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Human Security and the Transformation of the South African National Security Environment from 1990 - 2004: Challenges and Limitations

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INTRODUCTION

The term "human security" has gained increasing currency in recent years manifesting itself in a variety of academic, intellectual, practical and, increasingly, policy discourses. Whilst the term itself remains eminently appealing to those practitioners involved in initiatives aimed at preventing conflict, ensuring effective poverty reduction, creating structures of accountable and effective governance and contributing to systematic and periodic violation of fundamental human rights, it continues to remain an "essentially contested concept" (1).

One of its most self-evident limitations is its tendency to remain a normative vision rather than a practical policy tool (2) thereby limiting its ability to be concretely implemented. Another weakness, much to the chagrin of many people in the developing world, is its alleged "newness" – a term coined by Barry Buzan in one of his many articles on the subject where he introduced the term "new thinking in security" into what was, until the end of the Cold War, a primarily realist and traditionalist strategic and security studies community where considerable emphasis was placed

on the role of both the state and the armed forces in ensuring the creation of a climate of national and international security.

Indeed the bulk of the African metaphysical systems, humanist philosophies and most world religions, for example, have consistently stressed the key values of the human security paradigm – the centrality of humankind in the universe, the primacy of peace and good neighbourliness in the conduct of individual, familial and community affairs and the need to create an environment within which humankind's vast and largely untapped intellectual, spiritual and practical energies could flourish. This philosophy is manifested in the African metaphysical tradition of *"ubuntu"* which stresses that regardless of how developed a country may be in terms of its technological capabilities (state structures, resources and technological advances) it will continue to remain inherently backward and vulnerable until the broader human security condition is factored into this equation.

The aim of this article is to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the human security paradigm in relationship to the restructuring of the South African national security environment since the unmanning of the ANC in 1990, the initiation of multi-party negotiations during the same year and the convening of the country's first non-racial and democratic elections in 1994. It highlights the extent to which concepts of human security not only remained prominent in the general national discourse of the country but also the extent to which they were concretely incorporated into the government's diverse national policies.

It also highlights, however, the extent to which a normative vision does not necessarily constitute a viable policy. Policy is essentially what governments "do" and not what it is they say they are "going to do" – the latter simply remains a ***vision***, which, in most scenarios, may inspire people but rarely results in concrete changes on the ground. To ensure that the vision, values and principles of the human security paradigm move beyond mere utterances of good faith one needs to consider a range of environmental, strategic and practical challenges that can either facilitate or retard the attainment of the key precepts of the desired human security condition. These challenges are outlined in more detail in the latter part of the paper.

BACKGROUND TO NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE PRE-1990 PERIOD

The management of the national security environment in South Africa has changed dramatically from that which preceded it during the pre-1990 period. Developments that are notable in this regard include the demilitarisation of the national security decision-making process and the prioritisation of the human security agenda at the heart of government's national policies (although the implementation of the latter has been beset by a range of fundamentally pragmatic considerations).

To understand the changes that have occurred in the management of the national security function, however, it is important to understand the nature of the period, which preceded it - particularly the years between 1978 (the year P.W. Botha assumed leadership as Prime Minister) and 1990 (the year within which formal negotiations were initiated). The constitutional order that informed governance in South Africa during the period under review ensured that the exercise of full adult suffrage was largely the preserve of the white section of the population (although the institution of the tri-cameral parliament in 1984 extended the franchise to all sections of the population). The primary threat to the national security of South Africa was seen as the mass-based opposition that emerged against the government of the period. Individuals, local and international organisations, foreign governments and states that opposed the constitutional order of the country were considered to be threats to national security and were targeted as such by both the government in general and its security services in particular.

Whilst pursuing the practice of apartheid domestically, South Africa also ruled Namibia (the latter known at the time as South West Africa). The constitutional order that was erected within Namibia was based on the South African policy of separate development and the national security objectives, which were pursued in Namibia, were virtually akin to those, which the South African government practiced against its own domestic opponents. Namibia also provided the government with considerable strategic depth into the sub-continent - a depth that was extensively utilised by the former South African Defence Force (SADF) to destabilise key adversaries in the Southern African region (most notably Angola but also including Zambia).

