. (Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hof/nung) 5.1. Two faces of communism One conclusion which I have reached so far is that a communist society must be a society which regulates its interchange with nature in a rational way; this is to say that the existence of severe ecological crises would inhibit one from calling such a society 'communist'. This proposition follows from Marx's insistence that human emancipation means not only material abundance and non-existence of wage-slavery but also spiritual wealth (happiness) and conscious control of the individuals over their life-conditions. In what follows I shall focus on a possible ambiguity in this notion of communism. The ambiguity is . the last proposition: all depends on how strong a contamed m claim is made with respect to conscious control and how the realm of 'life-conditions' is defined. My suggestion is to distin­ gUIsh between two notions of communism. If we summarize some remarks of Marx with respect to communism in general, we could compIle the following list: 1 . abolition of private property; 2. abolition of classes, class exploitation, and class oppression·, 3 . universalization of happiness; 4. universalization of material wealth·, 5. expanding of disposable time; 6. return to use-value production; 'Thus the problem of a centrally mediated relation to nature becomes most urgent: t�� days of the mere exploiter, of the outwittcr, of the mere taker of opportUl1ltics are numbered even in technological terms. f 7. reappropriation of man's objectifications; 8. total individuals; 9. conscious control. The dividing line lies somewhere between (5) and 17). The difference between the two notions can be connected to the principles of market and plan and to the presence or absence of alienation and fetishism. Whereas the strong notion requires the superseding of alienation, the weak notion would allow its persistence. I return to this difference in sections 5.5.2 and 5.6. In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx himself gives a hint of such a distinction: here he says: 'Communism is the necessary form and the dynamiC principle of the immediate future, but com­ munism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society' I CW iii. 306). Maihofer ( 1968) points out this possible difference. It is possible that Marx here refers to 'crude communism', a notion which he also used in the Paris Manu­ scripts. In his later writings he equates the release of all human powers with communism. Nevertheless, there is still a tension within his concept of communism. Fot example, in his Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx introduces a lower stage of communism, which by later Marxists has been called socialism (d. Lenin 1 9 1 7 : 472). With this distinction we have again a weak and a strong notion of communism. But before discussing this possible tension, I shall first look at decisive traits of communism 'as such', as described by Marx. In the Comments on James Mill 1 1 844) Marx defines 'human society' as a society which makes possible the full release of human nature: Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would bave in two ways affirmed himself and the other person . I would have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature. Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature. lew iii. 227-8) Marx contrasts production under capitalist relations with 'produc­ tion as human beings'; the latter is a synonym for communism. Human beings are characterized as creative and communal beings. Capitalism thwarts the full development of the indivi­ duals, although-at least according to the 'official' position developed in Capital-it contributes to that development in so . . 234 Communism far as it enhances the variety ( Vielseitigkeit) of work and creates the social-co-operative character of work. A society which enabled the release of all human powers would be 'human society'. Marx approaches the project of emancipation not from a given 'system of happiness' but rather from the features of human nature. The first approach would be a static and doctrinal onc, whereas the sccond starts from empirical facts and scientific observation, namely that human beings have developed their productive powers, i.e. their domination over nature. Chapter 2 briefly examined the paradoxical and tautological implications in this approach. However, Marx was able to resolvc them by distinguishing between a historical and a critical dimension in his enterprise. The critical dimcnsion enables him to judge historical forms of production, including the capitalist form. At times, for Marx the scientific and the normative view converge. In these cases he advances 'Marxism as a science'. For example, the abolition of capitalism is not only desirable for him but real, a 'process which unfolds beyond our eyes' (as he put it in the Communist Manifesto). If a social form 'fetters' the project of mankind to increase mastery over nature, it has to be and it will be replaced by a social form better adapted to that need. The mechanisms which bring about this replacement arc equally historically observable real forces. In cases where Marx fuses both dimensions, he tries .to get around the task of defining communism, since this was troublesome. Consider, for example, his assertion in Capital i, where he approVingly cites thc monk Ortes of Venice, who said: 'Instead of proposing useless systems for people's happiness, I shall limit myself to investigating the causes of human misery' (Das Kapital i. 675-6, my translation). But the exposing of instances of human misery presupposes some notion of happi­ ness. 'Marxism as a critique', therefore, is indispensable in this enterprise. The reader will note that I am using the word 'fetter' with a different meaning from the usual one. The locus classicus for the notion of fettering is the 1859 Preface, where it occupies a central place to describe the relation between productive forces and relations of production in the course of history. The standard interpretation of the 1859 Preface is mainly about economic criteria, about fetters to the optimal use or development of produc- Communism 235 tive forces. However, productive forces are embodied in specific technologies and forms of social co-operation. They are the 'expression' or objectification of the creative individuals who strive towards a world which leaves no place for superior powers. This humanist model lies at the heart of Marx's discussion of the relation between productive forces and relations of production. It would be as mistaken to interpret the Preface in mere quanti­ tative economic terms as it would be to interpret it in scientific­ deterministic terms. It is true that capitalism fettered the deve­ lopment of the productive forces in this respect, too (remember that this was Lenin's central claim in his theory of imperialism), and that Marx also criticized capitalism in this respect. I say 'also' because this was neither his sole nor his most important criticism. In section 4.6, we saw that a spiritual element was always present in Marx's definition of 'progress'. We also saw that a successful Stoffwechsel between society and narure has to be included and that the Marxian theory offers the tools for such an analysis. After all, this is the crucial point for the whole debate between Marxists and environmentalists: if Marxism has a narrow, quantitative, 'productivist' notion of what increase in the productive forces means, the environmentalists' challenge to Marxism is completely in order. If, on the contrary, Marxism has a wider notion of the term (and I think it has) then the environmentalists' charge is misplaced. To sustain my argument further, I draw attention to the following critical elements in Marx's thought. In the German Ideology, he draws a contrast between com­ munism and all earlier modes of production. He writes, Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all naturally evolved premises [natur­ 'WUchsigj as the creations of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals . . . The reality which communism creates is precisely the true basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist inde­ pendently of individuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals. (eW v. 81, my emphasis) Marx does not yet use the term 'mode of production'. However, as the context makes clear, he is not only talking about a 236 Communism communist (social) movement but about communism as a social form. Note that the word 'natural' in the quotation does not so much refer to 'nature', but is used in the sense of 'given', 'unchangeable', 'opaque'. Not only naturel, but also nature2 can thus have 'naturally evolved' characteristics. The more mankind succeeds in transforming naturel, the less this is conceived as a mystical power; rather it is seen as something subjugated to the power of the united individuals. This aspect of actively trans­ forming nature becomes of crucial importance here and distin­ guishes Marx from Feucrbach's passive naturalism. For Marx, nature as such cannot be cognitively captured. As he put it with Vico, we can understand only what we have produced ourselves (see s. 5 . 5 . 1 ) . In Capital, Marx again analyses 'natural premisses' and the possibility of treating them as the creations of 'hitherto existing men'. In so dOing, he employs the Stoffwechsel concept to analyse the relation of society to nature and conceives of human development in the circle of externalization, objectification, and appropriation (ef. Habermas 1987a: 64 H., 76 H.). Under capitalism, the circle is interrupted, since the product of the producers does not return to them. Hence, to close this circle, private property needs to be abolished and labour has to be constituted as social labour from the outset. Marx presents four models of non-capitalist production. The first is Robinson's isolated production, the second is feudalism, the third is a patri­ archal farmers' community, and the fourth is 'a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community' ( Capital L 82-3). Now, this 'community of free individuals' is obviously a synonym for communism. Feudalism and the patriarchal family are both based on personal dependence, with the diHerence that feudalism rests on an enforced division of labour whereas the patriarchal family rests on a 'spontaneously developed division of labour' ( Capital i. 82). These rural-patriarchal communities thus could almost be called communist, if they were not founded on the 'immature development of man individually' which is reflected in the 'ancient worship of Nature' ( Capital i. 83, 84). Historically, these communities have been eroded to the extent Communism 237 that personal dependence has given way to impersonal depend­ ence, transforming labour power into a commodity. 1 Communism, for Marx, is thus a stage of society in which the unitedindividuals2 (freely associated men) act upon their material production and conceive their products as products of their own; not as products of nature, and not as mystical products, i.e. products of capital: The life-process of society which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is conciously regulated by thcm in accordance with a settled plan. (Capital i. 84, my emphasis) 'Natural character' and 'mystical veil' are interchangeable in the quote from the German Ideology (CW v. 8 1 , quoted above) and in the preceding quote from Capital-they fulfil the same function in his argument. When Marx says here that production must be 'regulated in accordance with a settled plan', this can be interpreted as a more concrete formulation of the German Ideology's. 'subjugation of human creations-to the power of the united individuals'. Communism will be the historical stage under which men for the first time supersede the natural character of the Stoffwechsel. The preconditions for such a society are the establishment of the world market and the existence of a uni­ versal class: the proletariat.3 In this section I touched upon three questions which need further examination. The first is the question of transforming I I employ here the evolutionary scheme from the Grundrisse where Marx depicts a development of mankind from personal dependence to impersonaJ dependence to freedom, sec Grundrisse 158. The full quote i$ given in s. 4.5, final note. 2 The notion of 'individual' is a modern concept which emerges directly from the dissolution of relations of personal dependence, I.e. when labour power is transformed into a commodity. In other words, members of a patriarchal family are not 'individuals'-or they are individuals only as part of a collectivity. See Luhmann 1989b. .> Note that both preconditions refer to communicative aspectsj the cn;:ation of the world market consists in the extension of means of transport and communication; likeWise, the proletariat is a universal producing and suffering class which represents the interests of humanity. In contrast to earlier producers, the industrial workers are producing co-operativc;ly, a fact which enhances communication. Comparing countries with different population den$ity, Marx draws attention to the fact that a country with less density may compensate for such a possible disadvantage with respect to productive power by means of communication. See Capital i. 333. 238 Communism nature and the cognitive possibilities which are required for a human society-a question which I discuss further in sections 5.3 and 5.5. 1 . The second is the question of how this 'conscious control' will be organized. Does something like central state planning follow from Marx's theory Is. 5.5.2)1 Closely linked to this topic is the third question: how are the weak and the strong notions of communism linked in Marx Iss. 5.5.2 and 5.6)? But first I shall consider the notion of labour which, according to Marx, forms the link between society and nature. 5.2. Labour In this section I focus on how Marx conceives of the character of productive activity in communist society. Is it true that he equated labour las necessary, nature-transforming activity of the human race) with unwanted activity? Did he conceive of communist society as a society in which labour has been trans­ formed into completely free activity? Is Marx's ideal of labour something close to 'play'? In what follows I shall answer all these questions in the negative. 5.2.1. The critical dimension of the concept oflabour Human beings are natural and social beings. Their life activity ILebensiiu/!erung) is thus not mere transformation of nature, but conscious and creative transformation of nature. In this transformation of nature they realize at the same time their species essence, their human nature. Marx saw clearly that the present conditions of production Icapitalist relations) impinge upon the full realization of these human characteristics I d. CW v. 87-8). The abolition of these conditions would thus give rise to the realization of all human powers. This 'expressivist' notion of labour ITaylor 1975) is present in all stages of Marx's theoretical development. What changes is the way he conceptualizes it. In section 2.5.3 I devoted some attention to paradoxical and tautological implications of this expressivism. I argued that Marx resolves the problem by splitting it up. First he analyses historical manifestations of this human essence, and second, he evaluates them on the basis of a notion of human self-realization. This second operation deserves our interest now. Communism 239 5.2.2. Labour and enjoyment In my view Marx constantly employed an ideal of labour which was a combination of work and enjoyment. We can find an instance of this approach, for example, in the Paris Manuscripts where he writes: 'In political economy labour occurs only in the form of activity as a source of livelihood . . . [P]olitical economy knows the worker only as a working animal-as a beast reduced to the strictest bodily needs' ICW iii. 241, 242). The alienated state of labour is constituted by 'the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content, but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind' ICW iii. 274). In the German Ideology, writing about the relation between individuals and the productive forces, he states: 'Labour, the only connection which still links them with the productive forces and with their own existence, has lost all semblance of self-activity and only sustains their life by stunting it' ICW v. 87). The same general approach is to be found in the Grundrisse where he introduces the distinction between labour and play. Marx opposes Fourier who advocates a transformation of labour into play Isee Grundrisse 7 1 2). He maintains that such a trans­ formation would be impossible, and, furthermore, even the most free work llike composing) is a most serious activity Isee Grundrisse 6 1 1 ).4 But Marx also opposes the view of Adam Smith who regards all work as a 'curse' and views leisure as the ideal human situation. Against this position Marx puts forward his different anthropology, that is, that man, in his 'normal state of health, power, activity', has the need for a normal quantum of work and hence interruption of leisure. In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou labour! was Jehova's curse on Adam. And this is labour for Smith, a curse. 'Tranquility' appears as the 4 Benjamin in his Passagen Well< endorsed Fourier's vision, arguing that once human labour ceases to be exploited, nature also ceases to be exploited and hence work can become play: 'Once exploitation ceases, labour will strip off its character as nature exploiting. It will then take place according to the model of childlike play which in Fourier forms the basis of the travail passionne of the harmoninens' {Benjamin 1982: 456). I return to Benjamin in a moment. 2AO Communism adequate state} as identical with 'freedom' and 'happiness'. It seems quite far from Smith IS mind that the individual, lin his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, facility, also needs a normal portion of work, and of the supersession of tranquility'. (Grundrisse 6 1 1 ) Although the Grundrisse would be seen to tum away from the early writings because of their deliberate 'realist' tone against Fourier, instead they rather confirm the position taken there, namely that labour and enjoyment in principle can, and should, go together; in the Grundrisse, we find the formula of 'travail attractif' for this fusion. Marx stresses the need human beings have for work, which may be done in an enjoyable way I'travail attractif') or in a fragmented, alienated, unhappy way las under capitalism). But Marx clearly opposes the extreme position that labour could be transformed into play. IThis Fourierian view employs the same anthropology as Adam Smith. Both regard human beings essentially as 'homo ludens' or at least having a strong 'leisure preference'.) Let us now examine the concept of labour in Capital. Marx starts with a theme which by now is familiar to the reader: man is part of nature, nature is man's inorganic body with which he must keep in contact in order to survive. This Stoffwechsel is therefore, in the first place, a necessity rather than a desire. So far as 'labour is a creator of use-value . . . it is a necessary . COndItIOn, mdependent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, WIthout whIch there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, and therefore no life' I Capital i. SO). Note that this approach is already present in the early writings and in the German Ideology: 'The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. It is the material on which his labour is realised, in which it is active, from which and by means of which it produces' ICW v. 273). There can be do doubt that Marx in Capital, too, endorses a normative concept of labour. Admittedly, there are some passages m whIch he seems to praise modern factory work for itself. As my discussion in Chapter 3 has shown, this appraisal has nothing to do with praising stupid, monotonous, or repellent work. The extolling merely refers to the social, co-operative character of production which would serve as a foundation stone of communist society. He praises the capitalist mode of Communism 241 production for having abolished the life-long attachment of one individual to one profession or branch of activity; he praises the tendency to develop more abilities, and, finally, the essentially co-operative character of industrial production S On the other hand, Marx is aware of the deskilling and other harmful conse­ quences of these tendencies under capitalist relations. Since Marx, in Capital, takes great pains to show that potential progress Iboth in the economic and spiritual sense of the term) is not set in motion as a result of capitalist social relations, it would be foolish for him to endorse a concept of labour which was devoid of any emancipatory element lef. Honneth 1982). 