One of the visitors to this page, a colleague in fact, who was at the Saint Ignatius Institute at the same time as I, asked for some comments on what Aquinas had to say about regicide.
| I just found a question about how far we are obliged to obey civil authorities, which addresses the question of regicide (tyrannicide), it is at the bottom of this page, and derived from the Commentary on the Sentences. Another sources I will draw on is On Kingship: to the King of Cyprus, a work attributed to Thomas Aquinas. Gerald Phelan, in his translation of this work, (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949) points out certain difficulties, that the work is actually an amalgam of the words of Saint Thomas and those of later writers. I will follow my usual approach, and following the advice of Saint Thomas himself, heed what is said rather than who said what. |
I will expand upon the following points, insofar as I have time.
Aristotle describes man as a social animal.
| Politikon gar <o anqrwpos kai suzhn pefukos | For man is a social (political) being and by nature designed to live with others |
| Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 9, c. 9, 1169 b, 18. | |
| See Aristotle's Politics, Book I, the beginning, where Aristotle traces the development of society according to man's nature |
Thomas develops Aristotle's doctrine of man as a social animal.
| Sciendum est autem, quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multis, quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; consequens est, quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicuius multitudinis, per quam praestetur sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum. Quo quidem auxilio indiget ad duo. Primo quidem ad ea quae sunt vitae necessaria, sine quibus praesens vita transigi non potest: et ad hoc auxiliatur homini domestica multitudo, cuius est pars. | It should be known that, since man is by nature a social animal, as one who needs for life many things that he alone cannot provide for himself, so man is consequently part of a certain multitude, throught which he is presented with help to live well. He needs this help for two reasons. First, with regard to the things that are necessary for life, without which he could not survive in this present life; and man is helped by the domestic multitude (the family) of which he is a part. |
| Nam quilibet homo a parentibus habet generationem et nutrimentum et disciplinam et similiter etiam singuli, qui sunt partes domesticae familiae, seinvicem iuvant ad necessaria vitae. Alio modo iuvatur homo a multitudine, cuius est pars, ad vitae sufficientiam perfectam; scilicet ut homo non solum vivat, sed et bene vivat, habens omnia quae sibi sufficiunt ad vitam: et sic homini auxiliatur multitudo civilis,cuius ipse est pars, non solum quantum ad corporalia, prout scilicet in civitate sunt multa artificia, ad quae una domus sufficere non potest, sed etiam quantum ad moralia; inquantum scilicet per publicam potestatem coercentur insolentes iuvenes metu poenae, quos paterna monitio corrigere non valet. | Every man receives generation, nourishment and teaching from his parents. Likewise the particular individuals who are parts of the domestic family help each other in the necessities of life. In another way, a man is helped by the many of which he is a part with regard to the perfect (complete) sufficiency of life; to be specific, so that a man does not merely live, but that he may live will, possessing all the things that he needs for life: and so the civil multitude of which the man is a part helps the man, not only with regard to physical things, insofar as there are many manufactured articles in a city which could not be produced by one house, but also with regard to moral matters; insofar as those rebellious youth who cannot be corrected by their father's warning are coerced by the public power with fear of punishment, |
| Aquinas, Sententia Libri Ethicorum L.1 lect.1, n.4 | |
Thomas Aquinas teaches that by divine law we are ordered to love our neighbor:
| Oportet enim unionem esse affectus inter eos quibus est unus finis communis. Communicant autem homines in uno ultimo fine beatitudinis, ad quam divinitus ordinantur. Oportet igitur quod uniantur homines ad invicem mutua dilectione. | There should be a union of affection among those to whom belongs one common end. Men share in the one common end of happiness, to which they are divinely ordained. Therefore, men should be united to one another by mutual love. | |