Up until 1975, countries like Mozambique and Angola and, until 1980, Rhodesia were still ruled by colonial administrations that pursued policies that were essentially variations of the apartheid and separate development policies practiced by the South African government. These administrations also implemented national security policies that targeted domestic resistance movements - movements engaged in similar political struggles to those being conducted within both South Africa and Namibia. As a result of these struggles these various governments and administrations increasingly found common cause with one another in both the political and the military spheres. This was formalised by a range of de facto and de jure agreements, which included joint training of security, force personnel, exchanges of military personnel and provision of financial support and equipment to one another when so required.

The liberation movements, in turn, increasingly began co-operating with each other and were to find extensive political, moral and material support from the socialist countries of the world. This support was interpreted, by both the South African government and the administrations in the afore-mentioned countries, as being evidence of a communist conspiracy and the desire of those socialist countries to export their ideologies to other parts of the world. The fight to preserve colonialism in the region and apartheid within Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa, therefore, was justified as a broader strategy designed to repel the spread of communism in the region in general and in South Africa in particular.

Once the countries referred to above attained their freedom, they continued their opposition to South Africa's constitutional dispensation through the provision of various forms of support to the South African liberation movements. They also attempted to institute within their own countries policies, which were, initially at least, strongly socialist in character and ideological orientation. Given their professed socialist leanings these countries were also deemed to be threats to South Africa's national security and were to become victims of varying degrees of South African pressure ranging from direct military confrontation (Angola), indirect military support to dissident groupings (Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique) and economic blockades (Zimbabwe and Lesotho for instance).

In an attempt to create alternative administrations and governments to those existing in these countries, South Africa crafted good mutual relations between itself and such political formations as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (RENAMO) of Angola and Mozambique respectively. These political formations, largely supported by South Africa, were positioned as allies in the fight to neutralise "communism" and thereby bring about stability in the region.

In the mid-80s, both in Namibia and South Africa itself, South Africa employed its strategy of supporting rebel political organisations, which it regarded as real or potential allies. Within South Africa similar allies were sought - the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), for instance, received support from the Intelligence Division in the form of intelligence briefings, provision of military equipment and the provision of military training. Similarly there were also plans to create a Xhosa Resistance Movement, more akin to the IFP. Other formations were mobilised for the same purpose. All of the above-mentioned objectives were justified, in political and ideological terms, as strategies designed to ensure that democracy, free market economic policies and stability could take root in both South Africa and South West Africa in particular and the region in general.

The form of the state that ensured that these policies were implemented was, thus, highly centralised, autocratic by nature, and placed a strong emphasis on coercive measures to ensure its survival (hence the resources allocated to its security agencies). Various references during the 1980s referred to South Africa as a "police state" (an incorrect reference given the influence of the armed forces within the government during the time – hence the influence of the "hearts and minds" strategy within overall government policy). In reality the South African state would best have been described as a "covert state" where government departments within and without the security community possessed covert budgets of which literally hundreds of billions of dollars were utilised to ensure the survival of the regime.

Although some faltering attempts were made to provide small pockets of social and economic improvement to the black community – largely influenced by the "hearts and minds" activities of the P.W. Botha administration's "Total Strategy"– these were too incremental, too limited

in their scope and too discredited to have any meaningful impact on the human security conditions of the targeted communities

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN 1990 - 1994

De Klerk's assumption of duties as President saw faltering attempts to restructure and contain elements of the security community. Without any power base within the security community De Klerk had to increasingly rely on the loyalty and the skills of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to inform him of intelligence-related developments. Concerned at the seeming autonomy of sectors of the military intelligence and the police intelligence communities he established a special Chief Directorate within the NIS (Chief Directorate Special Investigations) whose responsibility was to infiltrate the SADF and the South African Police (SAP) and determine the extent of covert activities.