5.2.3. The realm ofnecessity Human beings, whether they want to or not, must participate in the Stoffwechsel with nature. With this argument, Marx seems to come close to Adam Smith's concept of labour. But does it really follow that he has to give up his concept of 'travail attractif '1 A widespread view holds that Marx, at least in Capital iii, becomes more pessimistic and introduces the dichotomy of labour and leisure, where the first is alienated, the second free, conscious activity. The two are interpreted as corresponding to the realms of necessity and freedom and it is assumed that the early Marx dreamt of communism as the 'realm of freedom', whereas the later Marx came to acknowledge some undelightful necessities. I think that such interpretations are completely misconceived 6 Since the famous passage from Capital iii has been the subject of many discussions, I shall devote some attention to it. Marx says: In fact, the realm of freedom begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane cpnsiderations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his wantst to maintain and reproduce lifet so must civilized mant and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same timet the forces of 5 I am not sure if Marx proposes here a 'downright silly' position, as Elster 1 1985: 8 1 ) suggests. (, See, also, my own treatment in Grundmann 1988. 242 Communism production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associate producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as a blind power; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonethe­ less still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite. (Capital iii. 820) From this it follows very clearly that communism will never be a pure 'realm of freedom'-but the younger Marx did not entertain such a belief either. Marx, both in the 1840s and in the 1 860s and 1 8 70s, knew that mankind must transform nature in order to safeguard its existence and he expounded this view several times;' but something else follows from this too. Marx does not suggest that all that communism can bring about is a significant reduction in labour time. We are led astray if we would equate the reduetion of working time with a reduction of the realm of necessity, as many authors seem to do. When Marx speaks about 'development of human energy which is an end in itself ' ( Capital iii. 820), this refers to his earlier treatment of the problem of how human wealth can be conceived. Take, for example, the following passage from the German Ideology where Marx draws attention to the definition of spiritual wealth and praises the establishment of the world market as an important element in this respect: 'From the above it is clear that the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only this will liberate the separate individuals from the various national and local barriers, bring them into practical connection with the production (including intellectual production) of the whole world and make it possible for them to acquire the 7 Marx conceives of the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom both in a similar and in a different way from Aristotle. They are similar in stressing the natural necessity of labour as a life-maintaining process; they arc different in that Marx does not locate labour in the realm of oi1<08, the private household, to which in Aristotle the nobler polileia, the public, corresponds. Marx introduces labour into the 'public sphere, attributing to it 'noble' characteristics and locating an emancipatory dimension in it. Communism 243 capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man)' (CWv. 5 1 ). In the Grundrisse, he returns to this problem, citing a view which sees in the establishment of impersonal relations an advantage: 'It has been said and may be said that this is precisely the beauty and greatness of it [the world market]: this spontaneous interconnection . . . which is independent of the knowing and Willing of the individuals, and which presupposes their reciprocal independence and indiffer­ ence. And, certainly, this objective connection is preferable to the lack of any connection, or to a merely local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant relations' ( Grundrisse 1 6 1-2). But at the same time he adds a critical judgement: Equally certain is that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social interconnections before they have created them. But it is an insipid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as a spon­ taneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from their nature lin antithesis to their knowing and willing). This bond is their product. It is a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their development. The alien and independent character in which it presently exists vis-a.-vis individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the creation of the conditions of their social hfe, and that they have not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it. (Grundrisse 162) I return in section 5.5 to the 'Vieo-argument' contained in this passage. What is of interest here is that the world market is a precondition for the development of human wealth. Communism will not abolish the world-wide eonneetion between producers, but bring them under their conscious control. This is the pre­ supposition for mankind's gaining real wealth: In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposi­ tion other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces 244 Communism his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? (Gll/ndrisse 4881 I take this eloquent list of rhetorical questions as an extended version of the short remark in Capital iii, where Marx speaks of the development of human energy as an end in itself. From the above passage it is clear that the development of human powers depends I I ) on a given stage of transformation of nature; (2) on human capacities which have already been reached; (3) on new capacities which emerge and on human needs which set in motion the drivelor new goals. Or, in the language of Capital iii, 'the true realm of freedom . . . however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis' I Capital iii. 820). But it follows equally, and this is the stress in Capital iii, that mankind for this reason will always have to work. Only a stationary society would allow for the reduction of labour time to an insignificant length. However, Marx leaves no place for a 'station­ ary state' of society which would have been for him a society restricting human freedom in an unacceptable way. The develop­ ment of human powers demands the production and reproduction of the conditions necessary for it. The shortening of the working day is the prerequisite for this 'development of human energy as an end in itself ', as Marx claims in Capital iii. In order further to defend my position that Marx was not content with a simple reduction of working time in communist society, I give two possible readings of this sentence. First, it can be argued that the above claim refers principally to capitalist conditions where labour indeed has an alienated character. The shortening of the working day is a condition for the producers to be able to develop new creative powers and new needs. The working time, the work-load, and the alienated character of labour under capitalism fetter such a development. Therefore, the working day has to be shortened. But if, in a communist society, labour has lost its alrenated character, if humans develop their creative potential also in and through the process of production, shortening the working day may be of less importance. Imagine people who already in capitalist society are among the happy few to perform above all creative labour. Many of them would consider a . limitation of working time as a restriction of their personal needs and creativity. In a communist society, according to Communism 245 Marx, surplus labour itself will become a need (see Grundrisse, Berlin edn.: 23 1). Second, in a passage in the Manuscripts 1 861-3, Marx asserts that it is a 'law of motion' of human nature to develop new needs once an existing set of needs has been satisfied. Capital is propitious for this trend since it sets free labour in one branch and employs it in others. It develops human capacities in new directions lef. MEGA II iii. 1 . 1 75). It is often heard that the passage from Capital iii would conceive of a possibility of a leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom. Engels, in his Anti-Diihring, coined the term 'humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom'. He argued that with the seizing of the means of production by society, man becomes 'master of his own social organisation' ( CW xxv. 270r. However, Engels's treatment of the matter is based on social aspects alone, as becomes even more clear in the following passage: 'Man's own social organisation, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto govemed history pass under the control of man himself' (ibid.). But Marx, in the above passage, makes an argument about natural necessities. He says that human beings, in their development, will expand their wants thus creating a counter­ tendency to a decreasing realm of necessity. There might be one possibility for such a leap: if we imagine a 'stationary state' (John Stuart Mill) which is able to produce its wealth in an ever­ decreasing amount of time-if its population remains constant and no new needs are developing. This necessary transformation of nature could be done by means of an automated production process. But such a stationary state is completely incompatible with Marx's definition of what human freedom means. It is an integral part of his theory of human nature that humans develop, that they are creative and innovative, that they acquire new needs and knowledge and find new solutions to emerging problems. Consider the following passage from John Stuart Mill: I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our po 246 Communism 247 Communism present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get ani that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind. [Mill 1909: 748) While Marx could have agreed with the undesirable traits of industrial society, he certainly would not have agreed with the endorsement of the stationary state 8 For example, in Capital i, he writes: Only by suppressing the capitalist form of production could the length of the working-day be reduced to the necessary labour time. But, even in that case, the latter would extend its limits. On the one hand, because the notion of 'means of subsistence' would considerably expand, and the labourer would lay claim to an altogether different standard of life. On the other hand, because a part of what is now surplus·labour, would then count as necessary labour. [Capital i. 496) The point is that Marx is talking about natural limits to the transfonnation of nature which stem from this peculiarly human condition. In other words: the social character of human beings re-establishes anew the natural limits at each stage of historical development. The 'natural limits' are physically given and socially produced (see Hirsch 1977). Since these natural limits do exist, no matter whether physically given or SOCially produced, there is no place for speculation about mankind's 'leap' into the realm of freedom, as the Marxist tradition has assumed. The standard Marxist interpretation holds that the realm of freedom will be based on material abundance; only with this will it be possible to overcome personal differences. The similarities of this reading to the following observation of Hume are obvious. In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume pointed out that the conditions for justice derive from a specific situation in which mankind finds itself restricted by selfishness and limited gener­ osity of the human mind and scarcity of external objects (see Hume 1964: 266-7). However, among people imbued with mutual affection, things are often rendered common property, as 'married people in particular lose their property and are un­ acquainted with the mine and thine . . . The same effect arises Il Some recent advocates of a stationary state include Ophuls ( 1977) and Daly [ 1 9801· from any alteration in the circumstances of mankind, as when there is such a plenty of any thing as satisfies all the desires of men. In which case the distinction of property is entirely lost, and every thing remains in common' (ibid. 267). And: '(I1f men were supplied with every thing in the same abundance, or if every one had the same affection and tender regard for every one as for himself; justice and injustice would be equally unknown among mankind' (ibid.). Interestingly, Marx also uses part of this argument in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Needless to say, he did not include the aspect of mutual affection, but the aspect of material abundance is clearly seen as the basis for the withering away of justice. This line of argument played a most important role in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, where it was supposed to explain why a country like Russia with so little material wealth could not do away with the state bureaucracy, for example. Trotsky used this argument, saying that state and money would remain necessary as long as the material basis (i.e. more or less abundance) did not allow their withering away (Trotsky 1 9 7 1 : 56 ff.). But one should not overestimate the passage from the Critique of the Gotha Programme, for Marx was aware that people were different, that even personal antagonisms might survive capitalism (d. 1 859 Preface) and thus the conditions of justice might not disappear in communism (see also s. 5.5.3.). 5.3. Habermas: Marx between Kant, Fichte, and Hegel Habermas emphasizes the double influence of Kant and Hegel on Marx's concept of nature. According to him, the fact that first nature cannot be completely transformed into second nature thwarts the Hegelian component in Marx's model. Instead, argues Habermas, something like the Kantian Ding an sich re-emerges here. The materialist concept of synthesis [through soeial labour[ thus retains from Kant the fixed framework within which the subject forms a substance that it encounters. This framework is established once and for all through the equipment of transcendental consciousness or of the human species as a species of tool-making animals. On the other hand, in distinction from Kant, Marx assumes empirically mediated rules of 248 Communism synthesis that arc objectified as productive forces and historically transform the subjects' relation to theiT natural environment. (Habermas 1971a: 35) Habermas holds that Marx tried to overcome this theoretical dilemma by means of Fichte's philosophy. In so doing, Marx limits Fichte's absolute ego to mankind, which is a product of natural evolution and at each stage in its history is determined by the productive forces available to it. This can be stated in Fichte's terms where ego confronts its non-ego. As Habermas puts it, 'this interpretation given by Fichte with stubborn logic to Kant'S pure apperception sheds light on the identity of socially laboring subjects as it is conceived by materialism. As an identical ego they find themselves confronting an environment that obtains its identity in labor processes; this environment is not ego' (Habermas 1 9 7 1 a : 39). Habermas rightly emphasizes that Marx is congenial to Fichte's insistence (against Kant) that the unity of consciousness is achieved only by an act of self-consciousness: it is a product of activity (see ibid. 40). Marx's stress on the active element in man's relationship to nature here parallels his judgement of Feuerbach. Having appreciated Feuerbach's philo­ sophy in the early 1 840s, Marx in 1845 reassures himself of the importance of the active element, which was developed by idealism. As he wrote in the first thesis on Feuerbach: 'The chief defect of all previous materialism ( that of Feuerbach included) is that things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by idealism-which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such' (eW v. 2). According to Habermas, Marx restates with Fichte Hegel's critique on Kant: Marx restricts Fichtc's absolute ego to the contingent human species. Its act of self-generation, the activity in which it constitutes itself, is thus absolute only in relation to historical formations of the ego and the non-ego, to societal subjects and their material environment. Production is conditioned on both sides by 'natural presuppositions I [nature and human labour!. (Haberrnas 1971a: 40) But, Habermas continues, Marx's approach does not allow for a critical self-reflection of the productive subject, because Marx Communism 249 limits production or praxis to labour (see ibid. 42). Habermas claIms that there is a discrepancy between Marx's social theory and h,S philosophical self-understanding. In his social theory he was aware of both instrumental and communicative action where the first consists of transforming nature, the second i � embedded In cultural traditions and is exercised via symbolically mediated Interaction. However, so goes Habermas's charge, Marx dId not translate this insight into his philosophical frame­ work. 'Taken by itself, scientific-technical progress does not yet lead to a reflexive comprehension of the traditional "natural" operation of the social life process in such a wa that self­ conscious control could result' (ibid. 5 1 ) . ; 5.3. 