| Adhuc, Quicumque diligit aliquem, consequens est ut etiam diligat dilectos ab eo et eos qui conjuncti sunt ei. Homines autem dilecti sunt a Deo, quibus suiipsius fruitionem quasi ultimum finem praedisposuit. Oportet igitur ut, sicut aliquis fit dilector Dei, ita etiam fiat dilector proximini. | Further, whoever loves someone, consequently loves as well those who are loved by that person and those associated with him. Humans are loved by God, and God praedisposed them so that their enjoyment of one another would be something like an ultimate end. Therefore, just as someone becomes a lover of God, he should also become a lover of his neighbour. | |
| Amplius. Cum homo sit naturaliter animal sociale, indiget ab aliis hominibus adiuvari ad consequendum proprium finem; quod convenientissime fit dilectione mutua inter homines existitente. Ex lege igitur Dei, quae homines in ultimum finem dirigit, praecipitur in nobis mutua dilectio. | Moreover. Since man is by nature a social animal, he need to be helped by other man to reach his proper end; and this happens most fittingly when there is mutual love between men. Therefore, by God's law, which directs men toward their ultimate end, mutual love is commanded to us. | |
| Praeterea, Lex divina profertur homini in auxilium legis naturalis. Est autem omnibus hominibus naturale ut se invicem diligant; cuius signum est quod, quodam naturali instinctu, homo cuilibet homini etiam ignoto subvenit in necessitate, puta revocando ab errore viae, erigendo a casu et aliis huiusmodi, ac si omnis homo omni homini esset familiaris et amicus. Igitur ex divina lege mutua dilectio hominibus praecipitur. | Furthermore, the divine law is provided to man as help to the natural law. It is natural to all men that they love one another. A sign of this is that, by a certain natural instinct, one man helps another man, even a stranger, in necessity. For example, to warn them when they are going the wrong way, to rescue them if there is an accident, and so forth, as if every man was an acquaintance and friend of every other man. Therefore, mutual love is commanded to men by divine law. | |
| Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles L. III, c. 117 | ||
A civil community, such as the state, is bound by a sort of friendship, but for the state to achieve its end, which is the good of its members, something more is needed than the mere bond of friendship. Civil authority is needed. Thomas writes:
| Si ergo naturale est homini quod in societate multorum vivat, necesse est in hominibus esse per quod multitudo regatur. Multis enim exsistentibus hominibus, ut unoquoque id quod est sibi congruum providente, multitudo in diversa dispergeretur, nisi etiam esset aliquis de eo quod ad bonum multitudinis pertinent curam habens | If therefore it is natural for man to live in a society of many, it is necessary that there be something among men by which the multitude is governed. When there are many men, and each one provides for himself that which suits him, the multitude is scattered in various directions, unless there is someone who takes care of that which pertains to the good of the multitude. |
| ... Non enim idem est quod proprium et quod commune: secundum propria quidem differunt, secundum autem commune uniuntur. Diversorum autem diversae sunt causae. Oportet igitur, praeter id quod movet ad proprium bonum uniuscuiusque, esse aliquid quod movet ad bonum commune multorum: propter quod et in omnibus quae in unum ordinantur, aliquid invenitur alterius regitivum. | ...That which is proper (one's own/private) is not the same as that which is common: people differ with regard to the things that are their own, but they are united with regard to that which is common. Diverse things have diverse causes. Therefore, beside that which moves each man to seek his own good, there must be something that moves men to the common good of the many: on this account among all things that are ordered to one end, there is found something that rules another thing. |
| Aquinas, De Regimine Principum l.1, c.1 | |
From the above, we can see that civil authority would still be needed even if all the members of society were perfect and unselfish. Each person does well taking care of his own concerns, but if people are going to act together to accomplish greater things that benefit everyone, leadership and authority are needed. This is very much different from the theory of Thomas Hobbes, that men are by nature enemies one to another, and that they submit to authority as a way to end the war of all against all. Thomas sees that the normal attitude is that men help each other in need, while admitting that civil authority is also necessary to restrain those who do not act according to the norm and to defend the community against external enemies. However, a mere willingness to help others is not enough, if this natural inclination is going to be effective, than it must be guided by authority.