During De Klerk's tenure, the role of structures such as the State Security Council (SSC) and the National Security Management System (NSMS) – the latter two entities being the key co-coordinating bodies for the management of national security - became increasingly marginalised. The military and police chairs of the NSMS were replaced, where possible, with civilian heads and De Klerk relied more on the civilian NIS and his civilian Ministers (Ministers Gerrit Viljoen, Roelf Meyer, Kobie Coetzee and Leon Wessels) for advice than he did the security establishment. Ironically this partially provided a window of opportunity for the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies to initiate strategies aimed at both demilitarising the state and providing a platform upon which their Reconstruction and Development Strategy could be initiated (the latter constituting the basis for the post-1994 government's human security strategy).

Given the volatile nature of the transition and the divided nature of government over the direction of the negotiation process, security co-ordination was not highly effective during this period. The institution of the Transitional Executive Council's Sub-Councils on Defence, Policing and Intelligence provided a measure of strategic direction to the proposed security restructuring process. By early 1994, the role of the SSC and the NSMS in the formal decision-making processes of government had effectively ceased.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM AS THE CENTRAL PILLAR OF GOVERNMENT POLICY: 1994 - 2002.

The extent to which the management of the national security environment has changed since South Africa's first democratic and non-racial elections in 1994 is evident if one considers both the national security policies

which have emerged during the past eight years and the manner in which national security processes are being managed.

The key features of security management during the pre-1994 period were best characterised by its highly militarised nature, its prioritisation of regime security as the key pillar of its endeavours, the centrality afforded the security forces in the management of national security matters and its racially exclusive focus. The security concerns of the post-1994 government have operated more within the ambit of a human security paradigm. The features of this paradigm and its reflection in the present South African government's policies and practices are analysed in more detail below.

Human Security, National Interest and South African Government policy since 1994.

The adoption of human security strategies by the ANC government during the post-1994 period has extended the focus of governmental activities way beyond the traditionally narrower focus of military security. Security covers a much broader definition than that traditionally ascribed to it by traditional military analysts and strategic studies scholars and the South African policy community's approach to human security is best encapsulated in Michael Renner's quote:

> "Unlike traditional military security, human security is much less about procuring arms and deploying troops than it is about strengthening the social and environmental fabric of societies and improving their governance. To avoid the instability and breakdown now witnessed in countless areas around the globe, a human security policy must take into account a complex web of social, economic, environmental and other factors.....
>
> .....National Security is a meaningless concept if it does not encompass the preservation of liveable conditions on earth. A reasonable definition of security needs to encompass breathable air and potable water, safe from radioactive and toxic hazards, an intact climatic system, and protection against the loss of topsoil that assures us our daily bread. The well being of nations and their individual citizens depends as well on economic vitality, social justice, and ecological stability as it does safety from foreign attack. *Pursuing military security at the cost of these other factors is akin to dismantling a house to salvage materials to erect a fence around it*" [italics added] (3)

This approach to security forms the basis of the South African Government's approach to both the definition of its national interest and the management of security issues regardless of whether these security issues fall within the broader socio-economic environment or within the "traditional" security policy sectors. The South African Government's broad commitment to socio-economic reconstruction, development and economic growth is informed by the Reconstruction and Development

Programme (RDP), which outlines the inter-connectedness between political, socio-economic, developmental, physical and moral security.

The vexing issue of national interest, the central component of any definition of national security, received fuller expression within the inauguration of the post-1994 government. In a departure from the state-centred and racially exclusive emphasis on national security that pervaded the pre-1990 period, the new government defined South Africa's national interest in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (1998) as being:

> "South Africa's national interests are underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution, which encompass the security of the state and its citizens, the promotion of the social and economic well-being of its citizenry, the encouragement of global peace and stability, and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and development. These national interests are concretely reflected in key national policy documents - examples of which include the Constitution, a range of White Papers on the RDP, GEAR, and the Transformation of the Public Services, Intelligence and Defence" (4)

The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (1994) endeavours to place the human security within a South Africa-specific and holistic policy framework:

> "The Reconstruction and Development is an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework. It seeks to mobilise all our people and our country's resources towards the final eradication of the results of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future. It represents a vision for the fundamental transformation of South Africa. That integrated process of transformation must ensure that the country:
>
> * develops strong and stable democratic institutions and practices characterised by representativeness and participation.
>
> * becomes a fully democratic and non-racial society.
>
> * becomes a prosperous society, having embarked upon a sustainable and environmentally growth and development path.
>
> * addresses the moral and ethical development of society" (5)

In accordance with this vision all policy sectors within government have sought to define both their sectoral priorities and their objectives in a manner consistent with this vision. The Growth, Employment and Redistribution Macro-economic Strategy (June 1996) form the basis of government's economic strategy in this regard. Its objectives are defined as follows:

> "As South African moves towards the next century, we seek:
>
> * a competitive fast-growing economy, which creates sufficient jobs for all work seekers;
>
> * a redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor;
>
> * a society in which sound health, education and other services are available to all; and
>
> * an environment in which homes are secure and places of work productive.
>
> Strategies for rebuilding and restructuring the economy is set out in this document, in keeping with the goals set in the RDP. In the context of this integrated human strategy, we can successfully confront the related challenges of meeting basic needs, developing human resources, increasing participation in the democratic institutions of civil society and implementing the RDP in all its facets" [(6)].

The extent to which these definitions, visions and policies have informed the perspectives of even the "traditional" structures of the security community is outlined in more detail below.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN A DEMOCRACY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEFENCE AND INTELLIGENCE DURING THE POST-1994 PERIOD.

Transforming the National Defence Function

The most compelling example of the extent to which a paradigm shift has occurred in the management of the national defence function is provided by the following quote from the South African White Paper on Defence:

> "In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people.
>
> Security is an all-encompassing condition in which citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment, which is not detrimental to their health and well being.
>
> At national level the objectives of security policy therefore encompass the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice; economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. Stability and

> development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing" (7)

The principles upon which the management of the national defence function is managed stand in sharp contradistinction to the closed nature of the defence decision-making process during the pre-1990 period. Cardinal principles in this regard included the following:

> "a. National Security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security;
>
> b. South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with others states;
>
> c. South Africa shall adhere to international law on armed conflict;
>
> d. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture;
>
> e. South Africa is committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament;
>
> f. South Africa's force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by national defence policy;
>
> g. The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently;
>
> h. The functions and responsibilities of the SANDF shall be determined by the Constitution and the Defence Act;
>
> I. The SANDF shall be subordinate and fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive;
>
> j. The SANDF shall operate strictly within the parameters of the Constitution, international humanitarian law and domestic legislation;
>
> k. Defence policy and military activities shall be sufficiently transparent to ensure meaningful parliamentary scrutiny and public debate;
>
> l. The SANDF shall not further or prejudice party-political interests;
>
> m. The SANDF shall develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture;
>
> n The SANDF shall respect the right and dignity of its members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training" (8)

In concrete terms these principles have translated themselves into a vigorous and largely effective restructuring of the national defence

function which has been reflected in the demographic transformation of the institution, the creation of a Ministry of Defence, Parliamentary Committees on Defence, the Defence Secretariat and the largely successful completion of the military integration process (the latter including the integration of eight formerly warring armies and militias into a single, cohesive national defence force).

A number of examples can be used to illustrate the extent to which the South African Ministry of Defence have striven to ensure that the management of the national defence function was consistent with the government's new approach to security:

a. The South African Defence Review process best illustrated the extent to which defence could be managed in a manner consistent with human security needs. Conducted between 1995 – 1998 it included hundreds of consultations with a wide range of NGOs, business, academia, other government departments, rural and urban communities and specialist groupings. It was jointly driven by both the Joint Standing Parliamentary Committee on Defence and the Ministry of Defence and was widely acclaimed as the most transparent approach to defence policy formulation yet effected in the 20th century.

b. The defence budget saw drastic reductions from pre-1990 levels of spending (during the mid 1980s it consumed almost 20% of the annual state budget) to present levels where it hovers in the 5% region.

c The SANDF is increasingly shifting away from the traditional approach to defence which is predicated on "preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty" towards what the current Ministry of Defence refers to as "human security peace-keeping" where soldiers play both a peace-keeping role coupled to a more pro-active role in peace-building activities in their areas of operation.