1 . Labour and interaction Habermas's theoretical interest is thus in the first place to proVIde some thoughts on the philosophical-epistemological level. He does not think that Marx's concept of labour can fulfil this task. Instead, he introduces a distinction between two types of actIOn: Instrumental, nature-transforming action (which is characterized by means-ends relationships) on the one hand, and communicative action on the other, thereby taking up the d\StInCtIOll made by Aristotle (and further developed by Hannah Arendt) between praxis and poiesis. He characterizes the first type of action as typical of social systems, the second as typical of the hfe world. Instrumental action therefore not only refers to the transformation of nature, but also to the operation of social systems. I doubt that this distinction can help us tackle the ecological problematic. One reason for my scepticism is this: even granted that the institutional conditions for human eman­ cipation do exist, there might still be something which escapes Habermas's framework but which is contained in that of Marx above all in his analysis of machinery in the Grundrisse and th� Manuscripts 1 861-3. In other words, Habermas suggests that we conld separate a conscions control of social life production from the process of material prodnction: 'Marx very precisely dlstmgmshes the self-conscious control of the social life process by the combmed producers from an automatic regulation of the process of production that has become independent of these mdIvIduals. In the former case the workers relate to each other 250 Communism as combining with each other of their own accord. In the latter they are merely combined' (Habermas 1971a: 5 1 ). But this 'automatic regulation of the process of production' may constrain the 'self-conscious control' for ever. Communism in the strong sense ('human society') would thus be impossible. Habermas himself is aware that the development of productive forces leads to an increasing embodiment of knowledge in machines (ibid. 55 ('auf die Ebene VOn Maschinen ab­ gebildet wird', Habermas 1968: 76)) which has its limiting value in the 'organisation of society itself as an automaton' (Habermas 1 9 7 1 a : 55). But if this is true, then Habermas's distinction between instrumental and communicative action becomes less important. For what can the 'self-reflection' (which is embedded in the latter type of action) achieve? According to Habermas, it can achieve abolition of ideological delusion ( Verblendung) and class rule. But perhaps a still more urgent problem has been thcreby neglected: the existence of a productive automaton which remains even after the fall of bourgeois order as an 'animated monster'. Communism could only mean thc establishment of a classless society which is, however, still a society in which 'superior powers' are generated and reproduced systematically. Habermas does not seem to realize that Marx's 'ingenious combination of Kant and Fichte' (ibid.) is not doomed to fail because his model offers no place for critical self-reflection, but that on Marx's own account we have to reckon with the possibility that first nature can be transformed into second nature (under industrial conditions) only by paying the price of technological alienation. In other words, growth in productive forces leads to an increase in artefacts, vis-a-vis which the producers are only 'combined', not combining. As Marx noted in the Grundrisse: The combination of this labour appears just as subservient to and Icd by an alien will and an alien intelligence-having its animating unity elsewhere- as its material unity appears subordinate to the objective unity of the machinery, of fixed capital, which, as animated monster, objectifies the scientific idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does not in any way relate to the individual worker as his instrument; but rather he himself exists as an animated individual punctuation mark, as its living isolated accessory. (Grundrisse 470)9 ') As 1 have shown in ch. 3, Marx's final analysis in Capital differs from this outline. Communism 251 Now, if this trend cannot be reversed under communism, the 'true human society' will remain Utopia for ever. Habermas, although citing the same passage, does not pay attention to this question. He remains blind to the problem which technology poses to modem societies, since he thinks neither that technology can be brought back into the life world of the individuals nor that another type of technology can be imagined. He seems to assume that in order to make the producers the beneficiaries of a growth in productive forees, 1O the establishing of a society in which the ideal speech siruation is institutionalized would be necessary and sufficient. My argument against this is that not even such a society would have the means for controlling the unbounded 'animated monster'. As before, the producers would be the combined and not the combining. When they are stepping aside from the production process and engaging in discursive activities, they will eventually realize that their way of trans­ forming nature must be changed; and is precisely here that Habermas's model does not show how the two can be brought together, unless he can show how the communicative action influences the instrumental one. There is a certain ambivalence in Habermas (with respect to technical progress) which comes out in his 'early' critique of Marcuse. Here Habermas seems to immunize technical develop­ ment against criticism: 'The idea of a New Science will not stand up to logical scrutiny any more than that of a New Technology . . . For this function, as for scientific-technical progress in general, there is no more "humane substitute'" (Habermas 1971b: 88). But here Habermas confuses technical and scientific development, partly identifying science with technology. The reason for this is his immaterial definition of productive forces, as we saw in Chapter 4. To avoid a possible misunderstanding here, I should say that I agree that in industri­ ally developed societies there can be no functional alternative to science; but there can be other technologies (whilst it is difficult to imagine another science). This is the result of my analysis of social systems in Chapter 3 and 4, where I argued that technology is no social system. It follows that technology is open to social to Habermas rightly sees that growth in productive forces and the conditions of the good life arc not identical, the former can 'at best serve' the latter, see Habermas 1971b: 1 19. 252 Communism determination, its autonomy only an apparent one. The concrete shape of existing technologies is the result of conflicts and negotiations between social systems. Habermas presents a somewhat different approach in the article 'Technology and Science as Ideology' which was written three years earlier. Here he acknowledges that 'this thesis of the autonomous character of technical development is not correct' IHabermas 1971a: 59). He rightly sees that 'the pace and the direction of technical development today depend to a great extent on public investments' libid.). Moreover, he says that technology is coupled with economy, science, and politics libid.). But even on the basis of this approach he stops short of considering the topic of changing existing technologies when he writes that 'through the unplanned sociocultural consequences of techno­ logical progress, the human species has challenged itself to learn not merely to affect its social destiny, but to control it' libid. 6 1 ) . This is to say 'the social potential constituted b y technical knowledge and ability lis brought] into a defined and controlled relation to our practical knowledge and will' libid.). He sees the main obstacle to this in 'social interests that arise naturally Inaturwuchsig] out of the compulsion of the reproduction of social life without being reflected upon and confronted With the declared political self-understanding of social groups' libid. 60, amended translation I I ) . This is definitely not a mere restating of the orthodox Marxist position that it is only capitalist class rule which needs to be abolished; even a 'classless' industrial society would probably Ito a certain extent) face these problems. But Habermas fails to show how the communicative type of action can change the course of technological development since here he thinks that it should be changed. Habermas himself poses the question in the following way: 'IH]ow can the relation between technical progress and the social life-world, which today is still organized in a natural way, be reflected upon and brought under the control of rational discussion? ' libid. 53, amended trans­ lation). Habermas's answer points to the liberating potential of an undistorted political discussion. Such a discussion is pro­ hibited by domination IHerrschaftl, by interests which are not subject to public justification Isee ibid. 6 1 ) . I doubt that such I I I use the term 'natural' to render the German 'naturwuchsig', as is done throughout this work. Communism 253 a diagnosis and therapy are sufficient for the problem at stake. Habermas's somewhat imprecise use of the notion of 'domina­ tion' is obscuring rather than illuminating here. For what is meant by this notion? Obviously it is to denote the interests of social systems vis-a-vis the life world, or, as he later says, the spill-over of systemic imperatives to the life world. However, these social systems operate according to different systems­ codes; I find it difficult to fuse them together under the general heading Herrschaft. I would maintain that it is more illuminat­ ing to investigate the different mechanisms of the subsystems of society li.e. also their conflicts' ) in order to bring out both the dangers of some modern technologies and the possibilities of solving them Ifor an attempt to do so, see Luhmann 1989c). To summarize: Habermas's framework seems to imply too rigid a distinction between different types of action, such that the communicative element is excluded from nature-transforming activities. Ironically, he himself has to reintroduce the commu­ nicative element to enable social reflexivity. This reintroduction is necessary for Habermas, since he is aware that a liberated society has to become self-reflexive not only in its communicative sphere, but also in its technical-instrumental sphere. But is, then, the separation between instrumental and communicative action of great help for the understanding of ecological problems? 5.4. Messianic Marxism In this section, I set out to examine two writers who present an extraordinarily unorthodox Marxism: Ernst Bloch and Walter Benjamin. Both writers are most interesting in that they already focused on the problem of modern societies' relationship with nature some forty years ago. I shall claim that they are able to arrive at a position which is peculiarly aware of ecological problems on the basis of their metaphysical orientation. However, as will become clear, they cannot be put on a par with defenders of an ecocentric world-view. 5.4. 1 . Ernst Bloch: Marxism of technology It is a merit of Bloch's analysis that he addresses the problem of science and technology for communist society in a detailed 254 Communism way. In his book Das Prinzip Hoffnung, written during World War II and published in the 1950s, he discusses the question of technology above all in the chapter 'Will and Nature, Tech­ nological Utopias'. He praises bourgeois technology for having achieved some degree of progress, especially in constructing what he calls 'de-organicist' teehnology (entorganisierte Technik). This term is to denote the fact that modern technology cannot be understood any longer as a simple extension or replacement of the body (tool-arm; saw-teeth; eye-lens; etc.) but must be conceived as something completely new: 'And the more tech­ nology loses the final traces of its rootedness, or rather the more it gains new rootedness wherever it wants to, in the synthetic production of raw materials, in the radiation industry and whatever else in magnificent hubris: the more intimately and centrally the mediation with the interpolated system of nature must develop' (Bloch 1986: 67 1 ). This 'de-organicist' teehnology makes possible a more intimate mediation with nature. But at the same time, he charges bourgeois technology with being too abstract, with pressing forms on to natural contents without understanding them: 'Thus it becomes evident again and again that our technology up to now stands in nature like an army of occupation in enemy territory, and it knows nothing of the interior of the country, the fact of the matter is transcendent to it' (ibid. 696).1 2 In this respect, bourgeois technology is similar to capitalist economy: both produce accidents. Never­ theless, bourgeois technology is more reliable than its economy: 'Certainly bourgeois technology, by virtue of its elective affinity with natural mechanisms, is considerably more sound than the capitalist-abstract economic system, even non-Euclidean acts of boldness are not denied to it, they stand out remarkably, as we have seen' (ibid. 695). Bloch aims at a more intimate transforma­ tion of nature following Bacon: 'The control of nature INatur­ beherrschung] serves in Bacon the establishment of a "regnum 12 The metaphor of the conqueror was also used by Engels-see CW xxv. 461. Interestingly, Engels says the following with respect to the Italian Alps: 'when the Italians of the Alps used up the pine forests on the southern slopes, so carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by dOing so they were cutting at the roots of the dairy industry in their region: they had still less inkling that they were depriving their mountain springs of water for the greater part of the year, and making it possiQlc for them to pour still more furious torrents on the plains during the rainy seasons' leW xxv. 461). Communism 255 hominis" . . . Bacon's great maxim: "Natura parendo vincitur", nature is conquered by obedience, remained active, but it was crossed by the interest of an "exploitation" of nature, and thus by an interest which has nothing more to do with the natura naturans which Bacon still knows and singles out as the "causa causarum", let alone being allied to it' libid. 657). Against this Bloch holds that we have to construct new technologies which achieve a more intimate relationship with nature; a relationship which is totally different from the attitude of a conqueror who stands in the land of the enemy, pushing around the recalcitrant elements. Bloch accepts that it is man­ kind's project to gain fuller mastery over nature. However, he does not agree that 'exploitation of nature' should be part of that project. There are two terminological questions which arise here. The first is the question whether nature can be exploited, if it makes sense to speak of an 'exploitation of nature' in the strict sense.'3 When talking about exploitation, we usually have individuals in mind who, according to some moral standards, can be said to exploit other individuals. Obviously, this does not apply to man's relationship to nature, unless one is prepared to adopt an approach which attributes rights to nature Isee the discussion in ch. 2). In a weaker sense, however, we all speak of . exploitation of natural resources, a process which Bloch does not oppose as such. 'Marxism of technology, once it has been well thought-out, is no philanthropy for maltreated metals, but rather the end of the naive application of the standpoint of the exploiter and animal tamer to nature' libid. 695). The second, and more important, question seems to be that Bloch also uses the term in another sense: he wants to express the fact that people will not succeed in mastering nature if they 'exploit' it, that is, if they are not able to transform it according to some inherent laws or structures of the material elements. This means that they will not succeed in transforming it if they do not understand the laws and mechanisms involved. As I showed at the beginning of Chapter 2, quoting Bodei, ancient thought conceived of technical solutions as solutions directed against nature; it was only with modern writers that they were under­ stood as in accordance with natural laws-see Bodei 1983. \., Note that Bloch himself put 'exploitation' in quotation marks. 256 Communism Bloch's position is thus a position within modernity, accepting central claims of Enlightenment philosophy. He shares the belief that mankind can prosper in transforming nature; he does not reject the development of science and technology; on the contrary, he holds that only more developed technologies will contribute to mankind's prospering. These new technologies, however, need to be based on more profound insights into nature-something which seems inhibited by present capitalist relations. In so doing, he implicitly tries to defend the 1859 Preface, although it is not clear whether he charges capitalism with insufficient development or insufficient use of new pro­ ductive forces.'4 But at the same time, Bloch is aware that not every increase in productive forces contributes to social progress when he says that all rejoicing about great technical progress is in vain if it forgets that technical progress can be accompanied by social regress (see Bloch 1986: 696). My interpretation of Bloch is very charitable compared with that of Alfred Schmidt, for example. Let me therefore briefly sum up Schmidt's criticisms. He charges Bloch ( I ) with over­ estimating the possibility of unifying subject and object. Bloch aims at a 'mystical nature-subject' (Natursub;ekt) which has not yetiS revealed itself; (2) with being obscure about the 'open­ ness' ( Unabgeschlossenheit) and 'latency' of nature. I address the two points in turn. 1 . Schmidt is right when he insists that mankind's purposes will always remain alien to nature-also in socialism (see Schmidt 1 9 7 1 : 167)-and that mankind has to outwit nature. In this respect Bloch's terminology is indeed misleading (or self­ contradictory). Consider the following passage by Bloch: 'In place of the technologist as a mere outwitter or exploiter there stands in concrete terms the subject socially mediated with itself, which increasingly mediates itself with the problem of the natural subject' (Bloch 1986: 674). This may sound strange and confused, but one may interpret it that Bloch wants to stress the possible role of nature as co-producer, a role which can be set forth only on the basis of a deeper understanding of nature. But then, to repeat, he gets self-contradictory, since the Baconian 14 See Elster 1985: 259 for a distinction. This is the crucial notion for Bloch: the 'not-yet-character' of all that exists. \S Communism 257 approach also implies an Uberlister·technology. Moreover, the co-operative role of nature would also put man in the role of exploiter or outwitter ( Uberlister): either humans appropriate what nature freely produces, or they combine natural processes in a way beneficial to them: in the latter case, the 'cunning of reason' ( = uberlisten) is at work. Of course, I agree that there are mystical and religious elements in Bloch's concept of nature; but, nevertheless, I think that the interpretation which I gave above is a legitimate one. To put it in another way, Bloch's metaphysical beliefs may have made him sensitive to a problem which does not so much interest traditional Marxists. We could say, then, that Bloch's analysis was non-Marxist in its motivation but Marxist in its method. It is admitted that there is a 'meta­ physical surplus' which does not square with Marxian thought (see also Hudson 1982). 2. Schmidt's doubts about nature's 'latency' seem to be even less justified. Here it is Bloch, rather, who is in greater accord with the natural sciences. As we know from Darwinism, nature is an essentially unfinished and open process. Curiously, Schmidt thinks that higher beings than humans cannot emerge (d. Schmidt 1 9 7 1 : 162). This seems to me an exaggerated anthro· pocentrism, onc which conceives mankind as the centre of the universe. Evolution is a blind, and thus open, process, the stages of which are not predetermined. 5.4.2. Walter Ben;amin: the resurrection ofpast generations In Chapters 3 and 4, I presented and discussed some evolutionary approaches to social history. It was argued that, on a materialist conception, the new can only emerge as a recombination of the existing. Such a view certainly may be challenged from several positions. One of them is a position which expects the new as the totally different from the present. Walter Benjamin, in his Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen, put forward such an argument. Criticizing the notion of progress held by the German Social Democratic party, he noted that this was problematic in that it conceived of progress ( I ) as progress of the human species, (2) as unlimited (perfectibility), and (3) as inevitable (see Benjamin 1974: 700).'6 But basic to these three problematic notions is a 16 Note that his charge does not fit an evolutionary approach, as presented in chs. 3 and 4. 258 Communism concept of time as empty and homogeneous. 