Although Thomas uses the terms rex - king, and princeps - prince, we should not assume that he supported a certain model of monarchical government and rejected all other forms of government. We can safely assume that he would describe that President of the United as a king, one elected by the nobles for a certain period of time. The king or prince is the single man who holds power, who rules:
| Qui perfectam communitatem regit, idest civitatem vel provinciam, antonomastice rex vocatur; qui autem domum regit, non rex, sed paterfamilias dicitur. | He who rules a perfect community, that is, a city-state or a province, is called a king by a figure of speech; he who rules a house is not called a king, but the father-of-the-family. |
| Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, L.1, c. 1. | |
| Utrum Christiani teneantur obedire potestatibus saecularibus, et maxime tyrannis. | Whether Christians are held to obey secular powers, and especially tyrants |
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod christiani non teneantur saecularibus potestatibus obedire, et praecipue tyrannis. Matth. 17, 25, dicitur: ergo liberi sunt filii. si enim in quolibet regno filii illius regis qui regno illi praefertur, liberi sunt, tunc filii regis cui omnia regna subduntur, in quolibet regno liberi esse debent. Sed Christiani effecti sunt filii Dei; Roman. 8, 16: ipse enim spiritus testimonium reddit spiritui nostro quod sumus filii Dei. ergo ubique sunt liberi; et ita saecularibus potestatibus obedire non tenentur. | We proceed to the second article. It seems that Christians are not held to obey secular powers, and especially tyrants. In Matthew, 17, 25, we read: therefore the sons are free, for if in any kingdom the sons of the king who is in authority over his kingdom are free, then the sons of the king to whom all things are subject should be free in whatever kingdom. But Christians have been made the sons of God; Romans, 8, 16: for he has given testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God. Therebfore they are free everywhere and are not held to obey secular powers. |
| Praeterea, servitus pro peccato inducta est, ut supra, quaest. 1, art. 1, dictum est. sed per baptismum homines a peccato mundantur. Ergo a servitute liberantur; et sic idem quod prius. | Objection 2. Furthermore, servitude was brought in for sin, as was said above (Question 1, article 1), but by baptism men are cleansed from sin. Therefore they are freed from servitiude, and thus the same as before [before sin]. |
| Praeterea, majus vinculum absolvit a minori, sicut lex nova ab observantia legis veteris. Sed in baptismo homo obligatur deo, quae obligatio est majus vinculum quam id quo homo obligatur homini per servitutem. Ergo per baptismum a servitute absolvitur. | Objection 3. Furthermore, a greater chain (obligation) releases someone from a lesser one, as the New Law releases men from the observance of the old law. But in baptism man acquires an obligation to God, and this obligation is a greater chain (obligation) than that whereby a man is obliged to another man by servitude. Therefore one is released from servitude by baptism |
| Praeterea, quilibet potest licite resumere, cum facultas adest, quod sibi injuste ablatum est. Sed multi saeculares principes tyrannice terrarum dominia invaserunt. Ergo cum facultas rebellandi illis conceditur, non tenentur illis obedire. | Objection 4. Furthermore, anyone can licitly take up again what was unjustly taken way, when the faculty (to do so) is present. But many secular princes have tyranically invaded the dominions of lands. Therefore, when the faculty of rebelling is conceded to them, they are not held to obey the. [This seems to mean - when your king grants you permission to rebel against an invader who takes over the government, you are not held to obey the new government, but this is an objection on Aquinas' part, so read on.] |
| praeterea, nullus tenetur ei obedire quem licite, immo laudabiliter potest interficere. Sed tullius in libro de officiis salvat eos qui julium caesarem interfecerunt, quamvis amicum et familiarem, qui quasi tyrannus jura imperii usurpaverat. ergo talibus nullus tenetur obedire. | Objection 5. Furthermore, no one is held to obey him whom he may slay licitly, even in a praiseoworthy manner. But Cicero in his book On Offices would save those who slew Julius Caesar, although Caeser was a friend and familiar, since Caesar as a tyrant usurped the rights of emperor. Therefore no one is held to obey such men. |