Yet real challenges face the institutionalisation of a more human security centred approach within the corporate culture of the SANDF than policy pronouncements would have us believe. These include the following:

a The violent history from which South Africa has emerged has brought with it the "historical baggage" - a culture of aggression within the mentality of the members of the armed forces - that is not easily amenable to strategies of non-violent military deployment and their involvement in peace building operations.

b The recent arms purchases (submarines, frigates, helicopters, fighter aircraft and fighter aircraft trainers) have unsettled a number of South Africa's neighbours and constitutes weaponry hardly suitable for the SANDF's involvement in peace-keeping and peace-building projects!

Transformation of the national intelligence community: 1994 - 2002

The definition of the roles and tasks of the intelligence community provided in the White Paper on Intelligence (1994) indicated the extent to which intelligence had moved from a closed, secretive and unaccountable culture towards a culture that was supportive of democracy. The mission of the intelligence community was defined as being:

* Safeguarding the Constitution;

* The upholding of individual rights enunciated in the chapter on Fundamental Rights (the Bill of Rights) contained in the Constitution;

* The promotion of the inter-related elements of security, stability, co-operation and development both within South Africa and in relation to southern Africa;

* The achievement of national prosperity whilst making an active contribution to global peace and other globally defined priorities for well-being of humankind; and

* The promotion of South Africa's ability to face foreign threats and to enhance its competitiveness in a dynamic world.[9]

To ensure that the conduct and management proceeded in such a manner that was consistent with both the broader human security agenda and the features of the new South African democracy, the White Paper provided the following principles:

* Principle of an integrated national intelligence capability;

* Principle of departmental intelligence capabilities;

* Principle of political neutrality;

* Principle of legislative sanction, accountability and parliamentary control;

* Principle of the balance between secrecy and transparency;

* Principle of the separation of intelligence from policy-making;

* Principle of effective management, organisation and administration;

* Principle of an ethical code of conduct to govern performance and activities of individual members of the intelligence services [10]

The White Paper also states that one of the key roles of the intelligence community is to contribute to the creation of an environment within which human security can flourish. Consequently these principles have been reflected in the restructuring of the intelligence community, the creation of

the Ministry of Intelligence, the creation of the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Intelligence and the creation of the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee.

ENSURING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY : ACTING AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The extent to which the management of the national security function has changed and has increasingly aligned itself with broader aspects of international principles that tend to underpin the values of the human security paradigm is evident if one considers the range of protocols, international agreements and organisations which South Africa has either joined and/or been signatory to since 1994. Membership of international organisations includes the following:

a. Reinstatement of full membership status in the United Nations;

b. Admission as member of the Conference on Disarmament;

c. Readmission into the Commonwealth of Nations;

d. Admission into the Non-Aligned Movement and current chair (2001 - 2003).

e. Admission as member of the Organisation of African Unity and current chair of the African Union;

f. Founding member of the New Partnership for African Development;

g. Admission as member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

South Africa is also been signatory to the following arms control and disarmament protocols and agreements:

a. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol);

b. Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention);

c. Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War;

d. Antarctic Treaty;

e. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty);

f. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty);

g. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

h. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty);

i. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction;

j. Protocol 1 Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol 2 Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts;

k. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;

l. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects;

m. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction;

n. African Nuclear-Weapons- Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba);

o. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; and

p. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction.