1 7 Against such a concept Benjamin contends that history is a construction which is located in our time, not in empty and homogeneous time: 'History is the subject of a construction whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of , the now I retztzeitl IBenjamin 1973: 263, amended translation). This fact allows us to cite past events, just as fashion cites past clothes; the French Revolution cited ancient Rome and under­ stood itself as a renewal of it. The French revolution viewed itself as Rome reincarnate. It evoked ancient Rome the way fashion evokes costumes of the past. Fashion has a flair for the topical, no matter where it stirs in the thickets of long ago; it's a tiger's leap into the past. This jump, however, takes place in an arena where the ruling class gives the commands, The same leap in the open air of history is the dialectical one, which is how Marx understood the revolution. libid.) Central to Benjamin's argument is the notion of 'blasting out' Iheraussprengen ) these past events from the continuum of history. This metaphor corresponds to a second one which refers to the picture we have of these past events and which is available to us only in moments of danger. Benjamin coins the term 'flashing' lau/blitzen ) for it: 'The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognised and is never seen again' libid. 257). With these two basic concepts, we can understand Benjamin's different conception of social change. There is no stream of progress in which the Social Democratic Party and the working class can swim, but there are unique historical opportunities where a picture becomes available to the historieal subject and this can be reactivated at other such moments. 'Historical materialism wishes to retain that image of the past which unexpeetedly appears to the historical subject at a moment of danger' libid., amended translation). This last technique refers to the method of the materialist historian; for the fighting class the cognitive flashing is combined with practil blasting out Iheraussprengen) . I " Benjamin's preoccupa17 Lukacs in his seminal Geschichte tlnd KlassenbewufJtsein ( 1 923) noted that modern capitalism transforms time into a pure quantitative category-see Lukacs 1971: 179-80. III Note that both metaphors are metaphors from war; Benjamin wrote this text in 1942. Communism 259 tion with the phlegmatic politics of the Social Democrats leads to an overreaction. He frankly endorses an extreme subjectiv­ ism: for him, there seem to be no historical laws Or mechan­ isms but only the one of the grasping of unique historical opportunities. This 'tiger's leap' into the past corresponds to his claim of an increasing acceleration of history, as he noted in Thesis XVIII: lIn relation to the history of organic life on earth' writes a modern biologist, Ithe paltry fifty millennia of homo sapiens constitute some­ thing like two seconds at the close of a twenty-four-hour day. On this seale, the history of civilized mankind would fill one-fifth of the last second of the last hour.' The present, which, as a model of Messianic time, comprises the entire history of mankind in an enormous abridge­ ment, coincides exactly with the stature which the history of mankind has in the universe libid. 265) Although Benjamin calls this approach the true approach of the historical materialist, it is, rather, idealist. The 'totally different' is not something which has not yet been there, but, rather, some­ thing which did indeed exist a long time ago. Proletarian revolu­ tion therefore consists in bringing back a lost state of history. Revolution, for Benjamin, is redemption, revenge for the injustice to former generations. Not man or men but the struggling, oppressed class itself is the depository of historical knowledge. In Marx it appears as the enslaved class, as the avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of the downtrodden. This conviction . . . has always been objectionable to Social Democrats . . . Social Democracy thought fit to assign to the working class the role of the redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the sinews of its greatest strength. This training made the working class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren. libid. 262) Although Benjamin is not concerned with future generations, 19 he is able to work out a sensitive position in relation to nature. lY In Annex B to the Theses Benjamin makes clear that his approach is informed by fewish religion: 'We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remem­ brance, however. This stripped the future of its magiC, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For 260 Communism However, this sensibility comes from his religious background. As he noted in EinbahnstrafJe, human beings have to revere nature, since they depend on nature and are not able to give it anything. Thus, whenever they receive something from nature, they ought to be grateful. The earliest customs of peoples seem to send us a warning that in accepting what we receive so abundantly from nature we should guard against a gesture of avarice. For we are able to make Mother Earth no gift of our own. It is therefore fitting to show respect in taking, by returp.inga part of all we receive before laying hands on our share . . . An Athenian custom forbade the picking up of crumbs at the table, since they belonged to the heroes. If society has so degenerated through necessity and greed that it can now receive the gifts of nature only rapaciously, that it snatches the fruit unripe from the trces in order to sell it most profitably, and is compelled to empty each dish in its determination to have enough, the earth will be impoverished and the land yield bad harvests. (Benjamin 1986: 76) According to Benjamin, a society without exploitation might be able to give nature something back, even to 'improve' it: 'Once this exploitation has stopped, labour too will lose its nature­ exploiting character . . . Such labour which is animated by play does not aim at the production of values but at an improved nature' (Benjamin 1982: 456, my translation, my emphasis). Now, one might say that Benjamin's approach is forceful and persuasive but has the disadvantage of being based solely on an ethical dimension: gratitude towards nature.20 Of course, he wants to abolish the social conditions which inhibit such an 'alien' relationship to nature, but one might ask if this can be a realistic pcrspective for industrial societies. Let me thus turn to Benjamin's 'technical utopia'. Benjamin, unlike some 'green' fundamentalists, does not reject technological development. When proposing Fourier's ideal of labour (i.e. play), Benjamin is every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter' (Benjamin 1973: 266). But see Adorno 1977: 619 for a view which mentions Benjamin's concern for future generations. :w Interestingly, Bloch juxtaposes Schiller's and Goethe'S concepts of nature; according to Bloch, the fonner wants to dominate nature ('Beneficent is the fire's might, if man controls and guards it right'L the latter is grateful to nature: 'Sublime spirit, you gave mel gave me all for which I asked / You did not turn in vain I your countenance to me within the fire' (Faust, part It ff. 3217-20, as quoted in Bloch 1986: 670). Communism 261 aware that labour can become play only on the basis of the most developed productive forces: 'The unfolding and blossoming in playing presupposes highly developed productive forces which are available to mankind only today. However, they are provided only in the opposite sense of their potential: for the caSe of emergency' (ibid., my translation). Likewise, this 'liberated labour' is to 'improve' nature by technical means. Benjamin again cites with approval Fourier's Phalansteres: 'According to Fourier, good social labour should bear the consequence that four moons would illuminate the earthly night, that ice would retreat from the poles, that sea water would no longer taste salty, and that wild animals would enter the service of humanity. All this illustrates a type of labour which, far from exploiting nature, would set free the creations which are slumbering in its womb' (Benjamin 1974: 699, my transIation) 21 Perhaps it should be said that nowadays we may have the possibility of creating such animals with the help of genetic engineering (leaving open the question whether this is 'liberated work'): but who would be delighted? Similarly, the poles may be melting in the near future, but with quite disastrous consequences. Furthermore, Benjamin hopes that mankind will make true cosmic experiences-which he thinks indispensable-with the help of technology. The ancient relationship towards the cosmos was mediated by the experience of ecstasy (Rausch), while we moderns have technical possibilities at hand. These possibilities are extrapolated from war technologies which, of course, have been used only for destructive purposes. The result was a 'river of blood' (see Benjamin 1986: 93). But at the same time Benjamin is fascinated by these new technologies: 'High-frequency currents coursed through the landscape, new constellations rose in the sky, aerial space and ocean depths thundered with propellers . . . ' (ibid.). 22 However, the fascination is immediately broken when Benjamin adds the following to his enumeration: ' . . . and 21 Note the similarity to Bloch, who uses the notion of nature's co-produc­ tivity, its 'latency', See also the Similarity to Bloch's technological Utopia: 'Just as the chain reactions on the sun bring us heat, light and life, so atomic energy . creates fertile land out of the desert, and spring out of ice. A few hundred pounds of uranium and thorium would be enough to make the Sahara and Northern Canada, Greenland and the Antartic into the riviera' (Bloch 1986: 664). 22 Note the parallel to writers like Ernst Junger or the Italian futurists; sec Hinz 1985 for the latter. 262 Communism everywhere sacrificial shafts were dug in Mother Earth' IBenjamin 1986: 93). The ruling class's yeaming for profit had changed the bride's bed into a river of blood Id. ibid.). This sexual metaphor can be seen to conceive of the possibilities of technology in the same way as Bloch: as in principle leading to a more intimate relationship with nature. Again, like Bloch, these possibilities are not put into practice as a result of capitalist relations. The mastery of nature, so the imperialists teach, is the purpose of all technology. But who would trust a cane wielder who proclaimed the mastery of children by adults to be the purpose of education? Is not education above all the indispensable ordering of the relationship between generations and therefore mastery, if we are to use this term} of that relationship and not of children? And likewise technology is not the mastery of nature but of the relation between nature and man. (ibid.) With this formulation, Benjamin arrives at an extraordinary insight: he captures a central problem of modem societies in an ingenious fashion. He concentrates on the results of relations of domination, stressing the need for reflexivity. We gain nothing, he says, if we insist on the right to dominate nature lassuming we wish to use that term). Instead, he continues, we should be able to control I 'dominate') this relation . This formulation is congenial to Marx's project in that it stresses both the need to transform nature with the help of technologies and the need to evaluate these transformations. Domination of nature thus becomes a reflexive concept.23 5.5. Conscious control and central planning 5.5. 1 . Marx, Vico, and social complexity Marx derived part of his historical optimism from Vico and the tradition which followed him Id. Berlin 1976: 94, 137). Indeed, if Vico's claim were true, there would be a powerful reason to share Marx's optimism. As Marx indicated in a footnote in Capital i, he agreed with Vico that man can understand the world which is his own product much better than the world of 2,� See also Luhmann ( 1 984a: 644-5), who defines social rationality as the system's awareness of the reflexivity of its own operations on its environment. Communism 263 nature Iwhich is, according to Vico, the product of God). Marx says: Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of all social organisation, deserve equal attention? And would not such a history be easier to compile) since) as Vico says, human history differs from natural history in this) that we have made the former, but not the latter? (Capital i. 352) It is noteworthy that many commentators have not noticed the important implications which follow from this claim. Marx is often charged with having overlooked the fact that nature will never be completely transformed. Alfred Schmidt also bases his criticism of Bloch on this line of argument: 'Despite its increasing mediation, nature never becomes something completely "made" by us . . . This point expresses the most fundamental mark of distinction between the idealist and the materialist dialectic: even in a truly human world there is no full reconciliation of Subject and Object. This is what frustrates Bloch's hope for a philosophy of identity' ISchmidt 1971: 158). But Schmidt neglects the more basic problem: leven granted that nature and society could be reconciled) what if human creations still cannot be conceived as human creations and thus cannot be fully under­ stood?'4 In other words, what if the social sphere loses its privileged cognitive status? After all, it is only natural for us to doubt such a privileged status for the social sciences: did not the positivists charge the humanities with indulging in unscientific enterprises and with pretending to have gained knowledge about non-natural things? The motivation for this attack came from their experience of self-proclaimed human sciences, such as Marxism and psycho­ analYSiS, on the background of a fundamental crisis of the exact sciences such as physics and mathematics. How strong this positivist influence was land still is), we can see if we look at commonsense opinions regarding this problem. It is a widespread view that the natural sciences are able to know more about nature than the social sciences about society. It would be interesting to 24 Marx faces this problem when he discusses a possible 'deviatio? ' of technologies from human abilities. Howcver, he a�su�es a s�rong functlo,:al . . mechanism to be at work here which links human ablhtlcs to eXlstmg productlve forccs. See CW v . 87-8 and Capital L 488. 264 Communism examine how different epochs (and different writers) have seen this cognitive problem-a task which lies outside the framework of this study. What I want to do here is to formulate some doubts regarding Marx's privileging of 'the social' with respect to cogni­ tion. I do this by looking at some results of contemporary social research. Todd La Porte, in his seminal Organized Social Complexity, observes that IOlne particularly striking aspect of modern political and social develop­ ment has been the capacity of men to construct social systems encom� passing more and more groups. OUI lives arc bounded by agencies, organizations, combines, coalitions, and associations: networks of hundreds of connected groups and persons . . . One consequence of these increases in group connections . . . has been the tightening of organiza­ tional dependencies affecting social dynamics and political movements. Another has been a rapid increase in the number of people and agencies affecting the day-to-day experiences of individuals. Closely related to this increase has been onc in the number of surprises we encounter. They are generally disturbing surprises, caused by the interruption or frustration of Ollr expectation by some hitherto unrecognized depen­ dency. (La Porte 1975: 3) La Porte calls this a condition of social complexity-to be more precise, of organized social complexity. 'Systems that are characterized by organized complexity . . . are those in which there is at least a moderate number of variables or parts related to each other in organic or interdependent ways' (ibid. 5). The most obvious empirical referents are 'social groups with conscious purposes, such as formal organizations or informal, but cohesive, groups and associations' (ibid. 6). It is important that these systems are self-conscious in order that their interaction can count as organized. La Porte then provides a working definition of organized social complexity: 'The degree of complexity of organized social systems (0) is a function of the number of system components (Ci), the relative differentiation or variety of these components (Dj], and the degree of interdependence among these components (h). Then, by definition, the greater Ci, Dj, and Ik, the greater the complexity of the organized system (0)' (ibid.). La Porte concludes: '[Ilf it is true that the texture of life and its social institutions has become increasingly complex and can be expected to continue so, the implications for social Communism 265 theory, for political science, for the techniques of inquiry, and­ perhaps most important-for public policy are enormous' (ibid. 1 8). Now this is obviously an argument which presents a strong challenge to the Vico-Marx position.2S For if these are pervasive traits of modern societies, Marx's hope for an abolition of fetishism, for a full reappropriation of man's objectifications, for a 'reconciliation', is doomed. It is not doomed because of an 'indissoluble' rest of nature, which cannot be transformed, but for the opposite reason: even if mankind succeeds very well in transfonning nature we have to take into account the paradoxical result that it now suffers from social opacity. The process which leads to such a result is the development of the productive forces, which have grown not only in efficiency but also in size: as Marx himself was aware, the relation between individual (craft worker) and technology (his craft instrument on which he played like a virtuoso) was reversed with the advent of modern industry. To run certain technologies, it is indispensable to have a whole network of social institutions. Immediately connected to this diagnosis is the question of planning, or of 'social steering'. I lack not only space but also competence to discuss the different judgements on the prospects of planning in complex societies. 26 I only want to bring out a theoretical dilemma (which seems to be also a historical one) which Marx did not confront. Recall his distinction between ancient societies and com­ munism. In ancient societies people were dependent on nature to a large degree. Their 'mastery' of nature is on a low level. To this corresponds a mystical world-view: nature is essentially an opaque thing for human beings, whereas social relations in ancient societies are transparent. Communist societies, on the other hand, have succeeded in transforming nature into second nature, resulting in a (nearly) transparent nature and a transparent 25 The challenge becomes even stronger if we assume that ecological problems arise Out of an interplay between social and natural processes, both (at times) poorly understood-not to speak of their complex interaction. How little we know in this respect can be grasped from the discussion which followed the publication of a number of 'world-models' (Club of Rome and others) which tried to connect several factors in an obviously unsatisfying way. 26 Sec the contributions of La Porte ( 1975), Mayntz { l986); Scharpf ( 1989); Luhmann [ 1 98901; Teubner { 1 98901; Willke [19911; Krohn and Kuppers [ 1 990), Biih1 1 1 9891. 266 Communism society. In between ancient and communist societies lie societies which, to differing degrees, exhibit natural and social opacity; but the gross course of history seems to follow a road on which natural opacity decreases and social opacity increases-up to a point (capitalism) where, according to Marx, the social realm is most opaque, but the possibilities of breaking it up increase proportionally. However, this mechanism is a rather speculative one. Marx excludes the possibility that social opacity cannot be blasted away, but perhaps at most reduced. The growth of productive forces has led to a decrease in natural opacity but also to an increase in social opacity. Whereas Marx saw this opacity as a result of false reality which could be transformed into a true reality, some contemporary sociologists are more sceptical. They explain social opacity by social complexity which cannot be abolished. In other words, the 'inverted world' (Marx) presents an irreversible stage of social evolution. According to their approach, the evil has to be located more deeply than Marx locates it. If they are right, then Marx's assumption that with the abolition of capitalism fragmentation and alienation would also vanish must be regarded as obsolete. 