| Sed contra, 1 Petri 11, 18: Servi subditi estote dominis vestris. | |
| But to the contrary, 1 Peter 11, 18: Servants, be subject unto your masters | |
| Praeterea, Rom. 13, 2: qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit. Sed non est licitum Dei ordinationi resistere. ergo nec saeculari potestati resistere licet. | Furthermore, Romans 13, 2: he who resists authority, resists what God has ordained. But it is not licit to to resist the ordination of God. Therefore neither is it licet to resist secular authority |
| Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, obedientia respicit in praecepto quod servat, debitum observandi. Hoc autem debitum causatur ex ordine praelationis, quae virtutem coactivam habet, non tantum temporaliter sed etiam spiritualiter propter conscientiam, ut apostolus dicit roman. 13, secundum quod ordo praelationis a deo descendit, ut apostolus, ibidem, innuit. | I answer, it is to be said, that as was said, obedience concerns the precept that one keeps to observe a debt. But this debt is caused by the order of someone in authority who has the power to coerce, not merely in a temporal sense but also in a spiritual sense by conscience, as the Apostle says in Romans 13, As the order of authority comes down from God, as the Apostle suggests in the same work. |
| Et ideo secundum hoc quod a Deo est, obedire talibus christianus tenetur, non autem secundum quod a Deo praelatio non est. Dictum est autem, quod praelatio potest a Deo non esse dupliciter: vel quantum ad modum acquirendi praelationem, vel quantum ad usum praelationis. Quantum ad primum contingit dupliciter: aut propter defectum personae, quia indignus est; aut propter defectum in ipso modo acquirendi, quia scilicet per violentiam vel per simoniam, vel aliquo illicito modo acquirit. Ex primo defectu non impeditur quin jus praelationis ei acquiratur; et quoniam praelatio secundum suam formam semper a Deo est (quod debitum obedientiae causat); ideo talibus praelatis, quamvis indignis, obedire tenentur subditi. | And so insofar as it is from God, a Christian is held to obey such authoriies, but not insofar as the authority is not from God. But is was said, that authority can be not from God in two senses: either 1) with respect to how the authority was acquired, or 2) with respect to how the authority is used. As for the first, there are two ways it may happen: either 1) by a defect in the person, that he is unworthy; or 2) by a defect in the way he acquried power, namely by violence or simony (bribery), or he acquired it in any illicit way. From the first defect, nothing prevents him from acquiring the right of authority; and since authority according to its form is always from God (because he causes the debt of obedience), therefore the subjects are held to obey such authorities, however unworthy. |
| Sed secundus defectus impedit jus praelationis: qui enim per violentiam dominium surripit non efficitur vere praelatus vel dominus; et ideo cum facultas adest, potest aliquis tale dominium repellere: nisi forte postmodum dominus verus effectus sit vel per consensum subditorum, vel per auctoritatem superioris. Abusus autem praelationis potest esse dupliciter: vel ex eo quod est praeceptum a praelato, contrarium ejus ad quod praelatio ordinata est, ut si praecipiat actum peccati contrarium virtuti ad quam inducendam et conservandam praelatio ordinatur; et tunc aliquis praelato non solum non tenetur obedire, sed etiam tenetur non obedire, sicut et sancti martyres mortem passi sunt, ne impiis jussis tyrannorum obedirent: vel quia cogunt ad hoc ad quod ordo praelationis non se extendit; ut si dominus exigat tributa quae servus non tenetur dare, vel aliquid hujusmodi; et tunc subditus non tenetur obedire, nec etiam tenetur non obedire. | The second defect does impede the right of authority: for he who siezes dominion does not truly become the authority or lord; and so when there is an opportunity, someone may fight against such a regime: unless perhaps the man becomes the true lord either by the consent of his subjects or by the authority of a superior. But the abuse of authority can be twofold: 1) either as it is ordered by an authority, contrary to that for which the authority was ordained, as if he were to order an act of sin contrary to virtue, and authority is ordered to induce and preserve virtue; and then not only is one not hold to obey the authority, but is even held not to obey, as the Holy Martyrs suffered death rather than obey the impious orders of tyrants: or 2) because they compel their subjects to something to which the order of their authority does not extend, as if a loard were to exact tributes what the servant was not hold to give, or something of this sort; and then the subject is not held to obey, but neither is he held to disobey. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa praelatio quae ad utilitatem subditorum ordinatur, libertatem subditorum non tollit; et ideo non est inconveniens quod tali praelationi subjaceant qui per Spiritum Sanctum filii Dei effecti sunt. Vel dicendum, quod Christus loquitur de se et suis discipulis, qui nec servilis conditionis erant, nec res temporales habebant, quibus suis dominis obligarentur ad tributa solvenda; et ideo non sequitur quod omnis christianus hujusmodi libertatis sit particeps, sed solum illi qui sequuntur apostolicam vitam, nihil in hoc mundo possidentes, et a conditione servili immunes. | To the first objection, it is to be said that the authority which ordered to the benefit of the subjects does not take away the liberty of the subjects; and therefore it is not unfitting that those who have become the sons of God by the Holy Spirit should be subject to such authority. Or it should be said, that Christ speaks of himself and his disciples, who neither were of a servile condition nor did they have temporal goods which they were obliged to render unto their lords; and therefore it does not follow that every Christian shares in this kind of liberty, but only those who follow the apostolic life, possessing nothing in this world and immune from the servile condition. |
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod baptismus non delet statim omnes poenalitates ex peccato primi parentis consequentes, sicut necessitatem moriendi et caecitatem, vel aliquid hujusmodi; sed regenerat in spem vivam illius vitae in qua omnia ista tollentur; et sic non oportet ut aliquis statim baptizatus a servili conditione liberetur, quamvis illa sit poena peccati. | To the second objection it is to be said, that baptism does not remove all at once all kinds of punishments that follow upon the sin of the first parent, such as the necessity of death and blindness, or something of that kind; but it regenerates unto living hope for the life in which all this things will be taken away; and so it is not necessary that someone be freed from the servile condition as soon as he is baptized, although this (servile condition) is a punishment for sin. |
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod majus vinculum non absolvit a minori, nisi quando non compatitur se cum illo; sicut umbra et veritas simul esse non possunt: propter quod veniente veritate evangelii, umbra veteris legis cessavit. Sed vinculum quo in baptismo quis ligatur, compatitur vinculum servitutis; et ideo non absolvit ab illo. | To the third objection, it is to be said, that the greater chain (obligation) does not release one from the lesser, unless the former is not compatible with the latter; just as shadow and truth cannot exist simultaneously: because when the truth of the Gospel came, the shadow of the Old Law ceased. But the chain (obligation) by which someone is bound in baptism is compatible with the bond of servitude and so it does not release someone from it. |
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod qui per violentiam praelationem accipiunt, non sunt veri praelati; unde nec eis obedire tenentur subditi nisi sicut dictum est. | To the fourth objection it is to be said, that they who receive authority by violence are not true authorities; hence the subjects are not held to obey they unless in the sense which was stated. |
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod Tullius loquitur in casu illo quando aliquis dominium sibi per violentiam surripit, nolentibus subditis, vel etiam ad consensum coactis, et quando non est recursus ad superiorem, per quem judicium de invasore possit fieri: tunc enim qui ad liberationem patriae tyrannum occidit, laudatur, et praemium accipit. | To the fifth objection, that Cicero speaks at a time when some has seized dominion for himself by violence against the will of the subjects, or also to the consent of those who are coerced, and when there is no recourse to a superior by whom judgment can be made about an invader, then he who slays a tyrant to liberate his fatherland is praised and receives a reward. |