AVOIDING THE CREATION OF A HUMAN SECURITY "GHETTO" INTEGRATING THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESSES WITH NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL POLICY PROCESSES : 1994 - 2002

One of the key criticisms of the South African government's policies – gender affirmation for example – has been the tendency to place critical issues under the ambit of different "silos" – be these government departments, commissions or government-civil society partnerships. To avoid this tendency and to ensure that human security issues in general and key governmental policies in general flow through one another and into the communities, which a government serves, a new approach to policy formulation and management has been adopted.

A high level of interaction and integration exists between the activities of the national security community and the diverse national security policy processes and the ruling party, parliament and government. This is markedly different from the pre-1990 period where parliament's role in the management of the national security function was largely marginalised, where the policy capabilities of civilian government departments were under-developed and where a strong tradition of departmental autonomy prevailed.

The tasking of the armed forces if and when they are required to be employed either within or without the territory of South Africa and the co-ordination of security and defence policies and activities within the broader sphere of government policy and business are accomplished, at a ministerial level, via the six new Sectoral Clusters that are co-coordinated by the Cabinet Secretariat within the OP. These clusters consist of Governance, Economy and Employment, Peace and Stability, International Relations and Defence, and Social.

The security community interacts mainly with two of these clusters - the International Relations and Defence Cluster (where defence plays a supportive role to government's diverse foreign policy initiatives) and the Peace and Stability Cluster (where defence plays a supportive role to the internal efforts aimed at securing peace and stability within South Africa - most notably its role in supporting the SAP). This level provides the political and policy guidance and integration for the activities of the security community in these arenas. The staff working for the Ministerial clusters are overseen by Committee of Director Generals, which is comprised of the relevant departmental heads. The various security departments also interact with the Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services located in the Office of the President.

FUTURE CHALLENGES FACING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.

Notwithstanding progress recorded in redefining South Africa's national interests, human security, national security policy, the restructuring of the security community and the institution of appropriate forms of oversight and accountability, a range of challenges still confront this sector. Critical in this regard are the following issues:

a. To formulate an appropriate national security strategy/policy (which should ideally be renamed a "peace and stability strategy" to escape the nomenclature of the Cold War Period) that gives full expression to the following:

i An integration of the policy pronouncements contained within government's broader national policy documents (particularly those pertaining to the human security arena) and those contained in the policies of the national security community.

ii An integration of the national security strategy/policy (once formulated) into the national policy processes of government as encapsulated by the current cluster system.

b To formalise the status of the National Security Council formed in 2000 through appropriate staffing measures, statutory recognition and a definition of its roles and tasks in a public and transparent manner.

c To investigate the institution of a co-ordinated national system of security management at a local level that will integrate civic, civilian and security activities in order to attain conditions of peace and stability within these local communities.

ESTABLISHING "BEST PRACTICE": LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

South Africa has made considerable strides in incorporating the key elements of human security into its policies and, to a certain extent, its implementation of these policies (as evidenced by its recent announcement of massive public works programmes and projects to alleviate poverty and unemployment). Notwithstanding these developments, however, the practical implementation of human security programmes in the security arena – an arena beset with mistrust, adversarial memories and traditional practices – has encountered innumerable problems (some of which were referred to in the management of the national defence function referred to above).

South Africa's intervention in Lesotho in 1998 (an intervention requested by the Lesotho Government and mandated by the SADC and hence not typically a UN Chapter Six operation) was beset by initial abuses in which SANDF forces, confronted by a belligerent and startled Royal Lesotho Defence Force, encountered levels of resistance which faulty intelligence had not prepared them for. The national intelligence portfolio, although now focusing a substantial amount of its efforts on analysing threats to the country of a "non-traditional" nature (diseases, pandemics, crime, socio-economic deprivation, improvisation of service-delivery and the development of an early warning capability) still carries, in many respects,

the "baggage" of the Cold War intelligence tradition (over-emphasis on and misuse of the counter-intelligence component for instance).

The national policing function, which has sought to integrate policing into the national developmental and governance framework, has also suffered from the legacy of integrating fourteen police forces (those of the liberation movements, the former government and the former Bantustans) into a national force capable of providing effective community policing for all at a grass roots level. For the human security agenda to be accomplished it is imperative that two inter-related sets of issues be identified. The first relates to the "clusters" which such strategies should address and the second refers to the policy "lessons learned" which should guide such interventions in the future.