5.5.2. Centralplanning! In section 5 . 1 , I made the distinction between a weak and a strong notion of communism. The decisive difference has been identified in the existence of alienation and fetishism. However, according to Marx, alienation and fetishism have their social roots in privately producing units, i.e. under market conditions. The dichotomy market/plan thus becomes most important here. As we shall see, Marx was not very clear about the survival of markets in communism and the role of central planning. Take, first, his assertion in Capital that 'only products of different labour processes, carried on independentl'y for the accounts of different private individuals, confront one another as commodities' (Capital i. 49, amended translation). This qualifi­ cation enables Marx to claim that a socialist economy which has abolished exploitation, but continues to exchange products, is also free of commodity fetishism, since its products are not commodities. But this claim overlooks the fact that if different units of production (for example, workers' co-operatives) under Communism 267 socialism exchange products with each other, these products assume the form of commodities since they are use-value and exchange-value at one and the same time. Marx offers only a verbal resistance to such a conclusion by insisting that the different units of production must be carried on by private individuals in order for their products to assume the form of commodities (which, rather than providing a solution, begs the question). The whole problem therefore seems to come down to the question of market and plan. Before going into detail, a preliminary remark is in order. Up to now, I have quoted several passages from Marx where he speaks of 'conscious control' or a 'settled plan' which would be necessary for a communist society. I should like to stress that these notions are philosophical and abstract notions. We cannot, therefore, immediately derive from them an answer to the question whether Marx was in favour of central planning (in the sense of 'command economy') or not. And, what is more, he might even have opposed central planning if it came into oppo­ sition with the 'conscious control', that is, if the side-effects and irrationalities of central planning would have thwarted the full conscious self-control of mankind's fate. As I shall claim, Marx's theoretical framework requires both markets and plan. Marx needs markets for the transformation of concrete labour into abstract labour, and he needs the plan to establish the social character of labour from the outset. There is no way Out of this dilemma. As Michael Harrington observed, 'Marx is a major source of the contemporary confusion, not the least because he provides solid authority for contradictory positions' (Harrington 1989: 57). According to him, Marx regarded the Ten-Hours Law as nothing less than a 'modest Magna Charta', 'as the triumph of the political economy of the working class over the political economy of the middle class'. From this one can infer that in a 'socialist-tending society, markets would have an utterly different meaning than under capitalist laissez-faire'. But things are not so easy with Marx: 'Unfortunately, Das Kapital also provides solid reasons for arguing a contrary position: that socialism must totally dispense with markets. Small wonder that matters got confused' (ibid. 58). Marx criticized Proudhon and the Ricardian socialists Bray 268 Communism and Gray several times for their proposal to abolish money and replace it with certificates for labour time Isee CW xxix. 320 ff. ). Marx's main point of criticism is that their solution would be self-defeating, since it proposes that goods be produced, but not exchanged, as commodities Isee Moore 1980: 73; see also Cohen 1978: 127-8). Marx never proposed to 'count any two hours of concrete labour as equivalent. This is the solution of Proudhon and Duhring, but not that of Marx' IMoore 1980: 73). Instead, claims Moore, Marx was looking for a mechanism to translate concrete labour into abstract labour, since he was constantly aware of every society's need to perform this transformation. Marx maintains that 'complicated labour . . . lis] labour of greater intensity and greater specific gravity . . . Iwhich] resolves itself into simple labour put together; it is Simple labour raised to a higher power, so that for example one day of skilled labour may equal three days of simple labour' I CW xxix. 273). In a letter to Kugelmann he writes, 'that this necessity of the distribution of social labour in definite proportions cannot possibly be done away with by a particular form of social production but can only change the mode of appearance, is self-evident' ISW ii. 4 1 9). And in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains: To measure the exchange values .of commodities by the labour time they contain, the different kinds of labour have to be reduced to uniform, homogeneous, simple labour, in short to labour of uniform quality, whose only difference, therefore/ is quantity. This reduction appears to be an abstraction, but it is an abstraction which is made every day in the social process of production. The conversion of all commodities into labour time is no greater an abstraction, and is no less real, than the resolution of all organic bodies into air. (CW xxix. 272) But how, then, translate and measure more complicated labour? Here Marx rclies on the reality of bourgeois society which has already brought about the transformation of a great part of social labour into simple labour: 'The greater part of the labour per­ formed in bourgeois society is simple labour as statistical data show' ICW xxix. 273). But what, then, about the smaller part of complicated labour? How is the reduction brought about? Marx's answer in this text is evasive when he says: 'The laws governing this reduction do not concern us here' ICW xxix. 273). Communism 269 Eight years later, in the first volume of Capital, Marx conceives of labour performed under conditions of modern industry as nearly completely simple labour: 'Hence, in the place of hierarchy of specialised workmen that characterises manufacture, there steps, in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalise and reduce to one and the same level every kind of work that has to be done by the minders of the machines' I Capital i. 396; see also MEGA II. iii. I . 209). Finally, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx runs into a difficulty when he claims on the one hand that in the first stage of communism each should be rewarded according to her labour contribution, but, on the other hand, recognizes that labour is heterogeneous, that is, different workers perform different amounts of labour in a given time period Isee S W iii. 1 8- 19). To turn to the other horn of the dilemma. Marx never tires of demanding that labour be directly part of the aggregate labour of society, that it acquire this social character not only post festum, through the market, but from the outset. This insistence derives from his insight that fetishism and alienation arise only in conditions under which the producers are separated from each other, where 'fragmentation has become the normal state of affairs' IMEGA II. iii. 6. 218 1 ), where products assume the form of value-in a word: in market economies. From this insight follows his proposal to abolish markets and to replace them with a central plan: If we conceive society as being not capitalistic but communistic, there will be no money-capital at all in the first place, nor the disguises cloaking the transactions arising on account of it. The question then comes down to the need of society to calculate beforehand how much labour} means of production, and means of subSIstence it can invest . . . In capitalist society however where social reason always asserts itself only post festum great disturbances may and must constantly occur. (Capital ii. 318-19) Note that society is conceived here to calculate labour quanta. However, Marx does not tell us how this should be done. He only suggests that producers may now get paper certificates for their performed work: In case of socialised production the money�capital is eliminated. Society distributes labour�power and means of production to the different 270 Communism branches of production, The producers may, for all it matters, receive paper vouchers entitling them to withdraw from the social supplies of consumer goods a quantity corresponding to their labour time. These vouchers are not money. They do not circulate. (Capital ii. 362) There are several problems with that solution. The first is that labour has been reduced to simple, homogeneous labour in order that it can be compared. However, this does not match with Marx's position that the character of labour under communism will definitely be different from that under capitalism, a point to which I come in a moment. Another difficulty is that Marx thinks that these vouchers would not circulate. But who would ensure this? Would it not be natural to assume that they get exchanged, that a market of labour vouchers would emerge?27 To summarize the argument so far. In order to abolish fetishism, Marx needs to abolish labour markets; in order to calculate the ratios of concrete and abstract labour, he needs to retain markets.2s My claim is that Marx employs the term 'conscious control' to cover two different principles of organizing the economy: market and plan. Note that market and plan are not as such incompatible; mixed economies or market socialism may be feasible social forms. In the Civil War in France, Marx in fact seems to combine markets and plan: [Those) members of the ruling class who are intelligent enough to perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system-and they are many-have become the obtrusive and full-mouthed apostles of co­ operative production. If co*operative production is not to remain a sham and snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist system; if united co­ operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common planJ thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist production-what else, gentlemen, would it be but Com­ munism, 'possible' Communism? (CW xxii. 335; see also Moore who points out that the Communist Manifesto contains a model of market socialism which Marx was later to abandon: Moore 1980: 66-70): 27 Note that Marx at this point takes up the proposal of the Ricardian SOcialists, and of ProudJlon, to substitute money for such vouchers. The difference is that production is now socialized-Marx is therefore consistent in criticizing their proposal and in proposing something similar here. (But note how un� comfortable he feels: he says meinetwegen they may receive paper vouchers . . . ) 21'1 See Kosta, Meyer, and Weber ( 1 973: 99 ff.), who report on attempts in the CDR to measure complicated labour without markets. Communism 271 Social theory has developed the following concepts to distinguish between three forms of socialization. Whereas Oliver Williamson ( 1 975) distinguishes only between two forms, markets and hier­ archies, Luhmann ( 1 984a: 522) distinguishes between com­ petition, co-operation, and exchange; Elster ( 1985[, following Polanyi, distinguishes between market, planning, and reciprocity. These distinctions are different, but also overlapping?9 One could, for example, fuse them under the headings of market, state, and solidarity. And it seems that all modern societies employ all of the three mechanisms. A simple thought can illustrate this. Take first the plan: if it is not perfect (and who would assume it can be?), there will always emerge a market besides the plan-albeit a black market. Above we saw that it would be natural to assume the circulation of labour vouchers. Similarly, it would be absurd for a 'free' society simply to forbid markets. Likewise, if the market does not work perfectly (and who would assume it does?), state intervention will become necessary. Finally, solidarity seems always to operate in social relations, at least on the micro-level (interactions, families) but also on higher levels (agreements between firms, institutions, etc.). If labour gets reduced to simple labour under capitalist condi­ tions, will it retain this character in communism? Obviously not, if we look at Marx's own writings. I have already quoted the passage from Capital where Marx stresses the need for varied work which becomes realized first under capitalist relations. Certainly, one could say that varied work may be at the same time simple work-but Marx in Capital also stresses the need for an all-round education which is a clear sign that labour cannot be conceived as simple work. In my view, Marx did not change his basic position in respect of labour from the Grundrisse to Capital. But he has moved into a dilemma whose two aspects are the following: either he has a consistent position in favour of labour markets which transform complex into simple labour; but this solution entails the danger of fetishism and alienation. Or he has a consistent position in favour of planned labour allocation-in which case he has to assume that labour under communism has the same character as under capitalism. 29 Further examples are Parsons and Shils 1951; Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Kaufmann, Majone, and Ostrom 1986. 272 Communism 5,5,3, Social complexity and personal differences In this section, I briefly point to an apparent difficulty with Marx's concept of communism which has to do with the possible underestimation of ( I ) the importance of personal conflicts and (2) the importance of social functions, I address these two points in turn. Marx repeatedly stated that individuals were different .'o However, he seemed to believe that only under conditions of class societies, especially capitalism, would personal differences turn into conflicts, With the abolition of private property and classes, he argues, personal differences can be put to the benefit of all instead of turning into conflicts between individuals, In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels assert that 'with the abolition of the basis, private property, with the communistic regulation of production (and implicit in this, the abolition of the alien attitude [Fremdheit] of men to their own product), the power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and men once more gain control of exchange and the way they behave to one another' ( C W v, 48), In the Communist Manifesto, we read: 'In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' ( CW vi, 506), In the Comments on James Mill, we read: Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person, 11 ) ln my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object 1 would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt, 12) In your enjoyment or use of my product 1 would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to another man's essential nature . . . I would have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature. Our products 3() See 1859 Pre/ace, The Critique of the Gotha Programme. Communism 273 would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected Our essential nature, lew iii. 227-8) As far as this argument rests on the assumption of limitless material abundance it must be rejected on the grounds that Marx himself gave: there will never be a society with limitless material abundance, As far as the argument rests on the assump­ tion that personal endowments and interests can be channelled via a division of labour to the benefit of all, it seems to presuppose an unrealistic notion of social harmony, As Elster pointed out, 'Ie ]ven assuming people to be moved by altruism or a concern for the common good, they might not have a common conception of what that good is' (Elster 1985: 458), Marx could agree with such an account, arguing that this is characteristic of the first stage of communism, which is 'in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges' (SW iii. 23), And in the early Paris Manuscripts, Marx conceives of a 'crude com­ munism' which may well correspond to the two stages in the Gotha Programme, Marx writes: This type of communism-since it negates the personality of man in every sphere-is but the logical expression of private property, which is this negation. General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which greed re-establishes and satisfies itself, only in another way, The thought of every piece of private property as such is at least turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy and urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism is only the cumulation of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum, lew iii, 295)3 1 Maihofer pointed out that for this reason law as a social function would be indispensable for communist society,32 Now this seems to contradict Marx's hope of a 'withering away of the state', Maihofer and others have claimed that Marx never enter­ tained such a hope, What Marx actually said was that 'public power loses its political character' and that the proletariat will 31 In both texts, according to Marx, all members of society are workers. As Elster pointed OtH, 'what Marx in his youth saw as a blind alley, he later came to see as a necessary, if transitional stage' (Elster 1985: 452). 32 See Lukes 1985: 98 ff. for an eloquent exposition of further reasons. 274 Communism install an association which excludes the existence of classes and the conflict between them ."3 But consider Marx's comments I On the Tewish Question) on the 'perfect' state as embodiment of the universal: The perfect political state is, by its nature, manIS species-life, as opposed to his material life. All the preconditions of this egoistic life continue to exist in Civil society outside the sphere of the state} but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its true development} man-not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life-leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the political community, in which he considers himself a communal being, and life in civil society, in which hE: acts as a private individual, regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. ICW iii. 1 53-4, my emphasis) From this Marx concludes: Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citayelll and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognised and organised his 'forces propres ' as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished. ICW iii. 168)34 It is not only that the bourgeois has to be eradicated in order to retain the life of the citoyen, it is rather the whole separation which Marx aims to supersede lin the sense of 'aufheben'). This follows clearly from Marx's treatment of the bourgeois state as an instance of alienation: 'Out of this very contradiction between particular and the common interests, the common interest assumes an independent form as the state, which is divorced ,�.� See Communist Manifesto and Poverty of Philosophy. According to Maihofer, the formula of Withering away of the state was Engels's invention. However, and ironically, Engels himself envisages a Gemeinwesen which organizes the association of communist society. See Maihofer 1968: 14 ff.; see also Zolo 1974. .14 This is a theme which has been taken up again by the communitarian critique of liberalism. Communitarians want to fuse public and private, political and moral dimensions. Interestingly, they seem to commit the same fallacy in assimilating the 'self-rule' of society to that of an individual. However, to use Elster'S words here in criticizing Marx, 'this is a scale-error of monumental size and importance', see Elster 1985: 458. Communism 275 from the real individual and collective interests, and at the same time as an illusory community' lew v. 46). Elster convincingly argued that all debates and procedures of allocation of resources and of finding solutions to social problems are likely to assume a political character. This leads me to the second question, that is, whether Marx also overlooked the need for the maintenance of social functions such as law, economy, politics, etc. in communist society. We have already seen that Marx claimed that the state would lose its political character in communism. This seems to entail communism eradicating the political system altogether. In so far as Marx or Marxists adhere to such a position, it must be regarded as basically unrealistic. As social research in this century has shown, there is a trend of 'autonomization of social spheres'. One could even conceive of these social autonomiza­ tions as analogous to the autonomization of the economy which Marx so brilliantly analysed. But if it is true that such an autonomization has taken place, it is improbable that it can be simply reversed. Writers like Habermas explicitly acknowledge that this social differentiation has to be interpreted as an 'evolu­ tionary achievement', which is to say that every modem complex society must work according to the laws of different social subsystems in which money and power are the two main means of steering Isee Habermas 1 9 8 1 : ii. 499, SO l ). Marx, on the one hand, seems open to such a position when he writes in the Critique of the Gotha Programme: 'What social functions will remain in existence that are analogous to present state functions? This question can only be answered scientifically' ISW iii. 26). Equally open for the functional requirements of modern society lin this case of large-scale industry) was his position on education. As we saw, Marx claims that many-sided individuals will be needed by large-scale industry and that the educational system brings them forth. In the passage on child labour he even goes so far as to use the requirements of modern industry as an argument for the inevitability of child labour, which to my view is a somewhat sinister statement.35 In .1S He should have separated more clearly the capitalist need for child labour and his reasons for favouring a combination of theoretical and practical education. The way it stands, it could be interpreted as if Marx would not resist the squandering of children's lives in the factories. 276 Communism summary, Marx acknowledges the need of modern societies to have functionally separated social spheres; sometimes he even entertains a naive functionalist view, assuming that the require­ ments of large-scale industry will be fulfilled automatically. But on the other hand he clearly favours an abolition of social systems if and in so far as they are superior powers and are experienced as fate by the individuals. Here he favours a community model over a society model. But if the modern world is characterized by such objectifications as social systems which are essential to the functioning of society (whether based on 'socialist' or 'capitalist' principles) it seems impossible to bring them back completely into the realm of intersubjective action (Habermas's 'Lebenswelt' or the communitarians' 'com­ munity')-which was Marx's hope in the Tewish Question (inter alia). This would only be possible on the condition that all social functions could be performed by small local communities. However, as several authors have pointed out, any complex society needs some large-scale institutions which are organized on a regional, national, and international level and display some degree of centralization. It seems obvious, therefore, that aliena­ tion is inevitable here (and it may already exist on lower levels, ftom the intersubjective dimension upwards). How could we explain this ambiguity in Marx? Lukes suggested that there might be a contradiction between the individualistic and the communitarian impulses in Marx's thought: The notion of individuality, to which . . . Marx was so much attached . . . which reached the nineteenth century through Romanticism, Goethe supplying its artistic and Schleiermacher its metaphysical foundation -this notion prescribes that 'each individual is called or destined to realise his own incomparable image' (Simmel). The notion of commu­ nity, to which Marx was no less attached, which is no less rooted in the Western political tradition, pictures individuals as finding their fulfil­ ment in reciprocity and solidarity rather than competition and self­ assertion, and in mutual identification in common activities and the pursuit of common purposes. (Lukes 1985: 96)36 M> Or, as Habermas pointed out, drawing on Schiller: 'This self-formative process is related not to the individual but to the collective life-context of the people as a whole: "Totality of character must therefore be found in a people that is capable and worthy of exchanging the State of need for the state of freedom'" {Schiller, Si:imtliche Werke, v. 579; quoted in Habermas 1987a: 45). Communism 277 This argument would explain the first ambiguity, i.e. the problem of personal conflicts. With respect to the second problem we have to look even more closely at the philosophical tradition Marx inherited. This is the task of the last section. 5.6. Technology and the limits of the philosophy of the subject Marx follows Hegel in assuming that the subject will reappro­ priate its own 'creations', its own objectifications. But this assumption is dogmatic. Nothing guarantees or proves that there will be a subject or a reappropriation. For example, Seyla Benhabib rightly points out that 'Hegel's critique is based upon the normative image of a life form that has become "transparent" arid intelligible to the intellect, and in which individuals once again can recognize themselves as part of a "living" as opposed to a "dead" totality' (Benhabib 1986: 3�). But there is an ambi­ valence in Hegel's immanent critique of natural right theories which Marx was to inherit: [Oln the one hand, he criticizes the dogmatism of modern natural right theories in reifying present social relations; on the other hand, he himself admits that there is no moment in the present upon which to anchor the view of a unified ethical life. The ideal of an ethical life is not an immanent but a transcendent ideal, in the sense that it involves looking back to the past. (ibid. 32) Marx, like Hegel, conceives of human culture as a historical product of man's objectifications; the objects are the expression of man's inner essence and are thus prone to a 'reappropriation'. This reappropriation beeomes necessary because the actual course of history has led to an alienation of man from his objects. As Benhabib puts it, Marx's early diagnosis of the antagonism inherent in bourgeois civil society clearly parallels the Hegelian one of Entzweiung. The principle of essential unity is denied methodologically, but it is reasserted at the normative level as the immanent utopia which Marx claims is the implicit lought' towards which actuality must evolve . . . The reappro­ priation of the powers and potentialities that humanity has alienated from itself is the dream. (ibid. 38, 39) Let me introduce a thought experiment here. If we cannot rely on a complete Aufhebung of alienation, we might expect a 278 Communism reduction of alienation. This is to say that from the two models of communism only the weaker one is available. Recall the strong model from the beginning of this chapter. It is based on four elements: return to use-value production, reappropriation of man's objectifications, total individuals, and conscious controL These elements are four inseparable 'moments' of the Pro­ methean image of mankind. Total individuals are individuals who have reappropriated their objectifications and have brought all their activities under their common conscious controL37 This strong notion of communism clearly belongs to the notion Bildung of German Idealism (Humboldt, Herder) which Marx took up from Hegel's philosophy (but also from Feuerbach's materialism). As we have seen, it is contained both in Hegel's model of transformation of first nature into second nature which alone makes possible a rational character of the world and in Feuerbach's critique of religion which Marx considered the starting-point of all critique. According to him, in the emerging modern epoch, science, technology, and bourgeoisie had to fight religious tutelage and free themselves from that grip.3S But, equally, the established modern epoch has to carryon the fight against every other form of 'fate' or 'alien powers'. It is thus up to the human species to acquire control over its own fate (social and natural processes) and to develop all of its species powers, as embodied in individuals. Contrast now the weaker notion of communism: 1 . abolition of private property; 2. abolition of classes, class exploitation, and class oppression; 3. universalization of happiness; 4. universalization of material wealth; 5. expanding of disposable time. ( I ) and (2) are elements of standard Marxism. However, as my discussion has shown, forms of property and stratification are not the most important causes of ecological problems. I included (3) in this list since Marx thinks that people in former modes of 37 The notion of conscious control plays a big role in the humanist tradition going back to Dante, see Girnus 1974; Klein 1974. .Hl Humboldt and Schleicrmacher were favouring scientific autonomy which was guaranteed by the state in order to fight back religiOUS and ecclesiastical domination. Cf. Habcrmas 1987b: 8 1 . Communism 279 production were happier (d. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2288). But people in earlier modes of production certainly did not have full conscious control over their life-conditions: nature was an alien power, even if society was relatively transparent. Religious alienation was the normal state of these societies. I mention this only to show that (3) does not mean abolition of alienation. This is necessary to distinguish the weaker from the stronger notion of communism. Marx (not only in his early writings) seemed to believe that with the abolition of private property all other points would follow more or less automatically; at least the following passage from the Paris Manuscripts can be interpreted in such a way: 'Communism is the positive transcendence of private property, as human self-estrangement and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore is the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being-a return accomplishing consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development' (CW iii. 296; d. MEGA II. iii. 6. 2144). Let me now restate the problematic of the present work in the light of the above. Ecological problems are seen as the result of technologies operating in a highly differentiated society. The human species has developed technologies in order to dominate nstme; at a certain point in their development these technologies can no longer be controlled by individuals, but only by units of social co-operation. If we recall the evolutionary models from Chapter 4, we might say that both technology and social forms have assumed a shape which escapes the control of the indivi­ duals. Both craft technology and transparent social relations (like families, guilds, towns) had dimensions which could be grasped by the individuals. Modern technologies are not at the disposal of individual craft workers; likewise, social life cannot be conceived as a family writ large.39 Both stages of development display a sharp qualitative leap which any social theory has to recognize.4o 39 Teubnc: rightly notes that some socialist and corporatist theories wrongly eq�ate functional subsystems of societies with big corporations, capable of actIon (Teubner 1989a: 103). The same holds true with respect to SOme recent communitarian criticisms of liberalism. 40 Adorno, in an article called 'Fortschritt', clearly sees that Hegel and Marx were aware of this autonomization of supra-individual entities. He also sees a 'mythical element' in this process: 'Innerworldly progress has its mythical ----, - 280 Communism Marx pointed to both phenomena: individuals under conditions of modern industry are reduced to 'living accessories' who experience the (technical) world rather as 'fate' than as a product of their conscious controL As he said, 'in comparison with capitalist society, these old social organisms of production are far more simple and transparent' (Capital i. 83). Surely, science may reveal more and more secrets and solve more and more puzzles-this is also the route which Marx embarks on in order to foster his historical optimism. However, his optimism goes as far as assuming that in principle there can, and will, be a state of affairs which would make social science superfluous. In other words, Marx seems to presuppose that communism will create social relations which are entirely transparent to their members. As Cohen put it: Marx says that relations between human beings under socialism are {transparent' and 'intelligible', Economic agents whose actions arc integrated by a democratically formulated plan understand what they are doing . . . ISocial science) has no function in a world which has abolished the discrepancy between the surface of things and their true character . , . When social science is necessary, men do not understand themselves. A society in which men do not understand themselves is a defective SOciety. (Cohen 1978: 336-8) This interpretation is in line with my emphasis that what counted most for Marx in the final analysis was the construction of a rational world. Cohen gives a-to my view-excellent interpretation of the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. Marx says there: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.' Cohen rightly suggests interpreting this phrase not in the sense that Marx was (in contrast to Feuerbaeh) interested in practical questions. Rather, as Cohen suggests, we understand the meaning of the eleventh thesis best by adding 'to change it so that interpretation of it is no longer necessary' (Cohen 1978: 339, my emphasis)!l In other words: social reality must be such that it provides the conditions of intelligibility which initiate harmony between reality and element in that it takes place over the heads of the subjects and forms them according to its likeness. Hegel and Marx understood this well' (Adorno 1977: 631-2, my trans.). 4 1 See the Contribution £0 the Critique 0/ Hegel's Philosophy 0/ Law where Marx speaks about an 'inverted world'; see CW iii. 175. Communism 281 thought. Fetishism, which gives rise to 'false consciousness' does not mean that people are in principle unable to conceiv� reality. Rather, reality presents itself in the way in which it is represented by consciousness.42 It is up to social science to 'dissipate the mist' and provide explanations which make the world more intelligible. Contrary to Marx's hope, contemporary societies have become even mOre differentiated and complex. Social science is therefore needed mOre than ever before. 42 This 'realist' epistemology comes out very clearly in Marx's letter to Kugelmann of 1 1 july 1868: 'Since the thought process itself grows out of conditions, is itself a natural process, thinking that really comprehends must always be the same, and can vary only gradually, according to the maturity of development, including the development of the organ by which the thinking is done' ISW ii. 419). Conclusion Conclusion Every interpretation and every reconstruction has to start with a reduction. It has to limit the material which it regards as relevant, it has to limit the questions it is interested in, and it has to decide which method of research to use and what style of presentation to follow. I started my research with the basic intuition that the Marxian Wertgesetz, his theory of value which most scholars of Marxism hold to be essential, was of no interest at all when investigating the relationship between Marxism and ecological problems. This reduction may seem quite bold and unconvincing. For was it not Marx himself who devoted much attention to an 'unfolding of the laws of motion' 01 capitalism? Did not he himself try to decompose the surface phenomena of capitalist society into its constitutive elements which could be described by the theory of value alone? And did not Marx then, after this decomposition, try to reconstruct the manifold phenomena of capitalist society departing from the hidden structure lKernstrukt11l) of this very society, thereby unfolding the logic of the law of value? True, all of these questions have to be answered in the affirmative. It is also true that Marx conceived of the law of value as the gen eralJaw of capitalist society. Only in this type of society has the law of value found its most general expression. In pre-capitalist societies, the law of value is restricted or absent. I do not want to judge here if the law of value was effective in the way Marx thought it was during the late nine­ teenth century. Granted that it was, I think that two objections, one empirical and one theoretical, are fatal for it. The empirical objection is that with the emergence of the Welfare State the law of value no longer applies to society. Economic interventions, state enterprises, anti-cyclical interventions in the business cycle, and to a certain degree planning have restricted the working of the law of value in considerable ways. There has been a significant change from the 'invisible hand' to the 'visible hand' (Chandler 283 1977). Theoretical assumptions of the general validity of the law of value thus seem to be basically unrealistic. Perhaps a para­ doxical inference makes this claim even more plausible. Socialist societies which emerged in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Cuba should have done away with the law of value-at least according to Marxist theory. Instead, these societies seemed to be plagued by the persistence of this law. Many SOCially undesirable features were attributed to the persistence of exactly this law. As a consequence, Marxists found themselves in the absurd situation of claiming that capitalism and socialism were characterized by the hidden working of the law of value. The law of value was thus transformed from a historical into a universal law which could only give rise to confusion and endless debates within the camp of Marxist economists (ef. Brus 1972: ch. 4 and the quoted literature). But the law of value was not of any practical help for economic planners in socialist societies. They did not (and could not!) take seriously the implications of this MarXist dogma since it did not indicate clear lines of action. In determining the prices for the products of socialist economies, planners usually did not count embodied quantities of labour, but tried to simulate market operations in order to arrive at equilibrium prices (ef. Brus and Laski 1989). In practical terms this came down to the question of whether socialism can be conceived as a distinct economic system. To affirm this usually meanS to consider things like state ownership in the means of production, planning, poliCies of full employment, etc. as distinctive of a socialist economic system. However, both recent his toncal events in Eastern Europe and the competent judgement of economic reformers in these countries indicate that this is rather an 'open-ended' question libid. 