In essence four major transformation "clusters" can be determined within the management of any transformation process and all of these are applicable to the human security paradigm:

a. **Cultural transformation**. This entails the transformation of the culture of the institution in question, the leadership, management and administrative ethos of the institution and the traditions upon which the institution is predicated. It also entails the transformation of the value system upon which the institution is based.

b. **Human transformation**. This entails the transformation of the composition of the institution with regard to its racial, ethnic, regional, gender composition and its human resource practices. Human security is all encompassing and requires, as such, the "buy-in" of all stakeholders.

c. **Political transformation.** This process strives to ensure that the conduct and character of the institution in question conforms to the political features of the democracy within which it is located - acknowledgement of the principle of civil supremacy, institution of appropriate mechanisms of oversight and control, adherence to the principles and practices of accountability and transparency, a shift from state-centred security to collaborative security management.

d. **Organisational transformation.** This constitutes a more technocratic process within which the organisation in question is right-sized, its management practices and its diverse organisational processes made more cost-effective, its ability to provide services rendered more efficient, and its ability to respond to human rather than rigid organisational and managerial needs is effected.

Wide-ranging transformation processes of the type referred to above are immensely difficult to accomplish in their entirety as the transformation of the Lesotho, Sierra Leone and, partially, the South African security sectors have demonstrated. Shifting priorities, resource limitations, skills deficits, weak leadership and the sheer novelty of the transformational terrain may

bedevil such initiatives. The restructuring of the security sector of many African countries, particularly those that have emerged from either an authoritarian or violent past, demands, however, a visionary and integrated transformational strategy capable of ensuring that the country's security institutions do not regress into previous behavioural patterns.

There are key lessons to be learned from South Africa's experiences in this regard and that South Africans are still in the process of learning themselves:

a It is vital to distinguish between good policy and good intentions. As stated above policy has to be realistic, requires rational times frames and an appropriate consideration of resources. Human security strategies need to be costed and should be allocated to the appropriate role-players – be these government, the private sector, international donors of civil society.

b **Distinguish between vision and policy.** Policy is what government's "do", not say they are "going to do". Human Security visions too often succumb to the level of rhetorical utterance rather than concrete practice.

c Be realistic about objectives. If the different actors involved in the creation of a climate conducive to human security do not possess the capacity, in the short to medium term, to implement human security strategies, they should adopt an incremental approach to creation and management of grass-roots projects.

d Ensure that a wide-range of actors are involved in the formulation and implementation of human security projects. Although the state may continue to be the key interlocutor and facilitator in this process other actors are critical in this governance process – civil society and political society for example.

e Ensure that both the strategies and projects relating to the implementation of human security strategies are sufficiently focused to allow for meaningful implementation. The problem with many human security strategies, and this applies to many interventions made by donors in diverse parts of Africa, is that they are too wide to allow for meaningful policy formulation and, even more critically, meaningful policy implementation.

f The state continues to be a key actor in the human security agenda – bar those countries where the state has ceased to exist or only functions on a nominal and symbolic basis resulting in situations where civil society begins to adopt its functions (Somalia, Sierra Leone and Liberia for example). Some pundits of the human security agenda tend to marginalise or even eliminate the role of the state in this equation (a product, no doubt, of the mistrust with which both the public and civil society have viewed autocratic, state centred institutions).

Although considerable debate, increasingly at a practical level, has begun to suffuse theories of human security it is evident that more policy-oriented thinking needs to be injected into this ongoing discourse. It will, ultimately, only be at the implementation level where human security , so essential to the conditions of peace, stability and personal development, will be attained.

FOOTNOTES

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5.) White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, Ministry of the RDP, Pretoria, 1994, page 6.

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7.) Department of Defence, 1998. The Defence Review and the Defence White *Paper*. Pretoria 1998, page 3.

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10) ibid