149). The theoretical arguments which object to the theory of value were discussed immediately after the publication of the three volumes of Das Kapital. From the first criticisms of Bohm­ Bawerk till today there seems to be enough evidence to conclude that the critics of Marx had the better arguments. This could not be admitted by any serious Marxist who saw in the existence of this law, its analysis, and propaganda by Marx and Engels at the same time the essence of capitalism and its deadly critique. The fierce defence of this central dogma of classical Marxism has its explanation in the fact that it was considercd to be the corner- 284 Conclusion stone on which the whole theoretical and practical project rested. Therefore, if the critics of Marx on this point were right, Marxism as a theory would have been refuted and Marxism as a revolutionary practice would have been defective. This was the underlying assumption on both sides. As I said, my basic intuition was totally different. That I think Marxism has something valuable to offer in the analysis of ecological problems will surprise many of those who thought exclusively in terms of his theory of value. My other intuition was that Marxism, on a non-orthodox reading, could contribute quite a lot to the understanding of ecological problems. This is an interesting point since the social sciences until the 1980s did not seem to have much to contribute on the issue. I must say that I myself was surprised how much Marx's theory had to offer, once the strait-jacket of an orthodox interpretation was stripped off. However, one also has to point to the limits of its theoretical power. According to Marx, every product in bourgeois society as­ sumes the form of a commodity. A commodity embodies the unity of use-value and exchange-value. Labour also has this double character; it is the unity of concrete, use-value producing, and abstract, value-producing activity. Likewise, technology is both a means and medium to transform nature (partly consti­ tuting, partly constituted by -social labour) and constant capital at the same time. My working hypothesis therefore was to explore the theoretical possibilities of abstracting from the value aspect in all these cases and to focus primarily on the use­ value aspect. This perspective opened up a whole range of new approaches and possibilities which otherwise would have been occluded. Marx's analysis of nature and human nature starts with quite general assumptions about transhistorical conditions in which mankind is situated. Marx coined the term Stoffwechsel to denote man's dependence on and his active and conscious intervention into nature. This process could, in a very abstract way, be seen as a self-mediation of nature, a process in which human beings, as parts of nature, appropriate and transform nature. However, to 'unfold' this dialectic, it is necessary to introduce other distinctions. These distinctions have to be drawn all on the side of the s ocial, not on the side of nature. The Conclusion 285 first distinction separates culture from nature, the second separ­ ates technology from society, and the third separates the economy from politics and both again from a religiOUS and those again from a scientific dimension. As the reader will notice, I introduce several elements of post-Marxian sociology into a genuinely historical materialist framework. Among the former, the theories of evolution and of functional differentiation are the most important. My combination of contemporary SOCiological ap­ proaches with Marx's historical materialism seems to me made possible by a basic affinity between central elements of both. Note also that Marx's view of nature has some affinities with the lately promoted paradigm of constructivism in the social sciences (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Glasersfeld 1 9 8 1 ; Watzlawick 1976). This view appears in Marx when h e stresses the fact that primordial nature has been transformed by historical existing cultures into a second nature, a nature which is culturally shaped. The nature of nature, therefore, is a social construction of every single existing historical culture. The fact that man stands at the intersection between nature and culture has further consequences. One of them is that man is at the same time a natural and a social being, he is Natm­ Mensch and Menschen-Mensch ('Gemeinmensch, Communist') as Feuerbach put it. However, it is the human dimension which is relevant for the evaluation of the process of the appropriation and transformation of nature. In ancient societies this task was fulfilled by religious or mystical world-views. In modern times, where man has to reinvent himself/herself always anew,l the standards of evaluation are not eternally given but change from culture to culture, from generation to generation, from functional subsystem to functional subsystem (d. Beck 1988; Eder 1988; Luhmann 1989b). As I tried to show, Marx's standard for evaluation draws on a specific variant of modern thought. Most interesting are his insights deriving from his philosophical anthropology, combining results from the natural sciences with an ethical device: that human beings are to master the world and nature in such a way that they achieve adulthood (Miindigkeit). These two sides of I i!-s expressed by Baudelaire: 'Modernity is the transitory, the fugitive, the contmgent, half of the art, the other half being the eternal and unchangeable' (Baudelaire 1954: 892, my trans,; cf. also Foucault 1984; Luhmann 1989b). 286 Conclusion Marx's analysis are in tension with each other. Perhaps one could interpret them as corresponding to Enlightenment and Humanism, to use Foucault's distinction Isee Foucault 1984: 43 £.). The critical Marxian method is expressed in a sort of categorical imperative which reads in the following way: 'The criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being. ,2 Human beings have to reduce or abolish domination over each other and they have to aim at a conscious conttol of their actions. Marx conceived of this process as being parallel to, or even the pure unfolding of, human self­ realization. In putting it this way, he reconciled Enlightenment with Humanist thought. However, further problems arise here. The reconciliation is performed in a perfectionist and romantic framework which is formulated clearly in his philosophy of history. Inherent in history's course was a telos which had to be realized. For Marx, like Hegel, this telos was the reconciliation of the fragmented parts of modernity, the abolition of all deep-seated oppositions which characterize modern bourgeois society. To be sure, Marx diverges from Hegel in that he replaces the funetion which spirit occupies in Hegel's system with the function of productive labour. Nevertheless, he inherits all the problems of Hegel's philosophy of identity. For communism is seen as a state of affairs in which mankind is in harmony with its own creations, in which it has solved the riddle of history and knows itself as its solution, as he put it in the Paris Manuscripts. This teleology has been submitted to sharp criticism, and rightly so. I mention only the works of Kolakowski, Charles Taylor, and Habennas. lAs an aside, for Marx this communist future will not mark an end of history, but an end to pre-history, for it is only now that people have eome to produce their life-conditions consciously that they can make history properly. ) Marx did not directly address the problem he was facing. This problem was: how can the individual need for self-realization be reconciled with the development of productive forces which are, after all, a social entity? Does every productive force have to . 2 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 0/ Law, CW iii. 182. Conclusion 287 be within the scope of single individuals, every time controllable by them? How does Marx relate the individual to the social? The answer is that he tries to avoid this problem altogether by synthesizing Feuerbaeh's Gattungswesen with historical em­ pirical development. This theoretical move is expressed in the turn from the Paris Manuscripts to the German Ideology. Marx thinks that human objectifications are the embodiment and examples of human self-realization, to put it crudely: the Gat­ tungswesen in palpable form. This move was supposed to give him a firm stance against philosophical speculation. In fact, it opened the way to historical materialism. However, Marx never abandoned the expressivist conception of Gattungswesen which, at later stages of theoretical development, returns. Every time Marx confronts this return, he remembers his commitment to Gattungswesen and advances solutions which abolish deep­ seated oppositions in society, and which favout the individual. To be sure, Marx rarely addressed this problem in the terms I am using here. For him, all deep-seated oppositions were crystallizing in class cleavages. Therefore it was sufficient to abolish class rule in order to liberate human potentials. But in addressing the problem of technology, he faced the problem again and again. He became aware that a single change in property forms and the abolition of classes might not be sufficient to turn existing productive forces into authentic examples of human self­ development. However, as I tried to show, Marx concealed this disquieting issue. Now, one might argue: granted there is a critical potential in Marxism with respect to ecological problems, but it has been achieved at too great a cost, that is, only by subscribing to the philosophy of identity, which is untenable. The answer would be that we can separate in Marx the assumptions of Hegel's identity philosophy from his critical method. In other words: we should use Kant'S critical method3 and not Hegel's identity philosophy as the major reference point. Thereby, I think, one would get a sort of general4 standard for criticism which does not commit itself to the strong assumptions made in Marx's theory of history Ici. Foucault 1984). This critical model would ,� For some early studies on the relationship between Kant and Marx, sec Vorlander 1900; Bauer 1905; Adler 1975. For a recent attempt, see Kain 1988. 4 Not universal, for it is based on purely modern conditions! 288 Conclusion also be different both from neo-Kantian positions such as Habermas's discourse ethics (which, as is known, relies on linguistic reasoning) and from Anglo-American liberalism such as Rawls's theory. That it has something of interest to offer, I shall try ro explain now, coming back to the question of ecology. The process of transforming nature entails the danger that it does not work to the benefit of the producers. One reason for this may be that the whole process of transforming nature has grown 'out of control', that people are, as before, ruled by a 'blind fate'. It would follow that people have to achieve their power to control their life and thereby achieve human dignity. But this perspective can only be understood in a weak sense, not in the sense that there will be an end-state which has realized all of these ideals. Modern societies are characterized by a social and technological dynamism which makes an eventual 'halting point', at which mankind and nature are in balance, quite implausible. The proposed critical model is therefore not to be understood as containing the programme for a reconciled society; it only contains a critical potential which can be applied in different circumstances in order to improve the predicament of mankind. This approach differs from Rawls's or Habermas's in the following way. Rawls is operating on a much more modest level. The scope of his criticism lies exclUSively on the level of justice; problems of the above-mentioned kind fall outside his point of view. In this sense, Marx's preference for human freedom (over justice and Recht) has something to it. I do not doubt that Rawls's procedural techniques have much to offer regarding the process of finding a just regulation of, say, scarcity of resources, or distribution of wealth, but his theory gets these problems into its view only when they have already occurred. Habermas, in a similar way to Rawls, excludes from his analysis the locus where ecological problems are produced. His reaction to the alleged weakness of the praxis-philosophical reading of Marx is an overreaction and blinds him to the potential which really is implicit in this reading when properly understood. This leaves Habermas with the only critical tool for investigating discursive activities which would establish the conditions for an unconstrained consensus. For Habermas, the emancipatory potential lies completely within the communicative type of Conclusion 289 action. Strategic-instrumental action, on the other hand, which is outcome-orientated and applies to processes of transforming nature, does not contain any critical standards. But note: it is only after haVing read Marx and the praxis-philosophers with these spectacles that Habermas can derive a reduced account of the concept of labour which is bare of any emancipatory potential. Now I return to the proposed combination of historical materi­ alism and systems theory which I carried out in a framcwork of coevolution. It may be noted that 'social forms' here means something slightly different from in Marx's framework. Accord­ ing to Marx'S definition there are three major social forms which history has so far developed: ancient, feudal, and capitalist. To every historical epoch ( social form) Marx attributes a specific technology and specific forms of social co-operation (see Fig. 4.3). Marx himself pulls these elements together in a model in which different layers are in a relation of determination. At times Marx thinks that the development of the productive forces is the deepest layer in all societies and that this layer constantly develops and causes the relations of production (the social forms) to change accordingly. However, as I have shown, both empirical evidence and Marx's own considerations make clear that the development of productive forces is also influenced by the specific relations of production. To get a clearer picture, I therefore proposed to replace this somewhat obscure termino­ logy of relations of production and productive forces with a conceptual framework which was developed by post-Marxian SOCiology, that is, the language of functional differentiation as we find it in Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Parsons, Luhmann, and others. Replacing the too general 'social relations of production' with more accurate and sharper conceptual tools allows us to get better insights into the complicated process of technological and social coevolution. Economy, science, and politics are the most important social spheres which contribute to the develop­ ment of productive forces and are, in turn, themselves conditioned by a historical level of technology and its potentials. In using additionally a systems theoretical model for the reformulation of historical materialism, I hope to clarify further the real possibilities and dangers of such a coevolutionary process. Pro­ ductive forces are no autonomous force in history, they are = r ! 290 Conclusion socially shaped. It thus seems that a contemporary fear of a technologically inevitable trajectory which leads to an increas­ ing domination over people and to more or deeper ecological problems is not sufficiently founded. But the opposite is not true either. Since modern societies do not possess a centre, the planning of society and technology becomes difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, all social systems are operating on the basis of their own logic or code-each code being different from the others. The result is that each social system is a closed universe for the others, and none of them has primacy over the others. Autopoietic systems theory has not yet developed a convincing solution to the problem of how intersystemic com­ munication can be conceived-a theoretical requirement for the understanding of such a process. I have suggested some possible steps to handle the problem Iss. 3.3 and 4.3) which I do not repeat here. It is well known that communist parties in Eastern Europe claimed to be the sole organizations equipped to discover the objective laws of nature. A society that is consciously admini­ stered does not experience the same contradictions as capitalist societies Id. Ziegler 1987: 35). However, functional differentiation has eroded the party's privileged position as it has generally eroded any privileged position. The problems of regulatory politics are thus not very different in East and West. Most industrially advanced societies face ·severe ecological problems which are the result of their highly developed processes of transforming nature. Part of these societies are social movements and political forces which expose these problems and make them into political issues. Such issues became more and more important in the late 1980s. The emergence of ecological parties in the West has led to a considerable legitimation crisis of governments in power. As a result, many political parties all over the world have taken up ecological issues. Politicians, therefore, try to decrease ecological problems where possible. However, they are restricted when doing so. Politics does not stand at the top of a Ipyramidal) society nor in the centre of a Iconcentric) society: it is one social subsystem among others. This is to say that politics cannot be expected to cure modern societies of the disease of ecological problems. What politics does is to decide on public issues in a Conclusion 291 binding way S These decisions may also have effects on the economy or on science, but not in a direct way. We know of many cases where such attempts have proved to be dysfunctional for the solution of a problem. But there are also examples of successful political interventions Isee Rottleuthner 1989; Scharpf 1989; Biihl 1989). My claim that politiCS is not able to abolish ecolOgical problems need not be confused with a statement which would affirm that nothing can be done. As I have indicated, the process of techno­ logical development is crucial here. It would be naive to believe that politics could bring about new, less harmful technologies just by ordering them. Technologies which are economizing resources, which are less polluting, and which are safer lin the sense that they do not lead necessarily to industrial aCCidents) can only be the result of a social process in which scientific, political, and economic forces are the most important. The fact that politics is only one force in this process indicates that it cannot plan it from the outside; but the corollary is that politiCS, because it is part of that process, may be able to influence it from inside. It may be objected to my systems theoretical reformulation of historical materialism that this is a contradiction in terms since Marx's ethical theory and the cool functional analyses of systems theory are incommensurable. In a certain sense this objection repeats the long-standing schism between Marxism as humanism v. Marxism as anti-humanism. In claiming that both sides are reconcilable I also have to show in what sense the debate within Marxism was misconceived. In fact, I think that it revolved around a false dichotomy. The argument which is supposed to sustain my claim is that Marx's analysis of alienation and fetishism has to be detached from the individual level and that there is an equivalent for 'alienation' in systems theory. This is to say that the abolition or reduction of alienation not only, and not in the first place, means the change of certain psychic states of modern men, or enabling them as individuals to control .5 Where ecological problems are the result of a logic of public goods, politicS seems to have some power to resolve them. Examples are cases where ecological problems arc manifest and where it is possible to neutralize them by a combined policy of (legal) threats and (economic) offers. See Steiner 1974; Taylor 1982; Teubner 1987. 292 Conclusion social life, but, more importantly, means the enabling of social systems to get control over their environment. This 'getting control' is a shorthand to describe the complex feedback loop from society, including human needs and interests, affecting nature by means of technology, to nature which finally makes itself felt to society. At the turn of the twenty-first century one must acknowledge that Marx's hope of reconciling the individual with society is in vain. The conditions of a society in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all, and in which complete transparence is achieved, do not obtain. In so far as Marx's argument of a withering away of justice land the state) was based on the assumption that communism would overcome scarcity, it was refuted by the occurrence of ecological problems like scarcity of resources and pollution. Additionally, the mechanism of positional goods (Hirsch 1977) thwarts the possibility of a justice-free society. In so far as Marx's argument was based on the assumption that communism would bring about social transparence, this was refuted by an increase in functional differentiation. In other words, the basic separation of politics and economy was not only not reversed (as Marx expected), but completed and aggravated by additional differences. Precisely here lies the great virtue of systems theory for the reconstruction of historical materialism. The big problem in modern societies is not that individuals do not understand the working of certain technologies or of social systems. This does happen and has well-known effects, but these should be minim­ ized. Far more serious is the problem that social systems are often unable to observe and control (to 'understand') the effects of their own working on themselves. I suggest using the concept of alienation on this level also. The basic meaning remains the same; what is changed is the point of reference. It switches from the individual to the social. What Luhmann calls 'Rationalitat' 1 1 984a: 638 ff.) of social systems would in my reading be a state of affairs in which no alienation thus understood exists. In making Marx's humanism compatible with systems theory one has to pay a price. In my view, the price should be to drop the reference point of a subject which gets alienated and to replace it with the notion of social systems. To be sure, there is (at least) another possibility of reconciling the two. It is possible to Conclusion 293 criticizc capitalism exactly in terms of individual alienation, that is, to denounce every stcp in social differentiation as a further instance of the scandalous performance of capitalism. This is the solution favoured by many contemporary thinkers, whether Marxists, ex-Marxists, greens, or communitarians. For example, the influential model of 'small is beautiful' recommends the re-dimensioning of social and technical reality. I do not doubt that one can make such criticism with good reason and also with the help of Marx's notion of alienation. But neither do I think that it is congenial to Marx's general line of thought nor does it correspond to present social reality and its possibilities. The historical drive towards functional differentiation has been so strong that it could not be opposed by such simple models of social life which all, in a way, take as their reference point the community and autarchy of the Greek polis. To advance such a type of argument in a society which exists on a world scale and which is highly mobile, pluralistic, loosening traditional bonds, resembles the attitude of Don Quixote who 'long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was com­ patible with all economic forms of society' ( Capital i. 86 n.). Marx tried to find out real possibilities of social change on the basis of an analysis of the obtaining historical conditions. The direction of social change was indicated by his philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of identity. The real possibility for him was embodied in the working class which could bring about a new organization of society. However, this specific version of historical materialism is less and less convincing. Yet any project of human self-realization and of the overcoming of alienation has to be founded on a sound analysis of social reality, if it is not to become a pious wish. Heidegger made the intriguing statement that in the modern epoch man becomes the centre and measure of all beings I d. Habermas 1987a: 133) 6 This phrase can be taken at face value, that is, as a statement about the modern condition. But it can also be understood in a critical way, that is, that man should be measure and middle of all beings. In Heidegger, both meanings are intertwined. He continues his statement: 'Man is the sub: iectum, that which lies at the bottom of all beings, that is, in (, 'Das Zcitalter, das wir die Ncuzcit ncnncn, bestimmt sich dadurch, daB der Mensch Mag und Mittc des Scicnclen wird' (Heidegger 1961: Ii. 61). 294 Conclusion modern terms, at the bottom of all objectification and re­ presentation. , 7 The term 'objectification' ( Vergegens tiind_ lichung) points to the forme r, the term 'representation' (or : 'imagination', Vorstellbarkeit ) to the critical dimension. Ma rx is different. For him, the loss of individual power over soc ial relations Was a fact of reality ; for him it was all about rein vesting the mdlvldual WIth ItS los t power. The model was a society conceIved as community On a world scale in which there were plenty of resources and goo ds and hence no need for jus tice. Likewise, the distinction bet ween politics and economy, and between Cltoyen and bourge ois, would be overcome. The indivi­ dual would reappropriate all extemalized forces as forces propres. In so far as critics of modern society base their panacea on this outline, they are likely to im itate Don Quixote. They tak e over from Marx a model of society (de-differentiation) without rec on­ Sidering its analytical and historical foundations. But if the preconditions on which Ma rx based this critical model are no longer valid, the critical mo del itself loses its powcr. Soc ial theory, especially the theory of functional differentiation has evidenced the changing featur es of modern society. Sophisti �ated critical writers like Jiirgen Ha bermas and others have ack now­ ledged this fact. The critica l outline, therefore, has to take another form than the Marxi an. 8 Marx and Engels thought tha t they had developed sociali sm from an Utopian notion into a science. They did not forese e that their model of social scienc e was to become one among many others and that its practical message would lose its plausi bility. Moreover, as 'Marxism as a science' ran into all kinds of diffi­ culties, it took little to pro claim the counter-reaction to the MarX-Engels slogan. Marxism was now faulted for having gon e too far in the direction of scie nce. What was needed was the Utopian e1ement.9 I distinguis hed between Marxism as a scie nce and Marxism as a critique (sce ch. 2) and I maintained that the . 7 'Der Mensch ist das aHem Seienden, d.h. neuzeitlich alIer Vergegenstiin bchung und Vorstellbarl<eit d. zugrundeliegendc, das subj cctum' (quoted in Habermas 198 5: 160, emp hasis added). 8 For an example of criticiZing Habermas for gOing too far in the direction s�stems theory nd functio of nalism, see McCarthy 1985 � , In effect, many left­ wmg authors thmk that Hab , comprom ermas IS isin g with the devil. 9 Cf. Ernst Bloc h's notion of a cold and a warm stream within Marxism Hudson 1982. See also Wal lerstein 1986j Ricoeur 198 6. J Conclusion 295 former was blind to certain problems which have to do with motivational forces of social change whereas the latter draws upon a Utopian dimension. As Ricoeur ( 1 986) aptly pamted out, Utopia has an important function for society . It IS a �ort of store . of historically transmitted Images and fantaSIes whIch helps us to imagine other possible worlds. Ricoeur thus re-evaluates the notion of Utopia (which is often used in a pejoratIve sense among social scientists and philosophers) in asslgmng to It an essentially positive role. He even goes so far as to affirm that a society without Utopia is a dead socicty. In the present context it is important to note that critical social theory has to achieve something more than just proclaiming Utopian Ideas. It has to give a thorough analysis of the historical condItIOns whIch are under discussion and then to test some of the tools from Utopia's store. If this dialectic is forgotten, the process of cntlclsm degenerates into an end in itself. The fact that modern socIety IS not constructed according to human sIze and logIC does not mean that we have to forget about such ideals. The questIOn to which this book has tricd to contribute, therefore, IS: how can we strive towards them on thc basis of a sound analysIs, WIthout simply invoking a 'paradise lost'? a Bibliography 297 Bibliography 1 . Works of Marx On the fewish Question ( 1 843), in CW iii. Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction ( 1844), in CW iii. Comments on fames Mill, Elem ents d'economie politique ( 1 844) in CW iii. Econ omic and Philosophic Manuscr ipts (1 844), in CW iii. The Holy Family ( 1 845) , in CW iv. Letter to Annenkow, 28 Dec. 1 846, in CW xxxviii. 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W. 16, 19, 198 n., 279 n. agriculture 13, 1 4, 78-9,97,230 Althusser, L. 54, 102 Amburgery, T. 193 n. Amery, C. 15, 18, 36, 90 Archer, M. S. 135 n. Arendt, H. 249 autopoiesis 193, 198 self-referentiality 192-3, 198 self-Ire-)production 194, 214,217, 221 rheory of In-9, 2 1 7 Avincri, S . 1 1 5 n., 1 3 1 n. Babbage, C. 1 10, 1 24, 128 n., 129 Bacon, F. 26, 58-9, 62,91-2,231, 254-5 Bahr, H. D. 222 n. Bahro, R. 18, 223 Ball, T. 1 15 n., 1 17-18 Ballmer, T. 1 19 n., 204 n., 220 n. Barnes, B. 135 n. base-superstructure 158, 181-2, 190, 214, 289 Bateson, G. 1 2 1 Biitzing, W . 9 7 Baudelaire, C. 285 n . Bauer, O . 287 Beck, U. 2 1 5 , 285 Beckerman, W. 37-8,66-7 Belt, H. vanden 154-5 Bcnhabib, S. 104 n., 277 Benjamin, W. 239 n., 253, 257 Bentham, J. 86 Benton, T. 5 1 , 52 Berg, M. 127-8, 169, 1 70, 1 76 BergerJ. 184n., 185 n., 186 Berger, P. 285 Berghc, P. vandcn 183 Bergman, T. 1 89-90 Berlin, L 262 Bijker, W. 154,201 Binswanger, H. C. 141 Birch, T: H. 90 Bloch, E. 2 1 , 232, 253-7, 260 n., 261 n., 262-3, 294 n. Bloor, D. 135 n. Bobbio, N. 48,49 Bodei, R. 58,59,255 B6hm-Bawcrk, E. 283 Bookchin; M. 1 7 Boserup, E . I 1 1 n. Boudon, R. 40 Boulding, K. 226 Bourricaud, F. 40 Breuer, S. 198 Brus, W. 283 Buhl, W. 20, 56, 193, 265 n., 291 Callon, M. 154 Campbell, D. 85 Carlyle, T. 127-8 Carson, R. 12 Chandler, A. D. 282 coevolution, see evolution Cohen, G. A. 50, 142 n., 161, 180, 183 n., 184, 185 n., 214, 222, 225, 268 Cohen, }. 180 Cohen, M. 208 n. Commoner, B. 19,29,36 communist society 4, 10, 1 1 , 69, 89, 92,97, 98, 105, 1 18, 131, 133, 140-1, 1 72, 191, 214, 230-7, 265, 272 and ecological problems 89, 230-1 principles of 232 strong and weak model 232-3, 266,278 Dade, W. vanden 26,56 Dahl, R. A. 271 n. Daly, H. 56, 246 n. Dante 20 n., 58, 59,278 n. Darwin, C. 1 14-15, 1 16-18, 121-2, 147 n. Descartes, R. 58, 91,231 320 Index Dickens, C. 127, 128 n. Dobbins, �. 59 n. Dosi, G. 145 Dostoevsky/ P.M. 91 n. Douglas, M. 24, 155, 184, 2 1 8 ll. Durkhdm, E. 142, 1 74, 184, 289 Dworkin, R. 85 ecological catastrophes 22, 28-9,33 ecological crisis 9, 2l, 51 ecological problems 9, 1 2, 13, 14, 17, 20, 21-3, 27-8,36-41, 46-50, 72-5, 222-3, 229, 230, 284,287, 290 depletion of Datural resources 13, 14, 22, 78-9, 88,224 destruction of wilderness 1 3 extinction of species 13, 67 grecnhousc cffcct 12,22 pollution 13, 14, 22, 36-7, 38,46 Eder, K. 285 Eigen, M. 188, 203-5, 208, 2 1 7 Ellul, j . 198-9 ElSter, J. 71, 97, 101, 102, 108 n., 1 1 7, 152 11. , 154-5, 1 74, 180, 183-7, 209 n., 214, 219, 241 n., 256 n., 271, 273, 274n. Engels, F. 58, 72, 1 18, 122 n., 123, 190,204,245,254 n., 272, 274 n., 294 Enzcnsbergcr, H. M. 1, 30, 47-8 evolution: coevolution 9, 10, 197, 200, 204, 209-10,221 hypercyclc 205-6, 209, 212-13, 220n. riatural 1 17, 1 19, 155 of productive forces and relations of production 1 14, 173,203-12, 221, 279, 289 social 1 1 7, 1 19, 155 social Darwinism 120 n. SOCiobiology 120 n. externalities 27, 37, 41, 75 Feinberg, J. 56,85 n. Fctscher, ]. 73, 79,94 n., 100, 172 Fcucrbach,1. 7, 59 n., 95, 97 n., 98, 102, 1 64,236,248,278,285 theses on 102,280 Fichte, J. G. 66, 70, 248 Fletcher, G. P. 199 Index 321 Foerster, H. von 185, 188, 2 1 5 Fores, M. 129 Foucault, M. 285 n., 286-7 Fourier, C. 239, 240,260-1 Fraas, C. 72, 79 functionalism 183-8 functional v. causal explanation 184-8, 219 Fuss, P. 59 n. future generations 57, 65-70, 259 Galtung, J. 1 2 Gehlen, A . !0O Georgescu·Roegcn, N. 21, 5 1, 56 Geras, N. 102-3, 162 n.,208 n. Gemltana, V. 1 1 5 n. Gcuss, R. 53 Giddens, A. 3, 48-9 Girnus, W. 278 n. Glasersfeld, E. von 285 God 15, 5S, 1 1 8 Goethe, J . W . von 141, 189, 22S, 260 n. Goldman, M. 42 Gorz, A. 4,56 Gould, S. J. l l5 n., 1 1 6 n., 119 n., 120, 147 n., 155 Groh, D. 1 1 5 n. Gruhl, H. 15, 1 7 Grundmann, R. 172,241 n. Habermas,J. 16, 104 n., 1 19, 120, 148n., 153, 161 n., 173 n., 2 1 1, 236, 247-53, 275,276,278 n., 286, 288, 293�4 Haeckcl, E. 1, 1 7 Haken, H. I S 8 Hardin, G. 38-9 Harich, W. 15, 1 7 Harrington, M . 267 Hart, H. L. A. 85 n. Hayek, F. A. von 88 n. Hegel, G. W. F. 7,59 n., 62, 85, 91-5, 100, 1 3 1 11., 158, 163, 220,247, 277-8, 279 n., 286-7 Hcidegger, M. 92, 108 n., 135 n., 165 n., 293 Heilbronner, R. L. 12, 162 n. Hejl, P. M. 193 Hellcr, A. 101, 1 73, 1 79 Hempel, C. G. 185 Herder, J. G. 59, 278 Heuser-KeHler, M. L. 1 2 1 n. high-risk systems 33-6, 84, 131-2, 135 Hinz, M. 261 n. Hirsch, F. 246, 292 Hirschmann, A. O. 76 Hobbes, T. 122 11. Hofstadter, R. 120 n. Honneth, A. 241 Horkheimer, M. 16, 198 n. Howe, R. H . 189 n., 191 Hudson, W. 257, 294 Hughes, T. P. 109 ll., 151, 156, 157, 199,201, 202 human nature 9, 54,85, 100, 102 alien powers v. conscious control 54-5, 72 alienation 55, 108 self-realization 58-9, 70,73, 104, 139, 1 72, 174, 177, 226, 233, 287 true human esscnce 73, 103, 104-6 Humboldt, W. von 59, 278 Hume, D. 246-7 lllieh, L 21 Jonas, H. 3,56 Junger, E. 261 n. Kain, P. J. 287 ri. Kant, L 7,26, 55,66, 70, 85, 163, 189, 247, 287 Kaufmann, F. X. 271 n. Kelley, D. 42 Kern, H. 210 Keynes, J. M. 164 n. Kitschelt, H. 56 Klein, B. H. 145 n. Klein, M. 278 n. Kluge, T. 19 Knorr-Cetina, K. 135 n. Kolakowski, L. 104 n., 286 Korsch, K. 1 1 8 n. Kosta, 1- 270 n. Kramer, J. M. 42 Krohn, W. 26, 188,265 n. Kuhn, T. S. 146 Kupilik, M. 42 Kuppers, G. 188,265 11. labour 95, 96, 238-53, 286 division of 1 15, 1 22, 124-5, 133, 171-9,218, 227 eroancipatory dimension 10, lOS, 238, 241, 242, 243,261, 288-9 as 'play' and 'curse' 239, 260-1 simple and complicated 268, 271 as 'travail attractif' 240, 241 Lalonde, B. 1 7 La Porte, T . R . 264 Larmore, C. 186 Laski, K. 283 law: as instrument in regulating ecological problems 82�8 as social function 1 74, 273-6 Law, J. 201 Lazonick, W. 170 Leiss, W. 91 n.,231 Lenin, V.l. 2 1 1 n., 233,235 Lepcnics, W. 122 Levinc, A. 180 Liebig, J. 79, 121 Lifcldman, H. 44 lifcworld 249, 251-3, 276 Loh, W. 203 Luce, D. 43 Luckmann, T. 285 Luhmann, N. 29, 51, 56,87, 105 n., 1 17, 1 1 9, 142, ISO, 1 6 1, 1 74, 1 85-7, 191, 193, 194-7, 199, 212 n., 215, 2 1 7, 237 n., 262 n., 265 n., 271, 285, 289 Lukacs, G. 162 n., 258 n. Lukes, S. 53,85, 86, 152n., 158 n., 159 n., 180, 214 n., 273 n., 276 McCarthy, T. 294 machine 122-8, 130 capitalist use of 125-7, 139-40, 160, 1 68-9, 192, 209 definition of 122, 124, 166 machinery 1 10, 1 15, 125-8, 130, 133, 139, I l l , 1 76-7, 191, 209, 214 Marx's problems with 123, 13940, 165, 179 MacIntyre, A. 104 n. MacKenzie, D. 157, 160 n., 1 6 1 , 201 McQuarie, D. 193 n. Maihofer, W. 233, 273, 274 n. Malthus, T. R. 64, 1 15 n., 143 n. Mandel, E. 49 Mannheim, K. 158 n. Marcuse, H. 16,251 Marcn-Griesebach, M. 26 Index 323 322 Index market 1 1 , 37-40, 88 and plan 266-71 Marx, 1. 127 materiality continuum 196-7 Maturana, H. R. 193, 196 n., 212 n. Maurer, R. 62 Mayntz, R. 148, 154 n., 265 n. Meadows, D. 12,56,64 Merrill, R. 107 Mertoll, R.K. 31, 56; 87 n., 184 Meyer-Abich, K. 1 8 Mill, j . S. 19, 127, 150, 245-6 Mishan, E. f. 56 Moleschott, 1. 121 Moore, B., Jun. 221 n. Moore, S. 268, 270 Mulkay, M. 1,,5 n. Mumford, L. 17, 56 Myrdal, G. 1 2 Nagel, E. 185 nature: concept of 93,256-7,260 destruction of 9, 15, 2 1 domination of 2,4, 13, 14, 1 7, 10, 21, 23,49,52, 60-3, 92,99, 223, 243-4, 262,265 exploitation of 3 , 2 1 , 49, 255,260 first and second 10, 94, 96, 138, 236, 247,250 instrumental value 25, 56-7,83, 86, 96 intrinsic value 25,56-7,83,96 laws of 21, 58-9, 64, 95, 1 79,255; see also naturalism man's dealings with 23, 26, 28, 90 naturalism 17-20 teleological character 62 transforming of 3, 9, 90, 94, 96, 97, 98,99, 1 1 1, 132, 138, 225, 229, 236-7, 244, 246, 250, 255, 265, 289, 290 Nelson, R. 144-6 Neumann, J. von 205 n. Newton, !' 187 Nietzsche, F. 1 2, 9 1 , 229 North, D. C. 1 8 1 n. Norton, B. 15, 25,26,53,67,83 Oechsle, M. 16, 17,56 Offe, C. 184 n., 185 n., 186 Olson, M., jun. 43 Ophuls, W. 246 n. Parsons, T. 190 n., 193, 271 n.,289 Passmore, J. 13, 19, 20,23, 24, 29,30, 33,37-8, 56, 65, 83, 85 n., 97 Perrow, C. 30,33,34,35, 56, 84, 1 31-2, 135 Petrovic, G. 162 n. Pico della Mirandola 58, 59, 9 1 Pigou, A . 37 Pinch, T. 154,201 Piore, M. 152, 1 70, 1 9 1 , 202 Pizzorno, A. 76 Plemenatz, J. 108 n. Polanyi, K. 38, 2 1 1 n., 271 population growth 13-14,57, 64-5 Preuss, U. K. 84 Price, D. j. de Solla 135-7, 148-9, 196 Prigogine, L 18, 1 88 prisoners' dilemma 38,43-5,84 productive forces 3,4, 49, 103, 106, 1 12-13, 173 clash with relations of production 182, 222,234 growth of 3,4, 49, 60,220, 228, 229,250 Proudhon, P. j. 1 72, 267 Raiffa, H. 43 Rammcrt, W. 141, 156, 195 Rapp, F. 56, 129 n. rationality 16,25,37,55, 252, 280, 292 Rawls, j. 44,66,68, 104 n., 288 Regan, T. 56,85 n. Reiche, J. 62 Ricardo, D. 143, 147 n. Ricoeur, P. 105 n., 164, 1 75, 294-5 Rimbaud, A. 147 n. Rip, A. 154-5 Robinson, ,. 68 Rosdolsky, R. 224 n. Rosenberg, N. 109, 1 10, 1 15, 130-2, 135, 137, 154, 156 Rosenbladt, S. 40 Roth, G. 193 Rottlcuthner, H. 122, 215,291 Rousseau, I.-I. 40, 59 Sable, C. 152, 1 70, 191, 202 Sandel, M. 104 n. Seharpf, F.W. 21S,26Sn.,291 Schefold, B. 222,225 Scheler, M. 129 n., 149, 150, 213 Schelling, F. W. j. 121, 163 Schelling, T. C. 67 Schclsky, H. 108 n. Schiller, F. 59, 260 n., 276 n. Schluchter, W. 191 n. Schmidt, A. 8,93, 98, 121, 256-7, 263 Schmicd-Kowarzik, W. 6 Schumacher, E. 56 Schumann, M. 210 n. Schumpeter, J. A. 200 n., 203 Schuster, P. 203-5,208, 2 1 7 Schweitzer, A . 24 science 9, 26, 1 28-39, 251, 263-5, 280 Marxism as science 102 Marx's belief in 128-30, 1-'3 2-4, 138, 187-9 natural 79,95, 121, 128-39, 188 social 95, 120, 280 Seidel, C. 163 Sc1ucky, R. 173 Sen, A. K. 43-4 Shakcspeare, W. 60 Shaw, W. 45 Shrader-Frechette, K. 35 Sidgwick, H. 66 Singer, P. 85 n. Sismondi, j. C. 1. 143 Smith, A. 1 76, 220, 239, 240 society: ancient 58-9, 2 1 1 , 236,265-6 modern 87, 140,262,272,275, 279 truchuman, see communist society Spacmann, R. 58 Sraffa, P. 194 n. Steiner, H. 45, 215, 291 n. Stiehwch, R. 137 n., 193, 194 Stone, C. 85 n. systems: aUopoietic 196 n. autonomous 202 autopoictic 193-7 closed 195, 290 eodcs of 196, 198, 290 intcrfcrcnccof 146-7, 215-16 intcrpenetration of 212 n. intersystemic communication 290 social 87, 193, 249, 251, 290 technologic.al, see technology, 'IS system theory 10, 193 Sztompka, P. 193n. Taylor, C. 104, 187 n., 286 Taylor, M. 215, 291 n. Taylor, P. 77 tcchnology 9, 18, 28,29, 46, 74, 90-1, 107, 128-39, 149, 254 chemical 28-9, 35 as complex 213 complexity of 134; see also high­ risk systems 'eigendynamics' of 131, 152, 202, 279 evolution of 133, 139, 145, 153, 166, 198, 200-1 nuclear 28-9, 35 social construction of 201-2 as system 147-57, 193-203, 251 technological alienation 9, 108, 140, 162-6, 1 71, 250 technological asscssment 30, 200 technological determinism I l l, 159-62, 1 7 1, 1 79, 200- 1, 206, 207, 213 technological progress 1 13, 141-3, 199-200 tcchnological trajectory 145-7, 152, 213 teleology 62, 115 n., 153, 183 Teubner, G. 87, 159 n., 193, 202 n., 2 1 6, 265 n., 279 n., 291 n. thermodynamics, sccond law of 21, 51 Thcunissen, M. 104 n. threshold values 215-16 Tiezzi, E. 35, 1 1 7, 155 n. Trepl, 1. 18 Trotsky, L. 247 unintended consequences of human action 27, 30-3, 57, 71-2, 78, 87 United Nations Commission on Environment and Development 13,29 Ure, A. 1 10, 129, 167-9, 176 Varela, F. 193 Vico, G. 59, 94, 236, 262-3, 265 Victor, P. A. 38, 40, 225, 226 Voltairc, 62 Vorlandcr, K. 287 Waldron, j. 85 Walker, K. j. 5 1 324 Index Wallerstein, I. 294 Wartofsky, M. W. 59 n. Watzlawick, P. 285 Weber, M. 41, 108 n., 150, 154 n., 158 n., 1 74, 1 89, 190, 191, 199, 2 1 7, 289 Weick, K. E. 1 16, 122, 141, 1 53, 156, 202 Weizsacker, E. von 1 1 9 n" 204 n., 220 n. WeIskopf, E. 212 n. Whitc, L., /un. 15 Williams, R. 191 n. Williamson, O. E. 2 1 1 n., 271 Willke, H. 87, 193,265n. Winner, 1. 198 Wright, E. O. 180 Ziegler, C. 40,42, 43, 2 1 1 n.,290 Zolo, D. 193,274 n.